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By 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the diplomatic career 
of Thomas Cleland Dawson in an attempt to ascertain what influence, if any, he had 
in shaping the Latin American policy of the United States during the Roosevelt 
and Taft Administrations. When Dawson entered the diplomatic service in 1897, at 
the age of 32, his appointment as secretary to the United States Legation in Bra-
zil, came as the result of political patronage. However, what was probably con-
sidered originally to be a temporary position led to a distinguished diplomatic 
career. Following the Brazilian assignment, the posts that he held progressively 
grew in importance, until he was ultimately one of the chief advisers on Latin 
American affairs in the State Department. In addition to the secretaryship at 
the Legation in Brazil, his assignments included the following: Minister Resident 
and Consul-General in the Dominican Republic, 1904-1907; Minister to Colombia, 
1907-1909; Minister to Chile, 1909; Chief of the Latin American Division and Resi-
dent Diplomatic Officer in the State Department, 1909-1910; Minister to Panama, 
1910; Special Commissioner to Nicaragua, 1910; Peace Commissioner to Honduras, 
1911; Ambassador to the Venezuelan Centennial celebration, 1911; and Resident 
Diplomatic Officer in the State Department, 1911-12. 
There is no indication that Dawson significantly disagreed with the poli-
cies which Washington pursued during the years he was in the diplomatic service. 
Although his influence on the formulation of policy was confined largely to ad-
vising on certain specific aspects of implementation, rather than in devising 
new policies, he had a considerable impact on the Caribbean policy of the United 
' States by skillfully negotiating the agreements implementing the policy of dollar 
diplomacy. Perhaps his most significant contribution was assisting in negotiat-
ing the establishment of the customs receivership in the Dominican Republic. 
1 
p 
2 
Both in his dealings with Latin Americans and in his two volume history 
of South America published in 1903-04, Dawson demonstrated a genuine liking and 
sympathy for the peoples of Hispanic America. While this favorable disposition 
might appear to be contradicted by his acceptance of the policies of the State 
Department and his role in implementing these policies, such a contradiction is 
more apparent than real. Dawson considered the extension of United States com-
merce and protection of.legitimate financial investments of United States citi-
zens as completely justified. Regarding interference in the affairs of the Carib-
bean area, he believed that political stability in the region was contingent upon 
the economic stability and prosperity of the various countries. Since this area 
was a special sphere of United States influence, Dawson concluded that it was 
the United States' place to offer a helping hand. Furthermore, United States 
interference in the region appeared to produce some beneficial results for these 
countries. 
Dawson's most glaring deficiency was his inability to recognize and under-
stand the depth and sincerity of the opposition to United States interference 
which was present in the various Latin American countries. Where the United 
States could bring pressure to bear on a government, this disregard of popular 
opposition made little difference in achieving policy objectives. Where such 
pressure could not be exerted effectively, the failure to account for the opposi-
tion could result in failure of the policy. In either case, increased anti-
Yankee sentiment was likely. 
Dawson's death, on May 1, 1912, not only ended a distinguished diplomatic 
career which very possibly may have continued to grow in importance, but it also 
removed a strong advocate of the policy of dollar diplomacy. 
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PREFACE 
Much has been written on the Latin American policy 
of the United States during the first decade of this century. 
In view of their responsibility in shaping United States 
foreign policy, the roles of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt 
and William H. Taft, and their respective secretaries of 
state have received major attention in the study of United 
States-Latin American relations during this period. Indeed, 
this has been the case in the monographic literature and in 
the biographies of these men. 1 These men, however, necessarily 
had to depend on the staff of the Department of State and 
the diplomatic officers of the United States who were stationed 
in the various Latin American capitals for. information and 
advice upon which to formulate and implement policy. It is 
the purpose of this dissertation to investigate the diplomatic 
career of one of these men, Thomas Cleland Dawson, in an 
attempt to ascertain what influence, if any, he had in 
1Tyler Dennet, John Hay: From Poetry to Politics (New 
York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1934). Philip c. Jessup, Elihu Root 
(2 vols.; New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1938). Henry Pringle, 
Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography (New York: Frarrar and Rinehart, 
Inc., 1931). Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William 
Howard Taft (2 vols.; New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1939). 
James Brown Scott, Robert Bacon Life and Letters (London: William 
Heineman Ltd., 1924 • 
iii 
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shaping the Latin American policy of the United States during 
th.e Roosevelt and Taft Administrations. 
Thomas c. Dawson's diplomatic career in Latin America 
and the State Department", from the time he arrived at his 
first post in January, 1898, until his death on May 1, 1912, 
stretched over a period of a little more than fourteen years. 
His importance, however, is not to be found merely in the 
length of his service, but rather in the importance of his 
assignments. This is clearly demonstrated by a very brief 
review of his career in the foreign service and the State 
Department. Until 1904, he served in the relatively insig-
nificant post of Secretary of the United States Legation in 
Brazil. In April of that year, he was assigned to the newly 
created post of Resident Minister and Consul General in the 
turbulent Dominican Republic. In the next three years he 
would help to neg'otiate and implement a customs receiver-
ship in that Caribbean republic. Following his term in 
Santo Domingo City, Dawson served as United States Minister 
to Colombia, where relations with the United States had not 
yet recovered from the Panamanian revolution of 1903. In 
1909, he was sent as Minister to Chile. There he briefly 
handled the negotiations concerning the settlement of the 
Alsop claim. By late 1909, he was called back to Washington 
to serve in the State Department as the Cheif of the newly 
created Division of Latin American Affairs. His next assign-
ment was Minister to Panama. He was in Panama City less than 
iv 
a month when he was ordered to Nicaragua to negotiate a 
settlement with the new provisional Government of that 
country. In early 1911, he was again in Central America; 
this time he had been instructed to attempt to restore peace 
in Honduras. Completing his Honduran mission, he returned 
to Washington where he remained as Resident Diplomatic 
Officer in the State Department until his death in 1912. 
In determining the extent of Dawson's influence on 
the Roosevelt and Taft Administrations, it is necessary to 
investigate his attitudes toward the Latin American nations, 
their politicians and people, in order to see how his atti-
tudes differed from or were similar to those prevailing in 
the State Department. In this regard, Dawson seems to stand 
in contrast to some of his superiors. The Secretaries of 
State under whom he served, with the exception of Elihu Root, 
did not exhibit either much sympathy or unaerstanding towards 
the Latin Americans. 2 Dawson, however, became a student of 
the Latin American nations and produced a sympathetic study 
of the historical development of the South American countries. 
Finally, an effort will be made, where possible, to ascertain 
the attitude of the Latin Americans themselves towards Dawson 
and his work. 
Since Dawson played a prominent role in United States-
Latin American affairs, he naturally receives some mention in 
2Jessup, ~· cit., I, 468-69. Dana G. Munro, Intervention 
and Dollar Di lomac in the Caribbean 1900-1921 (Princeton, New 
.,.-~~~~-.-~ ........ ~~----~---~~~~~-------~~~-Jersey: Princeton University Press, 964 , pp. 160-61. 
v 
most works which cover United States diplomacy in Latin 
.America for the period 1898-1912. Most frequently his name 
appears in reference to his work in the Dominican Republic 
and Central America. Of those historians who touch upon 
Dawson's career, only Dana G. Munro in Intervention and Dollar 
Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921 makes any attempt to 
indicate his influence or his attitudes. 3 Here as elsewhere, 
only a small fraction of Dawson's career is treated. 
In discussing works which treat Dawson's career, two 
others should be noted. John E. Briggs, in an article entitled 
"Iowa and the Diplomatic Service," devotes a few pages to out-
lining Dawson's assignments in the diplomatic service. 4 
Calvin J. Billman in his doctoral dissertation, "Backgrounds 
and Policies of Selected United States Diplomats to Latin 
5 America, 1898-1938," expends four pages on Dawson. There is 
no indication of the use of any archival sources in this 
section, although mention is made of the Papers Relating to 
the Foreign Relations of the United States for 1904 and 1906. 
On the basis of this rather cursory research Billman concludes 
that Dawson was a hinderance to the improvement of United 
States-Latin American relations. 6 This present study shall 
differ from the above mentioned works in that it will 
3M •t . unro, ~· ~·, passim. 
4Iowa Journal of History and Politics, XIX (July, 1921), 
360-64. 
5
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University, 
1955, pp. 207-211. 
6Ibid., p. 211. 
vi 
concentrate on Dawson as the focus of attention while still 
attempting to keep him and his work in proper historical per-
spective. Furthermore, whenever possible manuscript and 
archival collections have been used. 
As in all works of this nature, the author has become 
indebted to numerous individuals in the course of his research 
and writing. Above all he wishes to express his profound 
gratitude to his adviser, Dr. Joseph A. Gagliano of the History 
Department, Loyola University, who not only introduced him 
to the importance of Dawson's diplomatic career, but also 
patiently offered advice, constructive criticism and encourage-
ment as the research and writing progressed. The author is 
also indebted for the helpful advice and criticism given by 
Dr. Ralph E. Minger and the Reverend Charles E. Ronan, s. J., 
both of the History Department of Loyola University, who read 
and criticised the manuscript. The conclusions reached in 
this dissertation and any faults that may still be present, 
however, remain the author's responsibility. In the mechanics 
of searching out documents, the author was greatly assisted 
by the staffs of the National Archives, the Manuscript 
Division of the Library of Congress, the Special Collections 
Department of the Deering Library, Northwestern University, 
and the E.M. Cudahy Memorial Library, Loyola University. A 
special thanks is to be extended to Messrs. Karl Grisso, Ref-
erence Librarian of the Hanover College Library, Robert w. 
McClew, Registrar of Hanover College, and Harley P. Holden, 
vii 
Assistant in the Harvard University Archives, for forwarding 
materials relating to Dawson in the Hanover College Library 
and Archives and the Harvard University Archives respectively. 
Finally, the author wishes to express his gratitude to the 
Arthur J. Schmitt Foundation whose generosity enabled him to 
devote a full year to the research and writing of this dis-
sertation. 
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· CHAPTER I 
I 
FORMATIVE YEARS: 1865-1897 
When Thomas Cleland Dawson was born on July 30, 1865, 
his parents were residing in the small northern Wisconsin 
town of Hudson, located on the Mississippi River. On both 
sides of his family, he was of Scotish ancestery. His father, 
Allan Dawson, was a native of county Clackmannan, Scotland. 1 
The elder Dawson had come to the United States with his 
parents twenty years earlier and had worked on his father's 
farm prior to moving to Milwaukee in order to study law. 
After being admitted to the bar, he had gained some prominence 
in his chosen profession. 2 The family of Anna Cleland Dawson, 
Thomas' mother, were descendants of Scotisli immigrants who 
had settled in northern Ireland around 1610. 3 
1The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography Being 
the History of the United States: As Illustrated in the Lives 
of the Founders, Builders, and Defenders of the Republic, and 
of the Men and Women Who are Doing the Work and Moulding the 
Thought of the Present, hereafter cited as The National Cyclo-
paedia of American Biography, Vol. XIII {New York: James T. 
White and Company, 1906-), p. 512. 
2a. F. Gue and Benjamine F. Shambaugh, Biographies and 
Portraits of the Progressive Men of Iowa Leaders in Business, 
Politics and the Professions, Vol. II: A Western Commonwealth 
(Des Moines: Conaway and Shaw, Publishers, 1899), p. 103. 
3The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Vol. 
XIII, p. 512. 
1 
2 
Although a native of Wisconsin, Thomas c. Dawson would 
not spend much of his life there. Within three years of his 
birth, his father died. Apparently, Anna Dawson remained in 
Hudson for a few years with her two.sons--Allan, Thomas' 
younger brother, had been born on October 7, 1866. 4 Whatever 
the duration of his residence in the Badger State, it would 
seem that while there the young Dawson did receive a brief 
introduction to formal education. Shortly, however, Mrs. 
Dawson moved with her sons to the small settlement of Enter-
prise, in Volusia County, Florida. Owing to the paucity of 
schools in their new location, the remainder of his elementary 
education was left to his mother's instruction. 5 
In 1878, at the age of thirteen, Thomas was enrolled 
in the senior preparatory program of Hanover College, a small 
institution of higher learning located not" far from the city 
of Madison in southeastern Indiana. After completing this 
final year of the preparatory program, which provided for 
instruction in algebra, geometry, English grammar, Latin 
(Vergil's Aeneid, Cicero's Orations, and prose compositions), 
geography, and physiology, he progressed to the Freshman year 
4who Was Who in America: A Com anion Volume to Who's 
Who in America, Vol. I, 1897- 942 Chicago: The A. N. Marquis 
Co. , 19 4 3) , p • 3 0 5 • 
5The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Vol. 
XIII, p. 512. Gue and Shambaugh, £E.· cit., II, 102. 
6 
of the College program. 
3 
The curriculum of the College at that time was divided 
into two basic courses, the classic and scientific, which 
differed little from one another. Pursuing the classics course, 
Dawson received an education which the college administration 
described as directed "to develop and discipline the mind, and 
to furnish that mental and moral outfit, which will best pre-
pare men and women to take up their special work in life. 117 
In fact, the College provided a rather broad liberal education. 
There was, as one might suspect, a heavy stress on the classics. 
However, courses in English, German, mathematics, physical 
science, history, geography, political science and "mental 
sciences"--psychology and philosophy--were required. 8 
In addition, a significant portion of the curriculum 
·was directed towards inculcating the students with religious 
and moral principles. Although the pamphlet describing the 
course of instruction at Hanover for the year 1880-81 main-
6 . 
Robert w. McClew, Registrar, Hanover College, letter 
to the author, September 30, 1969. 
For the information regarding Dawson's matriculation 
at Hanover College and for the description of the College's 
curriculum at the time Dawson enrolled, I am indebted to Mr. 
Karl Grisso the reference librarian at the College, Mr. Robert 
w. McClew the Registrar, and Professor Bowers the Custodian 
of the College's Archives. These gentlemen kindly forwarded 
to me copies of the material concerning Dawson presently in 
the Archives and Library of the College. 
7circular of Hanover College, 1880, p. 18. 
81bid., pp. 18-19. 
4 
tained that the College was "a Christian, though not a sectarian 
institution of learning, 119 it would seem that it was closely 
. 10 
affiliated with the Presbyterian Church. Sunday mornings 
were devoted to classroom study of the Bible and attendance 
in chapel was required in the afternoon. Additional religious 
instruction was provided throughout the week. 11 
Dawson was to have graduated with the class of 1883. 
However, during the winter term of his junior year, he had a 
disagreement with no less a personage than the president of 
' 
the College. The outcome of this dispute led him to withdraw 
from the school and to return to his home in Florida. The 
/ ' incident evidently became something of a cause celebre. 
Dawson's side of the story received prominence in the college 
newspaper, The Hanoverian. In the course of the winter term, 
as a result of illness, he had asked for, ~d had received, 
a four week extension of the deadline for his class essay. 
However, after two weeks had passed, Dr. Fisher, the President 
of the College, informed him that in view of the approaching 
end of the term the essay must be submitted immediately or a 
zero would be given for the assignment. This in turn would 
lower Dawson's grade in Constitutional Law by two per cent. 
9Ibid. 
lOThe tenth edition of American Universities and 
Colleges lists Hanover as being affiliated with the united 
Presbyterian Church. Otis A. Singletary and Jane P. Newman 
(eds.), American Universities and Colleges (10th edition; 
Washington, D. c.: American Council on Education, 1968), p. 457. 
11
circular of Hanover College, 1880, p. 18. 
5 
Dawson, in what was perhaps an outburst of adolescent self.-
righteousness, did not fail to inform the President that he 
considered this treatment unfair, especially since he had 
originally been given four weeks grace and had, in fact, been 
ill during the past two weeks. Furthermore, he made it known 
that if he could not receive justice at Hanover, he would go 
where he could obtain it. 12 
While the transcripts of Dawson's grades at Hanover 
appear to be no longer extant, he apparently had a more than 
credible record. 13 The editors of the college journal, The 
Hanoverian, noted in May, 1882, that given "a fair show," 
Dawson would "carry off class honors wherever he goes." More-
over, he enjoyed considerable popularity among his peers. The 
same editors reported that "Tom had more friends, perhaps, 
than any student 'in the College." His popularity is further 
attested to by the support given on his behalf in the argument 
with President Fisher by The Hanoverian and the editors' 
12The Hanoverian, II (May, 1882), 177. In spite of 
the fact that Dawson withdrew from Hanover in 1882, the College 
still awarded him a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1886. It would 
appear that Dawson was neither registered nor attended Hanover 
in the academic year 1885-86. Robert w. McClew, Registrar, 
Hanover College, letters to the author, September 30, 1969, 
and October 9, 1969. 
13Mr. Robert w. McClew, Registrar of the College states 
that at the time of Dawson's attendance "no one took very 
serious the filing or completion of student's personal records." 
Robert W. McClew, letter to the author, September 30, 1969. 
6 
subsequent refusal to withdraw their criticism of the President's 
handling of the matter. 14 
Returning to Enterprise, he joined with his brother 
Allan in publishing a weekly country newspaper called the 
Enterprise Herald. 15 As a result of this undertaking he was 
able, after two years, to accumulate enough money to return to 
16 
college. At the time of his withdrawal from Hanover, he 
may have considered completing his college career at Yale. 17 
In the end, however, he chose Harvard. 
On October 21, 1884, Dawson was admitted as a sophomore 
in the Harvard class of 1887. 18 While at Cambridge, he lived 
alone in room 70 of College Hall. 19 At the end of the year, 
he again withdrew from college. It is difficult to determine 
14The Hanoverian, II (May, 1882), 177. Hanover Col-
. lege Triangle, May 9, 1912, pp. 1, 4. 
15The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, 
Vol. XIII, p. 512. 
16Gue and Shambaugh, ~· cit., II, 102. 
17The Hanoverian, II (May, 1882), 177. 
18
c1ass of 1887, Record of T. C. Dawson, Harvard Uni-
versity Archives, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
For Dawson's transcript of grades, attendance record 
while at Harvard, and other materials regarding him in the 
Harvard University Archives, I am indebted to Mr. Harley P. 
Holden, Assistant in the Harvard University Archives, who kind-
ly sent xerox copies of these documents. 
19
aarvard University, College Directory 1884-85: A 
Full List of the Names and Addresses of the Students of Har-
vard university (Cambridge, Massachusetts: n.p., 1884), p. 28. 
The Directory incorrectly lists Dawson as a member of 
the freshman class. This book is to be found in the Library 
of Congress, Washington, D. c. 
7 
the primary motive for his action. In part, it was perhaps 
th t · d" · f h" f" 20 · h b e s rigent con ition o is inances. or, it may ave een 
academic. His transcripts and attendance records indicate 
i 
that he was an adequate if not spectacular student. While his 
grade average for the year was 84, he, nevertheless, had what 
would seem to have been a rather extensive absence and tardy 
record. 21 Furthermore, it would seem unlikely that his back-
ground would have enabled him to fit well into the Harvard 
social milieu. 
The termination of Dawson's studies at Harvard did 
not mark the end of his formal academic career. On October 15, 
1885, he enrolled as a member of the senior class of the 
C. . . S h 1 c· . t" Oh" 22 incinnati Law c oo , incinna i, io. At the time of 
Dawson's matriculation, the Law School provided two years of 
instruction, the junior and senior years, culminating in the 
awarding of the degree of bachelor of laws. Applicants for 
admission to the senior class, who had not taken the junior 
year at the college, were required to pass an examination 
covering the courses of the junior year and to present either 
20 Gue and Shambaugh, ~· cit., II, 102. 
21
c1ass of 1887, Record of T. c. Dawson and Record of 
Absences from and tardiness at recitations and lectures, 1884-
1885, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
22
while studying at the Law School Dawson resided at 
280 Race Street, Cincinnati, Ohio. William's Cincinnati Direc-
tof¥ Embracing a Full Alphabetical Record of the Names of the In-
habitants of Cincinnati, A Business Directory, Street Directory, 
Munici al Record, united States Post Office Director , Etc. 
Cincinnati: Cincinnati Directory O fice, 1886 , p. 341. 
8 
a certificate of attendance at another law school or a letter 
from an attorney stating that the applicant had studied law 
.· 23 for a year under his guidance. Since there is no evidence 
that oawson ever studied law either in college or in a law 
office prior to his arrival in Cincinnati, it seems likely 
that these rules were applied rather flexibly. It is possible, 
however, that this deficiency was made up later. While in 
Cincinnati, he worked in the law offices of Thornton M. Hinkle, 
a prominent Cincinnati lawyer. 24 
Apparently any deficiencies were easily made up, for 
Dawson graduated on schedule with his class in June, 1886. 
While the Law School's records for this period do not seem to 
25 be extant, nevertheless, he did display some degree of 
23catalogue of the Officers and Students of the Law 
School of the Cincinnati College for the Fifty-Fourth 
Academical Year, 1886-1887 with a Statement of the Course 
of Instruction (Cincinnati: n.p., 1887), pp. 14-15. [Here-
after cited as Catalogue of the Law School 1886-1887.] 
24Thornton M. Hinkle to John Sherman, January 29, 1897. 
Thomas C. Dawson's Application and Reconnnendation File. 
Files of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National 
Archives, Washington, D. c. [Hereafter cited as Dawson's 
Application and Recommendation File.] 
25This statement is based upon replies made to inquiries 
to the Office of the Dean, College of Law, University of Cincin-
nati and to the Director of the Archives of the University of 
Cincinnati. Letter of the author to the Office of the Registrar, 
College of Law, University of Cincinnati, August 28, 1969. 
Samuel s. Wilson, Acting Dean, College of Law, University of 
Cincinnati, letter to the author, September 3, 1969. Letter 
of the author to Samuel s. Wilson, September 9, 1969. Samuel 
S. Wilson, letter to the author, September 13, 1969. Letter 
of.the author to Peter R. Thoms, University Legal Officer, 
University of Cincinnati, September 19, 1969. Peter R. Thoms, 
brilliance as is indicated by the fact that he was awarded a 
$75 prize for the best essay on a designated topic for the 
class of 1886. 26 
Following his graduation from the Law School, Dawson 
headed for Iowa, arriving at Des Moines on his twenty first 
birthday, July 30, 1886. It is again difficult to determine 
9 
exactly what prompted him to make this move. In part, it was 
perhaps the belief that opportunities would be more abundant 
in Iowa. There is also the likelihood that family connections 
helped to determine his action. In 1884, a cousin of his, 
J.C. Hurne, had settled in the Iowa capital. Upon arriving in 
Des Moines, Dawson joined with Hurne to form a law partnership, 
which was to last until the end of 1889. In January, 1890, 
the law partnership having been dissolved, Dawson turned his 
attention to journalism. He took a position on the Iowa State 
Register as legislative reporter, but quickly advanced to 
assistant city editor and finally in August, 1890, to the 
position of city editor. 27 
letter to the author, October 28, 1969. 
The Register of the Department of State, September 20, 
1911 (Washington, D. c.: Government Printing Office, 1911), p. 63, 
states that Dawson received an M.A. degree from the Cincinnati 
Law School in 1898. From the information received in the above 
mentioned replies and from a search of various lists of the 
graduates of the Law School (Law Dept. of the University of 
Cincinnati, A List of Graduates of the Cincinnati Law Department 
of the University of Cincinnati From the Time of its Establish-
ment 1833 to 1904 [n.p., n.d.}), it would seem that this state-
ment is incorrect. 
26
catalogue of the Law School 1886-1887, pp. 18, 20. 
27 Gue and Shambaugh, ~· cit., II, 102. 
10 
Evidently the three years of practicing law in Des· Moines 
and the time spent working on the Register opened new oppor-
tunities for Dawson: opportunities which could lead to political 
I 
office. In the winter of 1890, he served as clerk of the 
Appropriations Committee of the Iowa House of Representatives. 28 
In February, 1891, he resigned his position with the newspaper 
and moved to Council Bluffs in order to form a law partner-
ship with John Y. Stone of that city, who was then Attorney 
General of Iowa. At the same time, Dawson became Assistant 
to the Attorney General, a position which was apparently 
appointive and which he held until the expiration of Stone's 
term in office in 1895. 29 
The period of four years during which he served as 
assistant to the Attorney General gave him adequate means to 
gain a degree of prominence in state politics and in the 
Republican Party organization. By 1893, he had risen to the 
chairmanship of the Party's central committee in Pottawattamie 
County (Council Bluffs), a position he held until 1897. 
28 A. J. Chentry to A. L. Hager, January 25, 1897, 
Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. 
29Gue and Shambaugh, ~· cit., II, 102. Dawson to 
Bacon, July 23, 1906, Despatches from United States Consuls in 
Santo Domingo 1837-1906, National Archives Microfilm Publica-
tions, Microcopy No. T.-56 (Washington, D. c.: National Archives, 
1962), vol. 19, roll 19. 
Gue and Shambaugh and the other biographical works cited 
above incorrectly refer to Dawson's position as Assistant 
Attorney General. In his letter to Bacon on July 23, 1906, 
Dawson explicitly states that he "was.for four years Assistant 
to the Attorney General of Iowa." 
11 
Popularity among fellow Republicans was not, however, confined 
to the environs of Council Bluffs, but spread throughout the 
state. 30 Undoubtedly Dawson's part in prosecuting various 
cases against the railroads and his appointment as special 
commissioner for Iowa in that State's boundary dispute with 
Nebraska, added to his reputation. Furthennore, the law finn 
f St d . d 1 d t' 31 o one an Dawson en)oye a arge an prosperous prac ice. 
Dawson's efforts on behalf of the success of the Repub-
lican Party in Pottawattami county bore fruit. During the 
three years of his leadership the control of the county govern-
t . h h d f th ubl' 32 p h h men came into t e an s o e Rep icans. er aps, ow-
ever, the most difficult task confronting the young Republican 
leader was to deliver his county for McKinley in the 1896 
Presidential election. The Presidential campaign in Iowa 
was not easy for the Republican Party. Nor was the outcome a 
certainty until the end. Many of the Iowa fanners were lured 
to the Democratic candidate, William Jennings Bryan, by his 
stand on the free coinage of silver. The chainnan of the 
state central committee_reported that "in many counties the 
30H. w. Byers, Speaker of the Iowa State House of 
Representatives, 26th General Assembly, to the Iowa Delegation 
in Congress, January 19, 1897, Dawson's Application and Recom-
mendation File. 
31Gue and Shambaugh, ~· cit., II, 102-103. 
32J. D. Edmunds, President, The Citizens State Bank, 
Council Bluffs to A. L. Hager, January 3, 1897; M. McDonald, 
Iowa State Representative 35th District, to Members of the 
Iowa Delegation in Congress, February 5, 1897; et passim, 
Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. 
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free silver craze had taken the form of an epidemic. 1133 
However,, the Republican party organization was well developed 
within the state and with a concerted effort34 by party officials 
and workers, Iowa was kept in the Republican column in the 
November election. In Pottawattami County, the Republican 
victory was largely attributed to the untiring efforts of 
Thomas Dawson. 35 
McKinley's election opened still further avenues of 
advancement. Dawson's work in the Iowa Republican Party had 
gained for him the respect of many local politicians, many 
of whom agreed that he was deserving of some reward for his 
services to the party in the form of a political patronage 
't' 36 posi ion. In addition, Dawson had an important connection 
in the national Republican Party. Since the days when they 
were classmates at the Cincinnati Law School, Thomas c. Dawson 
and Charles G. Dawes had been close friends. Dawes' rise to 
prominence in the party had been meteoric. At the age of 
33a. G. McMillan, Chairman Republican State Central 
Committee (Iowa) to James s. Clarkson, September 5, 1896. 
James s. Clarkson Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript 
Division, General Correspondence, Box 2, File 1896, Sept-Dec. 
34Ibid. H. G. McMillan to A. B. Cummins, August 20, 
1896. Charles G. Dawes Collection, Deering Library, North-
western University, Evanston, Illinois, [hereafter cited as 
Dawes Collection] , filed in an unmarked box in file folder 
marked 1896; most of the documents in this box pertain to 
political affairs. · 
35J. D. Edmunds to A. L. Hager, January 13, 1897; et 
passim, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. 
36
oawson's Application and Recommendation File, passim. 
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thirty-one, in 1896, he was a confident of President-elect 
McKinley and it was rumored that he was being considered for a 
cabinet post. There is no indication that the relationship 
between Dawson and Dawes became parasitic, with the former 
using it merely as a means to further his own career. This 
friendship, nevertheless, could not but be advantageous to 
Dawson when he sought political preferment from the McKinley 
dm . . t t• 37 a 1n1s ra ion. 
Shortly after the election, Dawson evidently decided to 
take advantage of this new opportunity and seek a place in the 
diplomatic service. It is possible, however, that Dawson 
had been giving some thought to entering the diplomatic ser-
vice prior to the election of McKinley. In his letter of 
recommendation fqr Dawson, Judge w. I. Smith, Judge of the 
District Court Pottawattamie County, states that he had fre-
quently urged Dawson to seek a position in the diplomatic 
service. 38 At this time it was his hope to gain an appoint-
ment as secretary to one of the United States legations in 
Europe, preferably Constantinople. 39 There can be no question 
37charles G. Dawes, A Journal of the McKinley Years, 
edited and with a forward by Bascom N. Timmons (Chicago: The 
Lakeside Press, R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1950), pp. ix-
xiii. Charles G. Dawes to Fred w. Upham, March 25, 1909, 
Dawes Collection, Press Letter Books, October 9, 1908 to May 22, 
1909, pp. 826-827. Dawson to Dawes, May 3, 1897, Dawes Col-
lection, File D, 1896-1897. 
38
wallis I. Smith to the President, March 21, 1897, 
Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. 
39Dawson to the President, March 18, 1897, Dawson's 
Application and Recommendation File. 
that Dawson was taking advantage of the system of political 
patronage which was then prevailing for the appointment of 
14 
diplomatic officers. But, he was not without qualifications 
for the position he sought. His linguistic accomplishments 
were of some note. He claimed to be able to speak and read 
French and to read German, Spanish, and Italian. 40 He was 
well educated and possessed some knowledge of United States 
diplomatic history and international law. Moreover, if the 
writers of his letters of recommendation can be taken at their 
word, "his address" was "wholly pleasing and attractive and 
. 41 
his character and conduct ••• upright and manly." 
The position of secretary of legation which Dawson was 
seeking was neither very prestigious nor lucrative. One 
man's opinion of the position is indicated in a letter from 
the United States Ambassador to Mexico, D.·E. Thompson to 
Charles G. Dawes, dated December 13, 1907. Dawes had tele-
graphed Thompson asking advice on aiding a young friend of 
independent wealth who wanted to enter the diplomatic service. 
This letter does not apply to Dawson; nevertheless, Thompson's 
remarks are interesting in view of the fact that prior to 
his appointment to Mexico, he had been United States Minister 
to Brazil, and Dawson had served under him as secretary of 
legation from the time of Thompson's appointment to Petropolis 
40Ibid. 
41J. Y. Stone to the Iowa Delegation in Congress, 
January 23, 1897; et passim, Dawson's Application and Recom-
mendation File. 
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in 1902 until Dawson left to become United States Minister 
in Santo Domingo City, in 1904. 
Thompson advised that if the young man had money and 
did not mind devoting himself to social affairs it might not 
be a mistake to enter the diplomatic service. Personally, 
however, Thompson could only see this type of life leading to 
the ruination of the young man. He furthermore doubted the 
likelihood of any advancement. If Dawes were determined to 
have his young friend placed in the diplomatic service, 
Thompson was sure that Dawes' political influence and connections 
would make this an easy task. Nevertheless, Thompson con-
eluded: "First and last, however, I will say very frankly 
that if your young friend has brains and something to help 
himself with, he can do much better than to enter the Diplomatic 
. Service." 42 
Sometime in the spring of 1897, Dawson changed his 
mind about applying for the secretaryship of the legation in 
Constantinople and instead put his name forward for the same 
post in Petropolis, Brazil. Several factors may have determined 
this change in plans. In the first place, the legation in 
Constantinople was probably out of the reach of the Iowa 
politicians in Congress, upon whose support Dawson ultimately 
had to depend. The political patronage allotted to them.in 
42 Thompson to Dawes, December 13, 1907, Dawes Col-
lection, 1906-1914 Name File, s-u, File T-General. 
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the diplomatic service probably was relegated to less prominent 
posts. Furthermore, the position of Minister to Brazil had 
recently been filled by the appointment of Edwin H. Conger, 
I 
a long time acquaintance of Dawson. It is not unlikely that 
the new Minister prevailed upon his young friend to join him 
1• n B 'l 43 razi • 
Finally, after several months of waiting, Dawson's 
efforts to receive his desired appointment were rewarded. In 
June, 1897, President McKinley submitted the,young Iowan's 
name to the Senate for approval as secretary to the legation 
in Brazi1. 44 By the first of July the necessary approval had 
been conferred by the Senate and Dawson informed of his appoint-
ment. 45 
Shortly thereafter, it would seem that the new secretary 
traveled to Washington for a brief period Of instruction in 
his new duties and at that time conferred with the Third 
43E. H. Conger to the President, June 3, 1897, Dawson's 
Application and Recommendation File. E. H. Conger to Secretary 
of State John Sherman, January 18, 1898, Despatches from the 
United States Minister to Brazil, 1809-1906, National Archives 
Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 121 (Washington, D. C.: 
National Archives, 1947) [hereafter cited as Despatches from 
Brazil], vol. 61, roll 63. 
44John Addison Porter (President McKinley's Secretary) 
to John Sherman, Secretary of State, June 23, 1897, Dawson's 
Application and Recommendation File. 
45sherman to Dawson, July 1, 1897; Thomas w. Cridler 
(3rd Assistant Secretary of State) to Dawson, July 1, 1897; 
Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State: Brazil, 
National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 77 
(Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1947) [hereafter cited 
as Diplomatic Instructions, Brazil], vol. 18, pp. 294-95, roll 26. 
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Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas W. Cridler, on the possi-
bility of delaying his departure for Brazil until September or 
October. The delay would provide more time to conclude personal 
and business affairs and would also enable him to escort 
Minister Conger's family on the journey to Brazil. The 
officials in the Deaprtment of State had no objection to the 
delay. 46 In spite of his original plans to set out for his 
new post in the early fall of 1897, Dawson did not depart from 
his home in Council Bluffs until November 11, finally leaving 
the United States around the twentieth of the month. Two 
months later, on January 18, 1898, he arrived in Petropolis. 47 
Thus, in 1898, just as the United States was about to 
embark on the course of empire building, Thomas c. Dawson, 
then in his thirty-second year, began the career in the diplo-
matic service which was to occupy him for the remaining four-
teen years of his life. The path which had lead to his 
appointment was not much different from that which lead 
many other men into the diplomatic service. Political 
patronage based on connections and faithful service to the 
party controlling the federal executive was the surest, if 
not the only, way to obtain an appointment as the representative 
46 Dawson to Sherman, August 2, 1897, Despatches from 
Brazil, vol. 61, roll 63. Sherman to Dawson, August 10, 1897, 
Diplomatic Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, pp. 260-61, roll 26. 
47 Dawson to Sherman, November 15, 1897, Despatches from 
Brazil, vol. 61, roll 63. Conger to Sherman, January 18, 1898, 
~-
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of washington in some foreign capital. Nevertheless, Dawson 
was not bereft of qualities which would recommend him for 
• i 
hiS new position. The appointment as secretary of legation 
was rather low on the diplomatic concursus honorum, and lurking 
in the back of Dawson's mind there was probably little inten-
tion of spending the rest of his life in diplomacy. More 
likely he hoped to use the appointment as a starting point 
for further political advancement. However, as time passed 
he would begin to look upon himself as a professional in his 
chosen career and to seek advancement therein. 
CHAPTER II 
I 
BRAZILIAN APPRENTICESHIP: 1898-1904 
Arriving at the harbor of Rio de Janeiro around 
January 18, 1898, on board the French ship the Chili, Dawson 
was immediately impressed by the scenic beauty of the Brazilian 
capital. As the ship entered the harbor, the waters sparkled 
in the bright summer sun; off to the left lay the city with 
its suburbs partially obscured by the thick tropical fullage 
but still discernible as they stretched between the mountains. 
The deep clear blue sky reminded him of those he had seen as 
a boy in Florida. Once on shore he found the crowded streets 
of the business district of the city less attractive. 1 It is 
unlikely that he spent much time in Rio before going to 
Petropolis, where the legations were located, to assume his 
new duties. 
The position of a secretary of legation was varied. 
The primary duty, of course, was to attend to the routine 
office affairs of the legation: transcribing official communica-
tions, maintaining the archives, and taking charge of the 
record books, seal and cipher of the legation. In addition, 
whenever either the office of minister fell vacant or the 
1 T.C. Dawson, "A Hanover Boy in Brazil," The Journal 
of Hanover College, V (October, 1898) ~ 98-99. 
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minister was absent from his post, the secretary was to act 
as charg~ d'affaires ad interim. 2 Within three weeks of his 
arrival, barely having gained an acquaintance with the affairs 
of the legation, Dawson found himself acting in this latter 
capacity. On February 6, Minister Edwin H. Conger left3 to 
assume his new post as United States Minister to China. 
Since the newly appointed Minister to Brazil, Charles Page 
Bryan, did not arrive and assume his official duties until 
April 11, 1898, Dawson was in charge for a little over two 
months. 4 
In spite of his relative lack of experience, Dawson 
I 
does not seem to have had any difficulty as charge. As a 
I 
matter of fact, the six years which Dawson spent in Brazil 
coincided with a growing cordiality which had been evident 
in the relations between the two countries· ever since the 
formal recognition of the Brazilian Republic by the United 
States in 1890. The result of this friendship became partic-
ularly apparent in 1898, when Brazil alone among the Latin 
American nations remained sympathetic towards its northern 
neighbor during the Spanish-American War. 5 An early 
2 Sherman to Dawson, July 1, 1897, unnumbered, Diplomatic 
Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, p. 249, roll 26. 
3oawson to Sherman, February 7, 1898, No. 105, Despatches 
from Brazil, vol. 62, roll 64. 
4Bryan to Sherman, April 12, 1898, No. 4, ibid. 
5E. Bradford Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco 
and Brazilian-American Relations (New York: Columbia university 
Press , 19 6 6 ) , p • 6 • 
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indication of this sympathy was given shortly after Dawson·•s 
. I 
assumption of the post of charge. On February 15, the 
u.s.s. Maine blew up and sank in the harbor at Havana. As 
soon as news of the tragedy reached the Brazilian Foreign 
office condolences were sent to the United States Legation. 6 
There can be no doubt that this expression of sorrow 
was in part perfunctory and dictated by diplomatic etiquette. 
Within two weeks, however, the Brazilian Government gave a 
more concrete demonstration of its friendship. On Wednesday, 
March 2, Foreign Minister Dionisio E. de Castro Cerqueira 
requested that Charg( Dawson call upon him the next day. In 
the course of the interview on the third, Dawson was informed 
that about two weeks earlier the Brazilian Government, through 
its minister in London, had been approached by an agent of 
. the Spanish Government with a proposal to purchase two 
Brazilian cruisers then under construction in the British 
shipyard of Armstrong. One of these ships, the Amaznas, was 
near completion. Cerqueira stated that when news of this 
contact reached Rio, President Prudente de Moraes Barros and 
he had discussed it, and the President had instructed him to 
inform Dawson confidentially of the proposition. Furthermore, 
the Foreign Minister was to ascertain if the current status 
of United States-Spanish relations were such that the sale of 
6Dawson to Sherman, February 17, 1898, No. 109, 
Despatches from Brazil, vol. 62, roll 64. 
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! the vessels to Spain would be construed as unfriendly to the 
united States. Cerqueira hastened to explain that he had been 
instructed to assure Dawson that the Brazilian Government had 
I 
only the friendliest sentiments towards the United States and 
did not intend to do anything inimical to the latter's interests. 7 
Dawson thanked Cerqueira for the expression and 
demonstration of friendship, and replied that insofar as he 
had been informed, United States-Spanish relations were still 
cordial. He promised, nevertheless, to telegraph the Foreign 
Minister's revelation to Washington. However, he realized 
that in addition to its friendly sentiments towards the United 
States, the Brazilian Government was anxious to sell these 
ships in order to obtain cash to help meet a debt installment 
due April 1. His interview with the Foreign Minister further-
more left him with the impression that the.Government was in 
fact anxious to sell the ships to its northern neighbor. 
Conflicting newspaper stories had already appeared reporting 
that the vessels had been sold to Argentina or Spain and that 
their purchase had been discussed with the German Minister 
in Rio. 8 
Foreign Minister Cequeira's gesture of friendship was 
welcomed in Washington. Dawson was instructed to seek per-
mission for the United States Ambassador in London to open 
7Dawson to Sherman, March 7, 1898, No. 116, ibid. 
81bid. 
negotiations with the Brazilian Minister there, in order to 
obtain an option on the two ships. 9 Upon receipt of these 
i 
23 
instructions, Dawson immediately contacted the Foreign Minister, 
and within a few hours the necessary consent had been obtained.IO 
On the twelfth, Dawson was further instructed to urge the 
Brazilian Government to take speedy and favorable action on 
the sale of the ships. Again the Brazilian Foreign Office 
readily complied. By the latter part of the month the trans-
~ 11 
action had been completed. Although most of these negotia-
tions were handled in London, Dawson played a minor role, 
and sharing in the success of the negotiations must have been 
a pleasant initiation into the diplomatic profession. 
One of the major policy objectives of the United 
States with regard to Brazil during Dawson's tenure as 
·Secretary of Legation in Petropolis was to.increase the 
amount of United States exports to Brazil. In fact this had 
been an objective of North American diplomacy since 1890, and 
was to remain so long after Dawson had been promoted. 
Brazilian exports to the United States had long enjoyed a 
favorable balance. From the end of the North American Civil 
9oay to Dawson, March 4, 1898, telegram, Diplomatic 
Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, p. 363, roll 26. 
10Dawson to Sherman, March 7, 1898, No. 116, Despatches 
from Brazil, vol. 62, roll 64. 
11oawson to Sherman, March 22, 1898, No. 122, Despatches 
from Brazil, ibid. 
i I 
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war, the United States had consumed the largest portion of 
Brazil's coffee crop, and, after 1870, this conunodity was 
admitted duty free into the United States. Brazil's other 
major exports, rubber and cocoa also found a ready market in 
12 the north. According to the State Department's calculation, 
in the fiscal year 1898 the value of Brazilian exports to 
the United States amounted to $61,750,000, of which over ninety-
five per cent were admitted duty free. During the same period, 
however, the value of United States exports to Brazil amounted 
only to $13,300,000. A little more than thirteen per cent of 
this total had been admitted duty free; but even part of 
13 this small amount had been subjected to clearance charges. 
Within the next four years this situation was in no way bet-
tered from the United States viewpoint. 14 
In order to remedy this discrepancy the State Depart-
ment under the leadership of James G. Blaine and his Republican 
successors during the McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt !\dminis-
trations attempted to increase United States exports either 
by obtaining preferential treatment for United States goods 
or by means of reciprocity agreements. The latter had ini-
tially been accomplished under the McKinley tariff of 1890 
12Burns, ~· cit., p. 63. 
13Hay to Bryan, March 4, 1899, No. 115, Diplomatic 
Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, p. 420, roll 26. 
14Burns, ~· cit., p. 63. 
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and an agreement with the Brazilian Government formulated in 
1891. In spite of its unp<Jl>ularity in Brazil, this arrangement 
endured until the passage of the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894, 
which, while maintaining pxotectionism, eliminated reciprocity. 
aowever, with the enactment of the Dingley Tariff in 1897, 
reciprocity was restored to the diplomatic arsenal of the State 
oepartment in its efforts to secure a favored market for 
15 
united States goods. 
Naturally, most of the negotiations ~oncerning com-
mercial concessions were conducted by the United States 
Ministers: Charles Page Bryan 1898-1902, and David E. Thompson 
1902-1906. Nevertheless, daring the various periods when 
Dawson was serving as charg!, approximately fifteen months in 
all, he frequently had to conduct the negotiations on this 
topic. Whenever. he did handle these negotiations, he always 
energetically pressed his Government's point of view. 16 
In addition, he did not hesitate to suggest alternate 
means of exerting pressure to achieve the desired end. Inform-
ing the State Department of the Brazilian Government's refusal 
to enter into negotiations on a treaty of commercial reciprocity 
15Lawrence F. Hill, "The United States," Brazil, ed. 
Lawrence F. Hill (Berkely, California: University of California 
Press, 1947), pp. 350, 357. 
16Dawson to Sherman, March 25, 1898, No. 123, enclosure 
2: Dawson to Cerqueira, Ma:r:ch 25, 1898, Despatches from Brazil, 
vol. 62, roll 64. Dawson to Hay, September 30, 1899, No. 188, 
Despatches from Brazil, vol. 64, roll.66. Dawson to Hay, 
December 31, 1899, No. 214, and enclosure 5: Memorandum, ibid. 
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in March, 1898, Dawson noted that the incumbent Government had 
iess than eight months left in office and was desperately trying 
to avoid national bankruptcy. Therefore, the President and 
his cabinet were reluctant to disturb the existing financial 
situation. To a large extent, Dawson reported, the financial 
difficulties confronting the Brazilian Government came from 
the fall in the rate of exchange. Since the revenues were 
collected in the depreciating currency and the debts had to be 
paid in gold, he noted that it was understandable that the 
Government was reluctant to reduce the revenues by any tariff 
concessions. In spite of this apparent appreciation of the 
Brazilian Government's problem, Dawson went on to report 
that the daily exchange rate was largely dependent on the 
amount of coffee sold, since that export was the principal 
source of foreign exchange. Moreover, he maintained that the 
imposition of the import tax on coffee as provided by the 1897 
tariff would probably have an adverse effect on that commod-
ity's price because the United States was its largest market. 
This fall in price, Dawson thought, would result in a decline 
in exchange and thus would not only harm the producers but 
also the Government who would be embarrassed by the further 
depreciation of its currency. He suspected that this as an 
aspect of the problem might not have occurred to the Brazilian 
Government and if Washington was determined to continue press-
ing for a reciprocity agreement this point might be profitably 
,........- 27 
brought to the attention of the Brazilian Foreign Office. 1.7 
-The Department of State, however, decided to terminate negotia-
tions on a reciprocity agreement until the new Brazilian 
president was installed in mid-November. 18 
A similar suggestion was included in a despatch dated 
pecember 31, 1899. After discussing possible concessions to 
united States commerce with the new Foreign Minister, Olyntho 
de Maglhaes, Dawson reported that he believed the Brazilian 
Foreign Office had not yet seriously studied the question and 
that the Government was not demonstrating any genuine willing-
ness to assist in elevating the loopsided trade balance. In 
view of this Dawson thought that it was time to present the 
Brazilian Government with "a frankly stated request" for 
preferential treatment of certain articles rather than to 
continue to ask what the Government was willing to do. He 
further implied that the threat of the imposition of the three 
cents per pound import tax on coffee under the 1897 tariff 
bill, might have a salutary effect on the Brazilian executive 
. . th . 19 in securing ese concessions. 
About two years later Dawson again had an opportunity 
to advise on policy. In 1900 the Department of State had 
instructed Minister Bryan to urge preferential treatment for 
17Dawson to Sherman, March 25, 1898, No. 123, Despatches 
from Brazil, vol. 62, roll 64. 
18J.B. Moore to Bryan, April 30, 1898, No. 13, Diplomatic 
Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, p. 362, roll 26. 
19Dawson to Hay, December 31, 1899, No. 214, Despatches 
from Brazil, vol. 64, roll 66. 
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flour coming from the United States was in barrels while that 
imported from its chief competitor in Brazil, Argentina, came 
20 in sacks. Finally in the fall of 1901, in an attempt to 
I I 
grant some concession to United States conunerce, the Brazilian 
Government attempted to increase the duty on flour in sacks, 
thereby making flour in barrels more competitive. However, 
during the year and a half which had transpired since the 
original request had been made, Yankee flour exporters had 
also switched over to the use of sacks. While he was apparently 
I 
not initially aware of the changed practices of the United 
states exporters, as soon as this matter was made known to 
him, Dawson urged the State Department to send him new in-
structions which would permit him to continue to seek the best 
interests of the flour exporters by opposing the new duties. 21 
Much to Dawson's pleasure, the State Department was aware of 
the changing conditions and wired him to urge the Brazilian 
. 22 Government not to impose the additional duty on flour in sacks. 
In addition to energetically pushing the negotiations 
for conunercial reciprocity and offering suggestions for 
20Hay to Bryan, March 30, 1900, No. 179; Hay to Bryan, 
July 27, 1900, No. 207, Diplomatic Instructions, Brazil, 
vol. 18, pp. 475, 483, roll 26. 
21Dawson to Hay, November 1, 1901, No. 368; Dawson to 
Hay, November 12, 1901, No. 371, Despatches from Brazil, 
vol. 67, roll 69. 
22Dawson to Hay, November 13, 1901, No. 372, ibid. 
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alternate action, Dawson also possessed a detailed understanding 
of both the financial situation in Brazil and the impact of 
the Rio Government's policies on United States· exports to 
that country. This understanding was clearly illustrated in 
two despatches he sent to Washington while acting as charge 
in 1899. In late September, 1899, the Brazilian Chamber of 
oeputies considered a tariff bill which would have provided 
for a maximum schedule applicable to countries which taxed 
Brazilian exports and a minimum schedule which would be applied 
to those nations granting free enterance to Brazilian products. 
Dawson reported to the Department of State and to the Brazilian 
Foreign Minister that the new plan would not materially aid 
United States exports. Moreover, he pointed out that the 
application of the maximua schedule against France and Italy, 
the countries against whoa the new law was· primarily directed, 
would not benefit the United States, since French and Italian 
qoods were mainly in competition with British and German 
products. 23 In October, 1899, he sent the State Department a 
report on the domestic and foreign flour and grain business in 
Brazil. His conclusion was that under the existing tariff 
regulations the prospect for United States flour~xports was 
bleak. 24 
23Dawson to Hay, September 30, 1899, No. 188, Despatches 
from Brazil, vol. 64, roll 66. 
24 Dawson to Hay, October 20, 1899, No. 194, ibid. 
30 
Both of these reports were apparently well received in 
25 
washington. In referring to Dawson's report on the proposed 
aew maximum and minimum tariff schedules, Secretary of State 
say noted: 
The Department observes with satisfaction your careful 
examination of the proposed action of the Brazilian Govern-
ment, and its probable effect upon our commerce with that 
country. An intelligent appreciation by your Legation of 
the entire question is of special importance in view of 
the long delay incident to correspondence between the two 
capitals.26 
In addition to reciprocity and preferential treatment 
of Yankee exports, the Department of State also so~ght to 
extend United States commerce in Brazil by instructing its 
consular agents and diplomatic representatives to gather and 
: 27 
report information on potential markets. The diplomatic 
representatives could not, of course, personally present 
_petitions on behalf of individuals seeking.concessions or 
business opportunities; but, they were to see that United 
States citizens had equal opportunities with other foreigners 
in having their case heard. 28 As a result of his travels in 
25Hay to Dawson, November 3, 1899, No. 155; Hay to 
Dawson, November 23, 1899, No. 158, Diplomatic Instructions to 
Brazil, vol. 18, pp. 452, 455-56, roll 26. See also, Hay to 
Dawson, November 2, 1899, No. 154, ibid., pp. 451-52. 
26Hay to Dawson, November 3, 1899, No. 155, ibid., 
p. 452. 
27Hay to Bryan, October 26, 1898, No. 88, ibid.,·p. 406. 
28Hay to Bryan, October 12, 1898, No. 81, ibid., 
pp. 401-402. 
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Brazil and detailed study of various aspects of the Brazilian 
economy and industry, Dawson was also able to assist along 
these lines. I I 
In mid-March, 1899, after a trip through the state of 
Minas Gerais, he submitted a lengthy report to the Department 
of State. From his observations, he concluded that the conserv-
ative characteristics of the inhabitants of that state would 
result in slow modernization of "their industrial habits and 
organizations. n Nevertheless, in spite of what might . . . 
have been considered unfavorable conditions, Dawson reported 
that the population and wealth of the state were rapidly 
increasing and that there was an opportunity for United States 
trade which was "well worth cultivating." He thought that 
there was a possibility of establishing or increasing the 
market for numerous products of United States manufacture, 
ranging from mining machinery and farm tools to toilet soap 
d t t d . . 29 an pa en me 1c1nes. 
Three years later while traveling in the State of Rio 
Grande do Sul, Dawson visited the construction site of the New 
Hamburg and Taquara Railroad. He immediately saw an opportunity 
for North American manufacturers to furnish some of the 
material required in the construction of this railroad and 
others that were to be built in the State. He suggested that 
29Bryan to Hay, March 15, 1899, No. 135, enclosure 1: 
Dawson to Bryan, March 12, 1899, Despatches from Brazil, vol. 
63, roll 65. · 
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the local importing firms contact firms in the United States, 
but discovered that they found it more convenient to deal with 
European firms. In his report to Minister Bryan in Rio, 
Dawson noted that the lack both of an United States business 
house and a consular representative in Porto Alegre made it 
difficult for United States commercial interests to obtain 
any consideration. He further recommended that the matter 
of the railroad construction be brought to the attention of 
United States firms in Rio de Janeiro in order that an agent 
could be sent forthwith in the hope of. gaining some share in 
supplying the necessary material and equipment. 30 
The possibility of securing a share of the Brazilian 
railroad construction for United States manufacturers and 
investors had actually been present in Dawson's mind long 
before his trip to southern Brazil. In late 1899 he had sub-
mitted to Washington a detailed report on the various Brazilian 
railroad routes. In it he covered the history of Brazilian 
railroad construction, the cost of operation, yearly profits 
and governmental control. He thought that such information 
might "be useful to manufacturers producing material used in 
railroad construction and management, and to capitalists 
contemplating investments in them. 1131 
30 . Bryan to Hay, May 23, 1902, No. 418, enclosure 1: 
Dawson to Bryan, May 16, 1902, Despatches from Brazil, vol. 67, 
roll 69. 
31oawson to Hay, December 26, 1899, No. 212 and enclosure, 
Despatches from Brazil, vol. 64, roll 66. 
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I In early 1904, while acting as charge, Dawson found 
another opportunity to assist North American commerical pene-
tration of Brazil. The Brazilian Government was about to let 
a contract for the construction of a smokeless powder factory. 
The United States chemical company of Dupont was interested in 
obtaining this contract. When the company's representative, 
Colonel J. B. Burbank, arrived in Rio, Dawson personally intro-
duced him to the minister of war. Dawson obviously thought 
that this was necessary to obtain an equal hearing for the 
North .American concern since the German Minister had introduced 
German manufacturers. In this instance, Dawson's purpose 
was more encompassing ~han merely gaining a contract for a 
single chemical company. He thought that if Dupont won the 
contract, other United States commerical interests would 
. indirectly benefit. The use of North .American material and 
plans in the construction of the powder plant would give 
concrete evidence of Yankee mechanical progress. Brazilians 
were vaguely aware of this progress, he conceded, but were 
f 'l' 'th E t ' 1 d h' 32 more ami iar wi uropean ma eria an mac inery. 
Neither Dawson's energetic pressing for commercial 
reciprocity and preferential treatment of United States 
products nor his efforts on behalf of securing new markets for 
North American manufacturers made him unique. To the contrary, 
certainly he was right in line with the tho ~~b~ Tii~w~~ 
V LOYOLA \fl 
:H.f'81,V tiiipli~che 
l..18RAR'< 
32 Dawson to Hay, February 9, 1904, 
from Brazil, vol. 69, roll 71. 
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Department of State and with those of his immediate superiors, 
MinistersCharles Page Bryan and David E. Thompson. However, 
the manner in which Dawson conducted the negotiations on 
I 
commercial issues and his actions on behalf of United States 
producers clearly illustrates his acceptance of the importance 
of increasing United States trade in Brazil and the extent to 
which he, as a diplomatic representative, was involved in this 
effort. That his actions on behalf of North American exporters 
and manufacturers were appreciated is duely ~ttested to by 
the numerous letters included in his Application and Recommenda-
tion file from manufacturers urging his appointment as United 
States ambassador to Brazil in 1911. 33 
Dawson's tenure as Secretary of Legation and the periods 
I 
when he served as charge undoubtedly afforded him adequate 
opportunity to perfect his skills as a diplomat. It would 
seem that his competence was well appreciated by his initial 
superior, Minister Charles Page Bryan who served in Brazil 
from 1898 until his transfer to Switzerland in 1902. On 
several occasions Bryan noted Dawson's competence and ability 
in handling the Legation's affairs. 34 While Bryan's successor, 
33James Mitchell to the President, December 6, 1911; 
Thomas A. Eddy to Huntington Wilson, December 5, 1911, et passim, 
Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. 
34Bryan to Sherman, April 12, 1898, No. 4, Despatches 
from Brazil, vol. 62, roll 64. Bryan to Hay, June 9, 1899, No. 
159, Despatches from Brazil, vol. 64, roll 66. Bryan to Hay, 
February 1, 1900, No. 220, Despatches .from Brazil, vol. 65, 
roll 67. 
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David E. Thompson, made no reference to Dawson's ability, 
there is no evidence that he felt him incompetent. Certainly 
he did not hesitate to leave Dawson in charge of the Legation. 
Moreover, since Dawson had been in Brazil and in the diplomatic 
service some five years before Thompson left Lincoln, 
Nebraska to assume his first post in Brazil, there can be 
little doubt that the former was not only better versed in 
Brazilian affairs but also in general diplomacy than the new 
Minister. 
That Dawson grew in professional competency and learned 
from his experience is further evidenced in his response to 
a State Department circular in July,: 1904 concerning coopera-
tion between diplomatic and consular officers in collecting 
commercial information. Dawson, at that time Minister Resident 
and Consul-General in the Dominican Republic, reported that, 
as a result of his experience in Brazil, he believed that the 
best commerical reports came from those consuls who worked 
under the conviction that the excellence of their work would 
be observed by their superiors in the Department of State and 
ultimately lead to promotion. Consequently, he thought that, 
while it was necessary for the Legation to watch over com-
mercial matters and to offer guidance in the case of a new or 
careless consul, it was desirable that the Minister's control 
should not be such as to weaken the consuls conviction that 
his work would receive proper evaluation in Washington. He 
further recommended a system of efficiency reports for all 
L 
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members of the consular and diplomatic services, both by their 
"immediate and indirect superiors." Apparently, he felt 
that the overlapping of ·functions and lack of clear lines of 
responsibility within the two services at time caused either 
unnecessary duplication of work or failures to transmit per-
tinent information. Therefore, he suggested that either the 
Ministers or Consul-Generals should be held directly respon-
sible for translating and transmitting those decrees of the 
Government to which they were accredited which affected com-
. 35 
merce in any way. 
Considering Dawson's familiarity with the economic 
conditions in Brazil, his comparatively meger salary of $1,800, 
I 36 
which was increased when he was serving as charge, and the 
length of time he spent in Brazil,, it would not seem out of 
place to wonder if his diplomatic record was in any way 
besmirched by hints of bribery or gain resulting from his 
position or by any other scandal. This investigation turned 
up no evidence to indicate a hint of wrong doing. Nevertheless, 
it is probable that he did use knowledge of conditions in 
Brazil to make what he considered to be an auspicious investment 
35Dawson to Hay, August 20, 1904, unnumbered, Despatches 
from United States Minister to the Dominican Republic, 1883-1906, 
National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 93 
(Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1966) [hereafter cited as 
Despatches from the Dominican Republic], vol. 11, roll 11. 
36sherman to Dawson, July 1, 1897, unnumbered, Diplomatic 
Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, pp. 249-51, roll 26. 
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in the Sao Paulo Tramway, Light and Power Company. 37 While it 
is impossible to say with certainty whether this investment 
effected Dawson's future actions, it is to be observed that 
the matter was not closed until late March, 1904, only two 
months before Dawson left Brazil to accept a new assignment. 38 
The files of the State Department indicate that Dawson 
was involved in at least one controversy which was undoubtedly 
annoying and could also have been an embarrassment to him in 
his diplomatic career. This controversy developed out of an 
agreement between Dawson's brother-in-law Fernando Duval, a 
Brazilian, and H. Kilburn Scott, a British mining engineer. 
Apparently in 1901, Duval, who lived in Rio de Janeiro, had 
employed Scott to investigate mining properties in Rio Grande 
do Sul. Since Duval could not speak English, Dawson acted 
as intennediary and interpreter. Duval later claimed that 
Scott violated their contract and refused to pay for the 
latter's services. Dawson was caught in the middle. His 
37 . Dawson to Dawes, February 18, 1904, Dawes Collection, 
File D, January-June, 1904. Dawes to Dawson, March 28, 1904, 
Dawes Collection, Letter Press Books, Personal Correspondence, 
January 26, 1904 to April 30, 1904, p. 297. 
38At the time of Dawson's death in May, 1912, he had 
on deposit with the Central Trust Company of Illinois, of which 
Charles G. Dawes was president, seventy shares of stock in the 
sa'o Paulo Tramway Light and Power Company. These shares had a 
total par value of $7,000. "Central Trust Company of Illinois 
acting for Chas. G. Dawes, Agent for Luisa Dawson, Executrix of 
the Estate of Thomas c. Dawson", Schedule "A", Securities de-
posited with Central Trust Company of Illinois for Safe Keeping 
by Thomas c. Dawson During his Life. Dawes Collection, 1906-
1914 Name File, Dawson-Fai, Thomas A. [sic] Dawson File. 
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brother-in-law blamed him for Scott's default, and Scott 
demanded that Dawson get the money from Duval or in lieu of 
that pay it himself. Dawson refused. In 1902, Scott turned 
the case over to his British attorneys and attempted to get a 
judgment against Dawson in a British court. He did succeed in 
securing some sort of judgment and thereupon his lawyers 
made the case known to the State Department. The charges were 
then forwarded to Dawson for reply. Dawson in turn presented 
his side of the story, and while denying both liability and 
the validity of any judgment in a British court, offered to 
submit the entire case to a Brazilian court or to an arbiter 
any time Scott desired. 39 Scott apparently did not see fit 
to pursue his case in the Brazilian courts as Dawson suggested, 
but continued to write directly to Dawson and threatened to 
. 
unmask him for what he was before his superiors in Washington. 
In July, 1903, Dawson again wrote to the Department and laid 
Scott's letter and his own reply before Assistant Secretary 
F . B L . 40 rancis • oomis. Dawson's initial explanation when Scott's 
lawyers brought the matter before the State Department had 
apparently been satisfactory41 and the renewal of the issue 
39
aay to Dawson, November 25, 1902, unnumbered, 
Diplomatic Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, p. 581, roll 26. 
Dawson to Hay, November 28, 1902, unnumbered, Dawson's Applica-
tion and Recommendation File. 
40Dawson to Loomis, July 3, 1903, unnumbered, and 
enclosures: Scott to Dawson, June 12, 1903; Dawson to Scott, 
July 3, 1903, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. 
41Dawson to Loomis, July 3, 1903, ibid. 
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does not seem to have caused any further stir. Dawson's 
willingness to submit to a Brazilian court or arbiter and his 
forwarding of Scott's letter to the Department of State would 
seem to indicate his desire to have the matter in the open, 
and would appear to attest to his innocence of any misconduct. 
Although Dawson enjoyed his work and found it interest-
ing42 he evidently hoped the Brazilian assignment would serve 
as a stepping stone for advancement. Certainly the limited 
prestige and the meger salary offered little inducement to 
stay as Secretary of Legation for any length of time. As 
early as April, 1898, his close friend Charles G. Dawes, who 
was then Comptroller of Currency, wrote hopefully that the 
future might offer opportunities for Dawson's advancement in 
th d . 1 t" . 43 e ip oma ic service. 
Since advancement in the diplomatic service was con-
tingent on political preferment, Dawes and Allan Dawson, 
Thomas' younger brother, both strongly urged him to return to 
the United States for the 1900 presidential campaign. Dawes 
succinctly put in the following words: 
You could not get any more prestige if you stayed there 
many years more, and at the same time would lose 
42Dawes to Dawson, April 9, 1898, Dawes Collection, 
Letter Press Book, Personal Correspondence, February 21, 1898 
to April 28, 1898, p. 391. Dawson to Dawes, November 4,_1901, 
Dawes Collection, File D, July-December, 1901. 
43Dawes to Dawson, April 9, 1898, Dawes Collection, 
Letter Press Book, Personal Correspondence, February 21, 1898 
to April 28, 1898, p. 391. 
l 
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valuable years out of your life. If you have any chance 
for diplomatic advancement under the next administration, 
~ou shouli be here now and stay here until the campaign 
is over. 
I 
In order to facilitate Dawson's obtaining a leave to return 
to the United States, Dawes personally wrote to the Department 
45 of State urging that the leave be granted. However, the 
Department had already decided to grant Dawson's request before 
receiving Dawes' letter. 46 
Nevertheless, Dawes continued to watch out for his 
friend's benefit. Once Dawson was back in Washington, Dawes 
tried to get him appointed to the vacant off ice of First 
Assistant Postmaster General. This was apparently without 
Dawson's knowledge. He was taken around to see Postmaster 
General Smith; but, the conversation was directed to political 
topics to keep Dawson from catching wind of what Dawes and 
Smith had in mind. Dawes also discussed the appointment with 
McKinley. He felt that his friend's case was in "pretty good 
shape." Dawson, however, either was not offered or did not 
th - 't' 47 accept e posi ion. It is possible, that for political 
reasons, it was thought wiser to offer the post to some one 
44Dawes to Dawson, January 24, 1900, Dawes Collection, 
Letter Press Book, Personal Correspondence, November 28, 1899 
to January 26, 1900, p. 481. 
45Dawes to Dawson, January 11, 1900; Dawes to J.A. 
Kasson, Department of State, January 11, 1900, ibid., pp. 347, 366. 
46Hay to Bryan, January 6, 1900, No. 166, Diplomatic 
Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, pp. 46~-65, roll 26. 
47Dawes, A Journal of the McKinley Years •••• , pp. 
237-38. 
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else. Or perhaps the position was offered and Dawson turned 
it down preferring to remain in the diplomatic service. 
Whatever the reason for Dawson's failure to get the 
position in the postal department, he did become actively 
involved in the 1900 presidential campaign. Again, this was 
probably through the efforts of Dawes. In July, Dawson 
requested and received an extension of his leave of absence. 48 
During the late summer and fall he headed one of the executive 
bureaus at the Republican Headquarters in Chicago. 49 
In spite of his presence in the United States and his 
participation in the presidential campaign, no advancement 
was still forth coming. In July, 1901, Dawes, who was about 
to leave his post in the Treasury Department, was again writ-
ing that it was virtually impossible to obtain a promotion 
. without being in Washington. Pressure was· enormous, he reported. 
He further urged Dawson to raise his sights and ask for the 
best position available. Dawes observed, "you are very 
worthy, but your modesty handicaps you somewhat. 050 
48Dawson to Hay, July 19, 1900, unnumbered (written on 
the stationery of the Comptroller of Currency), Despatches from 
Brazil, vol. 65, roll 67. Hay to Dawson, July 21, 1900, unnum-
bered, Diplomatic Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, pp. 492-93, 
roll 26. 
49The National Cyclopaedia of American Biograehy, Vol. 
XIII, p. 512. George B. Cortelyou, Secretary to President 
McKinley, to Dawson, August 29, 1900, William McKinley Papers, 
Microfilm, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, reel 49, 
p. 96. 
so Dawes to Dawson, July 12, 1901, Dawes Collection, 
Letter Press Book, Personal Correspondence, May 14, 1901 to 
July 26, 1901, pp. 460-61. 
r 
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By November, 1901, Dawson was still hoping for a pro-
motion but had little faith in obtaining one. He had reached 
the point where he considered leaving the diplomatic service 
d t . b . 51 an en ering usiness. Disappointment over not being pro-
moted was not the only reason why he was thinking about chang-
ing professions. In part, he was being led in that direction 
by financial considerations. In February, he wrote Dawes that 
he could no longer make the financial sacrifice necessary to 
remain at his post. 52 However, in spite of little hope of 
advancement and the increasing strain on his finances, he 
did not resign. While in the United States on leave in 
December, 1902, he again applied for a promotion. At that 
time he requested advancement to First Secretary of Embassy 
or to Minister of a "small mission like Uruguay." 53 Advance-
. ment ultimately would come but it was still sixteen months 
away. 54 
It is difficult to determine what exactly persuaded 
Dawson to stay in Brazil in spite of the indication that he 
was planning to resign. Possibly he determined to remain in 
51Dawson to Dawes, November 4, 1901, Dawes Collection, 
File D, July-December, 1901. 
52 Dawson to Dawes, February 14, 1902, Dawes Collection, 
January-June, 1902, part 1. 
53The Assistant Secretary to Mr. Mosher, December 24, 
1902, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. 
54Loomis to Dawson, April 28, 1904, telegram, 
Diplomatic Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, p. 636, roll 26. 
r 
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the diplomatic service and decided that even though advancement 
was slow in coming he still might have a chance if he remained 
at his post. However, there are other possibilities. On 
I 
April 5, 1900, while in London on his way back to the United 
States, Dawson married Luiza Guerra Duval, a Brazilian lady 
whose family had banking interests in Rio de Janeiro and Porto 
Alegre. 55 Therefore, family ties may have kept him in Brazil. 
Moreover, his wife had several business interests of her own 
and Dawson was involved in getting these in ~rder. 56 Conse-
quently, this may also have detained him. At any rate, when 
Dawson spoke of the financial sacrifice involved in remaining 
55The National C*clopaedia of American Biography, Vol. 
XIII, p. 512. Gue and s ambaugh in their article on Dawson in 
Biogra~hies and Portraits of the Progressive Men of Iowa Leaders 
in Business, Politics, and the Professions, give Mrs. Dawson's 
maiden name as Luiz Duval Murray. QE.· cit., II, 103. 
Three children were born of this marriage. Allan the 
eldest was born in Washington, D. c., on February 16, 1903. He 
ultimately went into the diplomatic service and devoted most of 
his career to Latin American affairs. {Who Was Who In America: 
A Com anion Biogra hical Reference Work to Who's Who in America, 
Vo • II: 1943-1950 Chicago: The A. N. Marquis co., 1950 , p. 
147). On October 15, 1949, while serving as Counselor at the 
Unites States Embassy in Santiago, Chile, Allan apparently com-
mitted suicide by jumping from his office window on the eighth 
floor of the Embassy. (The Washington Post, October 16, 1949, 
p. 1). A daughter, Lilita, was born on July 31, 1905. (Dawson 
to Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress [hereafter cited as the Roosevelt Papers], 
Series 1, Letters received, August 7-21, 1905, Box 95). It is 
possible that she is still alive. A second son, Frederico, 
was born in the summer of 1907 and died in August, 1911. 
(The Washington Star, May 1, 1912). 
56Dawson to Dawes, February 14, 1902, Dawes Collection, 
January-June, 1902, part 1. 
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secretary of Legation, it is highly doubtful that he referred 
to approaching poverty. Nevertheless, it is likely that he 
found it necessary to di°p into his own resources. 
In view of the fact that Brazil was but the first 
assignment in a fifteen year diplomatic career spent in the 
capitals of various Latin American countries and in the Depart-
ment of State and marked by ever increasing responsibility in 
the conduct of inter-American relations, it would seem proper 
to conclude this phase of Dawson's career with an examination 
of his concepts of the historical and future development of 
South America, a major part of the area which would occupy 
his attention for the remainder of his life. Dawson's grasp 
of the contemporary Brazilian political and economic develop-
ments was more than adequately demonstrated in his despatches 
to the State Department. In addition, he utilized the time 
spent in Brazil to read extensively in the history of the 
South American nations and to discuss the political develop-
ments with scholars and the public men directly involved in 
shaping the destinies of these countries. 57 The result of 
these readings, discussions, and his own observations was a 
two volume history entitled The South American Republics. 
The first volume, published in 1903, covered Argentina, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil, with the last country, as might 
be expected, receiving the largest portion of the text. The 
57Thomas c. Dawson, The South American Republics, 
Vol. I (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, l903), p. vi. 
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second volume, published the following year, dealt with the 
nations of the west and northern coasts of the continent, 
including the newly established country of Panama. After an 
introductory chapter in volume I covering the discoveries 
and conquest, the general format was to handle each country 
separately beginning with the colonial period then proceeding 
through the wars of independence and concluding with the 
political developments of the nineteenth and early years of 
the twentieth centuries. A physical description of each 
country was also included. 
Dawson found the origins of the problems confronting 
the independent South American states, a tendency towards 
political disintegration, distrust of rulers and government, 
militarism, and economic retardation, in their colonial 
. experience and in their fight for independnece. The tendency 
towards localism, which frequently acted as a centrifugal 
force in the development of both the Spanish American nations 
and Brazil, could be traced, he believed, to the constitutional 
forms transplanted from the Iberian peninsula. 58 Distrust of 
rulers and governments, which could give a predisposition 
towards revolution, resulted, he maintained, from Spanish 
and Portuguese tyranny. 59 In addition, he saw the wars of 
independnece, which naturally brought the military leader and 
adventurer to the fore, as a factor in contributing to 
58Ibid., I, v, 7. 59Ibid., p. v. 
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militarism in the Hispanic nations. 60 The economic retardation 
which the Spanish-American republics had experienced, again 
was attributed largely to Spanish colonial policy. This 
policy, Dawson argued, "ingrained into South Americans the 
belief that industrial and commerical activity exists only by 
sufferance of the government. 1161 Moreover, it hampered com-
mercial spirit and deprived business skill of its rewards. 
The result was that office holding instead of productive 
pursuits "became the most popular of avocations." This 
pernicious effect, he maintained, could still be seen in the 
South American countries, and it was only slowly that the 
national ideals were becoming industrial. 62 In modern times, 
he reported, the geographic isolation of Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Peru and the Pacific coast of Colombia added to this economic 
retardation. 63 To Dawson there was a close connection between 
political advancement and economic advancement, and the 
industrial retardation from which the South American nations 
64 
suffered also helped to account for their political problems. 
In spite of the failures of the colonial system and 
isolation imposed by geography, Dawson was basically opti-
mistic about the 'general political and economic development 
of the continent. He was convinced that militarism had "already 
definitely disappeared from more than half the continent" and 
60ibid. . 61Ibid., p. 52. 
63Ibid., II, iv-v. 64Ibid., p. v. 
r 
was "slowly becoming less powerful in the remainder. 1165 
Politically, he saw an increase in "civic capacity" and the 
I 
slow evolution of "the best form of government for their 
47 
special needs and conditions." As a United States citizen he 
. . d th t th. f ubl. 66 . 11 h reJoice a is orm was rep ican. Economica y, e 
also felt that there was hope. Immigration would raise the 
industrial level, 67 and the opening of the Panama Canal would 
infuse new life into the commerce of the west coast of the 
t . t 68 con inen • 
This general optimism was further reflected in his 
treatment of the individual countries. He foresaw a bright 
future for the countries of the Rio de la Plata. Argentine 
, industrial impetus, he believed, had reached the point where 
it could surmount all obstacles, and he was certain of Argen-
. tina's eventual "material greatness" and of its ultimate and 
extensive moral and intellectual impact on the rest of the 
t . t 69 con inen • The little country of Paraguay, which had suf-
fered so heavily in the war with Brazil and Argentina, he 
thought would no longer be a threat to any of its neighbors 
and that Paraguay now stood open to the world. 70 His opti-
mistic forecast for Uruguay was tempered by his realization 
of the historical conflict between Argentina and Brazil over 
that small country's territory. While predicting that the 
66Ibid., pp. v-vi. 
69Ibid., I, 161. 
67Ibid., p. v. 
70Ibid., p. 224. 
68Ibid., II, v. 
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country would increase in wealth and population, he also felt 
that Uruguay would "continue to be the political storm-center 
7·1 
of the Atlantic coast." 
It was for Brazil that he had the most glowing predic-
tion. Dawson reported that country was virtually "teeming with 
life and full of potential wealth--too much so, perhaps, for 
the most wholesome development of the human race." 72 He main-
tained that within the next two centuries Brazil was destined 
"to support the largest population of any of the great political 
divisions of the globe." 73 In addition to this tremendous 
economic potential, Dawson thought that the Brazilian political 
situation had improved and that there was little danger of 
· t 1 d' · · 74 in erna 1s1ntegrat1on. The Brazilian Government had had 
a rather difficult time financially during the first decade of 
· the republic, but here too Dawson saw an improvement. Capital 
was beginning to accumulate, industrial habits were being 
formed, and a tendency toward moderate methods in the exploita-
tion of the natural resources of the country was appearing. 75 
Brazil, he contended, was certain to endure. Immigration from 
Western Europe and North America he thought to be inevitable. 
The country might be thus transformed economically by this 
influx "but the new conditions will have to fit themselves into 
the political and social framework already in existence. 1176 
71Ibid. I 
74Ibid. I 
pp. 282-83. 72Ibid., p. 306. 73Ibid., p. 289. 
p. 510. 75Ibid., p. 511. 76Ibid., p. 512. 
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With regard to Peru's political development he reported 
most favorably, noting that that country had "long since passed 
the stage of pronunciame"ntos and military government. 1177 The 
I i 
outlook for the economic development of the country also looked 
bright. A stimulus along this line, Dawson believed, would 
be the Peruvian Corporation which had been formed by Peru's 
British creditors after the foreign debt had been settled by 
the Grace contract of 1889. "The existence of this gigantic 
private enterprise," he wrote, "which will apply the energy 
' 
and economy characteristic of individual enterprise to under-
takings governmental in magnitude" undoubtedly would aid 
Peruvian industrial development. 78 
In spite of the Civil War of 1891, Chile had been the 
most stable of the Spanish American governments. Dawson attri-
buted this unique phenomenon to several factors: the landed 
aristocracy had been interested in cultivating their farms and 
in peace rather than in taxing the poverty stricken; the people 
were industrious and "naturally inclined toward industrial 
progress" and were not easily led into following a revolutionary 
chief; finally, the country itself was compact not geographi-
cally divided up like Argentina and Colombia. 79 Furthermore, 
he foresaw no repetition of the internal strife which had 
rocked the country at the beginning of the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. Rather, there would be a continuation of 
77Ibid., II, 132. 78Ibid., p. 129. 79Ibid., pp. 189-190. 
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the historical political stability. 80 Similar optimistic 
predictions were given for the economic and political develop-
ments of Bolivia, Ecuador, Venzuela, and Colombia. 81 
In addition to the historcial treatment of the countries 
of South America and the optimistic prognosis for their future 
political and economic development, Dawson at least gives a 
hint of his thoughts on United States involvement in Latin 
Americao In view of the concern he showed for the expansion 
of United States trade in Brazil while serving as Secretary 
of the Legation and the interest he had in the economic develop-
ment of the South American countries as indicated in his his-
torical treatment of them, it is not surprising that he hoped 
,1 
to see United States influence and trade expand along the 
west coast of the continent once the Panama Canal was opened. 
He felt that a predominance of influence and trade was "justly 
due the United States' geographical proximity and political 
sympathy." 82 Moreover, he felt that "every patriotic American" 
must hope to see the strong intellectual, financial, and com-
merical influence of the European nations "supplemented by 
. 83 American schools, money, and commercial enterprise." 
In view of Dawson's work during his next assignment 
in the Dominican Republic, it is interesting to note his 
attitude towards the problem of European intervention to force 
SOibid., pp. 228-29. 
Slibid., pp. 278, 281, 342-43, 399, 472. 
82Ibid., p. v. 83rbid. 
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a Latin .American nation to pay its foreign debts and claims. 
This problem arose in 1902 when the Venezuelan dictator 
Cipriano Castro refused to settle foreign claims, and units 
of the British and German navies blockaded Venezuelan ports, 
bombarded the coast and sank two Venezuelan boats. While not 
giving an all inclusive solution for the problem of default 
by a Latin American nation on its foreign obligations in 
writing of the Venezuelan crisis, Dawson observed that in this 
instance, arbitration was "certainly the best method of adjust-
t 11
84 
men • However, his view on the occupation of territory by 
a European power in order to force the Latin American state to 
comply was quite clear: he opposed it. He wrote that such 
action "by European powers might give the latter a military 
hold in the western continent which would embarrass and corn-
. plicate more important relations." 85 
Probably just about the time he was completing the 
second volume of his history, the revolution occurred in 
Panama which enabled that former Colombian province to become 
an independent state and thus permitted the United States to 
undertake the building of the trans-isthmian canal in Panama. 
His treatments of the historical development of Colombia and 
Panama and of the events surrounding the revolution are clearly 
designed to justify the revolution in Panama and the action of 
the United States in supporting it. He begins his argument 
84Ibid., p. 398. 85rbi'd., 398 99 pp. - • 
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by maintaining that geographically and historically Panama was 
not part of "Colombia proper. 1186 Moreover, to "Colombia 
proper" the building of a trans-isthmian canal was of no 
special conunercial interest since it "has its outlet down the 
Magdalena to the Caribbean. • . . Concerning the Hay-
Herran Treaty, Dawson implies that the Colombian Government 
was at fault for the Colombian Senate's failure to ratify 
the treaty and should have done something to secure ratifica-
tion. 88 This failure, according to him, blackened Colombia 
in the eyes of the civilized world and constituted an injustice 
to the people of Panama. Referring to the Colombian Govern-
ment's attempt to negotiate a new treaty after the rejection 
of the Hay-Herran Treaty, he wrote: 
The United States, however, absolutely refused to con-
sider any ot:her terms than those already agreed upon, and 
the civilized world saw the completion.of an enterprise 
promising incalculable benefits to mankind indefinitely 
postponed by the opposition of Andean provinces whom the 
accidents of war and international politics had given an 
arbitrary control over a region with which they had no 
natural connection. The situation was particularly hard 
for the people of the Isthmus, whose confident hopes were 
now disappointed of at last receiving, by the prosperity 
which would follow the building of the canal some compensa-
tion for the oppression and losses they had suffered during 
the eighty years of misrule by the Bogota oligarchies.89 
Moreover, he clearly supported the action of the United States 
Government in lending its support to the revolutionary forces 
and in denying the use of the trans-isthmian railroad to 
86Ibi"d., 405 06 pp. - • 87Ibid., p. 470. 
88~., p. 486. 89~., pp. 486-87. 
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Colombian troops in Colon, and thereby preventing them from 
reaching the scene of the rebellion in Panama City. His justi-
fication is based on the assumption that the United States 
was authorized to act thusly under the Bidlack Treaty of 1846, 
between the United States and Gran Colombia. 90 
Dawson's arguments, of course, overlook several equally 
important factors. He makes no mention of the fact that the 
Colombian Senate was at complete liberty to reject or ratify 
any treaty as it alone saw fit. 91 Moreover, in stressing the 
need of the canal he chose to disregard the existence of an 
alternate route through Nicaragua which was still available. 92 
In maintaining that the action of the United States was.justi-
fied under the treaty of 1846, he further overlooked the fact 
that while not interpreted as protecting Colombia from Panamanian 
. secession, by this treaty Washington did recognize Colombian 
sovereignty over the isthmus. Therefore, it hardly seems 
just to interpret the treaty in such a way as to prevent the 
I f ff ' 1 d l ' ' h h 1 t . 9 3 Bogota Government rom e ective y ea ing wit t e revo u ion. 
9oibid., pp. 487-88. 
91J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States Latin 
American Relations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 
251 •. For a more detailed analysis of this point see, E. Taylor 
Parks, Colombia and the United States 1765-1934 (Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1935), pp. 406-12. 
92Mecham, 2£· cit., p. 251. 
93Parks, ~· cit., p. 406. 
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oawson's treatment of the Panamanian episode is probably less 
indicative of a conscious distortion of the facts than it is 
• I 
of a wholehearted and uncritical acceptance of President 
Roosevelt's policy in securing the Panamanian route. 
The six years spent in Brazil as Secretary of the 
Legation served as an apprenticeship for Dawson's latter diplo-
matic career. During this period he had ample opportunity to 
develop his skills as a diplomat. Furthermore, he adequately 
demonstrated his ability to grasp the essentials of a situation 
and to fulfill effectively his instructions and press his 
Government's viewpoint. 
In addition, he achieved a more than passing acquaintance 
I 
with the history of a large part of the area which would occupy 
his attention for the remaining years of his life. While 
recognizing the deficiencies of the countries of South America 
and the problems confronting them, his general outlook for 
their political development was optimistic, perhaps overly so. 
And, economically he saw the South American continent as a 
virtual storehouse of untouched resources. 94 
Concerning his own country's relationship with Latin 
America, his ideas were also taking shape during this period. 
There can be no doubt that he saw South America as a potential 
market for North American goods and a place for the investment 
of capital produced by the growing United States economy. 
94Thomas C. Dawson, "The Caucasian In Brazil," Popular 
Science Monthly, LXIV (April, 1904), 550. 
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Moreover, he willing accepted as just the use of high handed 
methods by the United States Government in its dealings with 
a weaker nation in order to secure what Washington considered 
I 
to be a righteous cause. On the question of making the weaker 
nations of the area behave and fulfill their international 
obligations, he offered no definite solution; but he clearly 
opposed European occupation to secure this objective. Finally, 
while not specifically mentioning it, it is likely that 
Dawson felt that the tremendous resources of South America 
made it imperative that the United States exert a predominant 
influence on that continent. 9S 
Though Dawson's ability and support of United States 
policy would seem to have been adequately demonstrated, pro-
motion was slow in coming. The failure was in the system 
which coupled diplomatic promotion with poiitical patronage, 
rather than in the man. Dawson could either resign in disgust, 
or remain at his post, as he apparently chose to do, hoping 
that either his political patrons or recognition of his ability, 
or perhaps both, would ultimately secure the promotion he 
sought. 
95For Dawson's views on the necessity of controlling 
trade routes, mineral supplies, and food supplies, see ~· 
r 
. CHAPTER III 
ASSIGNMENT TO THE TURBULENT 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: APRIL, 1904 
Dawson's patient waiting for an advancement in the 
diplomatic service was finally rewarded in late April, 1904. 
On the twenty-eighth of the month he received a telegram from 
Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Loomis informing him 
that he had been appointed by President Roosevelt to the newly 
created post of minister to the Dominican Republic, with a 
1 
salary of $5,000 a year. 
The Administration's first choice for this newly 
created post apparently was General Edward C. O'Brien, former 
C ' ' f N ' t' 2 onunissioner o aviga ion. O'Brien, who turned down the 
Dominican post, and his brother John F. O'Brien were prominent 
figures in the New York Republican Party. In March, 1904, 
the General had sought the position of secretary of the 
Isthmian Canal Conunission. At that time, Roosevelt had refused 
1Loomis to Dawson, April 28, 1904, Diplomatic Instruc-
tions of the Department of State 1801-1906: Haiti and Santo 
Domingo. Haiti, National Archives Microfilm Publications, 
Microcopy No. 77 (Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1946) 
[hereafter cited as Diplomatic Instructions to Haiti and Santo 
Domingo], vol. 4, p. 489, roll 98. 
Congress had recessed on April 28, 1904. Consequently, 
Dawson's nomination was not sent to the Senate until December 6, 
1904. His appointment was confirmed on December 8, 1904. 
U.S. Congressional Record, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1904, XXXIX. 
Part 1, 26, 65. 
2The New York Times, April 29, 1904, p. 5. 
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to intervene on his behalf, arguing that the Commission alone 
could select its secretary. In the end O'Brien was not the 
Commission's choice. The O'Briens considered this as a rebuff 
by the President and attempted to use it to add further bitter-
ness to an already existing intra-party feud in the state of 
New York. 3 Therefore, by tendering the newly created post 
in Santo Domingo to General O'Brien, President Roosevelt may 
have been attempting to soothe O'Brien's hurt feelings and 
thus mend political fences in his home state during the presi-
dential election year. 
Although Dawson may have been officially second on the 
list to receive the appointment to the Dominican Republic, 
there can be little doubt that he was the preferred choice of 
the Department of State. In a memorandum on conditions in 
. the Dominican Republic, dated March 19, 1904, Assistant Sec-
retary Loomis, who had recently returned from a trip to the 
republic, observed the need for an independent diplomatic 
post in Santo Domingo. Loomis advised the Secretary of State 
that the individual placed in charge of the new legation should 
be "a discreet, experienced, capable man. 114 Certainly, the 
3B. B. Odell to Roosevelt, March 23, 1904, March 30, 
1904;.J. B. Bishop to the President, April 4, 1904; Roosevelt 
to T. c. Platt, March 16, 1904; Roosevelt to John F. O'Brien, 
March 17, 1904. Roosevelt Papers, Series !-Letters received: 
March 17-April 8, 1904, Box 71; Series 2-Letter Books, vol. 46, 
February 25-April 21, 1904, pp. 180-81. 
4 Memorandum For the Secretary of State on the Dominican 
Republic. Present Conditions Observed During a Recent Visit--
Financial situation--Historical Notes--American Interests--Some 
r 
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experience which Dawson had gained while serving as Secretary 
of Legation in Petropolis and the skill and diligence which 
he had demonstrated in filling that post indicate that he pos-
1 
sessed these qualities. 
Dawson's appointment as Resident Minister and Consul-
General to the Dominican Republic brought him to two posts 
which for the previous twenty years had been almost solely 
occupied by Negroes. 5 The practice of successive administra-
tions in Washington to use the combined post~ of Minister to 
Haiti-Charge' to the Dominican Republic, and the position of 
Consul-General in Santo Domingo City as a source of patronage 
for deserving Negroes apparently had led Black politicians 
to consider Hispaniola along with Libera6 as their special 
preserves. To counter any adverse reaction which might be 
produced among the Black community in an election year by 
the appointment of a white man to the newly created posts, the 
Negro educator Booker T. Washington wrote to Roosevelt's 
secretary, William Loeb, offering to release the following 
statement to the Black press: 
Suggestions. Roosevelt Papers, Series I-Letters received: 
March 17-April 8, 1904, Box 71. This memorandum was transmitted 
to Roosevelt by Secretary Hay on March 25, 1904. Hay to the 
President, March 25, 1904, ibid. 
SDavid c. MacMichael, "The United States and the Dominican 
Republic 1871-1940: A cycle in Caribbean Diplomacy" (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of 
Oregon, 1964), p. 79. 
61bid., p. SS. 
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The bill making an appropriation for the establishment of 
a separate legation for San Domingo has passed Congress, 
and it is probable that the President will very soon select 
a Minister for that place. 
It has been learned on good authority that the Presi-
dent had intended appointing a colored men [sic) to the 
ministership, but the Dominicans have diplomatically in-
formed him that they prefer that no Negro be sent to them 
as Minister, at least not for the present. It is further 
stated that because of the complicated and sensitive con-
ditions existing in San Domingo, the President, however, 
may .decide to send a white man to occupy the place tempo-
rarily and later on may appoint a colored man to be the 7 permanent Minister if it should be thought to be desirable. 
From 1889 until Dawson's appointment, Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic had shared the same United States representa-
tive. However, while Port-au-Prince was favored with a lega-
tion and a fully accredited minister, Santo Domingo had to be 
content with part-time and less impressive representation. 
When circumstances required it, the United States minister in' 
the Haitian capital would make the trip to Santo Domingo, 
I 
where he would assume the character of charge d' affaires. 
During his absence, United States representation would be left 
in the hands of its consular agents in that republic. 
Though the Dominican Government did not consider this 
arrangement to be fully in accord with its desired prestige, 8 
the United States found it reasonably satisfactory for a number 
of years. In the spring of 1904, however, the Roosevelt 
7Booker T. Washington to Wm. Loeb, Jr., April 28, 1904, 
Roosevelt Papers, Series !-Letters received, April 9-29, 1904, 
Box 72. 
8Edgar c. Duin, "Dominican-American Relations, 1895-
1907" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of History, 
Georgetown, 1955), pp. 17-18. 
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Administration decided that full time representation was required 
in the Dominican capital. An appropriation for the combined 
' 
post of Minister Resident and Consul-General in the Dominican 
Republic was secured in the Deficiency Appropriations Act of 
9 April 27, 1904. 
The decision to establish an independent diplomatic 
mission in the Dominican Republic doubtless arose from the 
desire of the Administration in Washington to be assured of a 
steady flow of reliable information at a time when the prospect 
of greater United States involvement in the affairs of the 
ubl . b . . . t 10 Rep ic was ecoming more imminen • This involvement was 
believed by some to be necessary in view of the chaotic condi-
tions prevailing in the Caribbean nation. The Government to 
which Dawson was informed he had been accredited was, in the 
. spring of 1904, still in the process of attaining control over 
the entire country. Moreover, the Republic was deeply in debt 
and on the verge of bankruptcy with its foreign creditors 
and their governments clamoring for payment. · 
In 1844, the eastern two-thirds of the island of 
Hispaniola emerged as the independent state of the Dominican 
Republic. For the next thirty-eight years the country's 
9Hay to Powell, June 14, 1904, No. 250, Diplomatic 
Instructions to Haiti and Santo Domingo, Haiti, vol. 4, roll 98. 
10Memorandum For the Secretary of State on the Dominican 
Republic. Present Conditions Observed During a Recent Visit 
• • • • Roosevelt Papers, Series 1-Letters received: March 17-
April 8, 1904, Box 71. 
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history was marked by alternating revolution and strong arm 
rule. The ascension of Ulysses Heureaux to the presidency in 
1882 temporarily altered this course by eliminating the kalei-
1 
doscopic changes for the next seventeen years. Heureaux's 
first administration, 1882-1884, lacked the political oppres-
sion and financial instability which characterized his later 
regime. In 1886, he was able to secure his reelection to the 
presidency. By means of political preferment, bribery, exile, 
imprisonment or assassination, he was able t? retain control 
11 of the government for the next thirteen years. 
While the respite from internal upheavals provided by 
Heureaux's Government brought a degree of prosperity to the 
C 'bb bl' 12 t th t' h' . t f' . 1 ari ean repu ic, a e same ime is inep inancia 
1 . ' 1 d ' . tab'l't 13 Wh h t th po icies e to economic ins i i y. en e came o e 
presidency the Dominican Republic already had an outstanding 
foreign bonded debt.resulting from a loan made by British 
bankers in the 1860's. This loan, known as the Hartmont loan, 
was refunded in 1888, when Heureaux was able to obtain a new 
loan from the Dutch firm of Westendrop and Company. To assure 
that the new loan would be paid, the Dominican Government 
turned the collection of the custom revenues--the principal 
source of the Government's income--over to a board known as 
11
sumner Welles, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican 
Republic 1844-1924, Vol. I (New York: Payson & Clarke Ltd., 1928), 
pp. 449-50, 455-56, 461-62. 
Future 
12
otto Schoenrich, Santo Domi~go a Country with a 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918), pp. 70-71. 
13 Wells, 2£· cit., pp. 467-68. 
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the Caja de Recaudacicin or simply the regie. This board, 
consisting of representatives of the Dutch banking firm, in 
addition to collecting the custom duties deducted the amount 
necessary to pay the bondholders and remitted the remainder 
to the Government. 14 
Two years after the initial bond issue under the 
Westendrop agreement, the firm floated another loan for the 
Dominican Government, this time to finance a railroad between 
the port of Puerto Plata and the major northern inland city of 
Santiago. For several months, the interest on the bonds were 
met. However, before long the Heureaux Administration again 
found itself in need of money. To meet this need, the Presi-
dent devised a new plan. His scheme consisted of_ granting 
local importers exemption from tariff duties in return for 
the advancement of a sum of cash. The natural outcome was 
that insufficient funds came ·into the hands of the regie and 
the bonds went into default in 1892. 15 
When Heureaux sought another loan, the Dutch firm which 
had almost been ruined by the recent default was unable to 
comply with the request. Moreover, by now, Westendrop and 
Company, eager to divest itself of its Dominican interests, 
sought the aid of a group of New York attorneys in negotiating 
a transfer of the Company's interests, including the right to 
141bid., pp. 469-70. Schoenrich, ~· cit., p. 355. 
15 Welles,~· cit., p. 494. Schoenrich, ~· cit., 
pp. 355-56. 
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collect the customs, to the United States Government. When· 
this scheme failed, Messrs. Smith w. Weed, Brown and Wells, 
the attorneys involved, organized the San Domingo Improvement 
Company of New York, incorporated under the laws of New Jersey. 
This new corporation assumed the obligations and rights of the 
Westendrop firm. Among these rights, of course, was included 
the regie. Eventually, the Improvement Company organized two 
subsidiary corporations, the San Domingo Finance Company and 
the Company of the Central Dominican Railway. 16 
The Improvement Company's contribution to the "improve-
mene' of the country during the next seven years was limited 
to completing the Puerto Plata-Santiago railroad, which had 
been started under the supervision of Westendrop. The Company, 
however, did serve to tide the Heureaux regime over financially • 
. In addition to the original bonds, which were issued in 1893 
to serve in the refunding of the Westendrop loans, further 
issues were made in 1893, 1894, and 1895. All were issued at 
rates favorable to the Company. By 1897, as a result of heavy 
borrowing for military supplies and deflection of customs 
revenues away from the regie, the previously issued bonds were 
again in default and the government in dire need of money. 
Eventually, the older bonds were refunded; but attempts of 
the Improvement Company to float another bond issue proved 
futile. To resolve his financial problems, Heureaux issued 
16
schoenrich, ~· cit., pp. 355-56. 
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paper currency which depreciated almost as quickly as it was 
. t d 17 prin e • 
Heureaux's regime came to an end with his assassination 
I I 
in 1899. His financial policies, particularly the issuance of 
fiat money, did not ingratiate him to the merchant class with-
in the Republic. Undoubtedly, this factor contributed to 
his end. Nevertheless, the financial situation was not the 
sole cause for the dictator's demise. Those involved inthe 
assass:iration had been plotting his overthrow, for sometime, 
and many of the conspirators had suffered personally at the 
hands of the President. 18 
The revolution, which followed the death of Heureaux, 
resulted in the emergence to prominence of two men, Juan 
. d . / d . / h . f 11 Isi ro Jimenez an Horacio Vasquez. T eir o ewers were 
respectively known as Jimenistas and Horacistas. The Govern-
. . I . d I • ment established with Jimenez as presi ent and Vasquez as vice 
president ended in revolution in 1902. A Horacista victory 
1 I . 'd p aced Vasquez in the presi ency. 
As a result of strong public sentiment against the 
Improvement Company at the beginning of his brief administration, 
17Ibid., p. 357. 
18
welles, ~· cit., pp. 535-537. Dawson to Secretary of 
State, October 1B,--r90~enclosure: "Chronology of political 
events in Santo Domingo," Papers Relatin7 to the Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States, 1906 Part 1 Washington, D. c.: 
Government Printing Office, 1909), p. 591. [Hereafter Papers 
Relatin to the Forei n Relations of the United States shall be 
cited as FRUS, wi the appropriate year. 
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. / Jimenez determined to terminate the realtionship between the 
company and the Dominican Government. Negotiations to achieve 
this end were undertaken with Judge John T. Abbott, the vice 
president of the Improvement Company. For its part, the Improve-
ment Company was not averse to withdrawing from the Republic 
provided that its original investment could be repaid. 19 These 
negotiations came to nothing, since Jim~nez changed his mind 
and decided to arrange a new agreement with the Company allow-
ing it to retain the control of the regie. Jime"nez probably 
hoped to use the North American corporation as a counter balance 
to other foreign creditors who were beginning to exert con-
siderable pressure on his Government in order to secure payment 
20 
of the amounts due them. 
The new contract between the Company and the Dominican 
Republic, signed in March and ratified by the Dominican Congress 
on April 18, 1900, was to be valid only if the Company were 
able, among other things, to secure the consent of the majority 
of the bondholders to suspend payments on the bonds and to 
agree to a refunding. In spite of its contention that the 
majority of the foreign bondholders had agreed to this pro-
vision, the Company, in fact, did not secure the support of 
the French and Belgian creditors. When the Dominican Govern-
ment learned the truth of the matter, it immediately notified 
19
welles, ~· cit., II, 559-60. 
20MacMichael, ~· cit., pp. 148-149. 
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the Company that the money collected by the regie was not to be 
distributed until it could be definitely ascertained if the 
majority of the bondholders agreed with the arrangement. The 
Improvement Company, maintaining that it represented the 
majority of the foreign creditors, refused to accept the Govern-
ment's orders. The ultimate result of this dispute was the 
issuance of a decree by the Government in January, 1901, depriv-
ing the Improvement Company of the right to continue its col-
l t . f th t d th . 21 ec ion o e cus om revenues un er e regie. 
The United States Department of State, since the begin-
ning of the McKinley Administration, had been taking a progres-
sively more active interest in the protection of the burgeon-
ing interest of United States citizens in the Dominican 
Republic. 22 However, it was not until early 1901 that the 
· Department of State began to take an active interest in the 
dispute between the Company and the Dominican Government. 
Previously, the Department had merely maintained that in any 
settlement the rights of the United States bondholders should 
not be prejudiced. 23 But, with the decree depriving the Company 
of the right to collect the customs under the regie, Secretary 
of State Hay instructed William F. Powell, who represented 
the United States at both Port-au-Prince and Santo Domingo, to 
21welles, 22.· cit., II, 560-63. 
22MacMichael, 22.• cit., pp. 120-21, 124-125. 
23
welles, 22.· cit., II, 563. 
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of fer the good off ices of the Department on behalf of the 
Improvement Company. Powell, always eager to press United 
states claims, 24 interpr~ting his instructions somewhat more 
1 1 I 
strongly than Hay intended, presented the Jimenez Government 
with a harshly worded note demanding a settlement favorable to 
the Improvement Company. Although this course of action met 
with the Department's disapproval, Powell was instructed to 
continue the negotiations. 25 
Temporarily interrupted by the Horacista revolution, 
the negotiations were eventually resumed and resulted in the 
Company agreeing to accept $4,500,000 for its properties in 
the Republic. These consisted of national bonds valued at 
$2,000,000, interest in the railroad from Puerto Plata to 
Santiago valued at $1,500,000, and interest in the bankrupt 
National Bank and other investments valued' at $1,000,000. 
However, the inability of the opposing parties to come to an 
agreement with regard to inunediate transfer of the Company's 
railroad to the Government and governmental inspection of the 
Company's records led to a break in the negotiations. This 
impasse was finally resolved when the Department instructed 
Powell to suggest arbitration. On January 31, 1903, a protocol 
was signed in which the Dominican Government agrea:lto pay 
24Ibid., p. 559. MacMichael, ~· cit., pp. 144-45. 
25Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in 
The Caribbean 1900-1921 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1964), pp. 82-84. 
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$4,500,000 and the Company promised to withdraw after turning 
over the railroad and its other properties to the Government. 
The rate of payment and the timetable for the transfer of 
properties were to be set by a board of arbitration whose mem-
bership was to consist of an appointee of the President of the 
United States, an appointee of the Dominican President, and 
a third member jointly appointed by the two chief executives. 
If, however, within sixty days after the signing of the protocol 
the third arbitrator had not been named he was to be selected 
from among the members of the United States federal judicary. 26 
This was the practice ultimately followed. 
Within two months of the signing of the arbitration 
I . 
I protocol, the Vasquez Government was overthrown by General Wos 
y Gil. Before the end of the year Wos y Gil himself had been 
. forced out by a coalition of Jimenistas and Horacistas. 
General Carlos F. Morales emerged from these tumults more or 
less victoriously. Originally a Jimenista, he had deserted 
his former chief. As soon as his forces controlled a large 
portion of the country, Morales established a coalition 
cabinet composed of both Horacistas and thoseJimenistas who 
supported him. 
26welles, ~· cit., II, 585-86. Munro, op. cit., pp. 
84-5. Protocol of an agreement between the Unitea States of 
America and the Dominican Republic, for the submission to 
arbitration of certain questions as to the payment of sum here-
inafter agreed to be paid by the Dominican Government to the 
Government of the United States on account of the claims of 
the San Domingo Improvement Company of New York, a corporation 
under the laws of the State of New Jersey and a citizen of the 
United States and its allied companies, FRUS, 1904, p. 271. 
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On December 3, 1903, Miguel E. Alfau, Morales' foreign 
minister, requested recognition by the United States charg/ in 
Santo Domingo. Powell made recognition contingent on the ac-
ceptance of certain provisions. The new Government would have 
to recognize the validity of the Improvement Company's arbitra-
tion protocol and several other claims which he had been pressing. 
Moreover, Morales would have to promise to send a conunission 
I to Washington to negotiate the transfer of Samana and Manzanillo 
Bays to the United State~ and the introduction of some measure 
of North American control of the Dominican finances. When 
Powell received assurance that the revolutionary Government 
would accept these provisions, he proceeded to recognize 
Morales without awaiting further in~tructions from Washington. 27 
Powell's recognition of the Morales Government came as 
somewhat of a surprise to the State Department. The policy in 
Washington was clearly one of wait and see. Following the 
standard procedure in such cases, recognition was to be with-
held until the revolutionary regime indicated that it had con-
trol of the country. Nevertheless, Powell's recognition, once 
extended, was not withdrawn. 28 
An examination of the State Department's files of the 
instructions sent to Powell during the months of December, 1903 
27Munro, ~· cit., pp. 88-89. FROS, 1904, pp. 262-66. 
28Loomis to Powell, January 9, 1904, January 17, 1904, 
FRUS, 1904, p. 265. Hay to Powell, January 20, 1904; Loomis to 
Powell, January 27, 1904, Diplomatic Instructions to Haiti and 
Santo Domingo, Haiti, vol. 4, roll 98. Munro, ~· cit., p. 89. 
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and January, 1904, does not indicate that Powell had been 
instructed to demand a treaty between the United States and 
2·9 the Dominican Republic. . It would seem, therefore, that the 
I 
idea of a treaty was strictly his own. Nevertheless, the think-
ing in Washington was changing and the suggestion was perhaps 
welcomed. The Dominican Commission submitted its proposals 
to the State Department on February 3, 1904. These included 
concession of naval and coaling stations for the United States 
I 
at Samana and Manzanillo Bays and the right of the United States 
. ' 
to build lighthouses along the Dominican coast in return for 
the United States assuming the full domestic and foreign debt 
of the Republic, helping to maintain order and assisting in 
t . 1 t' 30 preven ing revo u ions. 
The willingness of Morales to permit his nation's 
sovereignty to be violated, as it surely would be if the United 
States were to accept the treaty, which was brought to Washing-
ton by the new Dominican Foreign Minister, Juan Francisco 
I Sanchez, doubtless came from the President's realization that 
his Government was in danger from internal revolution and 
external intervention. His forces had not yet been able to 
gain the loyalty of the entire country. The northern section 
of the nation remained especially hard to bring under control. 
Furthermore, the possibility of intervention by a European 
29Diplomatic Instructions to Haiti and Santo Domingo, 
Haiti, vol. 4, roll 98. Munro, ~· cit., p. 88. 
30Munro, ~· cit., pp. 89-90. 
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power in order to secure the payment of debts owed its nationals 
appeared likely. One possible source of this intervention was 
a contract signed by the Dominican Government with the French 
and Belgian bondholders in 1901. This contract, which pro-
vided for a reduction in the amount due the bondholders, 
stipulated that the custom revenues from the ports of Santo 
I 
Domingo and San Pedro de Macoris were to represent security 
for the payment of the debt. That the French and Belgian 
Governments might demand the revenues from the assigned ports 
was not out of the question, since the Governments preceeding 
that of Morales had failed to meet payment on the obligations. 
In addition, the German, Spanish and Italian Governments had 
I 
pressured the Dominican Government into signing agreements 
in 1903 providing specific payments for the claims of their 
·nationals against the Dominican Republic. ·As these had not 
been honored, it was possible that these Governments might 
begin to bring pressure upon Morales in order to force him to 
pay, or suffer the lose of some customhouses. In May, 1904, 
the Italian Government insisted upon the Morales Government 
signing a protocol which provided that the revenues from the 
/ port o~ Samana would be devoted to the payment of the Italian 
. . 31 
claims. 
If Morales saw greater United States involvement in the 
31Dawson to the President, July 1, 1905, "Memorandum on 
the Dominican Modus Vivendi, Its Effects up to the Present Time, 
and the Reasons That Ledto its Adoption," FRUS, 1905, pp. 386-87. 
l 
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affairs of his country as the solution to pressing internal and 
international problems, several United States officials with 
interventionist or annexationist tendencies appeared eager to 
listen to his plans. As indicated, William F. Powell, the 
I United States charge in Santo Domingo, was one of these. His 
ultimate objective was annexation. In mid-March he sent the 
Department of State a lenghty despatch containing his thoughts 
on that topic. Rejecting forcible annexation as impractical, 
Powell suggested a plan which he hoped would ultimately lead 
t 
the Republic along the path of voluntary annexation to the 
United States. The first step in his plan was to secure 
Morales' consent for the United States to control all the 
I 
customhouses. The funds collected were to be divided between 
the Government and its creditors, thus eliminating or diminish-
. ing foreign dissatisfaction. Moreover, with United States 
control, revolutions would diminish, for insurrgents would be 
unable to seize the customhouses. The United States would 
also be in a position, Powell claimed, to influence the govern-
ment to effect beneficial reforms. As prosperity came to the 
country, the Dominicans would see the advantages of close 
association with the United States and voluntarily seek union 
ith th t N th Am . ubl' 32 w e grea or erican rep ic. 
Francis B. Loomis, Assistant Secretary of State, was 
another official favoring further intervention in Dominican 
32Powell to Hay, March 14, 1904, No. 796, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 11, roll 11. 
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· affairs. Desiring more information before making a final 
I decision on the treaty that Sanchez had proposed, President 
Roosevelt sent a commission headed by Admiral Dewey to investi-
1 I 
gate conditions in the Dominican Republic. Loomis, a member 
of this commission, met with Morales. In the course of their 
meeting, the question of possible United States control of the 
Dominican customhouses was discussed. The Dominican Government 
had originally intended to include this proposition among the 
proposals sent to Washington in February, but had dropped it 
I 
before sending its commission. By March 16, 1904, however, 
Morales was willing to add this provision to his earlier 
. 33 
suggestion. 
When Loomis returned to Washington, he prepared a memoran-
dum on the conditions he had observed. This document was sub-
mitted to the Secretary of State for his consideration. The 
analysis which the Assistant Secretary presented was pessi-
mistic. While acknowledging that the Morales Government was 
growing stronger, he noted that it still was unable to control 
the entire country. He contended, in fact, that "the Dominican 
Republic is approaching--if it has not already reached--a 
state of anarchy." Moreover, as a result of the disorders 
that the Republic was experiencing, sugar plantations owned by 
United States citizens had suffered considerable damage. There 
can be no doubt that Loomis had little sympathy for the 
33Munro, ~· cit., pp. 90-91. Powell to Loomis, March 
16, 1904, telegram, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, 
vol. 11, roll 11. 
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' politicians who were formenting incessant civil wars. He 
observed: 
The frequent and sometimes bloody civil wars in the 
Dominican Republic are not the outgrowth of an honest 
difference of opinion or of a conflict of ideas or of 
the defense or assertion of some principle of policy of 
governmental action, but are shameless sordid struggles 
for the privileges of controlling customhouses and dis-
posing of their revenues. The country is largely in the 
grasp.of desperately selfish irresponsible political 
brigands. Many of these guerrilla leaders are little 
better than savages cs far as their ideas of property 
rights and the3{ights of those weaker than themselves are concerned. · 
Although Loomis remarked that among "the conservative 
property-owning and industrious people of the country" annex-
ation to the United States was evidently favored, he himself 
did not suggest this alternative. Instead, he regarded 
United States control of the customhouses as the ultimate solu-
tion to the incessant revolutions. By controlling the ports 
of entry and collecting the customs, the United States would be 
denying this source of revenue to the potential revolutionaries. 
Morales, Loomis reported, was in accord with this view of the 
situation. The Assistant Secretary felt certain that the 
money collected from the customhouses would be adequate during 
the first year to meet both the Dominican bu~get and the 
interest on the foreign debts. This last point was worthy of 
special consideration, since as a result of heavy foreign 
34Memorandum For the Secretary of State on the Dominican 
Republic. Present Conditions Observed During a Recent Visit •• 
Roosevelt Papers, Series 1-Letters received: March 17-April 8, 
1904, Box .71. 
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investments and equally heavy debts owed to foreigners, 
European Governments were reluctant to refrain from interfer-
. ' 
ring in the affairs of the Dominican Republic. 35 
So far as the immediate situation was concerned, Loomis 
believed that the status quo could be maintained, "with due 
protection to American interest," if Commander Alfred Dilling-
ham, a United States naval officer who had considerable experi-
ence in dealing with the chaotic Dominican situation, were 
placed in charge of the waters around the Republic and had 
three ships at his disposal. The possibility of United States 
control of the customhouses was not rejected but merely put 
off for the time bei~g. When and if such action were considered 
necessary, Loomis thought that this could be achieved without 
massive military intervention. However, a marine guard might 
·be needed at every port for several months: In the meantime, 
he suggested that an independent diplomatic post be created in 
Santo Domingo. In transmitting this memorandum to President 
Roosevelt, Secretary Hay especially noted the Loomis suggestions 
concerning the immediate action to be taken and the possi-
bility of eventual United States control of the customhouses. 36 
By March 29, Roosevelt had decided to reject the treaty 
I proposed by Sanchez, including the subsequent addition of 
United States control of the Dominican custom revenues. 
35Ibid. 
36
rbid. Hay to the President, March 25, 1904, Roosevelt 
Papers, serreB 1-Letters received: March 17-April 8, 1904, Box 71. 
Powell's observations on annexation had no effect on the 
decision, for his despatch did not arrive in Washington 
until April 2. The Loomis memorandum, however, undoubtedly 
i i 
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influenced this decision; for, while foreseeing the advantages 
of eventual North American control of the Dominican custom-
houses, the Assistant Secretary had noted that it was possible 
for the time being to maintain the status quo. That the Presi-
dent had determined to do just that, postponing rather than 
rejecting a form of United States interventi~n, is clearly 
demonstrated in the exchange of letters between Roosevelt and 
Hay at the time. Informing Roosevelt that Sanchez had been 
notified of the United States' rejection of the idea of a 
treaty, Hay wrote: 
I saw General scinchez yesterday, and gave him his coul 
de grace. He bore his doom like a soldier and a gent e-
man. He rose and said: "When I came here my hope was in 
·the generous good will of the American people. Now my 
only hope is in God", which he seemed to regard as an 
inadequate compensation.37 
Roosevelt replied: 
I I am really touched about poor General Sanchez. Do you 
think it will restore his trust in Provide~ge if he is 
given a hint to come back in eight months. 
During the subsequent three months, Morales was able to 
consolidate his position. In April, with only the port of 
Monte Cristi and the surrounding area remaining in the hands 
of his Jimenista opponents, he believed himself secure enough 
37Hay to Roosevelt, March 30, .1904, ibid. 
38Roosevelt to Hay, March 30, 1904, Roosevelt Papers, 
Series 4 B-Letters of Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay. 
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to issue a decree setting elections for the end of May. 
result of these elections, he was chosen constitutional presi-
dent of the Republic. The Monte Cristi problem was.partially 
resolved when the revolutionary troops, commanded by Generals 
I 
oesiderio Arias and Demetrio Rodriguez, reached an agreement, 
on June 10, with General Cespedes, the representative of the 
Morales Government. 39 
The agreement between the Jimenistas and the Government 
in Santo Domingo had been reached as a result of the mediation 
by Commander Alfred Dillingham, the captain of the u.s.s. 
Detroit, which had been stationed in Dominican waters for 
sanetime to protect United States citizens and their property 
during the disturbances in the Republic. During his tour of 
duty off the coast of Hispaniola, Dillingham had considered 
it necessary to intervene several times between the opposing 
forces. Nevertheless, if Powell's word on the matter can be 
accepted as true, there was "no officer in the American Navy 
more popular with the Dominican people. . . . 
The agreement which Dillingham presided over in early 
June, 1904, did not actually strengthen the Morales Government. 
In effect, Monte Cristi province was recognized as a virtually 
independent area, with General Arias as governor and responsible 
for maintaining order. Arias, in return, promised to collect 
39Munro, 2£· cit., p. 94. Welles, ~· cit., II, p. 610. 
40Powell to Hay, April 29, 1904, No. 857, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 11, roll 11. 
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and turn over to the Government all weapons held by the irisur-
gents. This unsatisfactory arrangement failed to resolve the 
• i 
basic issues between Arias and Morales. Arias felt that his 
position was in jeopardy, while Morales feared that his oppo-
nents would use the province of Monte Cristi as a base to 
begin a revolt whenever they believed that the time was 
41 
opportune. 
These long range consequences obviously did not appear 
to Dillingham. In fact, he contended that the liberal terms 
granted by the Morales' Government was "a wise policy. • • 
and a very excellent stroke by Cespades because it has placed 
the insurgents so under obligation to the government, that 
they have become ardent supporters of it." This severe case 
of myopia on the part of the Commander is easily understood if 
.one realizes that Dillingham was looking at the situation 
solely from the vantage point of the United States. Inter-
vention by the naval forces of the United States in order to 
secure peace in the Dominican Republic was, Dillingham main-
tained, encouraging the Dominicans to believe that the United 
States was planning to come to their aid. This encouragement 
would help Morales to stay in power, until the United States 
could in fact give that aid. Evidently, Dillingham believed 
that that time would come in December, after the United States 
Congress had met. Moreover, North American intervention, the 
41
welles, ~· cit., II, 610-11. 
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commander asserted, served to show "foreign powers that the 
United States considers it its own affair to look after this 
Republic, and so lo~g as we continue this policy, there is 
I 
no danger from any other power in Santo Domingo." 42 
Thus by the spring of 1904, the prospect of greater 
United States involvement in the Dominican Republic had been 
fully considered and rejected, at least temporarily, by the 
Roosevelt Administration. Clearly this rejection was not the 
result of any official Dominican opposition ~o the idea. To 
the contrary, President Morales had indicated that he was most 
receptive to the idea. The decision not to become more involved 
in the Dominican Republic was probably the result of two factors. 
In the first place with a presidential campaign facing him, 
Roosevelt probably was reluctant to offer his political oppo-
nents an opportunity to assail him by presuing a too aggressive 
policy in the Dominican Republic. 43 Furthermore, from the 
reports that the State Department was forwarding to the White 
House, it appeared that the situation in that Caribbean 
republic were becoming more settled and that immediate inter-
vention was probably necessary neither to preserve order nor to 
42secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State, June 
24, 1904, transmitting Dillingham to Secretary of Navy, June 5-
10, 1904. Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State, 
National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 179 
(Washington, D._c.: National Archives, 1964) [hereafter cited 
as Miscellaneous Letters], June 22-30, 1904, roll 1215. 
43oexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine 1867-1907 (Balti-
more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), p. 419. 
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thwart European intervention. For the time being, the Administra-
tion in Washington would content itself with creating an 
independent diplomatic post in Santo Domingo, thereby assuring 
both an adequate flow of information from Santo Domingo and 
proper direction of any future negotiations, and the stationing 
of naval vessels off the coast of the Republic. 
Dawson arrived in New York, from his Brazilian post, on 
June 7, 1904, and remained in the United States about two weeks 
before departing for his new assignment. During his stay in 
the United States he spent some time familiarizing himself 
with the correspondence between the Department of State and 
Washington's previous representatives in Santo Domingo. In 
addition, he doubtless received instructions to make an exten-
sive tour of the Dominican Republic and an intensive study of 
the financial situation prevailing in the Republic. 44 
44Hay to Dawson, June 14, 1904, No. 1, Diplomatic 
Instructions of the Department of State, Dominican Republic, 
National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 77 
(Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1946) [hereafter cited 
as Diplomatic Instructions to Santo Domingo], vol. 1, pp. 1-3, 
roll 98. 
· CHAPTER IV 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IMPROVEMENT COMPANY AWARD: 
JULY _14, 1904 - DECEMBER 28, 1904 
Dawson's arrival in the Dominican Republic was more 
like that of a proconsul sent to rule an extra-territorial 
possession than that of a diplomat sent to represent one sov-
ereign government before another equally sovereign government. 
He arrived at Puerto Plata, situated on the north coast of the 
island, on the morning of June 29. There he found Admiral 
c. D. Sigsbee, Commander-in-Chief of the Caribbean squadron 
of the United States Navy, awaiting him with the flagship the 
u.s.s. Newark and other ships of the squadron. During the next 
two weeks Dawson ·accompanied by Admiral Sigsbee and other 
naval officers visited the important coastal towns and several 
·. -
of the major towns of the interior. On July 13, the newly 
appointed minister and his naval escort headed for the Haitian 
capital. Arriving there on July 15, Dawson spent sometime 
discussing matters in the Dominican Republic with Minister 
Powell and in meeting the important figures in Haitian political 
and diplomatic circles. After receiving the Legation's archives 
from Powell, Dawson and his companions finally set sail for 
Santo Domingo City. 1 
1Dawson to Hay, July 6, 1904, No. 3; July 28, 1904, Nos. 
6 and 7, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 11, roll 11. 
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The Caribbean squadron conveying Minister Dawson to· his 
post arrived off the Dominican caiptal on the twentieth of 
July. Arrangements were quickly made for his formal presenta-
I I 
tion to President Morales on the twenty-third of the month. On 
the day of his formal presentation, Dawson accompanied by 
Sigsbee and all the captains of the ships in the squadron 
left the Newark to the salute of the flagship's. guns. Arriving 
at the quay they were met by members of the President's staff 
and thence conveyed to the Government Palace for the official 
. 2 
ceremonies. 
Dawson's extended tour had afforded him the opportunity 
to meet many of the major political and commerical figures in 
the Republic, and undoubtedly he 'had some contact with the 
common people. At any rate his initial impression of the 
Dominican people was favorable. He found them to be "polite, 
kind, frank and brave." Moreover, he believed that "with a 
settled government they"would prosper. 3 
2Dawson to Hay, July 28, 1904, No. 8, ibid. 
3Dawson to Hay, August 9, 1904, No. 9, enclosure 4: 
Dawson to Petit, ibid. 
Dawson's favorable impression is in stark contrast to 
that of Admiral Sigsbee. The Admiral, strongly influenced by 
racial theories, had little hope for the progress of the Dom-
inicans or, as far as he was concerned, for any of the Latin 
American Republics. The only hope for these areas, he main-
tained, was a strong influx of foreign innnigration and foreign 
domination. Regarding the Dominican Republic he had the follow-
ing observations to make: 
"The population of San Domingo is wholly of ml.xed blood 
--the blood of the crude tropical negro, with the blood of the 
retrograde Spaniard. The parent stock in Spain is retro-
grade, and by reason of life in the tropics, the off-shoot in 
San Domingo is still more so, even in its nearest approach to 
,... 
[ 
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In spite of his rather unorthodox, if not somewhat men-
acing, arrival at his new post, Dawson evidently did not make 
an unfavorable impression upon those with whom he came into con-
tact. He and his naval escort were cordially received in all of 
the cities where they stopped. 4 However, the reception in Monte 
Cristi was perhaps cool. 5 The favorable impression that Dawson 
left on the Dominicans was echoed by one of the leading news-
papers of Santo Domingo Cith whose editor described Dawson as 
"un hombre de aspecto muy simpatico. 116 
One of the first problems that confronted Dawson when 
he arrived in the Dominican Republic was implementing the 
arbitration award settling the claims of the Santo Domingo 
purity. The crossing of the tropical Spaniard with the tropical 
negro has not served to regenerate the former--indeed, the 
contrary is true.· My observations lead me to the conclusion 
that there is no pure white blood among native Dominicans •••• 
The Spaniard has intense and agressive pride; the negro is 
highly imitative and lacks a sense of proportion. Conjoin 
these qualities and we have the Hispano-negro, with his lofty 
declarations and his poor performance •••• 
"An official pay roll, and a place thereon is the para-
mount conception of government to San Domingo. Lofty sentiments 
are expressed to the contrary, but the fact remains. Progress 
means more revenue in order to provide more and better places. 
The local political history of San Domingo bears me out in this 
statement. • • • The people are not by nature industrious; 
governmental work is light therefore governmental work is eagerly 
sought." Secretary of the Navy to Secretary of State, August 3, 
1904, transmitting Sigsbee to Secretary of the Navy, June 26, 
1904, Miscellaneous Letters, August 1-10, 1904, roll 1219. 
4Dawson to Hay, July 6, 1904, No. 3 and July 28, 1904, 
No. 6, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 11, roll 11. 
5secretary of the Navy to Secretary of State, September 
1, 1904, transmitting Sigsbee to Secretary of the Navy, August 23, 
1904, Miscellaneous Letters, September 1-10, 1904, roll 1222. 
6Dawson to Hay, July, 1904, No. 8, Despatches from the 
Dominican Republic, vol. 11, _roll 11 •. 
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Improvement Company. The conunission, which had been appoin.ted 
to settle the dispute between the Company and the Dominican 
Government, handed down its award ~n July 14, 1904. 7 The Award 
p~ovided for the transfer of the Company's stocks in the National 
Bank to be turned over to the Dominican Government within 
ninety days. The railroad would be handed over to the Govern-
ment when it had paid the United States, which was acting as 
receiver, $1,500,000 of the debt owed to the Improvement Company. 
Other bonds which the Company held would begin to be turned 
over to the Republic when the principal on the debt of 
$4,500,000 had been reduced to $2,076,635. Interest on the 
I 
principal was to be four per cent per annum. 
I 
The payments under the Award were to be made to a 
financial agent appointed by the United States. These payments 
. were to consist of monthly instalments of $37,500 for the first 
two years and then to be increased to $41,666.66 per month 
thereafter. The money to meet the monthly payments was to be 
secured from the custom revenues and port dues of the ports of 
/ I Puerto Plata, Sanchez, Samana, Monte Cristi, and any other 
customhouses north of 18° 45' north latitude and east of the 
Haitian border. Apparently to assure adequate revenues, the 
tariff rates in these ports could not be reduced more than 
twenty-five per cent without the consent of the United States. 
If the Dominican Government should fail to meet the scheduled 
7The text of this Award appears in FRUS, 1904, pp. 
274-276. 
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payments, the financial agent was authorized to demand that the 
customhouse of Puerto Plata be turned over to him. Should 
the revenues of this port prove to be insufficient, he could 
i i 
then request possession of the other ports, or the Dominican 
Government could request that the financial agent take charge 
of these ports. Moreover, in August, 1904, the Dominican 
Government was to pay its share of the expenses of the arbitra-
tion. Failure to meet this expense was also recognized as due 
cause for the financial agent to demand poss~ssion of Puerto 
Plata. 
In addition to his duties of collecting the monthly 
installments on the loans and taking possession of the various 
customhouses if the installments were in arrears, the financial 
agent appointed by the United States also had other prerogatives. 
He could appoint subordinate officials and' employees. Further-
more, the agent was to act as a financial adviser to the 
Dominican Government on all matters affecting its ability to pay. 
The entire expense of the collection and the salary of the 
financial agent were to be borne by the Dominican Government. 
On August 9, 1904, Secretary of State John Hay wrote 
Dawson that the State Department had appointed Mr. John T. 
Abbott as the financial agent of the United States who was to 
receive the installments on the debt of the Improvement Company. 8 
As mentioned above, Abbott was the vice president of the 
8secretary of State to Dawson, August 9, 1904, FRUS, 
1904, p. 279. 
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Improvement Company and had previously represented the Company 
in its dealings with the Dominican Government. In appointing 
,Abbott to this post the State Depar±ment and President Roosevelt 
were merely following the advice of the Improvement Company. 
In making the appointment, however, the State Department 
attempted to escape any future responsibility for Abbott's 
action in collecting and disbursing the funds. Abbott was 
informed that "this appointment. • • is made and is to be 
accepted on the understanding that it imposes no responsibility 
on the Government of the United States on account of your col-
lection and disbursement of the sums awarded by the Commission, 
all such responsibility being specifically disclaimed.u 9 
When at the end of August the Dominican Government 
received Abbott's letter announcing his appointment as finan-
cial agent, the Dominican Finance Minister' agreed to receive 
him but only in an unofficial character. An official reception 
was impossible, Velfsquez explained, because the Dominican 
Government had not decided whetherto accept or reject the 
Award of July 14. The Finance Minister informed Abbott that 
he believed it impossible for the Republic to meet the monthly 
payments and that moreover, he felt that the arbitration com-
mission had exceeded its authority in granting the financial 
agent excessive powers and had thus violated the Dominican 
9Abbott to Assistant Secretary Loomis, August 4, 1904, 
Miscellaneous Letters, August 1-10, 1904, roll 1219. 
L 
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In spite of Dominican reluctance to accept him offi-
cially as the financial agent under the Award, Abbott wasted no 
time in making the necessary preparation to put the Award into 
effect. On September 9, he appointed Joseph c. Strickland as 
Deputy Financial Agent for the port of Puerto Plata, where 
the first customhouse was to come under the control of the 
Financial Agent in the event the Government failed to meet the 
stipulated monthly payments. Abbott's action was based on the 
assumption that the acceptance or non-acceptance of the Award 
of July 14 by the Dominican Government had absolutely nothing 
to do with the validity of the Award. He argued that it derived 
I 
its validity from the original protocol signed by the United 
States and the Dominican Republic establishing the arbitral 
. . 11 
commission. 
On September 15, President Morales returned to the 
capital after a month tour of inspection of the northern 
provinces. 12 Six days later Abbott met with the President 
and discussed the Aw~rd. Morales indicated none of his 
10Dawson to Hay, September 10, 1904, No. 35, enclosure 4: 
Velasquez to Abbott, August 31, 1904; enclosure 3: Abbott to 
Dawson, September 7, 1904, Despatches from the Dominican 
Republic, vol. 12, roll 12. 
11Dawson to Hay, September 10, 1904, No. 35, enclosure 5: 
Abbott to Velasquez, September 2, 1904; enclosure 6: Abbott to 
Dawson, September 10, 1904; enclosure 8: Abbott to Strickland, 
September 9, 1904, ibid. 
12Dawson to Hay, August 30, 1904, No. 29; September 27, 
1904, No. 43, ibid. 
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•ent would not be able to make 
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He acknowledgedthat the Govern-
the initial payments due on 
L 
october 1. He intended,· therefore, to fulfill the provisions 
I . 
I I 
of the Award by turning the customhouse at Puerto Plata over 
to Abbott. Before a definite commitment on this point could 
be made, however, Morales stated that it would be necessary to 
consult with his Cabinet. Nevertheless, he seemed confident 
that he could gain his Cabinet's agreement to this plan. 13 
Abbott told Morales that he had refrained from demand-
ing the payments due in August and September because of the 
President's absence from the capital. However, he now thought 
it time to make the demand for these payments. In lieu of 
receiving these sums he would exercise his right as financial 
agent to demand the customhouse at Puerto Plata. Abbott was 
willing to cooperate to the extent of waiting until the Presi-
dent had a chance to break the dire news to his ministers, 
if such were Morales' wish. The President preferred to go to 
his Cabinet with the demand already in hand. Hence, Abbott 
drew up the necessary documents and presented the demand to 
the Minister of Finance on Spetember 21, the same day as his 
interview with Morales. 14 
If Dawson and Abbott were now confident that the Award 
would be accepted by the Dominican Government without further 
Abbott 
13 . Dawson to Hay, September 27, 1904, enclosure 1: 
to Dawson, September 26, 1904, .~' 1904, p. 281. 
14
.!__bi' d. I 281 83 pp. - • 
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ado, they were drastically mistaken. Within a few days, i.t 
became quite evident that the Government had decided to try to 
obtain some modification of the Award, and if that were not 
possible, to reject it completely. On September 23, two days 
after Abbott's conversation with President Morales, Foreign 
Minister scfuchez requested an immediate interview with Dawson. 
Dawson was informed that the Dominican Government, although 
not unanimously, had decided to accept the Award. In spite 
of the fact that there were constitutional grounds upon which 
the Award could be rejected, it would, S~chez noted, have the 
practical res'ul t of removing some of the customhouses from 
the grasp of possible revolutionaries. He further noted that 
the revenues from all customhouses in the Republic would not 
be adequate to meet both the expenses of the Government and 
the amount due the Improvement Company under the Award. In 
order, therefore, to secure sufficient funds for the Govern-
ment, sixty per cent of the gross revenues would have to be 
set aside for its uses before it could agree to the Agent taking 
possession of any of the ports. If this guarantee were not 
forthcoming, Dawson was given to understand that Mr. Abbott 
would not be placed in charge of the Puerto Plata customhouse 
on October 1, and the Dominican Government would inform Washing-
ton of the reason why it considered the Award to be unconstitu-
tional and inoperative. On the twenty-seventh, Finance Minister 
Vel~squez visited Dawson, and on the twenty-eighth, Dawson 
/ 
and Sanchez conferred. Again the topic of discussion was the 
,,....- 90 
i ~odification of the Award. If the Government could not be 
assured of sixty per cent of the revenues collected by the 
Financial Agent, the Foreign Minister wanted an agreement which 
would delay the implementation of the Award for a month or two. 15 
On the morning of the twenty-ninth, President Morales 
met with Dawson and also attempted to obtain some modification 
of the Award. The President maintained that the execution of 
the Award would leave him without the means to pay his officials 
and troops and this would inevitably result in a revolution. 
Furthermore, Morales had little hope that the Financial Agent 
would look with sympathy upon his Government's plight, for, 
in the final analysis, the Agent, who also represented the 
creditor companies, would be concerned with nothing other than 
collecting the amount due the Improvement Company. Morales 
. then stated that he had been advised that the Award violated 
the Dominican Constitution and to agree to it would violate 
his oath of office and virtually deprive Congress of its con-
stitutional obligation to provide a budget for the country. 16 
That the arguments based upon the unconstitutionality 
of the Award really were of little concern to the President 
can hardly be doubted. His real fear was not violation of the 
Dominican Constitution but fear that his Government would lack 
15 . Dawson to Secretary of State, September 27, 1904, 
~' 1904, p. 280. Dawson to Hay, September 27, 1904, No. 44; 
October 6, 1904, No. 51, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, 
vol. 12, roll 12. 
16Dawson to Hay, October 6, 1904, No. 51, ibid. 
sufficient funds to meet its daily administrative expenses·. 
This point was made clear in the interview with Dawson on 
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October 29. While rejecting the supervision of the custom-
houses under the Award, M6ra:les was inore than willing to have 
the United States assume the collection of all the custom 
revenues of the Republic, provided $1,200,000 were allotted 
for the annual expenses of the Dominican Government. The 
remainder could be divided among the Republic's various creditors. 
In an interview with Abbott on the same day, Morales reiterated 
this proposal adding the provision that all the creditors must 
t •t 17 agree o 1 • 
Throughout this time, Dawson refused to enter into any 
discussion with the Dominican officials concerning a modifica-
tion of the Award or to give them any hope that the Government 
in Washington ~ould be willing to agree to. any such modifica-
tion. He maintained that he had no authorization to discuss 
the validity of the Award and that he considered it binding. 
In reply to the Dominican contention that the execution of the 
Award would leave insufficient funds for the daily operation 
of the Government, Dawson merely replied that certainly the 
arbitration commission had given adequate consideration to the 
ability of the custom receipts to meet both the cost of running 
the Government and the installments due the Improvement Company. 
Moreover, Dawson regarded it unlikely that the Financial Agent 
17Dawson to Hay, October 6, 1904, No. 51 and enclosure 
2: Abbott to Dawson, September 29, 1904, ibid. 
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would administer the Award in such a way as to be prejudicial 
to the Dominican Government, for the Agent, Dawson asserted, 
also had an interest in maintaining peace and order. However, 
if once the Award were in operati~n and it became evident that 
it was impossible to meet both governmental expenses and the 
amount due the Improvement Company, the question of reducing 
the payments could be raised. 18 
Furthermore, Dawson was not even moved by Morales' 
desire to substitute United States control of all the custom-
houses for Awa~d. He replied that he had no instructions to 
enter into such a discussion. Besides, Dominican acquiesence 
in the Award would not only provide inunediate assistance in 
solving some difficulties. It would further favorably dispose 
the Administration in Washington "in the event that the United 
States might b~ willing to entertain a proposition looking to 
a wider responsibility. 1119 
In spite of his steadfast refusal to discuss the modifica-
tion or delay in the execution of the Award, Dawson was not 
completely oblivious to the Dominican arguments. In late 
September, he wrote to Secretary of State Hay that he "would 
have preferred that the Award had fixed a later date for the 
Agent's taking possession" of the customhouses. Moreover, he 
did bring the matter of guarantee of sixty per cent of the 
18Dawson to Secretary of State, September 27, 1904, 
FRUS, 1904, pp. 280-81. Dawson to Hay, October 6, 1904, No. 
sr;-0espatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll 12. 
19Dawson to Hay, October 6, 1904, No. 51, ibid. 
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custom revenues for governmental expense to Abbott's attention. 
He discussed with Abbott the possibility that the latter might, 
in his capacity as repre·sen tati ve of the Improvement Company, 
assure the Dominicans that a minimum would be turned over to 
the Government out of the revenues collected in the ports under 
the control of the Financial Agent. Abbott, however, rejected 
the idea and his reasons for doing so-seemed good to Dawson. 
The Minister's acceptance of Abbott's reasons doubtless were 
based on the belief "that a firm attitude at the beginning" 
was essentia1. 20 
Unable to obtain modification or delay of the Award, 
and apparently unconvinced by Dawson's arguments, the Morales 
Government informed Abbott and Dawson that it would not allow 
the Award to gQ into effect on October 1. 21 The State Depart-
ment was unwilling to tolerate this decisipn. Dawson was 
instructed to inform the Morales Government that the arbitrators 
had considered the problem of providing adequate revenues for 
all contingencies. To modify their award would be to reject 
their unanimous decision. Some hope, however, was held out to 
the Dominicans. Their representations could be presented after 
20
oawson to Hay, September 27, 1904, No. 42, ibid. 
An extract of this document is to be found on pages 280-81 of 
~' 1904. 
21Dawson to Hay, October 6, 1904, No. 51, enclosure 
2~ Abbott to Dawson, September 29, 1904; enclosure 4: 
Sanchez to Dawson, September 29, 1904, Despatches from the 
Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll 12. 
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the Award had been put into effect. 22 
That the decision to reject the Award was neither 
unanimous among the members of Morales' Cabinet nor final in 
I 
nature soon became evident. In an interview with Abbott on 
October 8, Foreign Minister S~chez indicated that he disagreed 
with his colleagues in the Cabinet in their decision to reject 
the Award. Furthermore, while rejecting the arguments that 
the Award violated the Dominican Constitution and that reten-
tion of sixty per cent of the revenues was n~cessary for the 
expenses of the Government, he contended that the Award repre-
sented a triumph for Dominican progress. 23 
In the face of North American unwillingness to compro-
mise on the point of modification of the Award, it would appear 
that if the attitude which scfuchez represented did not gain 
sway in the Cabinet, at least the members aecided that it was 
futile to resist any further. In the cabinet meeting held on 
October 9, to discuss the United States' attitude toward the 
Dominican rejection of the Award, the ministers decided to 
reverse the Government's previous position and accepted the 
Award. Obviously, Morales hoped to gain more by accepting the 
Award than merely pleasing the United States Government. When 
I Sanchez informed Dawson of the Cabinet's decision on the tenth, 
22Hay to Dawson, October 4, 1904, FRUS, 1904, p. 283. 
23Dawson to Hay, October 8, 1904, No. 53, enclosure 1: 
Abbott to Dawson, October 8, 1904, Despatches from the Dominican 
Republic, vol. 12, roll 12. 
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the Foreign Minister indicated that it was also the intention 
of the Government to ask that Monte Cristi be placed under the 
control of the Financial Agent and possibly the ports of 
I I 
samana and Sanchez also. The reason for the Government's 
decision to place the other ports under the administration of 
the Award was simply that Monte Cristi was a particularly sharp 
thorn in the side of the Government. The officials in that 
port were virtually independent of the Government's control 
and word had been received that merchants were being granted 
reductions in the payments due on the customs in order to 
encourage them to import through Monte Cristi. This resulted 
in a decline in revenues coming into the hands of General Arias 
i 
the Jimenista Governor of Monte Cristi. 24 
Control of the customhouse at Puerto Plata, which was 
. transferred to the Deputy Financial Agent on October 20, was 
to be retroactive to the seventeenth of the month. Prior to 
the execution of the Award, both Dawson and Abbott had refused 
to make any agreement concerning the possibility of the 
Financial Agent providing the Government with any funds to aid 
it meet daily needs. Once the Morales Cabinet agreed to accept 
the Award, however, Abbott consented to provide $680 a day to 
the Government for one week. The Government had a critical 
need for this sum, since the.funds for the salaries of the 
troops and officials at Puerto Plata, Santiago and Moca all 
24Dawson to Hay, October 21, 1904, No. 59, ibid. 
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came from the receipts at Puerto Plata's customhouse. This 
temporary payment would at least enable the Government to adjust 
i f . t th . •t t• 25 ts inances o e new si ua ion. 
At this point, Morales again suggested that all four 
ports be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Financial 
Agent. This time he qualified his offer by requesting that 
$40,000 or $30,000 be allotted each month to the Government 
for its budget. Although Dawson believed that this plan would 
be advantageous to both the Improvement Company and the Govern-
ment, since it would enable the Company to collect the amount 
provided for under the Award and assured the Government of 
revenue to maintain peace in the northern provinces and thus 
i 
protect the Agent in the possession of the various ports, he, 
nevertheless, refrained from advising Abbottt on the subject. 26 
Apparently, Abbott's superiors in the Improvement 
Company did not object to the temporary payment being made to 
the Dominican Government from the revenues the Agent collected 
at Puerto Plata. Nor did they foresee future difficulty in 
arranging for that portion of the budget covered by the revenues 
of Puerto Plata. Abbott, however, notified Morales that he 
could give no definite answer to the President's suggestion 
until he returned from consultation with the directors in New 
York. In the meantime, the daily subsidy would be terminated 
as of October 23. 27 
25Ibid. 
27John B. Moore to Acting Secretary of State Loomis, 
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When Morales learned that the $680 a day was to be cut 
off, he requested that Dawson help him gain some assistance. 
oawson realized that Morales' plight was caused by the lack of 
i I 
funds in the Dominican treasury and the semi-independence of 
some of the provinces. Nevertheless, he ur~ed the President 
to find the funds necessary to pay the troops in the affected 
areas, at least until Abbott could arrive in New York or until 
the Department of State could reply to a telegram he was send-
ing to Washington. 28 
In an interview on October 24, the Finance Minister 
and President again stressed their inability to secure suf-
ficient funds from other sources to meet the budget of Puerto 
Plata, Santiago and Moca. Assuring himself by this time that 
the position of the Government was virtually impossible, 
Dawson agreed to wire Washington reconunending that some tempo-
rary assistance be granted to enable Morales meet the expenses 
necessary to maintain his Government in power. On October 29, 
the State Department telegraphed permission to instruct the 
Deputy Financial Agent at Puerto Plata to pay $680 a day to the 
Dominican Government, unless Abbott had made some previous 
arrangement. 29 
October 27, 1904, Miscellaneous Letters, October 21-31, 1904, 
roll 1227. 
28 Dawson to Hay, October 21, 1904, No. 59, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll 12. 
29Dawson to Secretary of Stat~, October 25, 1904, tele-
gram; Dawson to Hay, November 2, 1904, No. 64 and enclosure 4: 
Dawson to Strickland, October 29, 1904, ibid. 
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Dawson's efforts on behalf of the Dominican Government 
achieved only temporary relief. On the evening of Saturday, 
November 5, a telegram from the State Department countermanding 
the instructions of October 29, arrived at the United States 
Legation in Santo Domingo. Although the payment of the $680 to 
the Dominican Government was to be suspended until Abbott 
returned, it was not the intention of the officials in Washing-
ton to indefinitely deny the Morales Government revenue from 
the northern ports. The telegram concluded that when Abbott 
returned, he would probably be able to make some arrangement 
to pay for the budget in connection with the transfer of the 
other three ports to the control of the Financial Agent. 30 
I 
This unexpected reversal of policy by the United States 
was not well received in Santo Domingo. I Velasquez, who was 
. in Puerto Plata at the time, threatened to· deprive Deputy 
Finance Agent Strickland of possession of the customhouse if 
Dawson could not do something to resolve the new dilemma. 
Back in Santo Domingo City, Dawson attempted to dissuade 
Morales from drastic action which would endanger 
the satisfactory progress already made toward a definite 
settlement of his financial difficulties and a guarantee 
of continued exemption from revolts, and especially not 
to endanger the bright prospect he now had of securing, 
by an arrangement with Mr. Abbott affecting all four 
northern ports, the definite guarantee of a reasonable 31 budget, and the suppression of contraband at Monte Cristi. 
It was impossible, Dawson pointed out, for the Department of 
30Dawson to Hay, November 6, 1904, No. 66, ibid. 
31Ibid. 
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f state to supply the necessary funds, and it would be unjust for 
l 
the Department to require the Improvement Company "to go down 
into its pockets." Morales would have to draw upon his other 
32 
resources. 
Suddenly Morales changed his tone. He would agree, he 
said, to allow Strickland-to retain control of the custom-
house at Puerto Plata, provided that the Deputy Agent consented 
to complete the payments for the week of October 30 through 
November 5. Dawson decided to interpret liberally his latest 
instructions from the Department. Agreeing to Morales terms, 
he reasoned that certainly "the suspension could hardly have 
been intended to take effect before the date of the telegram 
ordering.it. 1133 
Within a few days, Dawson again learned that his efforts 
had been only temporarily successful. This time it was the 
Dominican Cabinet's turn to reverse its previous decision. 
On Tuesday, November 8, Dawson was asked to attend a cabinet 
meeting. He was informed that the members of the Government 
·had decided to comply with Finance Minister Velfsquez's request 
that the customhouse at Puerto Plata be returned to Dominican 
control if the daily payments were not resumed. Dawson declined 
to make any effort to secure this objective, for his Government 
had approved of the interruption of the payments. Furth~rmore, 
the sum already paid by the Deputy Agent to the Dominican 
32Ibid. 33Ibid. 
I 
r Government was considerably in 100 excess of the amount collected 
f 
l 
at the port. After presenting his reasons for refusing to 
attempt to re-instate the daily payments, Dawson turned to the 
I I 
task of persuading the Dominicans of the inadvisability of ful-
filling their treat to eject Strickland. In the first place, 
he argued, such action would "endanger the probability of 
making an arrangement for a sure budget based upon the revenues 
of all four northern ports." Secondly, such action would not 
only be self defeating but useless, for the first ship scheduled 
to land cargo was the one bringing Abbott back to the Dominican 
Republic. Finally, Dawson pointed out that he had complied 
with President Morales' request of the previous Sunday and now 
he had a right to expect the President's promises to be kept. 
Dawson's arguments were evidently convincing, for, on the ninth, 
Foreign Minister s£nchez informed him that·the Cabinet, accept-
ing his advice, had decided to await Abbott's return before 
any further action would be taken. 34 
Abbott returned .to Santo Domingo on the afternoon of 
November 17. Within a day, discussions were begun looking 
/ towards the ultimate control of the customhouses at Sanchez, 
Monte Cristi, and Samanf in addition to that of Puerto Plata. 
Realizing that the authorities at Monte Cristi might prove 
difficult to handle, Dawson had determined to lend the Morales 
Government every possible moral support in its efforts to turn 
34oawson to Hay, November 17, 1904, No. 70, ibid. 
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over control of the customhouse located there to Abbott. 
Morales was intending to go personally to that port aboard a 
oominican gun-boat. Simultane·.ously, the u.s.s. Detroit would 
carry Abbott and Dawson to the same destination. Washington, 
however, was not yet ready to officially interfer so blatantly 
in Dominican affairs as to have the United States Minister 
present at the actual transfer of control to the Financial 
Agent. There was no objection to the Financial Agent descend-
ing upon Monte Cristi aboard the Detroit. Dawson, however, 
was instructed not to go beyond Puerto Plata. 35 
The plans that Dawson, Abbott, and Morales were making 
for the transfer of the customhouse at Monte Cristi proved to 
be premature. By November 22, Morales, because of dissension 
within the Cabinet and among his supporters, was forced to 
withdraw his earlier promise to turn the additional three 
customhouses over to the Financial Agent. Finance Minister 
/ Velasquez, a prominent Horacista, threatened to resign if this 
plan were carried out •. In fact, all Horacista support, the 
main prop for Morales' Administration, would probably have 
been withdrawn had these ports been turned over to Abbott. 
Devising a plan to provide more revenue for the Government, 
/ Velasquez had even obtained an agreement with General Arias to 
stop the diverting of goods from Puerto Plata to Monte Cristi. 36 
35Dawson to Hay, November 21, 1904, No. 74, ibid. 
Loomis to Dawson, November 21, 1904, telegram, Diplomatic 
Instructions to Santo Domingo, vol. 1, roll 98. 
36Dawson to Hay, November 22, 1904, No. 76, Despatches 
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Dawson was "disappointed" over this change of plans. 
He anticipated that the Morales Government would again threaten 
to deprive the Financial" Agent of his control of the custom-
house at Puerto Plata. If the Government chose to follow this 
course, Dawson informed the State Department that he intended 
to make a firm protest and hoped that a United States naval 
vessel would "be available to give" him "its moral support in 
such an effort to maintain American interests secured by the 
Protocol and Award. 1137 
Dawson also believed that the full implementation of 
the Award was essential in order to press other claims of 
United States citizens against the Dominican Government. By 
the third week in November, he had become convinced that control 
of Monte Cristi under the Award was important. Without the 
control of the customhouse at that port, he reported, it would 
be impossible to prevent the shifting of imports from Puerto 
Plata to Monte Cristi. This situation resulted in a decline 
of revenues at the form~r port and consequently a lose of 
large revenues for the Dominican Government. This lose made 
"it a hopeless task to secure a payment of the other American 
claims" that the Department had instructed him to press. 38 
Dawson envisioned the Award far more broadly than merely 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll 12. Dawson to Hay, 
December 3, 1904, No. 80, Despatches from the Dominican Repub-
lic, vol. 13, roll 13. 
37Dawson to Hay, November 21, 1904, No. 76, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll 12. 
38Dawson to Hay, November 21, 1904, No. 74, ibid. 
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as a means of protecting North American business interests·or 
merely as a punative measure to be taken against the economically 
I 
prostrate Dominican Gove·rnment. He considered the execution 
J 
! 
of the Award as a means of aiding the Dominican Government. 
In the first place, the implementation of the Award would 
remove one and possibly four ports from the potenetial grasp 
of revolutionaries. Furthermore, it would provide, at least 
in part, United States aid in straightening out the financial 
morass into which the Republic had fallen. 39 Concerning the 
I 
manner in which the Award should be administered Dawson wrote 
the following to Secretary Hay: 
When the Award shall have been put in operation I 
believe it should [be] executed in an ungrudgingly 
generous and helpful spirit toward this Government and 
people, and I hope it can be made a basis for further 
arrangements which will extricate them from their dif-
ficulties and safeguard them from revolutions and repudia-
tion. But the first step is to put th~ Award into effect, 
and sooner or later the Dominicans who are now ~gvocat­
ing delay and evasion will see that this is so. 
The eventual possibility of the United States giving 
assistance to the Domin~can Republic must have been apparent 
to Dawson before he ever reached his new post; for, certainly 
he must have been aware of the proposals for assistance made 
by the Morales Government in the late winter of 1904, and of 
the not unfriendly disposition with which the Roosevelt Admin-
istration had greeted these overtures. In addition, his own 
39Dawson to Hay, October 6, 1904, No. 51; November 21, 
1904, No. 76, ibid. 
40Dawson to Hay, September 27, 1904, ibid. 
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independent investigations soon convinced him that the Dominican 
Government needed outside assistance. One of the major tasks 
which absorbed Dawson's ·attention during his first few months 
among the Dominicans was that of "trying to get some insight 
into their horribly confused financial affairs. 1141 
In spite of the complexities of the situation, Dawson 
could write his superiors in the Department of State on Septem-
ber 12 that his investigation had led him to the conclusion 
that the Dominican debt was "approximately $32,280,000." 
This figure only gave a small indication of the financial 
problem confronting the Morales Government, whose plight be-
came more clearly illustrated when the amounts due creditors 
i 
and governmental expenses during the next year were compared 
with the anticipated revenue for the same period. It was 
estimated that the Government would need $1,300,000 or at the 
very least $1,200,000 for its administrative expenses. In 
addition, the obligations due creditors amounted to $1,441,609.26, 
excluding both the amounts due the Improvement Company under 
the Award of July 14, 1904 and the sums which had fallen into 
arrears in the past. The anticipated revenues, under Dominican 
administration, were $1,846,000. Of course, the Government 
intended first to deduct the funds necessary for its operation 
before applying anything to the payment of its debts. Under 
these circumstances, about $546,000 would be devoted to paying 
41 Dawson to Dawes, September 13, 1904, Dawes Collection, 
File D, July-December, 1904. 
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the annual debts of over two and a half million dollars. 
oawson, therefore, concluded that "the condition is one of 
hopeless bankruptcy unless there is a radical change in the 
system of collecting revenues, and a great reduction in current 
expenditure. 1142 
However, his investigations had further convinced him 
that the radical changes necessary to assure an improvement 
in the collection of the revenues was unlikely to take place. 
On the twenty-fourth of September, he wrote to Secretary of 
State Hay that 
A study of past and present conditions in this country 
leaves no reasonable hope that under Dominican management 
of the customhouses the four abuses--peculation, contra-
band, secret rebates, and receiving revenues in paper 
obligations previously issued--will cease. 
Nor did he consider mere foreign supervision of the custom 
. collection adequate. As long as the collectors remained under 
the control of the Dominican Government, the inefficient and 
illicit practices would continue. 43 
Inefficient and corrupt administration of the custom-
houses was not the only stream through which much needed revenue 
flowed out of the public coffers. A considerable portion of 
the amount collected was expended to prevent the overthrow of 
the existing Government. On this point Dawson's investigation 
had led him to conclude "that the present expenses could be 
42Dawson to Hay, September 12, 1904, No. 36, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll 12. 
43Dawson to Hay, September 24, 1904, No. 41, ibid. 
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benefits they derive from Governmental administration at least 
as now conducted." The '$1, 300, 000 that the finance ministry 
I I 
believed necessary for the administration of the government 
would probably, in fact, be increased by another $400,000. 
out of this sum nothing was allotted for internal improvements, 
public education, the paying of the public debt or the improve-
ment of the miserably conducted public services. Virtually 
the entire sum, Dawson reported, would be sent to supress 
insurrection and for "salaries paid to officials who have no 
other function than to aid in maintaining the present Govern-
ment in power. 1144 
Thus, Dawson was convinced that if left alone, the 
Dominican Government could not hope to extricate itself from 
a state of financial confusion, exacerbated by the ever present 
. 
threat of insurrection. He undoubtedly concluded that the 
full implementation of the Award of July 14, 1904--that is, 
the placing of the four northern ports of Puerto Plata, Monte 
Cristi, S~chez and Saman~ under the administration of the 
Financial Agent appointed by the United States--was a possible 
means of ameliorating this situation. 
Dawson's conviction of the necessity of United States 
interference in the financial affairs of the Dominican Republic 
was strengthened by his conversations with select elements with-
in the Republic. From his earliest days there he was told 
44Ibid. 
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that North American intervention was necessary and even wel-
corned. On July 6, 1904, in one of his first despatches from 
his new post, Dawson reported that 
With hardly an exception, the many Dominicans whom I 
have met in the last nine days, have told me that a long 
continuance of peace cannot be expected, unless the United 
States government intervenes. The officials are nearly as 
frank on this point, as are the merchants and farmers who 
are not in politics. Practically all classes seem to ex-
pect and hope for some form of American protection. I feel, 
however, that it will be well for me to become better ac-
quainted with the Dominican character before I give full 
credence to these expressions. They have, however, been 
volunteered every place we have visited, and usually in a 
form which wgde it impossible to avoid hearing them had I 
so desired. 
-Although he does not mention whether his information came from 
foreigners with financial interests in the Dominican Republic 
or native Dominicans, further investigation did not seem to 
contradict this early observation. In early November, Dawson 
wrote the Secretary of State that 
Merchants, planters and property holders in general 
are in favor of American financial intervention as the 
only hope of guaranteeing peace. The more customhouses 
we control the more likely they think such a beneficent 
result, and the better they would be pleased. But the 
office-holding and military classes, even those favoring 
the present Government, are as a rule in their hearts 
hostile to the execution of the Award. Their real reason 
is that they consciously, or unconsciously, recognize 
that it will reduce the amount of revenue available to 
pay the salaries they are receiving or that they hope to 
receive. But many among them realize the resistance would 
be fruitless, and a few of the wiser and more patriotic 
ones, including President Morales, see in the Award the 
means of putting an end to civil wars, to the frauds on 
the revenue and the expensive and wasteful system of 
military government, with its illegal payments to dangerous 
45Dawson to Hay, July 6, 1904, No. 3, Despatches from 
the Dominican Republic, vol. 11, roll 11. 
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persons. I notice, however, that though this opinion is 
frequently sustained in private, no articles in favor of 
it have appeared in the press.46 
So far as "the illiterate classes, who form nine-
tenths of the population," were concerned, Dawson believed 
they were indifferent to United States intervention, although 
those near the towns, he reported, might be in favor of such 
intervention. There was always the possibility that this 
class might be incited to revolution on the pretext of defend-
ing the national sovereignty against Yankee interference. He 
speculated, however, that the majority of these people would 
remain quiet unless the initial efforts of any revolution 
were immediately successful. There was "little danger of a 
spontaneous popular rising. 1147 
The foreign creditors and the diplomatic officials 
representing these creditors' respective countries, Dawson 
reported, also would not be averse to further intervention 
by the United States in the financial affairs of the Dominican 
Republic. This intervention, however, would have to be beyond 
the scope envisioned by the Award of July 14, 1904. The 
Spanish charg~, representing Spanish and German claims, and 
to a lesser extent the Italian representative objected to the 
implementation of the Award on the grounds that it interfered 
with either the priority of their claims or the possibility of 
46Dawson to Hay, November 2, 1904, No. 64, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll 12. 
47Ibid. 
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collecting the amount due these claims. The Belgian and 
trench representatives made no objection to the Award. The 
I Italian charge, Dawson believed, was actually seeking assistance 
i I 
from the United States in securing Italian interests. Further-
more, he had learned that the French representative favored 
united States control of all the Dominican customhouses as the 
surest means of protecting the interests of the Belgian and 
French creditors. 48 
Moreover, President Morales himself had indicated that 
he favored ultimate United States control of the Dominican 
·custom service. His position had been made quite clear in 
March and again after Dawson arrived in the Republic. The 
President reiterated this position shortly after Dawson had 
been informed that the Dominican Government had decided not 
I / 
to place Monte Cristi, Sanchez, and Samana·under the control 
of the Financial Agent appointed under the Award. On Sunday 
morning, November 27, Dawson obtained an interview with Morales. 
He was desirous of ascertaining from the President a definite 
statement as to whether the decision not to transfer the three 
ports was final or if there were a possibility it might be 
reversed in the future. Dawson began the interview by expres-
sing his surprise at the withdrawal of the original proposal 
48 Dawson to Hay, August 23, 1904, No. 17, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 11, roll 11. Dawson to Hay, 
October 3, 1904, No. 47; November 4, 19.04, No. 65; November 16, 
1904; November 25, 1904, No. 78, Desp~tches from the Dominican 
Republic, vol. 12, roll 12. Dawson to Hay, December 19, 1904, 
No. 94, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. 
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to transfer the three additional customhouses to the Financial 
Agent's control. He observed that this decision had been made 
only after the Dominican Government had thoroughly considered 
it1 once the decision had been made, there had been no indica-
tion that it was being reconsidered. Dawson also stated that 
both he and Abbott, accepting the determination of the Dominican 
Government on this point, had worked to make the advantages of 
this arrangement clear to Washington, and had been able to 
secure funds for Morales "for the sole purpose of aiding him 
in his immediate financial difficulties pending'' the acceptance 
of the proposal by the United States and the Improvement Company. 
Had there been any indication that the proposal would eventually 
I 
be withdrawn these monetary sacrifices would not have been 
made. 49 
To this charge of misrepresentation, President Morales 
replied that he had withdrawn the proposal only in the face of 
opposition among his supporters so strong as to leave little 
doubt that not to have done so would have lead to inunediate 
revolution. "I remain firm," Morales said, "in my determina-
tion ultimately to carry out the policy outlined by General 
/ 
Sanchez and Mr. Hay and Mr. Loomis last spring--viz., to secure 
the effective intervention and protection of the United States 
/ by leasing to you Samana and Manzanillo Bays and turning over 
to you the control of all our customhouses." The time had been 
49Dawson to Hay, December 3, 1904, No. 80, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. 
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considered right to implement this plan; but, now it was nee-
/ 
essary to let Finance Minister Velasquez try his plan. As soon 
I 
as Velasquez met with failure, as he surely would, Morales 
told Dawson that he would revert to the original plan. The 
president concluded by saying: "I hope that in the meantime 
. the United States will reach an understanding with the other 
creditor nations which will make it practicable to extend the 
request to include the southern as well as 'khe northern ports. 1150 
L 
Dawson indicated gratitude at the President's expres-
sion of confidence in the United States. However, he observed 
that he had never mentioned either the possibility of leasing 
I Samana and Manzanillo Bays or the possibility of an arrange-
ment with all the foreign creditors. His negotiations had been 
confined to negotiating the transfer of the four ports to the 
. control of the Financial Agent. Dawson drew up his report of 
this interview with the President and sent it to the Department 
of State under the date of December 3. Arriving in Washington 
on the sixteenth, it was read by Assistant Secretary Loomis 
and Secretary Hay sometime between the seventeenth and the 
twenty-third of the month. The despatch was then forwarded to 
the White House for President Roosevelt's consideration. 51 
While it is difficult to determine the exact impact 
that Dawson's despatches had on the decisions which were.being 
SO Ibid. 
51
rbid. Across the top of this document is the follow-
ing hand written notation: "sent copy to President." 
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•ade in Washington, it, nevertheless, seems likely that the 
one of December 3 and the others containing his evaluation of 
the necessity of United States intervention to aid the Dominican 
Government in resolving its financial problems must at least 
have persuaded the Roosevelt Administration that such inter-
vention would not be opposed but rather welcomed by the more 
responsible elements within the Republic and by the foreign 
creditors. Nevertheless, these despatches certainly were not 
the only factors which determined the next step towards greater 
united States intervention. The policy of ultimate interven-
tion and control of the Dominican customhouses, it would seem, 
had already been determined before Dawson was ever appointed 
to the Legation in Santo~Domingo. By the presidential election 
of November, 1904, Roosevelt was assured of another four years 
in office. And with the presidential campaign behind him, he 
undoubtedly felt more free to pursue a more vigorous policy. 
Furthermore, if it had been the intention of the President 
and Secretary of State to use the Award of July 14, 1904 as a 
means of providing some aid to the Dominican Government with-
out more overtly interfering in the affairs of that republic, 
as it quite obviously was Dawson's plan, it became apparent by 
the end of November, that such a policy was not going to work 
very well. Whatever his motives, President Roosevelt indicated 
his intention of following a more determined course of action. 
In his annual message to Congress on December 6, 1904, he 
' noted that l 
r 
i 
l 
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chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a 
general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may 
in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention 
by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere 
the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine 
may force the United States, however reluctantly, in 
flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impo5ence, to 
exercise of an international police power. 2 
In pursuance of this new policy Secretary of State Hay 
sent the following telegram to Dawson on December 28, 1904: 
You will sound the President of Santo Domingo, dis-
creetly but earnestly and in a perfectly friendly spirit, 
touching the disquieting situation which is developing 
owing to the pressure of other governments having arbitral 
awards in their favor and who regard our award as conflict-
ing with their rights. Already one European Government 
strongly intimates that it may resort to occupation of 
some Dominican customs ports to secure its own payment. 
There appears to be a concert among them. You will as-
certain whether the Government of Santo Domingo would be 
disposed to request the United States to take charge of 
the collection of duties and effect an equitable distribu-
tion of the assigned quotas among the Dominican Government 
and the several claiments. We have grounds to think that 
such arrangement would satisfy the other powers, besides 
serving as a practical guaranty of peace of Santo Domingo 
from external influence or internal disturbance.SJ 
Whatever might have been his influence in shaping this 
more vigorous policy there can be no doubt that Dawson was in 
accord with it. On December 17, he had written a personal 
letter to Assistant Secretary Loomis. In this letter he gave 
his evaluation of the political and financial situation in the 
Dominican Republic. Concerning the course which the United 
52ouoted in H. c. Hill, Roosevelt and the Caribbean 
(New York: Russell and Russell, 1965), p. 157. See also FRUS, 
1904, p. xxxiv. 
53Hay to Dawson, December 28, 1904, telegram, Diplomatic 
Instructions to Santo Domingo, vol. 1, pp. 51-52, roll 98. 
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states should follow, he wrote the following: 
It is hardly necessary for me to say to you that I 
think our only policy for· the present is to let the pres-
sure of increasing financial difficulties bring about the 
inevitable result. Without our intervention they cannot 
pay, and unless they pay they cannot stay in power.54 
In summary, the first six months of Dawson's service in 
the Dominican Republic was largely devoted to attempting to 
secure the full implementation of the Improvement Company's 
Award of July 14, 1904, and studying the fiaancial situation 
of the country. Although strong opposition within the Dominican 
Cabinet and among President Morales' supporters prevented the 
complete execution of the Award, Dawson was successful at least 
in persuading the Morales Government to accept the Award and 
I 
to allow Puerto "Plata to remain under the Financial Agent's 
control. His study of the financial conditions of the Republic 
convinced him that the country could not extract itself from 
its financial problems without United States interference. 
Furthermore, he concluded that this interference would be bene-
ficial to the Dominican Republic and would not meet with opposi-
tion either in the Governme~t or among the monied and propertied 
interest. When the Administration in Washington decided the 
time was opportune to take a more vigorous stand, a position 
perhaps influenced in part by Dawson's reports, Dawson was in 
full accord with the decision of his superiors. 
54 Dawson to Loomis, December 17, 1904, personal, 
Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. 
Quoted in part in Munro, ~· cit., p. 99. 
CHAPTER V 
I 
DAWSON-DILLINGHAM AGREEMENT: 
DECEMBER 30, 1904 - JANUARY 21, 1905 
Upon receipt of Secretary Hay's telegram of December 28, 
1904, Dawson immediately began the course of negotiations which, 
over the next three months, would lead to a North American-
supervision of the Dominican customs. Dawson's first move 
was to seek an interview with President Morales. Both men 
agreed fully that the Dominican Republic could no longer count 
on the patience of its foreign creditors and that demands for 
payments of these debts would not be far in the offing. Further-
more, the President acknowledged that the European creditors 
would not accept .any guarantee that his Government could offer. 
Indeed, he returned to his previous stand that the best solu-
tion to the Republic's economic problems lay in United States 
control of the customs with a fixed sum being guaranteed to the 
Dominican Government for expenses. 1 
1Dawson to Secretary of State, January 2, 1905, No~ 100, 
FRUS, 1905, p. 298. 
The documents included in FRUS, 1905, pp. 298-370, give 
a rather detailed picture of the events surrounding the negotia-
tions of the agreement of January 21, 1905, the protocol of 
February 7, 1905, and the modus vivendi of April 1, 1905. While 
in some instances these documents have been edited, they are 
generally accurate reproductions of the originals to be found 
in Despatches From United States Ministers To the Dominican 
Republic 1883-1906, National Archives Microfilm Publications, 
Microcopy No. 93 (Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1966), 
roll 13, vol. 13 and roll 14, vol. 14: Therefore, most citations 
in this chapter and in those dealing with the protocol of 
February 7 and the modus vivendi refer to FRUS, 1905. However, 
- .... r" 
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In spite of this consideration, Morales was not yet 
quite ready to make a formal proposal that the United States 
assume charge of the cus.tomhouses. Opposition to such a pro-
pasal, while it still existed within the Cabinet and among his 
prominent supporters, was weakening. I Finance Minister Velasquez 
had just about given up on his own plan to provide the Govern-
ment with more revenues. Moreover, the arrangement which had 
left the Jimenista General Arias as governor of Monte Cristi, 
continued to prove unsatisfactory from the Government's point 
of view and the possibility of requesting that that port be 
taken over under the Improvement Company's Award of July 14, 
had again been suggested in the last cabinet meeting. 2 
i 
Dawson gave the President little hope that the Dominican 
I 
Government could use the Award solely as an aid in dealing with 
Arias. If it became necessary to request more ports under the 
d . I Awar , Dawson told Morales, these would have to include Sanchez, 
I 
and Samana as well as the Jimenista stronghold. However, 
Dawson noted that he "appreciated how great were the political 
difficulties" against which the President was struggling: 
"Difficulties which arose from the deeply grounded prejudice 
against any sort of American intervention existing among some 
of his supporters." Nevertheless, Morales alone, Dawson 
whenever there is a significant difference between the pllb-
lished document and the original, the citation will refer to 
the microcopy. 
2 Dawson to Secretary of State, January 2, 1905, No. 100, 
~· 1905, p. 299. 
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•aintained, could determine when this prejudice had sufficiently 
abated or when it was time to act in spite of the opposition. 3 
I 
At this point, Morales attempted to ascertain what 
portion of the custom revenues the United States would be wil-
ling to allot to the Dominican Government. Dawson refused to 
commit himself, undoubtedly realizing that to do so would 
result in a lose of flexibility in future negotiations. Instead, 
he suggested that the Dominican President ought to take the 
first step by stating what he considered to be a .fair distribu-
tion. Morales responded by suggesting a division of sixty 
per cent for the Government and forty per cent for the creditors. 
For his part, Dawson felt that such a limited sum might prevent 
I 
the United States from corning to an agreement with the creditors; 
nevertheles~, he was willing to submit the proposal to Washing-
· ton as soon as Morales was sure that the anti-North American 
sentiment in the Cabinet had sufficiently subsided. 4 
In order to assist in diminishing the anti-United 
States attitude, Morales requested that Dawson meet with 
Emilio Joubert, a prominent Horacista and the minister designate 
to the United States, and Finance Minister Vel~squez. It was 
the President's hope that this interview would assure Vel~squez 
that United States "intervention in the customhouses would be 
conducted in a manner that would of fend Dominican pride as 
little as possible and not destroy the prerogatives of the office 
118 
of minister of finance." Therefore, between December 31 and 
January 2, Dawson met several times with President Morales, 
I I 5 Joubert, Velasquez, and Foreign Minister Sanchez. 
i 
I I 
During these discussions, Dawson thought it necessary 
to reject three proposals which the Dominicans brought forward. 
In the first place, in order to maintain his freedom of action, 
he refused to commit himself "either personally or officially" 
to the proposed forty per cent - sixty per cent division of 
the revenues. Moreover, the Dominicans sought assurances 
that Abbott would not be placed in charge if an agreement were 
reached. Dawson inquired if there were any complaints with 
Abbott's administration of Puerto Platai but, he felt that it 
was necessary to take a strong stand on this point among 
"other considerations" in order to "take the first opportunity 
of impressing upon them that we would not take the responsi-
bility involved unless given a free hand to back up our repre-
sentatives in enforcing a rigidly impartial administration of 
the customhouses. 116 The final proposal came solely from the 
Finance Minister. Hoping to ease the humiliation of accepting 
/ North American intervention in the customhouses, Velasquez 
suggested some form of joint control. Reluctant to accept this 
suggestion, Dawson again based his rejection on the unwilling-
ness of the United States to accept responsibility without 
effective control. Nevertheless, he explained that he personally 
61bid., pp. 299-300. 
111'·1''! 
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not only willing but anxious to leave the Dominican Govern-
~ent with the maximum of administrative freedom consistent with 
! 
the essential prerequesite." At last, he agreed to consider a 
draft of the Finance Minister's.plan. 7 
Sometime during these preliminary negotiations the 
question of possible legislative ratification of any agreement 
providing for United States intervention probably arose. 
~ccording to Dawson, Morales was unwilling to commit himself 
to a definite position on this matter. His indecision came 
from uncertainty regarding his ability to persuade the Domini-
can Congress to ratify any such proposal immediately. A long 
deliberation in congress might provide the opportunity for the 
I 
Government's opponents to revolt. Consequently, the President 
prefe~red to delay discussion on the manner and time of sub-
. mission of any possible agreement to Congress until he was 
sure that the substance would be agreeable to the Horacistas. 
Thus, negotiation on this point was deferred for the time 
being. 8 In spite of divergent viewpoints between himself and 
the Dominican officials and continuing reluctance on the part 
of certain members of the Government, Dawson felt, by January 2, 
that the negotiations had progressed far enough and that opposi-
tion had sufficiently abated to wire the Department of State 
that Morales was willing to request the United States' 
7Ibid., p. 300. 
8Dawson to Secretary of State, March 7, 1905, No. 118, 
ibid., p. 351. 
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intervention in the control of the customs on the basis of 
sixty per cent-forty per cent distribution of the revenues. 9 
The negotiations were progressing better than Dawson had 
hoped for. Nevertheless, the instability of the political 
situation in the Dominican Republic convinced him of the 
necessity of progressing with all due speed. On January 5, 
he wrote the following to his friend Charles G. Dawes, then 
President of the Central Trust Company of Illinois: 
there is always the dread that the men I have been at so 
much pains to negotiate with may suddenly be standing up 
against a wall instead of sitting in the Minister's arm 
chair. It is a good deal like playing a careful game of 
whist on the head of a powder keg. Just as you are play-
ing the last card of a grand slam and are reaching for 
the stakes, bang! and you are lucky if there is enough 
left of you to begin a hunt for a fresh pack.lo 
I The Velasquez plan for joint United States-Dominican 
administration of the customhouses, which Dawson had agreed to 
consider, was transmitted to the United States Legation on 
January 6. In addition to providing for the United States to 
be the creditor for all the foreign and domestic debts of 
the Dominican Republic, it stipulated that the Government in 
Washington would appoint one employee to each customhouse who 
would be on equal footing with the collector of customs ap-
pointed by the Dominican Government. Over all supervision of 
the rights acquired by the United States under the agreement 
9Dawson to Secretary of State, January 2, 1905, No. 
100, ibid., p. 299. 
lODawson to Dawes, January 5, 1905, Dawes Collection, 
container January-June, 1905, File D. 
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~as to be intrusted to a North American financial agent. 
I 
.Anticipating possible revolution, Velasquez's plan provided 
that in case of temporary interruption of the regular collec-
tion in any port the United States could "assume the exclusive 
direction of one or more customhouses as long as the causes 
of the interruption lasts." The agreement was to remain in 
effect until the Republic's debts had been fully paid, and a 
monthly report was to be issued over the signatures of both 
the Dominican and United States officials. 11 
Notwithstanding these provisions, in no way was the 
United States to dominate. The principle of joint control, 
if not Dominican dominance, was clearly upheld. The United 
States and Dominican officials would determine which employees 
were absolutely necessary in each customhouse. All, however, 
would be appointed and paid by the Dominican Government. Al-
so, either the Dominican Government or the United States fi-
nancial agent could demand the dismissal of a lax employee. 
Furthermore, a complete adjustment of the Dominican debt was 
to be denied the United States officials. Half of those 
revenues which the Dominican Government had earmarked to be 
used to pay off the so-called deferred debt, were not to be 
included in the amount divided between the creditors and the 
Government. To assure the Dominican administration's freedom 
I 
to provide for the nation's economic well being, the Government 
11Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No. 
107, enclosure 1, FROS, 1905, p. 310. 
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retained the authority to alter its fiscal laws in order to 
t th . t f . lt d d t. . d 12 promo e e improvemen o agricu ure an omes ic in ustry. 
i 
Surprised that the Finance Minister's proposals offered 
as many guarantees as they did, Dawson, nevertheless, was deter-
mined to reject them. In view of the extensive abuses in the 
customhouses, the reforms offered were not sufficient. More-
over, not all of the debts were to be adjusted. Rather than 
break the news of his rejection directly to the Finance Minister, 
Dawson decided to inform Foreign Minister sfutchez, thereby 
11 ' 1 I f d f d. t' 13 a owing Ve asquez a ew ays o me ia ion. 
By Friday, January 6, it had been decided in Washington 
to proceed further with the negotiations for United States 
I 
control of the Dominican finances. On that day, Acting Secretary 
of State Francis B. Loomis sent Dawson a cablegram which con~ 
. stituted the Department's instructions to him for future negotia-
tions. After recounting Dawson's earlier warnings that the 
Dominican Government would not be able to meet all its obliga-
tions, Loomis noted that some claimants who were United States 
citizens were appealing to the Government to take vigorous 
action on their behalf and that some of the Republic's 
European creditors were becoming uneasy about the conditions in 
the country. He concluded that "these conditions constitute a 
menace to the Republic itself, 11 and then went on to state that 
12Ibid. 
13Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No. 
107, ibid., p. 302. 
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the only way these dangerous conditions could be removed was 
if peace were maintained and the revenues collected in such a 
way as to provide sufficient money to meet both the expenses 
of government and the amount due the Republic's creditors. 
The United States would aid in obtaining these objectives pro-
vided that conditions would assure the success of the under-
taking. To guarantee adequate revenues, government expenditures 
had to be limited, tariff schedules maintained at their exist-
ing levels unless modified with the United States' approval, 
and all the custom revenues collected by the United States. 
Forty per cent of the revenues would be turned over to the 
Dominican Government for its expenses and the remaining sixty 
I 
per cent would be used by the United States to pay the principal 
and interest on the Dominican debt as they came due, and to 
.pay the expenses of carrying out the arrangement. At the end 
of the year, any surplus held by the United States would be 
turned over to the Dominican Government. In addition, the 
United States would have to undertake an adjustment of the 
amount and terms of the entire Dominican debt and to evaluate 
all claims against the Republic. Dawson was instructed to 
"present these considerations" in his own way to the Dominican 
. 14 Government. 
In presenting the Department's conditions for the 
administration of the customs, Dawson decided to work through 
Foreign Minister sinchez, whom he knew to be in favor of North 
14Ibid. 
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American "intervention on any reasonable terms." He had 
I decided not to go directly to the President until Velasquez 
bad either accepted or def~nitely rejected sole control of the 
i lSi 
customhouses by the United States. Dawson's course was pos-
sibly motivated by two considerations. In the first place, he 
probably believed that Morales would not have accepted the plan 
I 
so long as Velasquez insisted on joint control. Secondly, 
Velisquez's outright refusal to accept the conditions, which 
Washington had laid down, could have placed the Morales Govern-
ment in the dangerous position of losing the support of the 
Horacistas. 
I Sanchez apparently did not raise the question of joint 
control during his meeting with Dawson on Saturday, January 7. 
What really bothered him was the proposed division of the 
revenues on the basis of sixty per cent for the creditors and 
forty per cent for the Dominican Government. If the Cabinet 
I 
accepted this distribution, Sanchez assured Dawson, the Presi-
dent and members of the Government would be forced to resign 
and flee the country. In spite of this dire prediction, 
Dawson doubted that the rigid position would be maintained 
after the Foreign Minister had time to reflect. 16 
In his second conversation with the United States 
Minister, s1nchez did not even refer to the planned distribu-
tion of the revenues. However, he informed Dawson that 
lSibid., pp. 302-303. 16Ibid. 
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I 
velasquez had been notified of the substance of Washington's 
position and had received it well and was willing to continue 
negotiations. 
I I . 
Therefore, Dawson and Velasquez resumed their 
conversations. From their first meeting it appeared that 
oawson's doubts concerning the rigidity of the Dominican stand 
on the distribution of funds was not without foundation. 
Velasquez informed him that a "new and rigidly economical budget" 
was in preparation. When it was completed, the minimum amount 
needed by the Government would be known. 17 
I Velasquez's proposed plan for joint control was dis-
cussed on Friday, January 13. Dawson assured the Finance Minister 
that most of the subordinate officials would be Dominicans 
I 
who would be selected in accordance with the suggestions of 
the Dominican Government. Nevertheless, the United States 
.had to have a free hand in employing and discharging. In view 
I 
of this position, a detailed examination of Velasquez's plan 
made it evident that the plan was unworkable. A new one would 
have to be formulated. · Although not definitely conunitting 
I . 
himself to anything, Velasquez suggested that Dawson proceed 
to draft a new proposal. 18 
In the meantime, President Roosevelt had decided to 
facilitate the negotiations by ordering Commander Alfred Dilling-
ham to return to the Dominican Republic. Dillingham was.chosen 
because of his "exceptional knowledge" of the conditions in 
17Ibid., p. 303. 18Ibid. 
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the Dominican Republic. His instructions were essentially 
the same as those sent to Dawson. In addition, however, Dil-
I 
lingham was instructed to remind Morales of their interview 
during the spring of 1904, in which the President had volun-
tarily offered to establish a customs receivership controlled 
by the United States in order to provide for the payment of 
the "recognized foreign claims", funds for the Government, 
and for the establishment of a sinking fund. To assist in the 
negotiations, Dillingham was to confer with the leading men of 
the country if the President and he thought that this would 
be helpful in gaining support for the proposed customs receiver-
ship. Of course, Commander Dillingham was to "work in harmony 
I 
with" Dawson, and to keep the Minister informed of the condi-
tions in the areas where he traveled. 19 
After his success in securing a truce between the 
Jimenista forces in Monte Cristi and the Morales Government, 
in June, 1904, Dillingham had not lost interest in events in 
the Dominican Republic. In late August, he wrote to Assistant 
Secretary of State Loomis expressing his views on the conditions 
in the Caribbean republic. The Commander expressed the belief 
that the younger generation of men, many of whom had been 
educated abroad, were sincerely desirous of establishing a 
system of good and stable government in their country. Dilling-
ham was convinced "that any country that sees fit to interfere, 
19 Secretary of State to Commander Dillingham, January 5, 
1905, ibid., pp. 300-301. 
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to create good government in Santo Domingo, will receive a 
hearty support of this class of men, and this government inter-
vening, I am sure will have the hearty support of the masses, 
I I 
provided the masses are considered and properly treated." 
The country which was rightly destined to interfere and thus 
introduce good government was the United States. This duty 
accrued to the northern republic "as the great civilizing 
power of the world. • • He reported that his conversations • • 
with foreign civilian and military personnelr indicated that 
these men believed the conditions in the Dominican Republic 
had to be improved and that it was the United States' place 
to take the appropriate action. "What the people of Santo 
Do~ingo need to-day," he repeated, "is to be taught to govern 
themselves: they are absolutely ignorant of what good govern-
ment means, they have never enjoyed the bl~ssings of good 
government. . . . 
Dillingham did not envision the interv"ention and sub-
sequent civic education to be easily brought about. The 
"surest and most economical method," he reported, would be the 
application of an amended form of the Platt Amendment provid-
ing for control of the country's finances, with particular 
attention being given to the control of the customhouses. 
Once the latter were out of the control of the Dominican poli-
ticians, illegal expenditures would stop. However, this would 
20A. c. Dillingham to Francis ·B. Loomis, August 21, 
1904, Miscellaneous Letters, August 21-31, 1904, roll 1221. 
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also result in depriving many of the leading politicians and 
military figures of their means of support, thereby making them 
! 
opposed to the reforms. Consequently, an occupation force of 
about 5,000 men was suggested. 21 
In December, 1904, Dillingham again wrote to Loomis. 
He had recently read a newspaper report which seemed to indicate 
an impending revolution in the Dominican Republic. The Com-
mander urged that action be taken to prevent an uprising 
against the Morales Government. He asked if it were not pos-
sible to enter in~o a treaty with the Dominicans; could not 
some assurance be given that the United States were interested 
in stabilizing conditions in the Republic?22 
I 
Conanander Dillingham's views were thus not unlike those 
expressed by Dawson in his despatches to the State Department • 
. It is not surprising, therefore, that the two men found them-
selves to be essentially in agreement, when Dillingham arrived 
in Santo Domingo City on Saturday, January 14. Both thought 
that the instability of the situation made it imperative to act 
quickly. They determined to concentrate their efforts in the 
capital. If Morales could depend on the support of Finance 
Minister Vel~squez and other Horacistas in the Government, a 
trip to the north to converse with the local Horacista·leaders 
would not be necessary. Furthermore, they were of the opinion 
21Ibid. 
22A. c. Dillingham to Francis B. Loomis, December 21, 
1904, Miscellaneous Letters, December 21-31, 1904, roll 1233. 
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that for the time being nothing could be done with the Jimenistas. 23 
Arrangements were made for Dillingham's formal presenta-
i 
tion to President Morale·s at ten o'clock on Tuesday morning, 
January 17. In the meantime, in a confidential interview, 
Dillingham reiterated to the President the United States' posi-
tion. Again, the necessity for financial reform was stressed, 
and the President was assured that the Government in Washington 
was motivated solely by the desire to improve the Dominican 
Republic's welfare. 24 
Morales replied that he and his Cabinet, with the 
/ 
exception of Velasquez, were ready to accept the United States' 
proposal. Provided that he could count on North American back-
ing, the President was even willing to carry out the arrange-
ment without his Finance Minister's support. The topic of 
conversation then turned to the necessity ef economic and 
administrative reforms. Morales' plans along this line called 
for the abolition of the army and of the payments to military 
chiefs, reduction of the number of provinces and officials, 
improvements of roads and schools, and an increase in the 
efficiency of the judicial administration. 25 The President 
requested that, in addition to merely aiding in the restoration 
of financial stability and the preservation of order, the 
United States also assist in bettering the industrial conditions 
107, 
23oawson 
FRUS, 1905, 
24Ibid., 
to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No. 
p. 303. 
p. 304. 25Ibid. 
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of the Republic. This could be achieved by permitting the· 
removal of existing export duties on cacao, tobacco, and coffee. 
soth Dillingham and Dawson agreed to recommend the inclusion 
in the agreement of a clause which would provide for the termi-
nation of these duties. 26 Moreover, fearing adverse public 
opinion and opposition from his Horacista supporters, the 
president urged the necessity of a quick conclusion of the 
t . t• 27 nego 1a ions. 
The formal presentation on the seventeenth was sur-
rounded with military pomp. During the ceremonies, Dawson 
made it a point to drink a toast to "the health of the Presi-
dent and the 'Independence of the Dominican Republic~'" Fol-
lowing the reception, the United States envoys called upon 
the members of the Cabinet. They were then informed that 
I I • Velasquez and Sanchez had been designated as commissioners with 
full powers to treat with the North Americans. In the mean-
time, Dawson had informed the Finance Minister that the plan 
submitted on January 6, for joint control of the customhouses 
was unacceptable and in turn had submitted a draft of an agree-
ment based on the instructions from Loomis. 28 
Prior to Dillingham's arrival, the negotiations between 
the Dominican Government and Dawson were kept secret. With 
the Commander's arrival, however, it became common knowledge 
26on January 16, the Department of State wired Dilling-
ham approval of this provision. Ibid., p. 305. 
27Ibid., p. 304. 28Ibid., pp. 304-305. 
131 
that the Government was contemplating some type of arrangement 
with the United States. This in turn resulted in the press and 
the populace demanding more detailed information. Rumors 
began to spread that the Vice President was about to break with 
the Government and lead a revolt against it. Moreover, there 
was a persistent fear that the United States planned to annex 
samani Bay, if not the entire country. According to Dawson, 
the press charged that Morales and his colleagues were selling 
out the country without consulting the people. 29 
In this apparently explosive ·atmosphere, Dawson and 
Dillingham met with S~chez and Vel~squez on January 18. The 
ensuing discussion indicated that the four men had come to 
agreement on the essentials. Consequently, the Dominicans 
prepared a draft agreement based on the plan which Dawson had 
·submitted on the seventeenth. This new set of proposals was 
completed and discussed on Thursday, January 19. The North 
Americans "found it necessary to insist upon many modifications 
in verbiage and detail;" but, an agreement had been reached 
before the two commissions separated. 30 
As was evident from Dawson's previous attitude, Minister 
I Velasquez had to forego the possibility of joint control of 
the customhouses. Nevertheless, both he and Foreign Minister 
29rbid., p. 305; Dawson to Secretary of State, March 7, 
No. 118, ibid., p. 351. 
30Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No. 
107, ibid., p. 305. 
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sinchez insisted on the inclusion of certain clauses which 
they thought would protect the sovereignty of their nation, 
provided for at least token control of the customhouses, and 
provide sufficient revenues for the expenditures of the govern-
ment. 
In addition to providing for the collection of all the 
customs and the adjustment of all the debts by the United 
states, the agreement stipulated that the North American repub-
lie would guarantee "the complete integrity of the Dominican 
Republic. 1131 Both Jimenistas and Horacistas agreed on this 
point. Refusal to accept the clause would have been considered 
a virtual declaration of the United States' intention to annex 
the Republic. Dawson and Dillingham assented to the inclusion 
of this provision "without hesitation or discussion." They 
felt that President Roosevelt's "recent message to Congress, 
his verbal statement to Captain [sic] Dillingham just prior to 
the latter's departure on this mission, and the general tenor 
of the Department's despatches" justified such action. 32 
31This clause is contained in the second paragraph of 
the preamble. Ibid., p. 311. 
32Dawson to Hay, January 23, 1905, No. 107, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. The message to 
which Dawson referred was evidently the President's annual mes-
sage to Congress on December 6, 1904, announcing the so-called 
Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The reference was 
probably to the following section: "all that this country desires 
is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and pros-
perous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can 
count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that.it 
knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social 
and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obliga-
tions, it need fear no interference from the United States." 
FRUS, 1904, p. XLI • 
............... 
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I I Sanchez and Velasquez refused to consent to the in.clusion 
of a clause which would have forced the Dominican Government 
to alter its tariffs according to the suggestions of the United 
I I 
states. 33 They were afraid that the clause would be used by 
the United States to force a revision in the Dominican tariff 
structure so as to give preferential treatment to North American 
products. However, it was agreed that the Dominican Government 
would only institute a tariff or tax reform in agreement with 
the United States. This, Dawson and Dillingham felt, was in 
d •th h I • • . 34 accor wi t e Department s intention. 
The hope of retaining some control, if only a shadow 
of control, over the customhouses lingered .in the minds of the 
Dominican commissioners. sc<nchez and Vel~squez insisted that 
any commission appointed to adjust the foreign or domestic 
~ 
debt include representatives of the Dominican Government. 
Employees in the customhouses "sofar as the fulfillment of 
their duties and the exercises of their rights is concerned," 
were to be "considered as DODli.nicans and therefore subject to 
the laws of the Republic. 1135 In addition, the Dominican 
Government was to have a representative in each customhouse 
33The Department of State had included such a provision 
in Dillingham's instructions but not in those sent to Dawson. 
Secretary of State to Commander Dillingham, January 5, 1905, 
FRUS, 1905, pp. 300-301. Dawson to Secretary of State, 
Jaii\iary 23, 1905, No. 107,ibid., p. 309. 
34oawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No. 
107, ibid., pp. 309, 312. 
35Article 2, ibid., p. 311. 
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who would watch after his Government's interests. 36 
On their part, Dawson and Dillingham were careful to 
see that this quasi joint control did not interfer with effective 
administration by the United States. The reasonableness of 
the request for joint representation on commissions appointed 
to adjust the debts was not contested by the North American 
envoys. However, the provision denying virtual diplomatic 
immunity to the United States appointees in the customhouses 
was accepted only after considerable discussion and after 
Dawson and Dillingham were convinced 'that it was designed to 
secure "faithful execution of Dominican custom laws and regula-
tions." Moreover, Dawson believed that any abuse of this 
clause could easily be prevented. Right of inspection was 
also subject to considerable discussion, but was eventually 
agreed to on the grounds that the Dominican Government could 
inspect but could not interfer with the collection of the customs. 37 
The Dominican commissioners were also somewhat success-
ful in securing sufficient revenues for the' support of their 
Government. Some modification of the Department of State's 
original instruction that the division of revenues be on the 
sixty per cent for the creditors and forty per cent for the 
Government, was acheived. The agreement stipulated that forty-
five per cent would be collected for the benefit of the creditors. 
Any extraordinary expenses which might arise in connection, 
361b1°d., 308 311 PP• I • 37Ibid., p. 308. 
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~ith the collection of the customs would be charged to the 
portion earmarked for the creditors. Finally, the salaries 
I 
of all the employees in the customhouses were to be provided 
for from the fifty-five per cent. 38 
In reporting the course of the negotiations, Dawson 
informed the Department of State that Dillingham would personally 
explain their reasons for deviating from the original instruc-
tions and accepting the fifty-five per cent-forty-five per 
cent division of the revenues. He, however, went on to point 
out that: 
I have given the subject of what would be a safe and 
reasonable minimum most careful consideration ever since 
my arrival, and while I have not yet been able to gather 
all the data necessary for a sound estimate, I think that 
$75, 000 a month for the first few months is as little as 
they can get along with. Later when the President has been 
able to dismiss the army and reduce the number of provinces, 
it may be that $800,000 [annually] will be safe. Neces-
sarily all the reductions can not be enforced immediately. 
The reform will take time and at best the position of 
President Morales and his government is bound to be exceed-
ingly difficult for the next year. If he fails the alterna-
tive is likely to be very expensive to the creditors and 
the United States as well as to the property owners of 
this island.39 . 
Thus it is evident that Dawson believed that the forty-
five per cent-fifty-five per cent distribution of the customs 
revenues was the minimum necessary to provide the Morales 
Government with sufficient funds to maintain itself in power. 
This evaluation was based on what the United States Minister 
considered to be a realistic appraisal of the economic 
38Ibid., pp. 309, 311-312. 39Ibid., p. 309. 
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necessities of the Government. Reductions in expenses were 
necessary but could not be expected immediately. The failure 
of the Government would ·1ead to a worse situation for the 
I I 
creditors and the United States. If reductions in expenses 
were necessary, how could a check be placed on governmental 
expenditures? Just such a check, Dawson believed, was found 
in the last clause of Article III. He called the Department 
of State's attention to the fact that this clause by which the 
'Dominican Government undertakes to keep its administrative 
expenditures within the limits of the indispensable neces-
sities of administration,' I believe, not only gives us the 
power to insist on a reduction of expenditures whenever we 
may deem it advisable, but it opens the door to a real 
superintendence of all administrative matters, which in 
wise hands can be used to great advantage. Its practical 
effect can be made like that of similar clauses in the 
financial0agreements to which the Government of Egypt is a party. . 
Dawson's allusion to the British control of Egyptian 
affairs in no way indicated that he sought annexation of the 
Dominican Republic. It would seem that he was again seeking 
a way in which the United States could effectively lend its aid 
to the improvement of the financial and administrative conditions 
in the Republic. The idea that United States control in the 
Dominican Republic might ultimately follow the pattern set in 
Egypt by the British was not unique to Dawson. An editorial 
in The New York Times on January 21, 1905 noted the beneficial 
influence of British administration in Egypt, and indicated that 
it seemed as if the Government in Washington intended to follow 
4oibid. 
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. 'l 41 a simi ar course. Furthermore, while one might question 
whether President Roosevelt envisioned the establishment of a 
situation similar to that in Egypt when he determined to 
accept the obligation of the receivership of customs in the 
DOminican Republic, he had, nevertheless, closely followed and 
admired British administration in Egypt for sometime. 42 
Excessive expenditures and insufficient funds might 
eventually bring down the Morales Government. There was also 
the more immediate threat that opposition to the convention 
-
would result in revolution. To thwart this possibility, it 
was the design, evidently of both sides in the negotiations, to 
41 . The New York Times, January 21, 1905, p. 8. 
42Howard K. Beal, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of 
America to World Power (New York: Collier Books, 1967), pp. 152-
153. In general,. it would seem that Roosevelt considered United 
States control of the Philippines to be comparable to that of 
the British in Egypt, rather than using the British example for 
justifying North American control of the Caribbean republic. 
Ibid., p. 153. David H. Burton, Theodore Roosevelt: Confident 
!Iilperialist (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
l968), pp. 82, 88-89. 
Perhaps the example of British control of Egypt was in 
the back of his mind when he determined to act in the Dominican 
Republic rather than let the situation there progressively grow 
worse, with the ultimate possibility of European intervention. 
In 1903, the German ambassador, Spec von Sternburg, suggested 
that the United States take the lead in backing an international 
syndicate which would take control of the finances of Venezuela. 
Howard K. Beal in his work Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of 
America to World Power recounts the President's reaction: 
"Roosevelt objected strenuously, 'I told him,' the President 
recounted, 'that at first blush myjlidgment was very strongly 
that our people would view with the utmost displeasure any such 
proposal, because ••• it would not only tend to produce complica-
tion among the guaranteeing powers but would pave the way for 
reducing Venezuela to a condition like that of Egypt,·' and that 
the Monroe Doctrine meant' of course that no European power 
should gain control of any American republic.[sic]" p. 347. 
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present the opposition in the Dominican Republic with a fait 
accompli. In part, at least according to Dawson, this was the 
- I 
reason why the question of senatorial ratification was never 
. d b th . . . . 43 mentione y e Dominican commissioners. It also explained, 
oawson reported, the inclusion of paragraph "a" of Article II: 
•From and after the date on which this contract takes effect 
the present customhouse employees shall be considered as acting 
under its provisions." If the incumbent employees could be 
considered to be acting under the agreement, the United States 
had, at least after a fashion, taken charge of the customhouses. 44 
With regard to a more definitive re-organization of 
the customhouses, Dawson advised his superiors that this be 
done "carefully and deliberately by an experienced man, who 
should come as soon as possible." Always congnizant of the 
· tenuous position of the Government, he suggested that Monte 
Cristi should receive an .American collector by February 1, the 
date upon which the convention became effective. Since Puerto 
Plata was already under the administration of the deputy 
financial agent, by the application of the Award of July 14, 
1904, nothing need be done there. As for the other ports, Daw-
son saw little harm in allowing them to stay temporarily under 
the direction of Minister Vel,squez. The Finance Minister had 
instituted some reforms already, and Dawson hoped "that the 
43Dawson to Secretary of State, March 7, 1905, No. 
118, FRUS, 1905, p. 351. 
44 Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No. 
107, ibid., pp. 308-309. 
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desire of getting places under the American management will 
tend to make the present collectors strictly enforce duties." 45 
The initial personnel necessary to take charge of the 
I ! 
customhouses, Dawson suggested, should consist of a chief and 
two assistants. The chief would take charge of the custom-
houses in the capital, while one of the assistants administered 
I the customhouse at Sanchez and the other took charge of Puerto 
Plata. The official currently in charge of Puerto Plata would 
administer Monte Cristi. 
I / 
Macoris, Samana, and Azua were to be 
left for later. Until these officials arrived, Dawson planned 
to have reports made to him. Also, Abbott would be there to 
. h' . 46 give im assistance. 
The uncertainty of the political situation made both 
Dawson and Dillingham uneasy, and even the agreement of January 
19 could not remove their apprehension. Only the finally 
signed document could do that. On the nineteenth and twentieth, 
preparing for any eventuality, Dillingham wired the Departments 
of State and Navy advising the stationing of naval vessels at 
. . . . d I Santo Domingo City, Monte Cristi, an Samana. Commander Dilling-
ham alleged that he did not anticipate an uprising but that 
the ships would serve to provide communications for the United 
St M. . t ~f th t 1 h . t t d 47 ates inis er • e e egrap were in errup e • 
45Ibid., p. 307. 46Ibid. 
47Ibid., pp. 305-306. Dillingham to Secretary of the 
Navy, January 19, 1905, telegram, Numerical File 1199, Records 
of the Department of State, R.G. 59, National Archives, Wash-
ington, D. c. This telegram with several others from Rear 
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on the twentieth Dawson and Velasquez worked to bring 
the Spanish and English versions of the document containing the 
agreement into accord. However, since the task of making the 
final copies could not be completed that night, the document 
was finally signed on Saturday morning, January 21. 48 
There can be little doubt that Dawson agreed with 
Dillingham's request for ships made on the nineteenth and 
twentieth. In wiring the Department of State of the signing, 
Dawson noted that some "excitement and criticism" existed. 
He further indicated that he wished to disarm this opposition 
"by a friendly attitude as to details;" however, a "firm attitude 
as to essentials and the presence of force was advisable for 
moral effect upon malcontents. 1149 ' Apparently Dawson was willing 
to use the naval force for more than mere "moral effect" if it 
. were necessary to accomplish the transfer of the customhouses. 
Within a few days after the signing of the agreement, Rear 
Admiral Charles D. Sigsbee, conunander of the Caribbean squadron 
of the United States Navy, outlined for Dawson a possible 
course of action for the navy to follow. In areas where there 
might be opposition to the transfer of the customhouses, the 
Admiral Charles D. Sigsbee, Conunander of the Caribbean squadron 
of the United States Navy, to the Secretary of the Navy, are 
to be found bound at the very end of the Numerical File case 
number 1199. They are bound out of chronological order and 
were evidently given no specific file number. 
48The document is dated January 20, 1905; nevertheless, 
it was not signed until January 21. Dawson to Secretary of 
State, January 23, 1905, FRUS, 1905, pp. 306, 312. 
49Ibid., p. 306. 
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troops and would be supported by the naval forces under the 
• i 
command of Sigsbee. "This proposition," the Admiral assured, 
•is not intended to limit the extent to which I may use the 
force under my command, but rather to assume the policy that 
might be most acceptable to the people of San Coming [sic] and 
of the United States." Dawson replied that he agreed with the 
Admiral's suggestion. He thought that it provided for the 
"prompt and decisive action which may be necessary to preserve 
our rights, and at the same time will prevent any adverse 
't' . ..so cri icism. 
By the end of the third week in January, 1905, the 
I 
first steps toward an United States control of the Dominican 
customs had been taken. In the initial stages of these negotia-
. tions it was Dawson who successfully prepared the way for the 
signing of the agreement on January 21. After the arrival of 
Commander Dillingham, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine, from the documents, whose influence was more impor-
tant. However, it would seem that the document which was finally 
signed was based upon the draft which Dawson had presented to 
I Velasquez on the seventeenth. 
Although from all reports the views of the two men 
were in accord, in a long and somewhat rambling letter, dated 
50secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State, 
February 2, 1905, (transmitting Admiral Sigsbee's report to 
the Secretary of the Navy), Miscellaneous Letters, February 1-
7, 1905, roll 1238. 
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January 16, 1906, to Robert Bacon, who had succeeded Loomis as 
Assistant Secretary of State, Dillingham appears to claim most 
of the credit for negotiating the agreement for himself. His 
objective, however, was clearly not to discredit or deny Daw-
son's part. It was rather to answer the critics of President 
Roosevelt who were accusing the President of following an unwise 
course in the Dominican Republic and of intentionally entering 
into an agreement with the Dominican Government without sub-
mitting it for the advice and consent of the Senate. 51 For 
his part, in his report to the Secretary of State on the course 
of the negotiations, Dawson expressed his gratitude to the 
Department for having sent Dillingham. Dawson found the Com-
mander to be "a most agreeable colleague" and reported that 
Dillingham 
has by his energy, tact, frankness, and decision done 
more than any other American could in so short a time 
with the members of the Dominican Government, and quick 
action was essential to success.52 
If the exact part which Dawson played in the latter 
part of the negotiations is somewhat unclear, his attitude and 
objectives are certainly more precisely defined in the documents. 
He was willing to consider the Dominican sensibilities insofar 
as he could without weakening the cardinal principle of effective 
control of the administration of the customhouses by the United 
51Dillingham to Bacon, Janaury 16, 1906, Miscellaneous 
Letters, January 13-19, 1906, roll 1278. 
52Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No. 
107, FRUS, 1905, p. 309. 
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The objective of this principle was to assure the 
collection of adequate sums, thereby enabling the Dominican 
I 
Government to pay its debts and to introduce reforms. 
Dawson, fully aware of the weakness of Morales' posi-
tion, skillfully conducted the negotiations in such a manner 
as to neither alienate the Horacista support which Morales 
enjoyed nor to lose his own flexibility. From the documents 
it would appear that throughout the negotiations neither Dawson 
nor Dillingham resorted to any threat of force to persuade the 
Dominicans to consent to the North American conditions for 
control of the customs. Indeed, there was little likelihood 
that they would have had to, for there appears to have been 
I 
little, if any, determined resistance to this control among 
the members of the Government. Once the agreement was signed, 
·however, Dawson was more than willing to lend the Dominican 
Government military support in putting it into operation. 
The reports of Dawson's work as Minister in the Dominican 
Republic were appearing in the newspapers back in the United 
States to the delight of at least one of his friends. On 
February 3, Charles G. Dawes wrote 
I note with much pleasure comments of the press of the 
country upon your action of Minister of the United States. 
I congratulate you on the great oppoetunity [sic] which is 
open to you, and upon the international re~~tation which 
your successful efforts are giving to you. · · 
53nawes to Dawson, February 3, 1905, Dawes Collection, 
container January-June, 1905, File D. 
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signing of the agreement of January 21 did not close the 
opportunities of which Dawes spoke. While Dawson and Dillingham 
• I 
had achieved United States control of the Dominican finances 
on paper, it was another thing to put this accord into operation. 
( 
. CHAPTER VI 
I 
THE PROTOCOL OF FEBRUARY 7 AND THE MODUS VIVENDI: 
JANUARY 27, 1905 - APRIL 26, 1905 
As the negotiations leading to the agreement of January 
21 drew to a close, the Department of State apparently did not 
feel that it was being kept fully informed of what was hap-
pening in the Dominican capital. Twice on January 20, and once 
on January 21, Dillingham and Dawson received telegrams request-
ing more information. Even though they evidently complied with 
these requests, the substance of the agreement appeared in 
the newspapers, first in the Dominican Republic then in the 
United States, before the Department received it. This naturally 
proved embarrassing for Washington. 1 
In the United States, news of the signing of an agree-
ment first appeared in the late issues of the New York evening 
papers, on Saturday, January 21. 2 The Sunday morning editions, 
in both New York and Washington, carried virtually complete 
descriptions of the agreement which had been signed the previous 
day. 3 The explanation for the leak was rather simple. Hoping 
1Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No. 
107, FRUS, 1905, pp. 306-307. 
2John Bassett Moore, The Collected Papers of John 
Bassett Moore, Vol. III (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
1944) , p. 181. 
3The New York Times, January 22, 1905, p. 1. The 
Washington Post, January 22, 1905, p. 1. 
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to quiet the opposition, the Morales Government had confidentially 
given out some of the provisions before the entire convention 
bad been agreed to by the commissioners. The press evidently 
obtained this information and printed it. 4 
On Monday, January 22, Assistant Secretary of State 
Loomis issued a statement to the press intended both to clarify 
the position of the United States Government and to forestall 
criticism. Loomis reported that the United States had decided 
to accept the formal and free invitation of the Dominican Govern-
ment to assist it in its financial crisis. He noted that 
"more than one of the great powers" had urged the Administra-
tion either to intervene or to consent to the intervention of 
European creditors. "Therefore," Loomis stated, "representa-
tives of this Government and of Santo Domingo have signed a 
memorandum of a proposed agreement looking· to the American 
control of the fiscal affairs, upon the request and with the 
consent of the Dominican Government." He further explained 
that the United States was neither assuming a protectorate 
over the Republic nor guaranteeing its debts. 5 In spite of 
the Loomis press release, President Roosevelt came under attack 
in the Senate the following day for having exceeded his author-
ity in entering an agreement with the Dominican Republic with-
out the consent of the Senate. 6 
4Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No. 
107, FRUS, 1905, p. 308. 
5The Washin2ton Post, January 23, 1905. p. 3. 
6The Washinszton Post, January 24, 1905, p. 4. 
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Loomis' statement that the accord of the twenty-first 
consisted merely of a "memorandum of a proposed agreement" 
hardly corresponded with. Dawson and Dillingham's view on the 
matter. Since Dawson was already making plans for the adminis-
tration of the customhouses on February 1, there can be little 
doubt that he considered the agreement which he and Dillingham 
had signed as binding on the United States. For its part, the 
state Department claimed that no authorization had been given 
for the signing. 7 However, it would seem that neither Dawson 
nor Dillingham considered that they had exceeded their instruc-
tions. Dawson reported that he and Dillingham had signed an 
agreement which "in all essentials ••• either coincides with 
i 
the instructions given us, or corresponds as closely as was 
practicable. 118 It is possible that Dawson and Dillingham under-
. stood that they were to sign an executive agreement. And if 
so, they were evidently not informed to do otherwise by their 
superiors. 9 Moreover, it appears as if the question of rati-
fication was avoided for fear that the delay might give the 
opposition in the Dominican Republic time to organize to over-
throw the Morales Government. 10 The confusion which developed 
7H. c. Hill, Roosevelt and the Caribbean (New York: 
Russell and Russell, l965), p. l60. 
8Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905,_No. 
107; FRUS, 1905, p. 308. 
9Munro, ~· cit., p. 101. 
10Dawson to Secretary of State, March 7, 1905, No. 
118, FRUS, 1905, pp. 351-52. 
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probably resulted more from the opposition which the agreement 
of January 21 generated in the Senate rather than from any 
failure of Dawson and Dillingham to obey instructions or the 
I I 
oversight of State Department officials. When Secretary of 
State Hay, who at the time was confined to his home because of 
illness, saw the agreement which Dawson and Dillingham had 
signed, he recorded in, his diary that he "at once wrote to 
Loomis saying it was a Treaty and nothing less and should be 
sent to the Senate the moment the text arrived. 1111 However, 
' 
ratification was impossible without modification. Therefore, 
on January 25, Acting Secretary of State Loomis sent Dawson a 
draft protocol of a new agreement. He was instructed to inform 
Morales and the Dominican Cabinet that the previously signed 
agreement was merely ad referendum. Undue publicity was to be 
avoided during the course of the new negotiations. 12 
Essentially, the draft protocol which Loomis sent to 
Dawson was the same as that signed on January 21. The changes 
which were made in Washington were probably considered minor 
and resulted, to a large extent, from the decision to have the 
t b ff t . 1 ft t'f' t' 13 agreemen ecome e ec ive on y a er ra i ica ion. Neverthe-
less, these alterations should be noted, for some gave the 
11Entry for Wednesday, January 25, 1905, John Hay's 
diary for 1905, John Hay Papers, Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D. c., Box 1. 
12Acting Secretary of State (Loomis) to Dawson, January 
25, 1905, telegram, FRUS, 1905, p. 313. 
13Ibid. 
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agreement a different comp·lexion while others elicited obje·ctions 
from the Dominican officials. 14 
The new protocol made it clear that it was in the 
national interest of the United States to prevent foreign inter-
vention in the Caribbean republic. Provisions, which were 
probably thought likely to meet with senatorial opposition or 
to limit the United States control or to diminish the amount 
available for paying the creditors, were altered. The explicit 
statement in the second article of the original agreement that 
the employees appointed by the United States to serve in the 
customhouses would be subject to Dominican law was omitted 
from the proposed draft. The same fate fell to paragraph "a" 
of the third article of the original which had provided that 
extraordinary expenses would be paid out of the fifty-five 
per cent held for the creditors. Article six of the proposed 
draft added the provision that the Dominican Republic could not 
increase the "export duties or its public debt without the 
consent of the President of the United States." Article 
seven of the original provided that the United States "at the 
request of the Dominican Republic, shall grant such other 
assistance as may be in its power to restore the credit, pre-
serve the order, increase the efficiency of the civil administra-
tion, and advance to [sic] material progress and welfare of the 
Republic." This was altered to read" "The Government of the 
14
copies of the two agreements appear on pages 311-
314, FRUS, 1905. 
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united States, at the request of the Dominican Republic, shall 
9rant such other assistance as the former may deem proper to 
I 
restore the credit •••• " Thus, while the United States 
might extend additional assistance the amount and type of 
assistance were left solely to the discretion of the Govern-
ment in Washington. Finally, the eighth article of the draft 
provided that the agreement would go into effect only after 
it had been ratified by the United States Senate. 
When Dawson received the Department's draft protocol 
on January 27, he immediately presented it to President Morales, 
Foreign Minister sfutchez and acting Finance Minister Lemarche, 
who was standing in for Vel~squez. After signing the agreement 
of January 21, the Finance Minister had traveled to Puerto 
Plata and Santiago with the dual objective of forestalling opposi-
· tion in the northern part of the country to the agreement and 
of facilitating the transfer of the customhouses to North 
American control. The Dominican officials were willing to 
accept the proposed draft and even thought it possible and 
convenient to have the Dominican legislature ratify the new 
accord. 15 
There were, however, some reasons for apprehension. 
In the first place, it· would be impossible, Dawson was informed, 
to guarantee Horacista acceptance until Velfsquez had returned. 
Far more vexing to the Dominicans was the possibility that the 
15Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, 
No. 110, FRUS, 1905, pp. 316-17. 
151 ~United States Senate might not ratify the accord. Concerning 
senatorial ratification, Dawson could only offer the assurance 
that President Roosevelt would do everything possible to 
I 
secure ratification. Moreover, the treasury was virtually 
empty. This situation of financial embarrassment was the 
result of the method of collecting the custom revenues. 
Promissory notes, some not due for as long as two months, were 
collected in the place of cash. The Government had used these 
notes as security for loans to meet inunediate expenses. All 
of the promissory notes collected for the month of January 
had been used up and with the agreement between the United 
States and the Dominican Government still pending, it would be 
impossible to obtain a loan. In order to aid the Morales 
Government over this critical stage, Dawson agreed to try to 
persuade some local banker to lend the Government the necessary 
funds, if the State Department did not object to this procedure. 16 
To achieve this end, Dawson approached Santiago 
Michelena, a Puerto Rican and an United States citizen, 17 who, 
in addition to being a prosperous merchant, operated one of 
the largest banks in the Dominican Republic. Michelena was 
willing to lend his assistance on two conditions: Dawson would 
16Ibid., p. 318. 
17Although United States citizenship was not conferred 
on Puerto Ricans until 1917 with the passage of the Jones Act, 
Michelena apparently was an United States citizen in 1905. 
Dawson specifically refers to Michele~a as an American citizen. 
Ibid. Also see, Dawson to Hay, February 13, 1905, No. 110, 
Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. 
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have to see that his rights were respected and would have to 
agree to recommend that he be continued as the banker after 
I 
the permanent arrangement had been made. Dawson replied that 
he could give no promises on the latter point. Nevertheless, 
he did not hesitate to point out that Michelena's "American 
citizenship, his financial standing and his willingness to help 
the Dominican Government pending the present negotiations, 
would certainly all have great weight if it became necessary to 
select a banker. 1118 
Dawson's next step was to secure his superiors' approval 
for any agreement between the Dominican Government and Michelena. 
In a telegram to the Secretary of State on January 27, Dawson 
I 
reported that he could secure Dominican assent to the new 
draft protocol provided that the Department would authorize 
some means to tide the Government over in its current financial 
embarrassment. He concluded by explaining that the necessary 
credit could be obtained if he were authorized to agree to 
transfering temporarily the collection of the revenues to a 
banker. 19 On the twenty-eighth, Loomis replied that while the 
Department of State had no authority to approve the arrangement, 
there was no objection to it provided that neither the provisions 
of the protocol nor the rights of the Dominican Improvement 
18oawson to Hay, February 13, 1905, No. 110, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. 
19oawson to Secretary of State, January 27, 1905, tele-
gram, ibid. Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, 
No. 110, FROS, 1905, p. 318. 
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company under the Award of July 14 were obstructed. 20 Upon 
receiving Michelena's consent to the arrangement, Dawson pro-
• I 
ceeded to draw up a contract which was signed on January 29, 
by Michelena and the acting Finance Minister. 21 
By this contract, Michelena was authorized, as of 
February 1, to collect the custom revenues and to direct the 
employees in the customhouses. In return Michelena was to pay 
the Dominican Government $75,000 monthly in four equal install-
ments. Since the custom revenues would still be in the form 
of promissory notes, as these notes came due the banker would 
apply the sum to eliminating the debt which the Government had 
thus incurred with him and also pay the salaries of the custom-
1 
house employees. Any balance that remained was to be held in 
trust by Michelena for the Dominican Government "subject to 
the order of" Dawson. Naturally, Michelena was compensated 
for his efforts. He was to receive one-half per cent per month 
interest on all sums due him, two per cent commission each 
month on the amount collected to cover the $75,000, and one 
per cent each month for the transfer of that amount. The 
Dominican Government held itself responsible for the faithful 
fulfillment of the contract before the United States Minister. 
The contract itself was to remain in effect at the discretion 
· 
20Loomis to Dawson, January 28, 1905, telegram, Instruc-
tions to Santo Domingo, vol. 1, roll 98. Dawson to Secretary 
of State, February 13, 1905, No. 110, FRUS, 1905, p. 318. 
21Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, 
No. 110, FRUS, 1905, p. 319. 
r 154 of the Minister. 22 Once the agreement had been concluded, 
Michelena began a tour of the Republic in order to arrange for 
the collection of the custom revenues and the payment of the 
23 budget. I 
Dawson later explained to his superiors that he had 
included the clause which provided for the contract to remain 
in effect at his discretion in order that he could end his 
•responsibility should the Department not approve" of his 
action. He also admitted that this clause provided him with 
a powerful diplomatic weapon, which could be used to get 
Velasquez to agree to sign the new protocol. If the Finance 
Minister were reluctant, Dawson could always threaten to 
terminate the contract, thus returning the Government to its 
condition of financial embarrassment. Also, Dawson apparently 
intended to use the clause, which authorized Michelena to 
retain the surplus revenues at the United States Minister's 
direction, as a lever against the Finance Minister. By in-
eluding this clause, Dawson saw to it that the Dominican Gov-
ernment would remain dependent on Michelena. However, the 
surplus thus gathered would also act as an aid to the Dominican 
22Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, No. 
110, enclosure 1: Contract between the Dominican Government and 
Santiago Michelena, FRUS, 1905, p. 325. Melvin Knight, The 
Americans in Santo DOiiiiilgo (New York: Vanguard Press, 1928f, 
pp. 29-30. 
23oawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, No. 
110, ibid., p. 319. Evidently Michelena's assumption of the 
collection of the customs produced rumors that the United 
States had taken over some of the customhouses. On February 3, 
the Department wired Dawson for information on this point. He 
replied that the rumors were false and probably resulted from a 
misinterpretation of Michelena's activities. Ibid., p. 321. 
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Government, by providing a fund upon which it could fall back 
when the protocol was finally signed. Dawson reported that in 
his judgment, "Velfsquez,• signature and the accumulation of a 
surplus were both absolutely essential to the success of the 
whole negotiations. 1124 
In fact, the Michelena contract had achieved more than 
either merely tiding the Morales Government over in a time of 
financial embarrassment or providing Dawson with a handy lever 
, 
to exert pressure on Velasquez to assure the Finance Minister's 
agreement to the Department's protocol. While Dawson does not 
report that this was his intention, and perhaps it was not, 
what in effect he accomplished by the contract was the partial 
implementation of the agreement of January 21, and a possible 
springboard for legally furthering United States involvement 
in the Dominican 'financial situation. Collection of the customs 
was now completely out of the hands of the Dominican Government. 
There had been, of course, no provision for the adjustment of 
the external and interior debts of the Republic, nor for the 
payment of the claimants from the surplus. However, the col-
lection was in the hands of an United States citizen whose 
rights were guaranteed before the United States resident minister. 
I 
Any interference in the collection could certainly result in 
the active involvement of the United States Government to pro-
tect its citizen's rights. 
It is also to be observed that Michelena received a 
24 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, No. 
110, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. 
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b 
him was apparently not one of Dawson's major concerns. It 
was verbally agreed between Michelena and acting Finance Minister 
i,emarche that the banker would temporarily suspend the collec-
tion of his commission and interest. Dawson approved of this 
26 
arrangement. However, in conducting the negotiations for 
the contract, Dawson was careful to follow the Department's 
wishes and not interfer with the rights of the Improvement 
Company under the Award. Both Michelena and the Dominican 
Government were clearly given to understand that the custom-
house at Puerto Plata, which was being administered under the 
Award of July 14, 1904, could not be included in those which 
ld d M• h 1 I d' t~ 27 wou come un er ic e ena s irec ion. 
A few days after the signing of the contract with 
Michelena, Dawson had another interview with Morales and the 
Foreign Minister. His purpose was to make known the State 
Department's decision to make a minor grammatical change in 
the preamble of the protocol. While refusing to give unquali-
fied approval to the Department's draft, President Morales 
took advantage of the opportunity afforded by the interview to 
make some proposed changes of his own. Dawson, insisting on 
the necessity of accepting the protocol just as it came from 
25Melvin Knight in his work The Americans in Santo 
Domingo claims that Michelena could anticipate over $27,000 
a year in interest and fees. QE_. cit., pp. 29-30. 
26 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, 
No. 110, enclosure 2: Minister Dawson to Mr. Michelena, 
January 29, 1905, FRUS, 1905, p. 325. 
27 Dawson to Secretary of State. February 13. 1905. 
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washington, refused even to entertain most of the changes.· 
on four points, however, the Dominicans stood fast. First 
they would not consent to ¢late the protocol as of the nine-
/ I 
teenth. Second, to exempt the customhouse employees from 
Dominican legal jurisdiction would wound national pride and 
cound not be accepted. Third, if the protocol called for 
ratification by the United States Senate, it must also be sub-
mitted for the ratification of the Dominican legislature. 
Finally, the protocol must stipulate that the agreement would 
terminate as soon as the debt was paid. These points seemed 
•more or less reasonable" to Dawson 28 and he, therefore, wired 
them to Washington. 29 The State Department was willing to 
agree to the changes which the Dominicans requested. But 
Dawson was urged to obtain Dominican approval as soon as pos-
sible, since Congress was about to adjourn~ It proved impos-
sible, however, to rush the Dominicans. Morales insisted that 
it was imperative to await the return of Finance Minister 
Vel~squez from his trip to the north, lest the Horacistas with-
draw their support from the Government. 30 
In addition to the attitude of the Horacistas, another 
No. 110, ibid., p. 319. 
28 Dawson to Hay, February 13, 1905, No. 110, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. 
29 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, 
No. 110, FRUS, 1905, p. 320. 
3oibid., pp. 320-321. 
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possible threat to the Government was the reaction of the Jimen-
istas in Monte Cristi towards the willingness of the Morales 
-
Government to allow United States intervention in the custom-
houses. Negotiations directed towards assuring Governor Arias' 
acceptance of the January 21 agreement or of securing control 
of the port of Monte Cristi, in addition to re-negotiation the 
protocol with Morales, occupied a large portion of Dawson's 
attention prior to Finance Minister Vel~squez's return to the 
capital. 
On January 25, two days before he received Loomis' 
instructions to renegotiate the agreement, Dawson wasinformed 
by President Morales that Governor Arias had protested the 
accord and had threatened to resign. If Arias fulfilled his 
threat, a revolt in Monte Cristi was a certainty. Dawson 
inunediately took steps to forestall this danger. The United 
States consul at Monte Cristi was instructed to advise Arias 
to await more definite information before going ahead with his 
resignation. Dawson assured that the "interests of Monte 
Cristi will be respected." Admiral Sigsbee and Conunander 
Dillingham, who were already on their way to visit the northern 
coastal cities on board the Admiral's flagship the u.s.s. Newark, 
were also alerted to the possibility of trouble in Monte Cristi. 
The danger seemed temporarily to pass when the consul at Monte 
Cristi telegraphed that Arias was willing to wait until he 
saw the full agreement before taking further action. By 
January 27, Sigsbee and Dillingham were on their way to meet 
159 
with Arias and give him the full details of the agreernent.~1 
When they arrived on the twenty-eighth, they quickly got 
in touch with Arias. The ostensible reason for the Governor's 
opposition was the failure of the agreement to include any 
reference to ratification by the Dominican legislature. 32 
However, the real reason, Sigsbee reported, was Jimenista dis-
trust of the Morales Adrninistration. 33 Nevertheless, by 
February 1, Arias was willing to accept the terms of the agree-
ment signed on January 21, without modification. Sigsbee 
wired the Secretary of the Navy on the second, suggesting 
!prompt installation of American custom authorities. 1134 
It is possible that the officials in Washington, 
I 
considering the problems that had already arisen with Monte 
Cristi and the fact that Arias was now willing to accept United 
States control of the customhouse there, decided that since 
the January 21 agreement could not become operative on 
31Dawson to SecretarY of State, February 13, 1905, 
No. 111, FRUS, 1905, pp. 326-27. 
32Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, 
No. 111, enclosure 2: Dillingham to Dawson, January 29, 1905, 
ibid., p. 333. Sigsbee to Secretary of the Navy, January 30, 
l905, telegram, Numerical File 1199, bound at the end of the 
file, Records of the Department of State, R.G. 59, National 
Archives, Washington, D. c. 
33sigsbee to Secretary of the Navy, February 1, 1905, 
telegram, Numerical File 1199, bound at the end of the file, 
Records of the Department of State, R.G. 59, National Archives, 
washington, D. C. 
34sigsbee to Secretary of the Navy, February 2, 1905, 
telegram, ibid. 
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February 1, as had originally been planned, it was wisest to 
take control of the customhouse under the only legal means 
avai.lable: the Improvement, Company Award of July 14, 1904. 
I I 
on Friday, February 3, the Department telegraphed this decision 
to Dawson. 35 
In spite of Dawson's urging, Morales and his Cabinet 
proved reluctant to issue the formal request that the United 
States take over the customhouse at Monte Cristi. They pro-
tested that such action would drive Arias into revolt and 
that it would be better to let Michelena take charge. Dawson, 
nevertheless, was soon convinced that the possibility of Arias 
revolting against the Government was not the real reason for 
preferring Michelena's control of Monte Cristi's customhouse 
to United States control under the Award. What the Dominicans 
really feared was that Monte Cristi would be placed under the 
control of John T. Abbott of the Improvement Company and that 
this was merely a harbinger of what would come when the protocol 
was finally ratified. 36 Dawson later informed the State Depart-
ment that he had 
slowly come to the conclusion that it is impossible to 
ignore or overcome the dislike of the Improvement Company, 
and of all persons who have been connected with it, which 
is felt by Dominicans of all parties. This hatred origi-
nally arose from the widely entertained belief that the 
main cause of all their present financial troubles was an 
alleged corrupt alliance between President Heureaux and 
35Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, 
No. 111, ~' 1905, p. 328. 
36rbid., pp. 328-329. 
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the Improvement Company. This feeling has been exacerbated 
by the bitter controversies which have continually gone 
on during the last five years between representatives of 
the Improvement Company and the various Dominican adminis-
trations. While this feeling of distrust is not really 
directed against Judge Abbott personally, its existence 
was the principal reason why three months ago the Dominican 
Government refused to ask the United States to take over 
Sanchez, Samana, and Monte Cristi customhouses under the 
award, notwithstanding that the terms offered by Judge 
Abbott were so advantageous and liberal to this government. 37 
Even though he realized that the true cause of the 
Dominican opposition to the United States controlling Monte 
Cristi, Dawson refrained from excluding the possibility that 
Abbott might be placed in charge of the customhouse, since he 
did not know what position Washington would take. Instead he 
argued that once the port was in the charge of the United 
I 
States, it could no longer be used by the Government's oppo-
nents as a port of entry for weapons. Moreover, he pointed out 
that his Government considered control of the port of Monte 
Cristi under the Award to be essential and was deserving of 
the confidence of the Dominican Government. Whatever their 
fears and reasons, the Dominican Cabinet finally consented to 
make the necessary formal proposa1. 38 
In his telegram of February 4, informing the State Depart-
ment of the Dominican Government's "request" that the United 
States assume control of the customhouse at Monte Cristi, 
Dawson made it clear that Morales and his Cabinet were afraid 
that this was merely the first step to complete control by the 
37Ibid., p. 329. 38Ibid. 
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xmprovement Company when the protocol went into effect. The 
oepartment telegraphed back the same day that a naval officer 
had been instructed to take charge 'of the customhouse at Monte 
Cristi. In addition, Dawson was instructed to 
assure the Dominican Government in [the) case pending 
[that when the) arrangement between the two governments 
is consumated the Santo Domingo Improvement Company will 
not have possession nor control of the customhouses. The 
United States itself would collect the revenues and make 
distribution as contemplated by the pending arrangement. 39 
When Vel£squez returned to the capital in early February, 
he proved even more difficult to deal with than Dawson had 
anticipated. At first, the Finance Minister refused to consider 
the draft protocol, insisting on the form of the one signed 
on January 21. 40 He then attempted to obtain modifications of 
the draft protocol so that it would contain certain of the 
guarantees inclu~ed in the earlier document. Above all, it 
was essential to include an iron clad guarantee that the 
territorial integrity of the Republic would be protected. In 
addition, Vel£squez desired to include clauses which would 
provide for any extraordinary expense to be paid out of the 
fifty-five per cent reserved for the creditors, and which would 
assure the appointment of Dominican subordinates in the custom-
houses. Finally, while the Dominicans were willing to pledge 
~ 
themselves unconditionally not to increase the debt, Velasquez 
39Ibid., pp. 329-330. 
40Dawson to Hay, February 7, 1905, No. 108, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. 
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thought it unnecessarily offensive to virtually pledge to do 
so at the behest of the President of the United States. 41 
Dawson repeatedly answered that he was not authorized 
I 
! I 
to agree to any changes in the draft protocol. He did try, 
however, to quiet the Dominican fears on the question of terri-
torial integrity. He stated that the United States was willing 
to guarantee against European aggression and to disclaim any 
aggressive intention on its own part; nevertheless, "the United 
States would not assume the responsibility implied in making 
a general guaranty of Dominican territorial integrity." 
When this failed, Dawson consented to telegraph the Dominican 
position to the Department of State. On the fourth, he wired 
the Secretary of State that the Dominican Finance Minister 
wanted a statement assuring the territorial integrity included 
in the first paragraph of the proposed draft, in addition to 
42 the one already included in the second paragraph. 
Wash~ngton thought that this was unnecessarily repeti-
tious and insisted on the original form. However, information 
that Vice President cfceres had received an alarming wire 
from Leonte V~squez, the Dominican consul-general in New York, 
reporting that the United States Government intended to use 
the proposed protocol as a means of eventually annexing the 
Dominican Reputilic, convinced Dawson that some guarantee on 
41Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, i905, 
No. 110, FRUS, 1905, pp. 321-322. 
42Ibid. 
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• this point had to be included in the agreement. 43 Therefore, 
on Sunday, February 5, Dawson again wired the Department explain-
r 
ing the adverse effect Vasquez's telegram had had on the Dominican 
Government. On the sixth, Dawson received permission to include 
a clause by which the United States agreed "to respect the 
complete territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic. 1144 
Dawson found it embarrassing and difficult to continually 
I 
resist Velasquez's demands for changes in the protocol. On 
• • I the one hand, Minister Velasquez, Dawson reported, was "a 
thoroughly honest, patriotic man, whose exceptional integrity 
has justly earned him the prestige he enjoys among the better 
classes of Dominicans." On the other hand, neither President 
I 
Morales nor Foreign Minister scfnchez would disagree with him. 
Rather, they supported him, fearing that his resignation would 
. result in the lose of Horacista support for the Morales Adminis-
tration. 45 
In spite of any respect that he may have had for the 
I Finance Minister, Dawson was determined to persuade Velasquez 
to sign the protocol. To secure this, he decided to exert 
pressure on the Finance Minister. Dawson was fully aware that 
43Ibid., p. 322. 
44Ibid. On the question of including a guarantee that 
the United States would respect the territorial integrity of 
the Dominican Republic, William Loeb, Roosevelt's secretary, 
wrote to Acting Secretary Loomis that "the President says of 
course put in anything the Dominicans want about our not annex-
ing the Island--the stronger the better." William Loeb, Jr. to 
Loomis, February 6, 1905, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, 
vol. 13, roll 13. 
45Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, 
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washington would entertain no more changes; however, on the 
I 
sixth he again wired the Department, stating that Velasquez 
would sign provided that the protocol was so altered as to 
I 
I I 
include an effective guarantee of the territorial integrity 
of the Republic and that the clause providing for the consent 
of the United States President before the Dominican debt could 
. d l' . t d 46 be increase were e imina e • If by chance, the Department 
accepted this latter change, the former already having been 
I 
approved, Velasquez would have to yield and sign. If the 
Department refused to consent, as Dawson doubtless thought 
would be the case, the Dominicans then would have no alternative 
but to accept the protocol as it stood or reject the entire 
idea of United States intervention in the customhouses. How-
ever, if even this failed, Dawson still had one last resort: 
"an order suspending Michelena's contract.!147 
Dawson received the expected telegram rejecting the 
proposed alterations on the sixth, and conveyed this informa-
I • tion to Minister Velasquez early the next morning. It was 
evident that the desired effect had been achieved. Neverthe-
less, the Finance Minister insisted on a further postponement 
until he consulted with his colleagues in the Cabinet and with 
No. 110, FRUS, 1905, pp. 322-323. 
46 Ibid., p. 323. 
47Dawson to Hay, February 13, 1905, No. 110, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. 
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congressional leaders. 48 
The rest of the morning was spent in preparing the 
I 
English copies of the protocol. Shortly after two o'clock 
in the afternoon, Vel~squez arrived at the Legation and agreed 
to sign provided that Dawson would consent to answer in writing 
a letter which stated that the Dominican commissioners be-
lieved the only justifiable modifications of the convention 
signed on January 21 were those stating that the convention 
was to be considered ad referendum and providing for the agree-
ment to terminate as soon as the debt was paid. Dawson agreed. 
In his reply, he wrote that while agreeing with the Dominican 
commissioners that the modifications they mentioned were 
I 
necessary, the United States Government believed that others 
were also necessary and the protocol as presented by Washing-
. ton must be accepted without further alteration. Thus, after 
being absolved of any guilt for not having secured further 
modi£ications, Vel~squez and S~nchez yielded. The protocol 
was signed at four o'clock Tuesday afternoon, February 7, and 
immediately transported by an United States naval vessel to 
San Juan, Puerto Rico in order to arrive in time to catch the 
mail boat to New York. 49 
Dawson took satisfaction in reporting that, in spite 
of difficulties, relations between the Dominican officials 
48Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, 
No. 110, FRUS, 1905, p. 323. 
491bid., pp. 323-324, 326. 
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and himself had remained amicable. He was convinced that "all 
pominican factions" appreciated "that the State Department and 
its representatives" in Santo Domingo were sympathetic and 
understood the Dominican susceptibilities. Further he believed 
that they realized that the United States would administer 
the protocol in a spirit of selflessness.so By "all Dominican 
factions" Dawson obviously did not mean either all political 
factions or the entire Dominican population. His statement 
undoubtedly referred to the various factions within the Morales 
Government. He was aware of the fact that there were those 
who would not support the Government's actions. In handling 
these, he realized the value of a show of force to keep them 
I 
-in line. Two United States navel vessels had been stationed 
in the harbor at Santo Domingo. Dawson acknowledged that the 
. presence of these ships had had "a powerful moral effect on 
the rash and ignorant elements, who unhappily are in the 
majority and who do not yet understand the real benefits the 
country will derive from the arrangement. • . . 
On February lS, President Roosevelt sent the protocol 
to the Senate, along with a message giving the background of 
the situation in the Dominican Republic and the reason which 
impelled him to take the action that he had.s 2 For over a 
so b'd 324 !.2:._. ' p. • Slibid. 
S2Message from the President of the United States, 
transmitting a protocol of an agreement between the United 
States and the Dominican Republic, providing for the collection 
and disbursement by the United States of the customs revenues 
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•onth, first in the regular session and then in a special ses-
sion, the protocol remained before the upper house without any 
sign that it would receive, ratification. Meanwhile, in the 
I ,.. I 
Dominican Republic the last three weeks of February and the 
first half of March passed without much change in either the 
political or financial conditions. Although critical prob-
lems did arise, Dawson did his best to minimize their disruptive 
effects. 
Monte Cristi, under the virtually independent Governor 
Arias, continued to be a potential source of unrest within the 
Republic. When the Morales Government had consented on 
February 4, to place the customhouse in that port under the 
control of the United States by the Award of July 14, 1904, 
Lieutenant Conunander E. F. Leiper of the United States Navy 
was appointed by Washington as the provisi0nal collector of 
customs. On Thursday, February 9, Dawson received an alarming 
telegram from Admiral Sigsbee reporting that Arias would not 
allow Leiper to take control of the customhouse. 
mediately got in touch with the Foreign Minister. 
Dawson im-
S~nche z 
explained that the mix-up had resulted from an oversight by a 
subordinate in the Foreign Office, who had failed to notify 
Arias of the Government's decision to allow the customhouse 
to be administered by the United States. As soon as the over-
sight had been discovered, the necessary instructions had been 
of the Dominican Republic, signed on February 7, 1905, ibid., 
pp. 334-349. 
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sent to Arias. Not completely satisfied that this would be 
sufficient, Dawson requested that Arias be inunediately sent 
I 
another explicit telegram. On Saturday, February 11, word was 
received that Arias had consented to the transfer of the custom-
house to Leiper's control.SJ 
Dawson thought that the misunderstanding at Monte 
Cristi had, at least in part, resulted from an oversight by 
the central government. However, he also thought that Arias 
was probably not without blame. The Governor, Dawson reported, 
probably had been glad to take advantage of the delay in the 
transfer to permit friends to disembark cargoes without pay-
ing the full duties.s 4 To Dawson the real value of United 
\ 
States control of the Monte Cristi customhouse was that the 
port could no longer possibly serve as a base for a revolution 
. against the Morales Government. While there was still talk 
of a Jimenista uprising in the interior, he believed that 
these malcontents were without financial means or important 
political leaders, and that the Government felt competent to 
handle any local uprising. Dawson, nevertheless, still be-
lieved that every precaution should be taken.SS 
Rmnors that President Morales had been opposed to 
SJDawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 190S, 
No. 111, ibid., pp. 331-332. 
s 4Dawson to Hay, February 13, 190S, No. 111, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. 
SSDawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, 
No. 111, FRUS, 190S, p. 332. 
170 ~· subJilitting the protocol to the Dominican legislature for rati-
fication, proved to be another source of discontent. By 
February 16, Morales was· afraid that these rumors would pre-
judice the Dominican deputies and he approached Dawson for 
assistance in disproving them. The President asked for a 
letter which would state that from the beginning of the negotia-
tions the Dominican chief executive had favored submission of 
the protocol to the Dominican legislature. The publication of 
such a letter, Morales hoped, would silence the damaging 
charges made against him. Dawson willing agreed to comply 
with the President's request. 56 
Undoubtedly, there were a few tense moments on 
\ 
February 24, when an unsuccessful attempt was made on Morales' 
life. Dawson reported that five men of Jimenista sympathies 
. were apprehended. He described them as "of the lower classes, 1157 
and believed that they had little backing. 58 Furthermore, he 
reported that the ambiguity brought about by the delay in 
ratification was actually serving to strengthen the position 
of those who were opposed both to the protocol and to Morales. 
He informed Washington that some were even claiming that a 
revolution against the President could count on moral support 
56Dawson to Secretary of State, March 7, 1905, No. 
118, ibid., p. 351. 
57Ibid., p. 352. 
58Dawson to Loomis, February 29, 1905, unnumbered, 
Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. 
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the United States. 59 
Dawson did his best to dispel any fears Morales might 
have entertained concerning possible ratification and also 
attempted to add to the atmosphere of good relations between 
the United States and the Dominican Republic. He reported 
that he assured Morales that it was the custom in the United 
states to call a special session of Congress immediately after 
the inauguration of the president on March 4, and that this 
special session would undoubtedly consider the protocol. 
Dawson also advised Washington to give Morales adequate warn-
ing if anylength of time was anticipated before ratification, 
in order that the President could take the necessary precau-
tions. 60 In order to. give expression to the spirit of friend-
. -
ship existing between the United States and the Dominican 
Republic, Dawson got Admiral Sigsbee to join with him in taking 
a conspicuous part in the celebration of Dominican Independence 
Day, on February 21. 61 
On the financial side, Michelena continued to collect 
the customs at those ports not administered under the Award 
of July 14, 1904. The original contract between the banker 
and the Dominican Government had been abrograted and a new one 
signed. Since the arrangement was working well, and undoubtedly 
59Dawson to Secretary of State, March 7, 1905, 
No. 118, ~, 1905, p. 353. 
GO Ibid. 
61Dawson to Secretary of State, March 7, 1905, No. 120, 
ibid., pp. 394-395. 
since Dawson no longer needed the contract as a diplomatic 
I 
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weapon to use on Finance Minister Velasquez, the United States 
I 62 Minister was not mentione~ as a party to the contract. 
Nevertheless, Michelena was guaranteed the right to secure 
redress through diplomatic channels, while the Dominican Govern-
ment promised to keep expenses below $75,000 a month and to 
preserve the surplus which was being accumulated. 63 
The special session of the United States Congress, 
which Dawson had mentioned, was convened on March 5. But 
ratification of the treaty had not been accomplished when the 
congress adjourned on March 18. To a large extent, senatorial 
opposition came from what was considered the President's high 
\ 
handed method in trying originally to put the agreement into 
_,J 
operation without senatorial ratification. When news of the 
. adjournment reached Santo Domingo on Monday, March 20, the 
Dominican Government naturally became apprehensive. The situa-
tion was not improved when, on the following day, a telegram 
from w. L. Bass in New York City was published stating that 
the Senate had rejected the protocol. Meetings openly ad-
vocating revolution were held. While his Government took 
what precautions it could, Morales nervously phoned the United 
States Legation every hour hoping to learn something definite 
62
oawson to Secretary of State, March 7, 1905, No. 
118, ibid., p. 353. 
63oawson to Loomis, February 29, 1905, unnumbered, 
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from Dawson. On Wednesday, March 22, the tension was somewhat 
eased when The New York Herald's correspondent in Santo Domingo 
• I 
received a telegram from his paper stating that Congress had 
adjourned; however, no action had been taken on the protocol. 
Finally, on Thursday, Dawson received word from the State 
oepartment. He was informed that the protocol had been favorably 
reported out of conunittee and would probably be ratified in the 
. 64 
next session. 
At this point it would seem that the already difficult 
position of the Morales Government daily became more impossible. 
In addition to the ever present threat of revolution a new 
problem was· added when Michelena, disgruntled over the possi-
bility of not being able to collect sufficient collateral to 
cover his advances to the Government, threatened to terminate 
. his contract with the Morales Administration. The problem 
arose out of the Government's earlier practice of granting 
preferential contracts to some of the larger importers, which 
allowed them to substitute government due bills for the regular 
. 65 promissory notes. 
More bothersome to the Morales Government than either 
the threat of revolution or the possibility of losing Michelena's 
financial assistance was the attitude of the European powers, 
whose nationals were creditors of the Republic, to the n9n-
64 Dawson to Secretary of State, March 27, 1905, No. 
122, FRUS, 1905, pp. 356-57. 
65Ibid., pp. 357-58. 
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ratification of the protocol. Dawson reported that an ultimatum 
and a show of force by a European power would demonstrate to 
the entire country that Morales no longer had the forbearance 
66 I I 
of the foreign powers. On Tuesday, March 14, even before 
congress adjourned, the Italian crusier the Calabria, under 
the command of Count Moriundo, arrived at the port of Santo 
Domingo. The commander and the Italian charg~ d'affaires had 
called upon Dawson in order to learn what the prospects were 
for the payment of Italian claims under the various protocols 
I 
that had been signed between the Dominican Government and its 
Italian creditors. The Italian officials were also interested 
in learning what effect the protocol of February 7 would have 
on the earlier agreements. Dawson replied that no specific 
plan for the payment of the debts had yet been made. Nor 
would it be possible to determine how much·would be paid an-
nually until the amount of the yearly revenues and the extent 
of the debt had been determined. However, he added that he 
. . 
was sure that the Government in Washington would try to adopt 
a plan which would be acceptable to the Italian Government. 
Furthermore, he was willing to transmit any practical suggestions 
that the Count might wish to make. The latter, however, was 
satisfied with Dawson's answer and offered no suggestions. 
On March 20, the Italian ship steamed out of the harbor at 
Santo Domingo. Instead of heading for Havana, as originally 
intended, its destination was Kingston, Jamaica. The arrival 
66Ibid., p. 357. 
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of the Calabria had produced considerable alarm regarding the 
Italian Government's attitude. Its withdrawal to the nearer 
port of Kingston did not· offer much solace. 67 
Since word of the adjournment of the United States 
congress had reached Santo Domingo City, several foreign creditors 
began exerting pressure on the Government. For example, on 
I 
the twenty-third, the Belgian charge made a formal demand that 
the Dominican Government resume payment under an agreement 
signed between the Government and the Belgian creditors in 
1901. The principal Italian creditor, a Mr. Bancalari had 
been pressing the Morales Government for sometime to allow him 
to collect those custom revenues which had previously been 
I 
guaranteed to him. With the adjournment of the Senate, he began 
to urge that some precaution be taken to prevent the complete 
lose of the revenues during the coming months. 68 
Dawson was fully aware of these difficulties confront-
ing Morales and his ministers. He had kept fully abreast with 
Bancalari's demand, though he claimed not to have discussed 
them either with the Italian nor with any member of the Govern-
ment. Dawson later reported that, at the time, he believed 
that the "creditors and government would soon reach a point 
where they would be obliged to come to me with a proposition 
of a modus vivendi. 1169 
67tbid., pp. 355-357. 
69Ibid. 
68Ibid., p. 357. 
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According to Dawson's report dated March 27, 1905, his 
expectations were not long in being fulfilled. On Friday 
I . 
morning, March 24, Velasquez requested that Dawson come to the 
Finance Ministry. When he arrived, Dawson discovered that the 
Finance Minister, as a result of the strain, was contemplat-
ing resigning. He attempted to dissuade Vel~squez from this 
course of action by appealing to the latter's sense of patrio-
tism. Dawson explained that the Finance Minister's resignation 
would only result in worse troubles for the Dominican Republic. 
After all, the year in office had provided Vel~squez with 
invaluable experience and moreover. "his proven honesty and 
patriotism carried weight with foreign creditors and the Domini-
can people. 1170 
\ 
c I Velasquez, whether he was persuaded by Dawson's argu-
. ments or not, next came to what was probably the real reason 
for the interview. He asked Dawson to propose some modus 
vivendi which could be in effect until the protocol of February 
7 had been ratified by the United States Senate. In view of 
his previous experience in dealing with Vel~squez, Dawson 
reported that he was certain that the Finance Minister already 
had devised some plan of his own. Therefore, he declined to 
present a plan. 71 
True to Dawson's expectations, Vel~squez then preceded 
to indicate that he was willing to agree to a temporary arrange-
ment which would provide the Dominican Government with forty-five 
7
oibid., p. 358. 71Ibid. 
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per cent of the total customs revenues while the remaining· 
fifty-five per cent would be held in
1
trust by the United States 
Minister, pending ratification or rejection of the protocol 
I 
I I 
by the Senate. Dawson was skeptical that Washington would con-
sent to his receiving any portion of the customs so long as 
the protocol had not been ratified. Nevertheless, he believed 
that an alternate depository could be found. If the original 
plan were not acceptable, Vel1squez was willing to name a joint 
commission. Dawson would be a member of the commission. Again, 
Dawson doubted that Washington would approve of his involve-
ment in the arrangement. In addition, he found another possible 
obstacle to the proposed modus vivendi. He could not, Dawson 
I 
told Velasquez, agree to any accord which might interfer with 
the Award to the Improvement Company. An agreement along the 
lines which the Finance Minister had proposed might very pos-
sibly do just that. Would the other foreign creditors agree 
to have the funds.earmarked for their payment held in trust 
while the Improvement Company continued to be paid? Later, in 
I 
an interview with President Morales and Foreign Minister San-
chez, the same plan was formally presented to Dawson. 72 
Following his interview with Vel1squez, Dawson reported 
that he, either directly or indirectly through intermediaries, 
proceeded to sound out the Italian, Belgian, French, and 
Spanish diplomatic representatives in Santo Domingo with regard 
I 
to their attitudes towards Velasquez's proposal. In general, 
72Ibid. 
. 
-. 
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these men were favorably disposed to the suggestion. The 
Italian representative, who was expecting Dawson's call, urged 
the United States Minister to agree to act as trustee. Al-
though surprised to learn of the plan, the Belgian diplomat, 
after consulting with his Italian colleague, indicated willing-
ness to accept it provided that the bondholders agreed to the 
moratorium and that the Improvement Company would also agree 
to a suspension of its payments. Again, Dawson gave no encourage-
ment on this latter point, but confined himself to pointing 
out the value of the Improvement Company Award in denying ports 
to potential revolutionaries and thus preventing rebellion. 
The French official took the same position as the Belgian re-
presentative, while the Spanish envoy apparently agreed with-
out reservation. The major North American creditors, outside 
of the Improvement Company, were also willing to accpet. In 
addition to ascertaining their general acceptance of the pro-
posed modus vivendi, Dawson also learned from his inquiries 
that the foreign creditors of the Dominican Republic would 
prefer the appointment of a single North American to collect 
the customs at the ports not then being administered under 
the Improvement Company's Award. To all of these creditors 
and foreign representatives, Dawson gave no assurances other 
than that he would submit the plan and the creditors views 
to Washington. 73 
73Ibid., pp. 358-59. 
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On Saturday, March 25, Dawson wired the Department of 
state that under the pressure of foreign creditors and fear of 
revolution, the Dominican Government was willing to agree to a 
modus vivendi. The creditors of the Republic, excepting the 
Improvement Company, would agree not to press their claims, 
provided fifty-five per cent of the custom receipts were held 
in trust in New York pending ratification or rejection of the 
protocol of February 7. The remaining forty-five per cent 
would go to the Dominican Government. Morales' Government 
would appoint whomever the United States chose to nominate to 
administer the southern ports. It would request that the two 
remaining northern ports be administered under the Improvement 
I 
company Award. Dawson urged that "some modus vivendi [was] 
absolutely necessary." 74 
In his written report of the twenty-seventh, Dawson 
reported that the Dominican Government was reluctant to turn 
the northern ports over to Abbott or to any one else who had 
been connected with the Improvement Company, though under the 
circumstances, even Abbott would be accepted. However, an 
agreement would have to be reached with the Improvement Company 
whereby the financial agent acting under the Award of July 14, 
1904, would hold in trust fifty-five per cent of the receipts 
of the ports under his control, with the remaining forty~five 
per cent being turned over to the Government. 75 Dawson hastened 
74Ibid., p. 359. 
75oawson to Hay, March 22, 1905, No. 122, Despatches from 
~ to explain that the modus 180 vivendi would in no way effect the 
• i 
rights of the Improvement Company under the Award, nor the 
substantive rights of the other foreign creditors who had 
claims to collect portions of the revenues of various other 
ports. The creditors, Dawson explained, would merely be 
agreeing to temporarily suspend their right of collection pend-
ing ratification or rejection of the protocol. 76 Dawson's 
unwillingness to endanger the Improvement Company's rights 
was undoubtedly motivated by his belief that any infringment 
77 
would not receive the Department's approval. 
A different version of the origin of the modus vivendi 
is given in a letter written on March 13, 1906, by A. E. 
Coulter, a United States citizen who was a long time resident 
in the Dominican Republic and manager of the Richmond, 
Virginia based Habanero Lumber Company. Coulter addressed 
his letter to Secretary of State Elihu Root, John Hays' suc-
cessor in the Department of State. Coulter recounts that 
news of the adjournment of the United States Congress without 
ratification of the protocol of February 7, had produced 
rumors and actual open opposition to the Morales Government, 
and that the representatives of the foreign creditors were 
preparing to demand that the various customhouses which had 
the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. 
76Dawson to Secretary of State, March 27, 1905, No. 
122, FRUS, 1905, p. 359. 
77This is also Munro's opinion. QE_. cit., p. 105. 
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t>een guaranteed to them under previous agreements be turned 
over to them. According to Coulter's letter, on Thursday 
March 23, he, Bancalari ·the chief Italian creditor, and Hamil-
ton Peltz, the correspondent of The New York Herald, were 
lunching together. Their conversation centered on the emergency 
resulting from the failure of the United States Senate to 
ratify the protocol of February 7. During this conversation, 
Coulter claims that he suggested that a possible solution 
to the problem might be a modus vivendi which would carry out 
the basic scheme of the proposed protocol on an.informal 
. 
basis until the Senate had had another opportunity to ratify 
the agreement. Control of the Dominican custom revenues would 
I 
be placed in the hands of an United.States citizen who would 
be nominated by President Roosevelt and appointed by President 
Morales. This North American would apportion the revenues to 
the Dominican Government for its budget and to the foreign 
creditors. Bancalari approved of Coulter's suggestion and 
thought that the other foreign creditors would also agree to 
accept it. Thereupon, Bancalari and Coulter supposedly called 
-upon President Morales, who willingly agreed to the scheme. 
The two men then proceeded to call upon the German and Spanish 
consuls, and the Belgian Minister. All three agreed to refrain 
from pressing their claims until the Senate had acted on the 
protocol, provided that the proposed modus vivendi could be 
placed into operation. Then Coulter and Bancalari called upon 
Dawson. Dawson according to Coulter, objected to the planned 
182 
-odus vivendi because he thought that the Improvement Company 
, · would not consent to the plan. Furthermore, he suggested that 
! a commission comprised o·f United States, Italian, and Belgian 
representatives would be more acceptable. However, Bancalari 
refused to agree to this suggestion, stating that only a plan 
providing for the United States to uphold the collector in 
his office would be acceptable to the foreign creditors. At 
any rate, Coulter claimed that Dawson agreed to transmit the 
plan to Washington. According to Coulter's version, Peltz 
then wired the entire plan to the Herald, from whence it was 
transmitted for the first time to the Department of State. 
On Friday morning, March 24, Dawson supposedly received instruc-
i 
tions to wire the Department fully on what was happening in 
the Dominican Republic. In the afternoon of the same day, 
. 
Dawson supposedly wired the plan of the modus vivendi, and 
d . . f 't 78 requeste permission to approve o i • 
From the evidence available, it is difficult if not 
impossible to reject either version as being a complete fabrica-
tion. Dawson's report is certainly the more contemporary and 
thus might be considered the more reliable. It must be ad-
mitted, however, that it is possible to argue that both versions 
were probably tinged by personal interest. On the one hand, 
it can be maintained that Dawson's report "assumes the credit 
of the negotiations for himself, as is natural since he was 
78A. E. Coulter to Root, March 13, 1906, Miscellaneous 
Letters, March 7-13, 1906, roll 1288. 
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the diplomat in charge." 79 While this is possibly true, it·is 
also possible that his report merely reflects events as he 
witnessed them from his vantage point. 
I 
I I 
The impact of personal interest, however, is certainly 
•ore evident in coulter's letter of March 13, 1906. Coulter 
was definitely interested in seeing the protocol of February 7, 
1905 ratified by the Senate. His company, the Habanero Lumber 
company was not a creditor of the Republic; however, the order 
which Coulter thought would result from the application of 
the agreement would enable the Lumber Company to develop its 
holdings of over one and a half million acres. 80 On January 11, 
1906, Coulter and another representative of the Habanero 
'Lumber Company called on President Roosevelt. At that time 
the President apparently told Coulter and his associate that 
they could aid their own interests and that of the United States 
by urging their senators to vote for the ratification of the 
protocol. 81 Coulter claimed that he had spoken to some senators 
during the time that intervened between January and March, 1906. 
Furthermore, he stated that he found that the major objection 
to the protocol among the senators to whom he spoke was their 
belief that President Roosevelt had exceeded his authority by 
79J. Fred Rippy, "The Initiation of the Custom Receiver-
ship in the Dominican Republic," The Hispanic American Historical 
Review, XVII (November, 1937), 457. 
SOA. E. Coulter to Root, March 13, 1906, Miscellaneous 
Letters, March 7-13, 1906, roll 1288. 
81The New York Times, January 12, 1906, p. 4. 
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placing the agreement into operation through the modus vivendi 
before the Senate had ratified the protocol. The letter of 
I 
March 13, 1906 to Secretary Root was written, according to 
coulter's own admission, 
that this plain statement of facts may assist in demon-
strating that the President did not instigate the move-
ment, and will refute the criticism of the opponents of 
the ratification of the treaty that in so doing infringed 
on the constitutional privileges of the Senate.82 
In view of this motivation, Coulter naturally was going to 
minimize the role of Dawson, the official United States re-
presentative, in the arranging of the modus vivendi. 
In spite of the degree of self interest in back of 
each report, the Dawson and Coulter versions of the origin 
\ 
of the modus vivendi are possibly largely complementary. 
Coulter's claim that both Dawson and the Dominican Government 
. were aware of the modus vivendi prior to Dawson's interviews 
I I 
with Velasquez, Morales and Sanchez on Friday morning, March 
24, does not disprove Dawson's version of the story. It does, 
however, possibly explain where the Dominicans received the 
idea. Dawson's failure to indicate the interview with Coulter 
and Bancalari in his report of the twenty-seventh or to wire 
the Department immediately on the proposed modus vivendi is 
easily explained. On the one hand, Dawson undoubtedly con-
sidered it unlikely, as he indicated in his report, that the 
State Department would be willing to become further involved 
82 A. E. Coulter to Root, March 13, 1906, Miscellaneous 
Letters, March 7-13, 1906, roll 1288. 
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' in the financial affairs of the Dominican Republic without 
the legal basis of the protocol. To do so, he probably reasoned, 
I 
might only aggravate the senatorial opponents of the protocol. 
on the other hand, given his belief of the Department's reluc-
tance for further involvement before the ratification of the 
treaty and his fear that the modus vivendi might infringe on 
the Improvement Company's rights, Dawson probably would not 
have considered it justifiable to submit the plan without a 
formal presentation of the plan by the Dominican Government. 
This, of course, did not come until the twenty-fourth. 
The fact that Bancalari was involved with Coulter in 
formulating the plan would explain why the Italian diplomatic 
I 
representative was expecting Dawson's visit and why he urged 
Dawson to act as receiver. However, if Coulter and Bancalari 
I . 
_had called upon the Belgian charge d'affaires, why should have 
the proposal been a surprise to him when Dawson approached him 
on the subject? A possible explanation for this conflicting 
report might be that the Belgian representative in Santo 
Domingo was also accredited to Havana. Coulter claimed that 
the Belgain representative was planning to leave Santo Domingo 
City on the very day that he and Bancalari approached the 
./ . 
charge, the latter was going to return to the Cuban capital. 
While it is not clear whether or not he changed his plans and 
stayed, it is possible that if he did leave he did not have 
time, either fully or even partly, to inform the official left 
in charge of the Belgian interests of the proposed modus vivendi. 
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Therefore, on the twenty-fourth, when Dawson got in touch with 
. I 
the Belgian charge the plan could have been a surprise to him. 
Thus, insofar as they cover the events in the Dominican 
I I 
Republic, the Dawson and Coulter reports do not necessarily 
contradict one another. It is not unlikely that the modus 
vivendi had its origin in the Coulter-Bancalari-Pletz luncheon 
conversation on March 23, and that Coulter and Bancalari passed 
on the idea to the Morales Government. Furthermore, it is pos-
sible that the men brought the subject to the attention of the 
other foreign creditors and even to Dawson. 
However, on some points the two versions cannot be 
reconciled and it appears that Coulter's is incorrect. Accord-
ing to Coulter the news of a proposed modus vivendi was first 
brought to the attention of the State Department by the Wash-
ington representative of The New York Herald, the Herald having 
received the report from Peltz, its correspondent in the 
Dominican Republic. The State Department supposedly then wired 
Dawson for further information. A check of the Miscellaneous 
Letters of the Department of State for the days of March 21 
through March 26, 1905, where any written or telegraphic mes-
sages from the Herald's representative should be filed, failed 
to turn up any such message. Furthermore, an examination of 
the diplomatic instructions sent by the Department of State 
to the United States representative in the Dominican capital 
also failed to indicate the instructions which Coulter claimed 
Dawson received. It is difficult, if not impossible, to say 
187 
t1hether this discrepancy was caused by a faulty memory on 
coulter's part or merely his desire to persuade potential 
readers that he and not "the Roosevelt Administration or its 
representative in the Dominican Republic really originated the 
idea of the modus vivendi. 83 
By Tuesday, March 28, President Roosevelt had decided 
to agree to a modus vivendi. on the twenty-ninth, Alvey A. 
Adee, second Assistant Secretary of State, who was serving as 
acting secretary, telegraphed Dawson the President's positive 
reception of the idea of the modus vivendi. The plan outlined 
in Adee's telegram of the twenty-ninth differed somewhat from 
that outlined in Dawson's telegram of the twenty-fifth. The 
I 
President's plan called for the United States Secretary of 
War to nominate and the Dominican President to appoint men who 
'l/ 
would administer 'all the customhouses in the Dominican Republic. 
Those selected by the Secretary of War were to be "men of 
capacity and absolute integrity, with some knowledge of Spanish." 
The forty-five per cent of the revenues collected would be 
turned over to the Dominican Government. The remaining fifty-
five per cent would be deposited in some New York bank, also 
to be selected by the Secretary of War. If the treaty were 
83Whether or not the Department accepted Coulter's 
version at its face value, Secretary Root sent a copy of 
Coulter's letter to Senator Daniel of Virginia. In his cover 
letter, Root explained that he sent the letter "because it bears 
upon the subject of our conversation a few days ago. I do not 
Know [sic] the writer but I understand him to be a very clever 
gentleman. He appears to have a property interest in Santo 
Domingo which entitles him to our consideration •••• " Root 
to Senator Daniel, ibid. 
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eventually ratified by the Senate this latter sum would then be 
divided among the Republic's creditors, if it were rejected, 
the sum would be turned ·over to the Republic. Dawson was 
instructed to inform the Dominican Government that the United 
states agreed to the modus vivendi "in order that pending the 
final disposition of the treaty no change shall take place in 
the situation which would render useless the consummation of 
the treaty or bring complications into its enforcement." The 
agreement was to take the form of an executive agreement. 
There was to be no reference to duties assumed by the United 
States vis-~-vis the Dominican Republic. 84 
From this communique it was clear that the Administra-
1 
tion in Washington had decided to reject the idea of allowing 
th~ northern ports to continue to be administered under the 
. Improvement Company's Award of July, 1904,.and thus, for the 
benefit of the Company. This decision would seem to indicate 
that President Roosevelt had decided to follow a new policy 
with regard to the Improvement Company. 85 Actually, it was in 
line with the Department's telegram of February 4, instructing 
Dawson to assure the Dominican Government that under the protocol, 
the United States and not the Improvement Company would control 
the customhouses. A further indication of this policy was the 
appointment of Dr. Jacob H. Hollander, a professor of Political 
84Acting Secretary of State {Adee) to Dawson, March 29, 
1905, telegram, FRUS, 1905, pp. 361-62. 
85Munro, ~· cit., pp. 105-106. 
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Economy at Johns Hopkins University and formerly treasurer.of 
puerto Reio, as the confidential agent of President Roosevelt. 86 
The announcement of this appointment was sent to Dawson on 
87 I I 
March 25. In his letter of March 28, instructing acting 
secretary of State Adee to inform Dawson of the acceptance of 
the Dominican modus vivendi, Roosevelt specifically outlined 
86The possibility of sending Hollander to the Dominican 
Republic in order to study the fiscal conditions of the Republic 
and to reconunend appropriate changes had first come to the at-
tention of the Department of State almost a year before the ap-
pointment was made by Roosevelt in March, 1905. In April, 1904, 
Powell informed the Department that Morales was anxious to have 
a person knowledgable in fiscal matters to be appointed by the 
State Department to come to the Dominican Republic and to propose 
changes in the tariff laws and in the administration of the treas-
ury. In reply to this request, Roosevelt suggested the name of 
Jacob H. Hollander. Hollander evidently considered the appoint-
ment but ultimately declined to accept it in mid-September, 1904. 
In October, when Dawson was studying the tax structure of the 
Dominican Republic, he wrote to Hollander asking that the latter 
suggest some books which would give him a better background in 
the general topic of taxation and governmental administration. 
In November, Hollander sent a bibliography to Dawson and noted 
that he regreted that his academic conunittments prevented him 
from coming in person to the Dominican Republic. Nevertheless, 
he expressed great interest in the financial and economic condi-
tions of the Caribbean republic. It would appear that from 
November until his appointment in March, 1905, Hollander had 
no further direct contact with the situation in the Dominican 
Republic. Powell to Hay, April 18, 1904, No. 841; Powell to 
Hay, June 6, 1904, unnumbered, Despatches from the Dominican 
Republic, vol. 11, roll 11. Dawson to Hay, August 30, 1904, 
No. 30, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll 
12. Hay to Powell, April 23, 1904, unnumbered, Instructions 
to Haiti-Santo Domingo, Haiti, vol. 4, p. 488. Loomis to Dawson, 
September 22, 1904, No. 24, Instructions to Santo Domingo, 
vol. 1, p. 19. Dawson to Hollander, October 28, 1904; Hollander 
to Dawson, November 23, 1904, Miscellaneous Letters, November 
14-23, 1904, roll 1229. John Hay to Roosevelt, April 20, 1904, 
Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 1, Letters received April 9-
29, 1904, Box 27. 
87Acting Secretary of State {Adee) to Dawson, March 25, 
1905, No. 49, FRUS, 1905, p. 355. 
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aollander's duties. Hollander was to "thoroughly investigate" 
all financial claims against the Dominican Government, "includ-
• I 
in9 the claim of the American Improvement Company." He was to 
ascertain the conditions under which the loans were made, the 
amount actually received by the Caribbean republic and the 
nominal amount of the debt. 88 
The Dominican cabinet officials were pleased to learn 
that President Roosevelt had decided to accept the modus 
vivendi. There was, of course, no objection to the decision 
to include all the ports under the modus vivendi rather than 
placing all of the northern ports under the Improvement Company 
Award. Nevertheless, Finance Minister Vel~squez did contest 
I 
certain provisions of the State Department's telegram. I Ve las-
quez argued that an international commission of receivers would 
. better.insure acceptance of the modus vivendi by the European 
creditors than the appointment of a single United States 
nominee. Also, he desired that the phrase "President of the 
United States" replace "Secretary of War." _The explicit men-
tion of the latter official might leave the Morales Government 
open to undue criticism. Furthermore, the Finance Minister 
felt that the functions of the yet to be appointed customs 
receiver and his assistants should be more specifically de-
fined, and that they should collect only that portion of.the 
88Roosevelt to Adee, March 28, 1905, Theodore Roosevelt, 
The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. IV, ed. Elting E. Mori-
son (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), 
p. 1149. 
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revenues which were to be held in trust for the creditors. 
TO replace the incumbent collectors and to alter the establish-
ed methods of collection, he pointed out, would be tantamount 
to the executive repealing the laws and constitutional pro-
visions by mere decree. He consequently proposed that the 
North American appointees in each customhouse, in addition to 
receiving the portion destined for the creditors, merely verify 
the acts of the Dominican collectors. 89 
On the first two points there was little discussion. 
Dawson explained that his conversations with the representa-
tives of the foreign creditors had indicated that they preferred 
a single receiver appointed by the United States Government. 
I 
Therefore, he did not feel justified in transmitting Velasquez's 
suggestion to Washington. With regard to replacing the phrase 
"Secretary of War" with the "President of the United States, 11 
Dawson agreed to wire the Department of State for permission 
to make the substitution. The necessary authorization was 
received on March 31. However, the question of the functions 
of the receiver of customs and his assistants produced a more 
1 th d . . 90 eng y iscussion. 
In reporting to the State Department Dawson acknowledged 
the correctness of Vel~squez's position on the illegality of 
superseding the incumbent customs officials. Nevertheless, in 
89oawson to Secretary of State, April 1, 1905, No. 
123, FRUS, 1905, pp. 362-363. 
9oibid., p. 362. 
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answering the Finance Minister, Dawson maintained that it was 
not yet the time to define specifically the functions of the 
united States appointed receiver. He stated that he believed 
I I 
that a receiver, who would appoint the necessary assistants 
and who would be supported by the Dominican Government, might 
be able to collect all the legal revenues without regard to 
special contracts. Thereby, the purpose of the modus vivendi 
would be successfully carried out. But, the situation was to 
remain flexible enough to permit modification after the arrival 
of Hollander. 91 
Dawson apparently next exerted mild pressure on the 
Morales Government. The internal disorders and the presence 
of the Italian warship the Calabria, which had returned to 
Santo Domingo on the twenty-eighth, prompted President Morales 
to seek immediate publication of the modus· vivendi. Dawson, 
however, pointed out that he was authorized to agree to the 
interim proposal only if the Department's telegram of March 29 
were accepted. He thereby effectively cut off further dis-
cussion of the details. The Dominican Government acquiesced. 
President Morales issued the necessary executive decree on 
Firday afternoon, March 31, and it went into effect the next 
92 day. 
The pressure of circumstances merely forced the members 
of the Dominican Government to accept the accord without a 
specific definition of the duties of the receiver and his 
91Ibid., p. 363. 92 Ibid. 
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assistants. Certainly this problem had not been resolved. On 
April 3, 1905, acting Secretary of State Loomis informed Dawson 
that President Roosevelt had selected Colonel George R. Colton, 
a former collector of customs in the Philippine Islands, as 
the principal collector at the port of Santo Domingo. Washing-
ton had decided that Colton was to receive a salary of $500 
per month and was to be assisted by a statistician, an account-
ant, and a stenographer. All salaries and traveling expenses 
t b "d b th . . Go 93 were o e pai y e Dominican vernment. 
I Dawson had a lengthy conference with Morales and Velas-
quez, on Wednesday, April 5. No objections were raised con-
cerning the payment of salaries or the traveling expenses of 
the United States nominees'. 94 However, when the discussion 
turned to the functions of Colonel Colton's deputies in the 
various customhouses the unanimity of opinion broke down. 
Morales felt that he himself should appoint, after consulta-
tion with Colton, those who were to assist the North American 
receiver. I • • Velasquez, moreover, again noted the illegality of 
any attempt to replace the incumbent custom officials or their 
. t t 95 assis an s. 
93Dawson to Secretary of State, April 6, 1905, No. 125, 
ibid., p. 367. Colonel Colton came to his new post with seven 
years experience as collector of customs at Manila and Iloilo. 
Ibid. 
94
with regard to Colton's salary of $500 per month, 
Dawson noted that the Dominican officials accepted it "although 
the minister of finance doubtless feels that it is unjust that 
he himself should receive less than half the amount agreed upon 
for the American receiver." Ibid. 
95Ibid. 
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In part, Dawson was willing to accept the President's 
r p0sition. He informed Morales that while the United States 
would not argue over the· matter of 1the form of the appointments, 
nevertheless, Colton had to be free to make the actual selection 
of his own assistants. I The Minister also assured Velasquez that 
Washington would disturb the Dominican officials only insofar 
as it was necessary to insure the full collection of the duties. 
This assurance could not have been very comforting to the 
Finance Minister, when Dawson indicated that the final decision 
on how this objective could best be attained would have to 
await the report of a practical expert, who had studied the 
situation. But, until such a report had been made, Dawson 
I 
believed that it should be clear to all that deputies with full 
rights of inspection and regulation, and directly responsible 
to Colton ought to be stationed in each customhouse. This 
arrangement would be beneficial to both the creditors and to 
the Dominican Government. On the one hand, the creditors would 
be assured of obtaining their full portion under the modus 
vivendi. On the other hand, Colton's assistants would be able 
to put an end to the preferential contracts held by powerful 
importers and to prevent the lowering of duties at the various 
customhouses in order to attract business away from competing 
ports of entry, thus assuring the Government of its full share 
also. 96 
961bid., pp. 367-368. 
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Dawson's arguments were apparently convincing, for · 
I Finance Minister Velasquez stated that he welcomed the assistance 
to the Dominican Government and its creditors. colton would 
I I 
be given a free hand in forming his own organization and would 
receive every assistance necessary to fulfill his purpose. For 
after all, Vel~squez explained, his and Colton's ultimate 
objectives were the same. 97 
At first sight it would appear that Dawson was in fact 
maintaining two contradictory positions. While making assur-
arices that the Dominican customs officials would not be dis-
turbed, he insisted that North American officials be appointed 
in every customhouse. Evidently what he had in mind was a 
system in which the legally appointed Dominican officials 
would remain in office; but their actions would be scrutinized 
by Colton's deputies. Certainly, Dawson was not in favor of 
replacingthe Dominican officials. He fully realized the impor-
tance of patronage to the Morales Government. The sudden dis-
missal of the incumbent customhouse employees, he informed 
Washington, "would probably give rise to serious embarrass-
ments and even grave disorders •• . . 
/ Velasquez's acceptance of this position also appears 
to contradict his previous position. However, such is probably 
not the case. In January, when negotiations first began, it 
I is true that Velasquez was most anxious to obtain joint control 
97Ibid., p. 368. 98Ibid., pp. 367-368. 
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of the customhouses. But, this position had been completely 
rejected by Dawson months before, and to revive it in April 
i 
"°uld have been futile. Furthermore, the pressure of circum-
stances had already forced the acceptance of the modus vivendi, 
which in effect had turned the customhouses over to North 
A111erican control. I Therefore, it is probably that Velasquez 
was willing to settle for at least titular control of the custom-
houses with no flagrant violation of the Dominican constitu-
tion and no overt disruption in the patronage system. 
In April, Hollander and Colton arrived in the Dominican 
Republic. Hollander came first, arriving on April 10. During 
the last week of April and the first of May he completed his 
I 
work in the capital and began to carry his investigation to 
th . . 1 •t• 99 e provincia ci ies • Colonel Colton arrived during the 
. last week of April and was presented to President Morales on 
April 25. I Colton and Velasquez immediately got down to dis-
cussing the administration of the customhouses. Although the 
negotiations were evidently conducted primarily by Colton, 
Dawson lent what assistance he could and attended the meeting 
between Colton and the Dominican officials. Agreement was 
finally reached on April 26. Dawson felt that the arrange-
ments made assured efficient collection of all the duties, and 
would prevent embarrassment for the Government at that time 
99Dawson to Hay, April 24, 1905, No. 128, Dawson to 
Hay, May 9, 1905, No. 136, Despatches from the Dominican Repub-
lic, vol. 14, roll 14. 
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and later when the convention came up for ratification. 100 By 
MaY 9, Colton had completed all arrangements for the custom-
house in the capital and sent his chief assistant to take 
charge of the customhouses in the other ports of entry. 
Thus, four months after the beginning of the negotia-
tions for United States control of the Dominican customhouses 
and financial affairs some form of this control was, in fact, 
implemented. Dawson's handling of the negotiations leading 
to the protocol of February 7 and the modus vivendi would seem 
to demonstrate that he attempted to smooth the difficult path 
the Dominicans found it necessary to travel. When the Morales 
Government found itself short of funds in January, an arrange-
\ 
rnent was made to tide the Government over this critical stage. 
,· 
When it was possible, Dawson attempted to take into considera-
tion Dominican susceptibilities and to inform the State Depart-
ment of these. Nevertheless, Dawson was determined to ac-
complish his goal of placing the customhouses and financial 
affairs of the Republic under North American control. In 
achieving this, he was not opposed to exerting diplomatic 
pressure when necessary. Though, it was never necessary or 
even considered necessary to use physical force against the 
Government, Dawson was not in the least opposed to lending 
"moral support" in the form of United States naval vessels to 
lOODawson to Secretary of State, April 26, 1905, tele-
gram; Dawson to Secretary of State, April 27, 1905, No. 132, 
~, 1905, p. 370. Dawson to Hay, May 9, 1905, No.138, 
Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14. 
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the Morales Government in its dealings with its opponents. 
The period from the signing of the agreement on January 
21, to the proclamation ·of. the modus vivendi on March 31, 
I 
I I 
witnessed a changing of the attitude of the Roosevelt Administra-
tion towards the Improvement Company. From its privileged 
position under the Award of July 14, 1904, the Company was 
relegated to the status of the other creditors by the modus 
vivendi and by Hollander's mission. Although Dawson did not 
advise against this course, he was somewhat slow to realize 
or to advise on the necessity for this change. However, he 
apparently was not unaware of the need for it. According to 
Dawson's own admission, he "slowly came to the conclusion 
that it is impossible to ignore or overcome the dislike of 
; 
the Improvement Company." This would seem to indicate that 
he was aware of the dislike but thought it.possible to dis-
regard it. 
Dawson's failure to realize that continued support 
of the hated Improvement Company caused his country to be 
suspect in the eyes of even those who were willing to accept 
United States intervention in the customhouses, and increased 
anti-American sentiment, undoubtedly grew out of his belief 
that the State Department was determined to continue to 
champion the Company's rights. Indeed, this policy had been 
made clear to him when the State Department wired its approval 
on January 28, 1905, to an arrangemen~ which would provide 
financial assistance to the Dominican Government until a new 
199 
protocol could be negotiated and signed. Moreover, to Dawson 
the Dominican attitude was clearly unwaranted. He reported 
that the Morales Government "and the foreign creditors have 
little confidence in Judge Abbott, although I know that 
personally he deserves it. 11101 Nevertheless, the myopia 
which Dawson demonstrated in supporting the Improvement Com-
pany, in spite of Dominican dislike, opened him, perhaps not 
unjustly, to an indirect charge by Colton of having contributed 
to the anti-American attitude in the Dominican Republic. 102 
lOlDawson to Hay, March 27, 1905, No. 122, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. 
102colton to Taft, June 18, 1905, personal and confiden-
tial, Numerical File 1199, bound at the end of the file, Records 
of the Department of State, R.G. 59, National Archives, 
Washington, D. c. 
r 
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CHAPTER VII 
MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO: 
NON-INTERFERENCE INTERVENTION 
MAY, 1905 - MAY, 1906 
On May 9, 1905, Dawson wrote to the Secretary of State 
requesting a leave of absence. 1 In part this leave was neces-
sitated by his health; in part by his desire to discuss Domin-
ican financial matters with Professor Hollander, who had re-
turned to the United States in early May and was planning to 
leave for Europe on June 13. Permission for the leave was wired 
to Dawson on May 20, and shortly thereafter he left for the 
I 
United States. 2 During the period i:rranediately preceeding this 
request and in the interval while waiting for permission to 
leave, Dawson was primarily concerned with.matters which might 
disturb the modus vivendi and in formulating a possible alternate 
to the agreement of February 7, if the latter should fail to 
receive senatorial ratification. 
The relationship between the Dominican Government and 
its French and Belgian creditors represented a possible threat 
to the operation of the modus vivendi. By an agreement signed 
in 1901, the Dominican Government had promised to pay these 
creditors $300,000 a year on the amount owed and an additional 
1Dawson to Hay, May 9, 1905, No. 139, Despatches from 
the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14. 
2oawson to Hay, May 22, 1905, No. 143, ibid. 
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$10,000 a year to cover the creditor's cost of maintaining· 
agents to look after their interests. The former sum had long 
ago fallen into arrears.' However, up to the time of the modus 
vivendi, the latter sum had been continually paid at the rate 
of $833.33 a month. With the proclamation of the modus 
vivendi, Finance Minister Vel~squez decided that the time had 
come to terminate this payment also. 3 I Velasquez reasoned that 
the modus vivendi obviated the need of the agents entrusted with 
watching out for the interests of the Franco-Belgian creditors. 
This task would now be performed by the collector of customs 
appointed under the modus vivendi. When these creditors ob-
1 jected, Velasquez could only suggest that the sum be paid out 
of the fifty-five per cent which was being deducted by Colonel 
Colton. 4 
. 
Dawson realized that the status of· the modus vivendi 
would definitely be endangered if the Franco-Belgian creditors, 
who were among the largest, were alienated and refused to 
continue to accept the arrangement. While he could not agree 
to allow the $833.33 monthly sum to be paid out of the fifty-
five per cent held for all the creditors, since the modus 
vivendi simply provided for the collection of this sum not for 
its distribution, Dawson attempted to remain neutral in the 
dispute and refrained from expressing any opinion on the validity 
3Dawson to Secretary of State, May 15, 1905, No. 142, 
~' 1905, pp. 371-373. 
4Ibid., pp. 371-73. 
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of either the creditors' position or that of the Finance 
Minister. Instead he suggested moderation on the part of the 
Morales Government. I d . I Dawson reported that he a vised Velasquez 
to have his views presented to the French and Belgian Govern-
ments in such a way as "to secure a calm and impartial considera-
tion of them." He thought that the Govemments involved would 
not insist on the payment of the monthly sums if they were 
convinced that the interests of their nationals were adequately 
protected under the modus vivendi. 5 
Dawson's personal views on the matter of the payment of 
the monthly sum were somewhat different from the calm and dis-
interested impression that he tried to convey to both the 
I 
Dominicans and the agents of the Franco-Belgian creditors. He 
. I 
thought that Velasquez really had intended to pay the $833.33 
. out of the forty-five per cent of the revenues tumed over to 
the Government, but once the modus vivendi was in operation 
the Finance Minister saw an opportuni·ty to secure an extra 
$10,000 yearly for strictly internal expenditures and conse-
quently decided to terminate the payments to the creditors. 
In spite of .his convictions on this matter, Dawson thought it 
unwise to bring this point up in his conversations with Vel~s-
quez,.particularly in view of the latter's "extreme sensitive-
ness and impulsiveness and the importance for Colonel Colton's 
sake of not jeoparding our cordial relations, at least for 
5Ibid. I p. 373. 
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the present. 116 
On May 12, President Morales informed Dawson that 
• I 
following the example of the _United States Senate, as reported 
in the newspapers, the Dominican legislature had subjected 
the protocol of February 7 to amendment. Morales wanted Dawson 
to look over the amendments and see if they would be agreeable 
with those being considered by the Senate. The President 
assured Dawson that he was not interested in securing the 
amendments but rather in preventing any embarrassment for the 
Dominican Congress by having its alterations rejected. Dawson 
replied that while he was interested in aiding Morales secure 
the ratification of the protocol by the Dominican legislature, 
I 
he could not enter into a discussion either of the amendments 
that were rumored to have been considered by the Senate or of 
those proposed in Santo Domingo. Nevertheiess, if a copy of 
the Dominican amendments were given to him unofficially he 
would be glad to send them on to Washington. 7 
Although Dawson was unwilling to discuss any amendments, 
it would seem that he and Morales and possibly Colton dis-
cussed a possible alternative to the protocol just in case the 
latter were not ratified. This alternate plan called for an 
United States corporation, to be known as the Bank of Santo 
Domingo and controlled by United States citizens, to refund the 
6Dawson to Hay, May 15, 1905, No. 142, Despatches 
from· the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14. 
7Dawson to Hay, May 13, 190.5, No. 141, ibid. 
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debt of the Republic at its market value, which would be at· 
about thirty-five to forty cents on the dollar. In return for 
its services, the Bank would receive a financial commission 
· · ' / l d' I 'l d . h and various concessions inc u ing a rai roa concession. T e 
b<>nds issued by the Bank would be secured by all the revenues 
of the Republic, excluding the municipal taxes. The revenues 
would be collected by a receiver who would be an United States 
citizen nominated either by the President of the United States 
or by the Bank and the President of the Dominican Republic. 
The receiver would have the authority to appoint other United 
States citizens as subordinates. For its part, the Dominican 
Government would agree not to alter its tariff rate or other 
taxation without the consent of the Bank and the approval of 
~ 
the receiver. Moreover, the Dominican Government would place 
I 
certain lands at Manzanillo and Samana bays and at the port 
of Azua in the hands of the Bank. Whenever necessary, the 
Bank would, without any formality, turn these over to the United 
States for use as naval stations~ 
8colton to Taft, June 11, 1905, personal, Numerical File 
1199, bound at the end of the file, Records of the Department 
State, R.G. 59, National Archives, Washington, D. c. Colonel 
Colton felt that this plan was superior to that provided for in 
the protocol of February 7, 1905. He reported to Secretary of 
War Taft that the plan would immediately place the Dominican 
Republic "upon a self supporting and safe financial basis" with 
the North American Bank being interested in aiding the internal 
development of the country. Colton thought that the problem of 
the Dominican foreign debt would be completely removed since it 
would be absorbed by a North American corporation. The embar~ 
rassment to the United States Government caused by the necessity 
of interfering in the internal financial affairs of another 
country would be removed, and it could relegate its interest to 
the normal process of protecting the lives and property of its 
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The substance of the alternate plan was sent to Secretary 
of war Taft by Colonel Colton. 9 No mention of it is made in 
I 
anY of Dawson's written reports, although it is possible that 
be may have discussed it with Roosevelt or the Assistant 
secretary of State after returning to Washington. The plan 
itself received less than enthusiastic reception from President 
10 ROOsevelt. In writing to Hollander about the proposed plan, 
the President revealed his reason for being wary of it. He 
wrote, "I am always afraid of seeming to back any big company 
g: 
~ which has financial interests in one of these South American 
~-
t states, and can only do so under the narrowest restrictions 
citizens. Moreover, it would be easier for the Dominicans 
themselves to accept since it would remove the fear of United 
States intervention. Commercial relations between the two 
countries, Colton maintained, would be closer and United States 
citizens would "g·radually acquire the Dominican market through 
. the natural business [sic] evolution that most follow." The 
Dominicans would also benefit. The receiver with the vast amount 
of information available to him could both readily handle the 
financial transactions of the country and protect the country 
from fraud. Colton further noted that this plan, contrary to 
that envisioned in the protocol, would keep the funds in the 
Dominican Republic rather than draining the Republic of fifty-
f i ve per cent of its custom revenues. He maintained that with 
the depressed condition of the Dominican business, this latter 
system could only produce further harm to the business community, 
while the new plan would actually act as a stimulus, by re-
circulating the money in the country. To Colton another advan-
tage, so far as the United States was concerned, was that the 
new plan provided for the Dominican Government to place certain 
lands at Manzanillo and Sarnana Bays and at the port of Azua in 
the hands of the Bank. These lands were to be turned over to 
the United States without formality, whenever they might.be 
necessary for use as naval stations. Ibid. 
9Ibid~ 
lORoosevelt to Spooner, July 7, 1905, Theodore Roosevelt, 
The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. IV, ed. Elting E. Mori-
son (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), 
p. 1265. [Hereafter cited as Roosevelt Letters.] 
;ii' 
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and most sharply defined conditions." 11 In view of Roosevelt's 
attitude, it is difficult to say whether this plan would have 
i 
been accepted if all other means failed. But such was not the 
case, and no more reference was ever made to it. 
Once back in the United States, Dawson continued his 
12 
efforts on behalf of the protocol. At eleven o'clock in the 
morning of June 7, Dawson met with President Roosevelt, 13 pre-
sumably to explain the Dominican situation to the President. 
The report must have interested Roosevelt, for during the course 
of the interview he asked Dawson to prepare a memorandum on 
the conditions in the Caribbean republic and suggested that he 
see Senator John c. Spooner of Wisconsin, a member of the 
I 
Senate's Foreign Relations Conunittee. However, shortly after 
14 this meeting with the President Dawson left for a trip west, 
11Roosevelt to Hollander, July 3, 1905, ibid., p. 1259. 
. 
12since there was no secretary at the Legation in the 
Dominican Republic who could act as charg~ d'affaires ad interim 
while Dawson was absent, the State Department decided to send 
Mr. M. Marshall Langhorne to preside over the Legation and 
Consulate General as deputy consul-general until Dawson returned 
to his post. Langhorne arrived in Santo Domingo City on June 2, 
1905. Acting Secretary of State (Loomis) to General skichez, 
May 23, 1905, FRUS, 1905, p. 374; Langhorne to Hay, June 5, 
1905, No. 146, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, 
roll 14. 
13Appointment book 1905, Roosevelt Papers, series 9, 
Diaries, 1905-1906, Box 2. 
14It would appear that Dawson's itinerary during.this 
trip included stops in Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio, and possibly 
Iowa. Both the death of his mother, who died in the spring of 
1905 and was buried in Madison, and his desire to see Senator 
John c. Spooner may have taken Dawson to Wisconsin. Business 
interests and political ties probably would have led him back 
1. ~ 
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the preparation of the report had to await his return on 
27.15 June 
dent. 
on July 1, Dawson submitted two memoranda to the Presi-
/ ! 
The longer of the two was ultimately published in 
virtually its complete form in the 1905 volume of Papers Relating 
' 16 to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The second 
-
to Iowa. In Chicago, it is likely that he stopped to visit 
shortly with his friend Charles G. Dawes and to discuss their 
joint efforts on a biography of President McKinley. On the way 
back to Washington, Dawson stopped off in Canton, Ohio, the 
home town of the late President, in order to interview Judge 
John Day, a close friend of McKinley's and Secretary of State 
in the President's cabinet during the Spanish-American War. 
While in Canton, Dawson also interviewed some relatives of the 
late President. Mrs. Dawson, who was expecting their second 
child and who had come back to the United States with their 
son Allan sometime before Dawson had returned in early June, 
remained in Washington while her husband made his western trip. 
Dawson to Roosevelt, July 2, 1905, personal, Despatches from 
the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14. Dawson to Dawes, 
July 3, 1905, Da~es Collection, General correspondence, July-
Dec. 1905. Dawson to Spooner, July 11, 1905, John Coit Spooner 
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, 
D. c. [hereafter cited as the Spooner papers], General Corre-
spondence, 1905, June-September, Container 77. 
15Dawson to Roosevelt, July 2, 1905, personal, 
Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14. 
Dawson to Roosevelt, August 9, 1905, Roosevelt Papers, series 1--
letters received August 7-21, 1905, Box 95. 
1611Memorandum on the Dominican Modus Vivendi, Its 
Effects Up To The Present Time, And The Reason That Lead To Its 
Adoption," July 1, 1905, FRUS, 1905, pp. 378-389. The only 
deletion from the printed copy concerned the tenuous status of 
the modus vivendi. Dawson reported that there were some members 
of the Horacista Party who would be willing to see the modus 
vivendi modified so that funds would once again come their way. 
Moreover, he noted that the "conunon people are too ignorant to 
understand the complicated details of the financial and inter-
national situation." Also those whom Dawson termed 11 \lnreconciled 
revolutionary factions" were desirous of seeing the modus 
vivendi terminated. This section appears on page ten of the 
original (Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 
14), and is deleted from page 381 in the copy printed in ~, 1905. 
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memorandum was marked confidential and only a brief passage, 
which Roosevelt included in a letter to Spooner, has been 
printed. 17 Both of these memoranda, which illustrate Dawson's 
attitude toward the intervention of the United States in the 
I 
financial affairs of the Dominican Republic, were probably 
intended for use by the President in his efforts to persuade 
the Senate to ratify the protocol of February 7. However, 
since they do not differ from his earlier actions or reports, 
their potential public character would not seem to detract 
from their veracity. 
Dawson saw international and internal advantages 
accruing to the Dominican Republic from the modus vivendi. 
He reported that the continual borrowing by the Dominican 
Government and its practice of offering custom receipts from 
various ports of entry as security for these debts had led to 
a situation in the past few years where foreign intervention 
had been repeatedly "imminent and could not have been long 
deferred had not the modus vivendi been proposed and accepted." 
Seizure of the customhouses would only have complicated the 
problem. Since the principal source of revenue was the custom 
revenues, the Dominican Government would not have had sufficient 
funds, and some international agreement in which the United 
States would have had to take a part would have been necessary. 
Furthennore, given the small per centage of the debt that 
17Roosevelt to Spooner, July 7, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, 
Vol. IV, p. 1263. The original of the memorandum appears in 
Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14. 
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receipts from a customhouse would have paid, the seizure of one 
or two customhouses by a European power would have been virtually 
• I 
permanent. However, the modus vivendi, Dawson thought, eliminated 
these vexing international complications. For the first time 
in five years the creditors had some assurance of receiving 
their payments. Thus, they were willing to leave the situation 
undisturbed. 18 
Dawson also believed that the internal affairs of the 
Dominican Republic benefited from the modus vivendi. He pointed 
9ut that the "honest and sensible business methods" which 
Colton had introduced into the customhouses had resulted in an 
increase in the revenues collected. In spite of the fact that 
I 
fifty-five per cent of the revenues were being deposited in 
New York for the eventual payment of the Republic's creditors, 
. Dawson claimed that the Morales Government·was realizing 
more money from its forty-five per cent than it had when it 
collected the entire amount. This in turn resulted in the 
Government being able to pay its employees and to pay cash 
for its necessities. Moreover, now that the threat of internal 
revolution had been greatly reduced, the Government could 
devote some of its energies to administrative reforms and 
internal improvements. The political stability which the 
country now enjoyed, he maintained, also had a salutary effect 
on economic developments. Production of tobacco, which had 
1811Memorandum on the Dominican Modus Vivendi ••• " 
~, 1905, pp. 380-81. 
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greatly declined during the revolutionary period, was experienc-
ing a tremendous growth. The acreage devoted to sugar pro-
duction was also being increased. The cacao industry was pros-
/ 
I I . 19 perous, and ranching was undergoing a revitalization. 
Dawson also felt that the modus vivendi would have an 
educative effect on the Dominican officials. Colton's administ-
ration of the customhouses would serve as an example for the 
Dominicans. They "would soon become competent to work the 
machinery themselves •• n Confidence in the Government's . . 
ability to pay would be restored. Dominicans would replace the 
foreign collectors. The debt would be re-serviced on favorable 
terms, "and, finally, the necessity for foreign financial 
control would disappear of itself. 020 
Whatever its advanta'ges, the modus vivendi was only a 
. 21 
temporary expedient. ~he protocol, however, Dawson maintained, 
would provide for a secure settlement of the Dominican debt. 
The provisions of the protocol providing for the collection by 
the United States of a portion of the revenues which would be 
divided among the creditors, Dawson believed, adequately met 
the need of providing the creditors with a sense of security 
that the debts would be paid. Of course, it would be necessary 
to divide proportionally among the creditors the sum collected. 
On this point, Dawson did not foresee any problem developing 
191bid., pp. 379-380. 
21Ibid., p. 382. 
20Ibid., p. 381. 
211 
with the Dominican or European creditors. They would, he felt, 
be willing to accept a portion of the fifty-five per cent 
I 
rather than demand a larger sum. However, he thought that 
the Improvement Company might cause some trouble if it did not 
receive the complete yearly payment provided for under the 
Award of July 14, 1904. It ~ould also be necessary to fix 
the actual amount of each debt. Here Dawson predicted that 
two difficulties would arisee On the one hand, an examination 
of the debts might lead to the conclusion that equity demanded 
they be scaled down, and, on the other hand, some decision 
would have to be made concerning the exact proportion of the 
fifty-five per cent which each creditor would receive. In 
I 
spite of the difficulties which might arise on these two 
points, and in view of the fact that the country was still a 
. long way from complete economic recovery, Dawson told the 
President that he hoped that both would be done, "in justice 
to suffering and poverty stricken Santo Domingo and to our 
own character as a high-minded, helpful and courageous govern-
ment. • . . 
Dawson concluded his confidential memorandum to 
Roosevelt by urging against so amending the protocol that the 
custom collectors would have extra-territorial inununity from 
the Dominican law. Such an amendment was being considered by 
22Dawson to Roosevelt, July 2, 1905, enclosure: 
Confidential memorandum, July 1, 1905, Despatches from the 
Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14. 
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! the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Dawson felt that this 
would unnecessarily "wound Dominican national pride and sus-
ceptibilities." . i He went on to state that 
Dominicans have reluctantly reconciled themselves to the 
hard necessity of accepting foreign customs collectors, 
but I doubt whether I could persuade them to confer explic-
itly on these collectors extra-territorial immunity •••• 
In substance and in practice the Dominican Government will 
concede such immunity without a murmur or a hitch, but the 
the [sic] Dominican reading and writing public would bitterly 
resent a treaty provision that flagrantly and in so many 
words violates their constitution, deprives their country 
of one of the most essential attributes of sovereignty and 
places it in the eyes of the world in the same category as 
Turkey, China, or Morocco. Santo Domingo believes that it 
deserves as good treatment in this respect as the European 
powers have given Greece.23 
To further aid in getting the agreement through the 
Senate without offensive amendments, sometime in late July or 
early August, Dawson sought out Senator Spooner at his summer 
home in Pittsburq, New Hampshire. Dawson explained that he 
wanted personally to explain "certain Dominican matters" to 
the Senator. Spooner was willing to discuss the Dominican 
situation; however, he insisted on the distinction that any 
discussion would be on a personal basis and not official basis. 
At the end of the interview, Dawson left with the impression 
that the Senator understood the "pet prejudices and weaknesses 
. 2j 
of the Dominican public opinion" and would be considerate of them. 
23Ibid. 
24 Dawson to Roosevelt, August 9, 1905, Roosevelt Papers, 
series !--letters received, August 7-21, 1905, Box 95. Dawson to 
Spooner, July 11, 1905, Spooner Papers, General correspondence, 
1905, June-September, Container 77. 
From the brief notation Spooner made on Dawson's letter 
of July 11, it would appear that the Senator was not completely 
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Before returning to Santo Domingo, Dawson made one more 
effort to remove criticism of the Administration's actions in 
the Dominican Republic. · At the suggestion of the Department 
I ; 
of State he called upon Mr. Albert Robinson, an editorial 
writer for The New York Sun. Dawson, in an ambiguous reference 
to Robinson, found him to be something of a mugwump, "a man 
with an anti-imperialist's attitude of mind, though not the 
opinions of one." In addition, Robinson's knowledge of certain 
of the events immediately preceeding the signing of the protocol 
were inaccurate and Dawson attempted to correct this. Dawson 
felt that his conversation with Robinson had resulted in the 
Sun taking a more objective view of the Dominican situation. 25 
Although his efforts while in the United States during 
the summer of 1905 did not help to speed the protocol through 
the Senate, they 'illustrate two aspects of.his thought. In 
the first place, there can be little doubt that Dawson supported 
the principle of United States involvement in the financial 
affairs of the Dominican Republic. This support was based on 
two points: the protocol prevented a difficult international 
pleased to meet with Dawson. He wrote: 
July 11, 1905 
About San Domingo, 
Came here without invitation awaiting my self, arriving without 
notice at 9 at night. 
Spent an hour or so with him." 
25Dawson to Root, January 19, 1906, Elihu Root Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. c. 
[hereafter cited as the Root Papers], General correspondence, 
D-J, 1906, Container 45. 
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problem and the Dominican Republic received benefits from ·the 
united States interference. Secondly, Dawson realized that in 
I 
spite of any benefits which might accrue to the Dominican Repub-
lic, interference with its sovereignty was difficult for the 
Dominicans to accept. Therefore, he was_ anxious to make this 
as least offensive as possible. 
Dawson and his family arrived back in the Dominican cap-
ital on September 10, 1905. 26 Upon his return he found the 
political conditions "entirely peaceful and satisfactory. 1127 
The situation remained much the same until mid-October. Then 
word reached the capital that a revolution was about to errupt 
in Monte Cristi, and that this uprising would have the financial 
I 
support of a North American couple named Reader. The rumored 
uprising never materialized. 28 Nevertheless, the possible 
. 
involvement of the Readers in the political and financial 
affairs of the Dominican Republic had already come to the atten-
tion of the Department of State. In fact, in September, Dawson 
had been instructed to report fully on the Readers' machinations 
in the Caribbean republic and on any connection they might have 
with the Improvement Company in opposing the protocol of 
26oawson to Secretary of State, October 19, 1905, 
No. 177, enclosure 1: Dawson to Admiral Bradford, October 12, 
1905, FRUS, 1905, p. 399. 
27Dawson to William Loeb, Jr. (Roosevelt's secretary), 
September 20, 1905, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. 
28 Dawson to Root, October 23, 1905, No. 178, Des-
patches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14. 
29 February 7, 1905. 
On October 7, Dawson sent the Secretary of State a 
. ' 
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lengthy report containing the information he had concerning the 
Readers. He reported that the Readers had their first contacts 
with the Dominican Government in October, 1904. At that time a 
I friend of President Morales, one Eliseo Perez, became acquainted 
with the North American couple while he was in New York. 
P~rez informed Morales of the Readers' supposed mining interests 
in Peru and that they were interested in undertaking financial 
operations in the Dominican Republic. In late December, Mr. 
Reader came to Santo Domingo and on the twenty-ninth was granted 
an interview with Morales. At that time Reader presented the 
President with a plan which called for extensive monopolistic 
I 
concessions, the leasing of Samana Bay, and permission to 
collect all the Republic's revenues. In return the Readers 
would refund and consolidate the public debt. It was just 
then that the initial negotiations for the custom's receiver-
ship started, and the President referred Reader to the Foreign 
Minister for further consultation. / When Sanchez discussed the 
matter with Dawson, the latter stated that he knew nothing 
about Readers' plans nor had he received any instructions from 
the State Department regarding them. Consequently, he refused 
to read the plan which Mr. Reader had given the Foreign Minister. 
In view of the United States Minister's lack of instructions, 
29Loomis to Dawson, September 28, 1905, telegram; 
Loomis to Dawson, September 29, 1905, telegram, Diplomatic 
Instructions to Santo Domingo, vol. 1, pp. 71-72, roll 98. 
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I 
sanchez returned the plan to Reader, and the latter apparently 
returned to the United States. In March, Mrs. Reader began to 
circulate reports that her husband had made a verbal contract 
I I 
with Morales for the adjustment of the Dominican debt, but 
that it had been dropped because of a protest on the part of the 
United States Minister made on instructions from Washington. 30 
The argument that the protocol of February 7, was harmful to 
the Readers was also used in the Senate as a reason for oppos-
ing ratification of the protoco1. 31 
Failing to secure the support of the Morales Adm.inistra-
tion for their scheme, Dawson continued, the Readers attempted 
to form some type of an arrangement with the discontented 
elements in the Republic. They turned to the Jimenistas in 
Monte Cristi. Sometime in late spring 1905, Reader returned 
. / 
to the Dominican Republic and contacted Demetrio Rodriguez 
and Desiderio Arias. Dawson reported that Reader, at that time, 
claimed that he had the support of the Improvement Company. He 
alleged that the Company was afraid that:if the protocol were 
not defeated the outcome of Hollander's investigation would be 
detrimental to its interests. Before returning to the United 
I 
States, Reader had signed agreements with Rodriguez concerning 
mutual obligations in the event of a successful revolution. 32 
30Dawson to Root, October 7, 1905, No. 169, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14. 
31Munro, ~· cit., p. 103. 
32Dawson to Root, October 7, 1905, No. 169, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14. 
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In his report of October 7, Dawson accepted the validity 
of the reports that Reader claimed the support of the Improvement 
• I 
company and that he actually had signed contracts with the 
Jimenistas in Monte Cristi, but he did not place much faith in 
the truth of the claim itself. He did not believe that the 
Improvement Company was really involved in any revolutionary 
plot against the Morales Government. He thought that Reader 
fabricated the connection with the Company to explain the pos-
sible source of the vast sums that would be necessary to finance 
any revolution. Furthermore, Dawson was convinced that 
I 
Rodriguez would not long support Reader's contracts once it 
became evident that the North American's promises were empty. 
I I 
Rodriguez, according t~ Dawson, only considered his contracts 
with Reader "as an anchor to windward in the storm which would 
follow the defeat of the convention. 1133 
Although the reports of the revolution supported by 
the Readers seemed to be baseless, another rumor, which also 
became current in mid-October, had more substance. This con-
cerned the growing split within the Dominican Government. 34 
The Morales Government, as indicated, was a coalition consist-
ing of dissident Jimenistas, who had supported Morales when he 
broke with Jim~nez, and Horacistas. Within the Government, 
Morales himself was in the embarrassing position of being with-
out any firm supporters, for the Horacistas upon whom he 
33Ibid. 
34oawson to Root, October 23, 1905, No. 178, ibid. 
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depended for support distrusted him. So long as the financial 
situation remained critical and there was a possibility of 
revolution, the coali tio·n seems to have held together fairly 
well. However, the modus vivendi provided the Government with 
adequate money and the involvement of the United States seemed 
to protect the Government from either foreign intervention or 
-domestic rebellion. With the advent of this stability, it 
would appear that the Horacistas became less convinced of 
the need to allow Morales as free a hand as they had in the 
direction of the affairs of the country. Instead they began 
to demand that Horacistas fill all the major posts, with the 
obvious intention of relegating the President to the status 
of a mere figure head. I 
The first open indication of the break in the Government 
I 
came around October 19, when Vice President Caceres and General 
Guayabin, both prominent Horacistas, arrived at the capital 
demanding that the Cabinet be re-organized to eliminate those 
who were not stanch Horacistas. On Saturday, October 20, 
I 
Caceres had a heated interview with Morales, who threatened to 
resign. Within a day, however, a compromise had been reached. 
Agreeing to stay, Morales pledged to remove several non-
Horacistas from the Cabinet and from other important administra-
tive posts. 35 As a result of this agreement, two cabinet 
ministers and the governors of two provinces were ultimately 
replaced. Fermine P~rez, Minister of War, and Bernardo Pichardo, 
35Ibid. 
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Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, were respectively r~placed 
by Luis Tejera and Eladio Victoria. Carlos Ginebra, governor 
. , 
of Puerto Plata, and Epifania Rodriguez, governor of La Vega, 
were also removed. 36 
During the first week of November, the Morales Govern-
ment uncovered a revolutionary conspiracy apparently centered 
/ 
at the port of San Pedro de Macoris, but possibly extending 
into the entire southern part of the country. The leaders 
were Jimenistas or Jimenista sympathizers; moreover, the 
Dominican Government gave some credence to rumors that the con-
spirators were receiving aid from interests in the United 
States who were opposed to the protoco1. 37 Steps were taken by 
the Morales Government to thwart the potential revolution. 
Known conspirators were arrested; troops were sent against 
. 
the insurgent strongholds; and Dawson was requested to ask for 
the stationing of a United States naval vessel at the port of 
I 
San Pedro de Macoris to discourage a revolutionary assult there. 
The adversity which the Government faced failed to resolve 
the differences between Morales and the Horacistas. The Horacistas 
demanded that the Government continue to bring ever increasing 
pressure upon the potential Jimenista insurgents. The Presi-
dent, on the other hand, believing that everything was under 
control, opposed sending out any further expeditions. 38 
36Dawson to Root, November 3, 1905, No. 182, ibid. 
37Dawson to Root, November 18, 1905, No. 185, ibid. 
38Ibid. 
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There were also several other indications that the 
split between the Horacistas and the President was becoming 
I 
deeper and more permanent. Horacistas began to demand that the 
protocol of February 7 be so amended as to provide that con-
gressional approval had to be obtained before the executive 
could ask for assistance from the United States. Since the 
Horacistas controlled the congress, this would have precluded 
any attempt by Morales to pull a coup on the dominate party. 
There was further indication that even with this amendment the 
Dominican Congress might still refuse to ratify the protocol. 
Furthermore, the compromise which had been reached between 
• I Morales and Vice President Caceres had not been accepted by 
I 
some of the other leading Horacistas. Former President Horacio 
I Vasquez, from whom the party derived its name, still opposed 
.Morales and encouraged ciceres to join with him in opposing 
the protocol. The Vice President, faithful to his October 
I 
connnittment1D Morales, refused to support Vasquez. The result 
was a division within the Horacista Party. For his part, 
Morales appeared more determined to re-assert himself. Foreign 
I 
Minister Sanchez, a staunch supporter of Morales, urged him to 
do so. An apparent surge in popularity produced by the common 
belief that he was resisting Horacistas added further impetus 
for the President to exert himself. Moreover, Governor Arias 
had sent his secretary to the capital to assure the President 
that in the event of a Horacista coup, he could depend upon 
221 
the support of the forces in Monte Cristi. 39 
While the division continued to grow, a tenuous balance 
of power, brought about by the factionalism within the Hora-
cista Party and the apparent strengthening of Morales' position, 
temporarily lent a degree of stability to the Dominican poli-
tical scene. The opposition, which some of the Horacistas 
had been showing towards the ratification of the protocol, 
seemed to diminish when Emiliano Tejera, a Horacista leader 
and early supporter of the protocol, reaffirmed his support of 
the agreement, promising to continue to work for its ratifica-
t . 40 ion. 
Dawson's actions in dealing with the factionalism were 
I . 
prompted by his main objective: securing the ratification and 
ultimate implementation of the protocol. In late April, 1905, 
. the State Department had instructed him to' do everything that 
he properly could "looking toward the maintenance of order and 
the establishment of good feeling on ·the part of the various 
political factions. 1141 This was the basic strategy he tried 
to follow, since he considered ratification of the protocol had 
its best chance if the principal members of the existing Govern-
ment stayed together. The resignation of Morales, Dawson thought, 
would lead to a revolution among the anti-Horacista elements in 
39Ibid. 
40Dawson to Root, November 25, 1905, No. 193, ibid. 
41Adee to Dawson, April 25, 1905, No. 59, Diplomatic 
Instructions to Santo Domingo, vol. 1, p. 58, roll 98. 
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the country. The withdrawal of Vice President ciceres or 
Vel~squez from the Cabinet would probably result in an uprising 
in the northern section of the country, the Cibao, where the 
I 
aoracistas were in a majority. In either case the chances of 
the protocol being ratified by the incumbent Dominican Congress 
would be greatly reduced. 42 
Dawson's conviction that the interests of the protocol 
would be served best by keeping the principal members Of the 
Government together did not mean that he was willing to use 
I 
his influence to persuade Morales to make concessions concerning 
these or other members of the Cabinet. To the contrary, Dawson 
refused to be drawn in or to t.ake sides during the factional 
bickering. 43 He either urged moderation or left the Dominicans 
to work out their own compromise. Moreover, he reported to 
Washington, that 'he considered it his offi~ial duty to maintain 
relations with Morales and the minister he chose to name. 
Dawson saw this not only as his duty, but also as the only 
politic thing to do "because all Dominican politicians Morales 
and Sanchez and their immediate followers are the most con-
vinced and determined friends of the pending Convention. • . . 
He realized that if he insisted upon Morales retaining men in 
the Cabinet whom the President did not desire to retain, they 
42Dawson to Root, October 23, 1905, No. 178, Des-
patches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14. 
43Dawson to Root, October 23, 1905, No. 178; Dawson 
to Root, November 3, 1905, No. 182; Dawson to Root, November 
18, 1905, No. 185, ibid. 
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would be kept. However, to follow this course, Dawson correctly 
believed, he would be constituting himself virtual director of 
the Dominican internal politics, a ;position for which he had 
no authority. Furthermore, he thought it would probably only 
lead to the elimination of Morales and his supporters, the one 
faction that had a definite plan for the payment of the debt 
W1'th Uni'ted States ai'd. 44 T M 1 th th t'll o assure ora es a e s 1 
enjoyed the confidence of the United States, Dawson had called 
the President's attention to the fact that his own letter of 
credence was directed to Morales as president and that there 
was no indication or intention of withdrawing recognition. 45 
Dawson did not have the same confidence in the Horacista 
I 
support of the protocol as he did in Morales' support. I Ve las-
quez's early reluctance to accept the agreement came to mind 
and Dawson could not be sure that the Finance Minister and the 
Horacistas would not reject the protocol if they could find 
an alternative. I Nevertheless, in dealing with Caceres and 
I Velasquez, he always treated them as important in the internal 
politics and in the implementation of the agreement and modus 
. d' 46 viven 1. 
The political factionalism that Dawson witnessed in 
the Dominican Republic caused him to have a rather poor opinion 
of the Dominican political and military classes. Those who were 
44Dawson to Root, November 18, 1905, No. 185, ibid. 
45nawson to Root, November 3, 1905, No. 182, ibid. 
46
nawson to Root, October 23, 1905, No. 178, ibid. 
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involved in the factional disputes and the accompanying opposi-
tion to the agreement with the United States, he believed, were 
i 
confined to these classes. The military and the politicians, 
Dawson maintained, were basically opposed to the convention 
because it would endanger "their salaries and perquisites." 
While the "more intelligent and patriotic" members of these 
classes realized that any Dominican Government, to survive, had 
to prevent the customhouses from falling into the hands of 
revolutionaries, Dawson reported that "the average politician 
and jefe forgets about this when his immediate selfish interests 
are threatened. 1147 The mercantile and non-political elements 
of society, he claimed, remained more firm than ever in their 
I 
support of the protocol, particularly now that they had had a 
chance to witness the operation of the modus vivendi under 
Colonel Colton's tactful administration. But, he wrote the 
Secretary of State that he was becoming more and more convinced 
that only the intervention of the United States as envisioned 
in the agreement could save the Dominican Republic 
from anarchy and bankruptcy, and prevent its turbulent, 
fickle, selfishly ambitious politicians from fighting each 
other for the off ices as they have done since the foundation 
of the Republic. 4 8 : 
In spite of what he had to say about Dominican politicians 
in general, he did not basically have an unfavorable opinion of 
the members of the Government who were directly involved in this 
47 Dawson to Root, November 18, 1905, No. 185, ibid. 
48Ibid. 
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factional strife. I I Vice President Ramon Caceres he described 
as "a honest, unambitious, and patriotic individual" who had 
come to the point of breaking with Morales as a result of pres-
, I I 
sure from friends. Velasquez, whose honesty and patriotism he 
had earlier attested to in most favorable terms, in this instance, 
was "the most aggressive and uncompromising man in the Cabinet. 
Dawson found Morales to be a determined individual, but unfor-
tunately possessing a characteristic common to many Latin Amer-
icans. In his report to the Secretary of State, Dawson wrote: 
It seemed to me--although of course I did not say so to 
President Morales--that like most Latin-Americans he is 
subject to being diverted from his serious purpose by con-
siderations of personal dignity, especially when he is con-
scious that his motives are good and unselfish. He is the 
coolest and most persistent Dominican who is prominent in 
political life, and yet he came near in this instance to 
throwing away the results of his two years hard work largely 
because his feelings were profoundly hurt at what he con-
sidered Horacista ingratitude.49 
In spite of his refusal to become involved in the 
partisan factionalism within the Government, Dawson had no 
intention of allowing a revolution either to endanger the 
Morales Government or to threaten the operation of the modus 
vivendi. Therefore, he made an effort to lend what aid he could 
to the Morales Government and to provide for the possibility of 
armed intervention, if necessary, to maintain the modus vivendi 
and prevent the customhouses from falling into the hands of 
revolutionaries. In early November, when Foreign Minister S~-
chez asked Dawson to request the presence of an United States 
49Dawson to Root, October 23, 1905, No. 178, ibid. 
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I 
naval vessel at the port of San Pedro de Macoris, Dawson made 
an investigation and while he found that the situation had not 
i 
yet become serious, the ·presence of a vessel was justified, 
in view of the possibility that th~re might be a sudden deteri-
oration of the political conditions in the Republic. At that 
time, the Department of State instructed Dawson that while the 
ships would be sent, marines were not to be landed without a 
specific request from the Dominican Government that they were 
needed for protection of the lives of American citizens, and 
that this protection temporarily could not be provided by the 
D . . th 't' so onu.nican au ori ies. Consequently, to justify the landing 
of United States forces, it would be necessary to be sure that 
I 
United States citizens were working in the customhouses, if 
there were none living in a given port city. 51 By November, 
1905, North Americans were already employed in the customhouses 
at Monte Cristi, Puerto Plata and Santo Domingo City. United 
I 
States citizens were living in Macoris; however, neither this 
I I port nor Sanchez or Samana had regularly employed North Americans 
in the respective customhouses. Dawson had asked Colonel Colton 
if a United States employee could be placed in the customhouses 
in each of these ports. But, there were not enough to fill all 
the posts. 52 
SODawson to Root, November 18, 1905, No. 185, ibid. 
51 Dawson to Root, November 18, 1905, No. 185; Dawson 
to Root, No~ember 20, 1905, personal, ibid. 
52Ibid. 
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The mutual distrust between Morales and the Horacistas 
again surfaced on November 26 and 27, as Morales finally deter-
• i 
mined to exert himself in an attempt to regain what he considered 
to be his legal prerogatives. His ,first move was to demand 
the resignation of the commandante of the troops stationed in 
the capital. He claimed that this man was his personal enemy 
and was organizing the troops to depose him. The President 
I further suggested to Finance Minister Velasquez that the entire 
Cabinet resign. To both of the propositions, the Horacistas 
were naturally opposed. They interpreted them as demonstrating 
Morales' intention to break completely with the Horacistas and 
form a cabinet of his own supporters. In the meantime, the 
conunandante and Minister of War Luis Tejera had' placed themselves 
at the head of the troops and barricaded the army quarters, 
f . drn't b t H ' t 53 re using to a i any one u oracis as. · 
In an attempt to reconcile their differences, Morales 
met with the prominent Horacistas on Monday, November 27. Both 
sides requested that Dawson be present at the meeting. Again 
he attempted to maintain neutrality, taking neither side and 
avoiding any involvement in the internal politics of the Republic. 
This position did not, however, prevent him from pointing out 
the failure to reach an agreement or compromise would certainly 
lead to civil war, which would damage the Republic in the eyes 
54 
of world opinion, and possibly ruin the Horacista Party. 
53Dawson to Root, December 5, 1905, No. 196, ibid. 
54Ibid. 
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Ultimately, a compromise was reached. The Horacistas 
sacrificed the cornrnandante. The Minister of War, Luis Tejera, 
resigned his portfolio and, assumed command of the Santo Domingo 
I I 
garrison. Tejera's place in the Cabinet was filled by Carlos 
Ginebra, who was replaced as governor of the capital city by 
Lorenzo Aristy. Ginebra's and Aristy's appointments were vic-
tories for Morales. However, the Horacistas were perhaps the 
real victors, for they retained control of the troops stationed 
. th 't 1 55 in e capi a • 
The compromise did not, of course, remove the underlying 
cause of the factionalism: the mutual distrust between Morales 
and the Horacistas. The Horacista officials, on their own au-
thority, had already begun what appears to have been a system-
atic harassment of those either known to oppose, or suspected 
of being opposed, to them. On the twenty-seventh, Bernardo 
Pichardo, the former Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, who had 
recently been driven from the Cabinet by the Horacistas, asked 
Dawson for asylum. Dawson, however, did not consider that the 
situation warranted such action. Nevertheless, he did promise 
to use his influence to avoid violence. 56 Undoubtedly, his 
refusal to grant Pichardo asylum was largely prompted by the 
belief that such action might only precipitate further division 
in the Government, and actually make it appear as if he were 
siding with Morales against the Horacistas. 
55Ibid. 56Ibid. 
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On Saturday, December 2, Dawson received word that· Vice 
President C~ceres, accompanied by an armed escort, was headed 
. i 
towards the capital, reportedly to demand the resignation of 
Morales. Although doubting that this was really the Vice Presi-
dent's purpose, Dawson thought that popular sentiment might 
I force Caceres to take such a course. However, upon checking 
I I 
with Velasquez, Dawson learned that Caceres was indeed coming 
and that when he arrived, a definite settlement or rupture 
would be made with the President. In view of the apparently 
worsening situation, Dawson conferred with Admiral Bradford 
who was aboard the u.s.s. Olympia, which was anchored off Santo 
Domingo City. Following Bradford's suggestion, Dawson sought 
. I 
an interview with the Governor of the capital and reminded him 
of the responsibility of the Dominican authorities to protect 
the lives and property of United States citizens in the event 
the public order was endangered. 57 
ca'ceres arrived in the capital that Saturday evening 
and the next morning Dawson was asked to meet with C~ceres, 
I Velasquez, and Emiliano Tejera. The Vice President assured 
Dawson that he had no intention of either. starting a revolution 
against Morales or of demanding the President's resignation. 
Nevertheless, the Horacista leaders stated that they expected 
Morales to govern in complete accord with the wishes of their 
party and to dismiss those who were not in sympathy with the 
party. Foreign Minister sinchez and Fermin P~rez, Governor of 
57Ibid. 
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Puerto Plata, were singled out as two officials who fitted 
into this category. Dawson advised against disturbing the 
• I 
status quo by demands from either side for cabinet changes as 
long as the protocol was still pending. To do so, he aruged, 
might endanger the continuance in power of the Horacistas and 
•the most fundamental interests" of the Republic. 58 While 
Dawson's arguments did not seem to have much affect on the Vice 
President, the Horacistas informed Dawson that they were willing 
to. guarantee the ratification of the protocol by the Dominican 
Congress, provided that it were amended to provide that the 
Congress would be consulted before the Dominican executive 
could request assistance from the United States. 59 
I 
Nextthe Horacista leaders and Dawson met with President 
Morales. Although the question of S~nchez's resignation did 
I 
. not come up directly at the meeting, Velasquez presented a 
contract whereby Morales would agree to appoint only officials 
approved by the Horacista Party; in return the party would 
guarantee its continued support of the President. To assure 
compliance with the agreement, both sides were to hold themselves 
responsible for its fullfillment before Dawson. Following his 
set policy, Dawson refused to become involved in the internal 
60 politics by accepting any pledges. 
In the meantime, Dawson had wired Washington about the 
possibility of a break between Morales and the Horacistas, and 
asked if he were authorized to request Admiral Bradford to land 
59Ibid. 60Ibid. 
r 
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troops to protect the lives of United States citizens and main-
tain order in the event that Morales were imprisoned, forced to 
resign, or assassinated. Dawson noted that if the President 
I I 
were forced out "no constitutional[ly] recognized Government 
would exist to ask American assistance as indicated in your 
telegram of the eighth of November." 61 This last statement seems 
to be inaccurate and might indicate that Dawson felt it neces-
sary to intervene if events came to such an impasse that Morales 
was forced out. In the event Morales were forced out, the 
/ Cabinet would still be in existence and Caceres could have 
easily succeeded to the position of chief executive. Thus a 
constitutional government would have continued to exist. This 
was precisely the position that Dawson later took, when Morales 
. . 62 fled from the capital. 
Secretary of State Root, however, was determined that 
the United States would not get involved in this domestic 
political factionalism. On Monday, the fourth, Dawson received 
a reply to his telegram of the previous day. Dawson was instruc-
ted to "strongly advise" Morales against breaking with his 
Cabinet. But, the State Department was "not willing to give 
instructions to Admiral [Bradford] based on assumption that 
President and Cabinet will create [a] situation requiring our 
intervention for the protection of American citizens. 1163 Two 
61Ibid. 
62Dawson to Secretary of State·, January 2, 1906, No. 202, 
~' 1906, Part 1, p. 539. 
63secretary of State to Minister Dawson, December 4, 1905, 
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days later, when the State Department received word of serious 
disturbances in the Dominican Republic, Root again wired Dawson 
that the United States could not take part in the factional 
strife. Troops were not to be landed except "when absolutely 
necessary to protect life and property of American citizens." 
This, of course, included protection of United States citizens 
involved in performing their duties in the customhouses. How-
ever, the Secretary of State noted that if the Dominican Govern-
ment wanted to terminate the modus vivendi, the North Americans 
employed in the customhouses would receive protection to with-
draw. 64 Root obviously had no intention of maintaining the 
modus vivendi against the Dominican Government's wishes. 
Dawson called on Morales after receiving Root's telegram 
of the fourth. Informing the President that the State Depart-
ment advised against a break, he urged Mor~les to meet again 
with the Horacista leaders. Morales opposed dismissing scfnchez, 
b k d h • • I ut as e Dawson to arrange for anot er meeting with Caceres, 
Tejera and Vel~squez. Dawson then contacted Vel~squez, urging 
him to meet with the President again, and try to reach a com-
promise. Dawson promised to "spare no reasonable efforts to see 
that the latter [Morales] played fair." When the meeting finally 
took place on the fifth, Dawson was again sununoned and again he 
FRUS, 1905, p. 408. 
64 Secretary to State to Dawson, December 6, 1905, 
telegram, ibid. 
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refused to take sides. 65 The apparent outcome of this meeting 
I 
was Morales' decision to get rid of Sanchez, in spite of his 
earlier unwillingness to do so. 66 
The exit of S~nchez from the Cabinet was not the major 
event which occupied the attention of either Dawson or the 
oominican politicians on Wednesday, December 6. They were 
rather confronted with a surge of anti-United States sentiment, 
brought about by a poorly timed transfer of marines from one 
ship to another. Admiral Bradford evidently assumed that the 
factionalism between the Horacistas and Morales was about to 
produce an open rebellion and determined to prepare to land 
marines if necessary. In all, there were three United States 
I 
naval vessels stationed off Santo Domingo City. One ship of 
light draft, the u.s.s. Scorpion, lay at the mouth of the Ozama 
river. The other two, the cruisers the u.s.s. Olympia and the 
u.s.s. Des Moines, unable to approach as closely to shore as 
the Scorpion, lay at anchor a short distance out. In order to 
supplement the number of men aboard the Scorpion who would be 
able to land if such became necessary, Bradford ordered landing 
parties to proceed from the larger ships to the Scorpion. The 
transfer was scheduled for ten o'clock in the morning of the 
sixth~ 67 
65 . Dawson to Root, December 5, 1905, No. 196, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14. 
66oawson to Root, December 15, 1905, No. 197, ibid. 
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Dawson, according to his report, had no knowledge of this 
planned maneuver until he was informed of it by Lieutenant 
commander Jones of the Scorpion at 9:30 on the morning of the 
i I 
sixth. At that late hour, it was impossible to contact Admiral 
Bradford in time to prevent the transfer of men. However, 
realizing that the appearance of armed men moving from the 
cruisers towards the shore line might be misinterpreted as an 
intended landing, Dawson rushed to inform Vel,squez, C~ceres, 
and Morales of the true destination of the marines. Initially, 
the Dominicans did not seem to think that the movement would 
produce any undue excitement in the capital. However, as the 
four men sat in the President's office discussing the meeting 
of the previous day and the decision to replace Foreign Minister 
I Sanchez, the Minister of War rushed in to announce that twelve 
boats filled with armed men had left the Olympia and the Des 
Moines, and were apparently preparing to land. In a few minutes, 
another official burst into the room with the news that a band 
of armed men was entering the Government Palace. These men, 
commanded by the commandante of the city, were under the impres-
1 
sion that Morales and Sanchez had called upon the North Ameri-
can troops for support in the dispute with the Horacistas, and 
consequently had come bent on killing the President and Foreign 
Minister. 68 
Upon hearing that the Palace was being invaded, Vice 
President c'ceres, according to Dawson, ran to the door saying 
68Ibid. 
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that he washed his hands of all responsibility for what might 
I happen. Dawson, however, attempted to calm Caceres by pointing 
i 
out that these were the Vice President's men, and that he could 
not shirk responsibility for their actions. He further offered 
I 
to go out with Caceres and .assure the conunandante and his men 
of the pacific intention and true destination of the landing 
parties. I The appearance of Caceres and Dawson successfully 
halted the group, and the men were persuaded to withdraw. 
I Dawson, Emiliano Tejera, and Velasquez then hurried to the city 
wharf. 69 
In the street, men, young boys, and women were rushing 
towards the water front determined to defend the capital against 
I 
what they believed to be an inuninent North American invasion. 
In some instances the anti-Yankee sentiment of the populace 
. 
. resulted in threats against the lives of United States citizens 
and those Dominicans in their employ. At the wharf, Lieutenant 
I Commander Jones met Dawson, and Tejera and Velasquez. Dawson 
had Jones repeat to the two Dominicans, and then to the conunan-
dante who again appeared on the scene, what instructions had 
been given to the troops that had been moved to the Scorpion. 
With the officials at least assured that no invasion was con-
templated, Dawson then agreed to arrange for the return of the 
troops from the Scorpion to the other ships, provided that the 
Dominicans would guarantee the safety of United States citizens 
living in the capital. While Lieutenant Conunander Jones went 
69Ibid. 
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off to contact Admiral Bradford, Dawson, exhibiting what must 
have been considerable courage and disregard for his own safety, 
I 
remained in the office of the port commander. About one o'clock 
in the afternoon, Dawson went out to the Scorpion to meet with 
Bradford and to arrange for the withdrawal of the troops. By 
late afternoon, calm had been restored to the city and the 
troops returned to the Olympia and the Des Moines. 70 
Once the excitement had died down, Dawson turned again 
I to the problem of Sanchez's removal from the Cabinet. Earlier 
in the day, Morales had asked Dawson to inform the Foreign 
Minister that his resignation would be sought. In this way 
the President would be spared the embarrassment of confronting 
I 
his loyal supporter and, in addition, it was felt that Dawson, 
under the circumstances, would probably be the only one who 
. could find S~chez. Upon returning to the· Legation, Dawson 
found the Foreign Minister waiting for him. Taking the news 
I 
well, Sanchez offered to resign, provided his safety was guar-
anteed and that he would be given a foreign post. Morales 
agreed to these terms. However, skichez's premature publica-
tion of the conditions of his resignation led to further division 
of the Cabinet and the threat on the part of the Minister of 
the Interior to have the former Foreign Minister arrested. 71 
I Dawson's own attitude to the Sanchez matter was ~imply 
I to see that Sanchez left the country as soon as possible fol-
lowing his resignation. Although S~chez, who felt his life 
71Ibid. 
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endangered, asked for asylum in the United States Legation; 
Dawson refused to become involved. To do so, he believed, 
I . 
might convince Caceres that he did not enjoy the United States 
I I 
Minister's trust, thereby endangering Dawson's own moral as-
cendency over the "simple minded, slow thinking, loyal and 
brave though violent and inexperienced" Vice President. 72 Grant-
I ing asylum to Sanchez might also give the impression that Daw-
son was siding with the Horacistas' opponents. The sooner 
I Sanchez left, the sooner a continuing source of friction between 
' 
Morales and ciceres would be removed. 73 
The events of the last week of November and the first 
week of December further strengthened Dawson's conviction, 
which he had expressed in his July memorandum to President 
Roosevelt, that the modus vivendi rested on insecure foundations. 
Endemic civil war and partisan rivalries had eroded the authority 
of government officials and party leaders over their followers. 
This shortcoming became particularly evident in time of crises. 
In addition, the leaders themselves, Dawson believed, demonstrated 
a political ineptness. He reported that he was 
more convinced than ever the Dominican statesmen--even the 
best of them--lack the training which is valuable in the 
practical conduct of a modern Government, and that a spirit 
of respect for law, order and regular responsible adminis-
tration is almost absent. Some of them talk fluently, 
intelligently and reasonably on the subject, but it is mere 
theory. In times of stress they practically revert to more 
primitive ways of thinking and acting. 
In a word they are like children and plain speaking, 
coupled with a careful observance of the amenities, is 
72Ibid. 73Ibid. 
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necessary in dealing with them. They are prone to ask·for 
foreign advice when they get into snarls, but are apt to 
misconstrue the spirit in which it is given, and to rush 
to the conclusion that the foreigner is either with or 
against their particular faction. Instinctively they recog-
nize their own limitations, although their Spanish pride 
will never let them explicitly admit it. When advice is 
given, they usually act on it, but never admit that they 
do so. They are more concerned with the form than the sub-
stance, offering in this a curious contrast to Americans 
and Englishmen. Though in their hearts they may hate and 
fear us, at bottom they have a singularly implicit belief 
that we do not lie, which governs their actions except 
when their suspicions a?! accidentally aroused or when they 
lose their heads •••• 
Following the excitement of the sixth and the storm over 
the resignation of scfnchez, a temporary calm fell over Dominican 
politics. Emiliano Tejera was appointed to be the new Foreign 
Minister, a choice which Dawson thought was excellent. 75 Vice 
President ciceres again departed for the northern part of the 
country, leaving affairs in the capital in the charge of the 
President and the· Cabinet. 76 All things considered, Dawson 
reported that he was daily becoming more convinced that Morales 
and the Horacistas had finally come to a working agreement. 77 
Actually the calm was deceptive and Dawson's confidence 
poorly founded. By the twenty-first, rumors were circulating 
I that Caceres was headed for Puerto Plata to remove the non-
74Ibid. 
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I I 
aoracista governor of that province, Fermin Perez. Though ·the 
I 
rumors apparently lacked substance, Governor Perez precipi-
tated a show down by attempting to arrest the commander of the 
port who was a Horacista. The result was that Morales himself 
I 18 issued a decree removing Perez. 
If Dawson or any of the Horacistas construed Morales' 
action against P~rez as indicating the President's complete 
submission to the Horacista Party, they were sorely mistaken. 
On Sunday, December 24, about seven o'clock in the evening, 
Morales casually left the capital on the pretext of attending a 
Christmas Eve dinner. Two or three miles from the city he 
was met by a band of twenty-five or thirty men. The President 
i 
and his associates then proceeded to take several government 
horses from a nearby pasture and rode off to the west. Morales' 
intention was to 'setup a temporary capital~ dismiss the Cabinet 
and form another one which would be loyal to him. 79 Unfortu-
nately for Morales, his active participation in the coup was 
thwarted when he fell from his horse on December 25, and broke 
80 his leg. 
Horacista and Jimenista reaction to the President's move 
crystalized quickly. By ten o'clock on the evening of the 
twenty-fourth, Morales' flight was known in the capital. Early 
78nawson to Secretary of State, January 2, 1906,.No. 
202, FROS, 1906, Part 1, pp. 536-37. 
79
rbid., pp. 538-39. 
80nawson to Secretary of State, January 16, 1906, No. 
203, FROS, 1906, Part 1, p. 544. 
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the next day about a hundred government troops were sent after 
I him. Vice President Caceres was sununoned back to the capital 
by the Cabinet to take charge of the executive and Congress 
I I 
was convened in order to impeach the President. In the mean-
time, Morales had been joined by local Jimenista leaders and 
there was a simultaneous uprising by the Jimenistas in Monte 
Cristi. 81 The Jimenista forces received re-inforcements and 
supplies at the Government's expense when the Dominican gun 
boat Independencia defected to Monte Cristi while on a supply 
, 82 
mission to the port of Sanchez. 
Within a week, it became apparent that the combined 
Morales coup and Jimenista uprising were doomed to failure. On 
January 2, the Jimenista forces launched attacks against Puerto 
Plata and Santiago. In both instances the Government's forces 
successfully defended their positions, and.in the attack against 
I 
Puerto Plata, the·Jimenistas lost General Demetrio Rodriguez, 
one of their most capable leaders. 83 The inability of the 
revolutionaries to gain control of any customhouse, or to obtain 
supplies from the outside, coupled with Morales' disability and 
the effective and prompt action of the Cabinet probably helps 
to account for the quick failure of the revolution. 
81oawson to Secretary of State, January 2, 1906, No. 
202, ibid., pp. 538, 540. 
82Ibid., p. 540. 
83oawson to Secretary of State, January 16, 1906, No. 
203, ibid. 
r 241 
At any rate, by January 3, Dawson had received a letter 
from Morales asking the United States Minister to intervene on 
I 
his behalf in return for which he promised to resign and go 
into exile. Despite the President's flight and intrigues with 
the Jimenistas, which constituted a breach of his earlier pro-
mises not to break with the Horacistas and plunge the country 
into revolution, Dawson decided to use his influence in an 
effort to save Morales' life and bring the insurrection to an 
end without further damaging the reputation of the Dominican 
Republic "in the eyes of the civilized world." 84 Therefore, he 
approached Foreign Minister Tejera and Vice President C~ceres 
on the possibility of a guarantee for Morales' life, in return 
I -
for the President's resignation and exile. After initial reluc-
tance prompted by doubts on the legality of accepting a presi-
. 
dent's resignation while he was under an indictment of impeach-
/ 
ment, Caceres agreed to the arrangement. Thereupon, Dawson 
I 
contacted the Spanish and French charges d'affaires, M. Flandrin 
/ 
and Sr. Albinana, and asked them to accompany him to Caceres' 
office in order to receive the Vice President's verbal promise 
to the conditions. Once this had been accomplished, Dawson 
and the other two diplomats began the rather long and difficult 
process of contacting the fugitive Morales. Finally, on the 
night of January 11, the Spanish charg~ located the President 
near the capital and escorted him to the city, where he took 
84 Dawson to Root, January 16, 1906, No. 203, Despatches 
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asylum in· the United States Legation. Once there, he submitted 
his resignation, and Dawson transmitted it to the Cabinet. 
. ' Throughout the next day, Flandrin and Albinana stayed with 
Morales, while Dawson made arrangements for the former presi-
dent's exile. Early that afternoon, the injured Morales, accom-
panied by Dawson, Flandrin, Albinana, and Foreign Minister Tejera, 
left the United States Legation and headed for the wharf. The 
Government supplied a strong guard as a precautionary measure 
against any demonstration either favorable or hostile to the 
ex-president. From the city wharf, Morales was carried out to 
the u.s.s. Dubuque, which took him to San Juan, Puerto Rico. 85 
By the middle of January, the major part of the insur-
1 
rection was over. On the fourteenth, the Independencia had 
surrendered. Furthermore, before going into exile, Morales 
. had given Dawson a note, at the latter's request, to transmit 
to the Jimenista leaders in Monte Cristi, calling upon them to 
lay down their arms. The reception of this note and the advance 
of government troops probably prompted Governor Arias to agree 
to surrender on the bases of a restoration of the virtually 
autonomous conditions which had existed in the province prior 
to the revolution. The Government, desiring to terminate once 
and for all this independent status, refused to grant these 
terms. A prison break, staged by the Horacistas who had been 
jailed in Monte Cristi and their seizure of the citadel, coupled 
with the arrival of government troops persuaded Arias and his 
85Ibid. 
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major supporters to take refuge on the United States naval · 
vessel stationed at the port. 86 Although guerrilla warfare 
continued for sometime afterwards in the province, with the 
I I 
flight of the principal Jimenista leaders from Monte Cristi, 
the major threat to the Government ended. 
Once the revolution was all but over, Dawson's main 
I 
anxiety was for the continued stability of the Caceres Govern-
ment. The insurrection had been less damaging to the Govern-
ment than previous uprisings; nevertheless, as a result of the 
revolutionary disturbances, the Government had found it necessary 
to enlarge the size of the military forces under the commands 
of the various provincial governors. Dawson hoped that these 
forces would be reduced as soon as possible, lest the governors 
use their increased forces to weaken the central government. 87 
There was also the danger that the.continuing factionalism 
within the Horacista Party, which in part was now caused by the 
I dislike of some for Finance Minister Velasquez and President 
I Caceres, might destroy the tenuous stability which the Govern-
ment's victory had recently secured. In addition, President 
c/.ceres, according to Dawson, was without ambition and to some 
degree lacked self-confidence. He, therefore, was not at all 
opposed to resigning in favor of so~e one upon whom the Horacistas 
86oawson to Secretary of State, January 16, 1906, No. 
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ld . . . t 88 cou Join in suppor • I In early February, Caceres announced 
that he had determined to resign and that former president 
I . ! 
Horacio Vasquez, the nominal head of the Horacista Party, would 
accept the presidency. 89 Despite his recognition of ciceres' 
definite limitations as a party leader and an administrator, 
Dawson was not in favor of the change. 90 In the first place 
he felt that any change in the Government was dangerous. Second-
/ ly, he knew that Caceres supported the convention of February 7, 
1905. I Horacio Vasquez's position on this matter was uncertain. 
Dawson, nevertheless, thought it best that he express no opinion 
I 
on the question of Caceres' resignation. Instead, he leftthe 
I 
events take their course, and members of Caceres' own party 
I 
prevailed upon him to serve out the remainder of the presidential 
I 
term. Finally, Caceres relented and agreed to continue in 
ff . 91 .0 1~. 
The continued peace of the Republic, Dawson was con-
vinced, depended on three factors. First of all, it was necessary 
that the principal leaders of the Horacista Party and the Govern-
ment be in agreement. Secondly, the insurgents had to be denied 
the supply of munitions. Finally, the possibility of the custom-
92 houses falling into revolutionary hands had to be prevented. 
88Ibid. 
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The last two objectives were fairly well secured by United 
States control of the customhouses under the modus vivendi and 
an embargo on the shipment of all fire arms and amunition from 
the United States to the Dominican Republic, which had been in 
~ffect since mid-October, 1905. 93 
In order to aid in soothing the f actionalsim among the 
Horacistas and to end any misconception concerning United States 
interference in Dominican domestic politics, Dawson took the 
I 
opportunity of Horacio Vasquez's visit to the capital in March 
to meet with the former president. Dawson thought that he had 
I 
succeeded in convincing Vasquez of the United States' neutral-
ity in the internal political problems of the Republic. Further-
/ I 
more, he was convinced that Vasquez would offer no opposition 
so long as the convention was pending. 94 
Although the Jimenista opposition was prevented from 
obtaining munitions with any degree of facility and continually 
denied any hope of taking control of the customhouses, armed 
opposition to the Government continued on a diminished scale in 
the province of Monte Cristi. 95 Elsewhere, open revolutionary 
activity was apparent. 96 In dealing with its opponents, the 
Government took stern measures, arresting several of the leaders 
93Dawson to Secretary of State, October 19, 1905, No. 
177, FRUS, 1905, pp. 398-99. 
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in direct violation of its promise in January to grant amnesty 
to all the revolutionaries. On the one hand, Dawson did not 
think that the oppressive measures of the Government would re-
' I I I 
sult in a major danger to the stability of the Government, even 
though there was opposition to its harsh methods. He reasoned 
that the oppressive tactics were not as severe as the country 
had previously been used to. 97 On the other hand, he reported 
that he attempted to encourage those members of the Government 
98 
who favored amnesty. 
Even though he did not foresee an immediate danger to 
the Government, Dawson, nevertheless, did believe that the 
continued factionalism among the Horacistas and the action of 
the Jimenista opposition within the Republic and the rumors of 
inuninent invasion by the exiles were helping to weaken the 
Government. 99 He may have been correct in.this evaluation. 
However, it was also true that between October, 1905 and Febru-
ary, 1906 the Dominican Government had successfully passed 
through a very critical period. In spite of factional division 
within the Government and revolution on the part of the opposi-
tion, the constitutional government had survived, somewhat 
changed in composition but still intact. 
Throughout the period of factional bickering from October, 
• 
to the time of Morales' flight from the capital on December 24, 
97Dawson to Root, April 2, 1906, No. 236, ibid. 
98Dawson to Root, May 22, 1906, personal, ibid. 
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Dawson claimed that he refused to take sides or to interfer in 
the internal politics of the Dominican Republic. Nevertheless, 
his claim of non-interference in Dominican domestic politics was 
more apparent than real. The facts that both sides in the dis-
pute consulted him and requested his presence at the meetings 
between them attest to Dawson's impartiality. But the mere 
fact that he was so consulted indicated that even had he wanted 
to, he could not have avoided involvement in the internal poli-
tics of the Republic. United States support of the modus 
vivendi and the pending protocol already constituted interference 
into the affairs of the Dominican Republic and necessarily made 
the United States Resident Minister one of the most important 
\ 
men in the Dominican capital and certainly the most important 
diplomat there. Furthermore, while it would appear that his 
urging of compromise and moderation on both sides helped to 
prolong the uneasy Morales-Horacista coalition, this urging it-
self constituted an involvement in the internal affairs of the 
country. This in no way implies that Dawson exceeded the wishes 
of his superiors. Such action was within the scope of his 
instructions. Dawson had been instructed to do what he could 
to keep harmony among the factions; but, he was also told that 
the United States could not become involved in the internal dis-
putes of the Dominican Republic. The problem was one of deter-
mining what constituted interference in Dominican internal 
affairs. To Dawson and to Secretary of State Root, urging har-
mony between the factions did not, whereas taking sides did. 
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The revolution of late December and early January per-
haps illustrates the impact of United States involvement in 
! 
the Dominican Republic. There can be little doubt that the 
modus vivendi and the success of the Cabinet were closely con-
nected. The uninterrupted operation of the modus vivendi for 
almost nine months had provided the Government with adequate 
funds to meet the emergency and had denied these funds to the 
opposition. In addition, the fact that United States citizens 
were in control of the customhouses prevented them from falling 
into the hands of the revolutionaries. The seizure of a custom-
house by the Jimenistas would certainly have led to armed inter-
vention to protect the North Americans who were working there. 
i 
Given these conditions, the question arises of why did 
the Jimenistas decide to revolt in late December, 1905. The 
_possible key to the answer may lie with President Morales. 
Above and beyond his host~lity to the Horacistas, Morales had 
another quality which may have made him attractive to the Jimen-
istas. Since Morales was constitutional president, was it not 
possible then that the United States Minister and the Government 
in Washington might continue to recognize him as the head of 
the Government and thus lend support to the Jimenista cause? 
If this were the case, Dawson's attitude was crucial, and he 
chose to continue to support the Horacista dominated Cabinet. 
At the time of Morales' flight in December, Dawson took the 
I position that the questions of the legal right of Caceres to 
succeed Morales and of the continuation of the Government were 
r 
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primarily points of Dominican constitutional law. His rea·son-
ing on this matter was put forth in a despatch on the revolution 
dated January 2, 1906. Dawson wrote: 
I 
I I 
The cabinet formerly named by President Morales is still 
in possession and exercising their functions. The only 
power given the President by the Dominican constitution is 
that of naming and removing the cabinet ministers. Once 
named they are the executive, and until they are removed or 
attempted to be removed by either Morales or Caceres, or 
are expelled from the capital and government offices, the 
question of who has the right to remove them is largely 
academic.100 
This was not always, however, Dawson's position. In 
November, he had noted that his letter of credence was directed 
to Morales as president, and on December 3, he had wired for 
instructions concerning the landing of marines without the 
explicit statement from the Dominican Government that it was 
unable to provide protection for the United States nationals, 
in the event Morales was somehow removed from the scene. As 
has already been mentioned, his reasoning then was that with 
Morales removed no constitutional government would exist. How 
can this change of view be explained? There is no conclusive 
explanation, but there are several possibilities. 
One possible explanation might be that Dawson had not 
read the Dominican constitution prior to his telegram of Decem-
ber 3, but had read it prior to his despatch of January 2. Al-
though up to December 3, Dawson makes no mention of having read 
or not having read the constitution, it would be very surprising 
lOODawson to Secretary of State, January 2, 1906, No. 
202, FROS, 1906, Part 1, p. 539. 
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if he had not read it. He had made a study of the Dominican 
financial affairs, had some acquaintance with the historical 
development of the country, and had become thoroughly familiar 
with Dominican politics and politicians. It would, thus, be 
absurd to think that, under these conditions, he had not become 
acquainted with the fundamental law of the Republic. 
A second possibility might be that in early December, 
Dawson thought that a complete break between Morales and the 
Horacistas would result in the disintegration of the Government. 
But this is not the indication he had given in the December 3 
telegram. Therefore, it would seem that he did not particularly 
foresee the dissolution of the Cabinet, and, thus a government 
I 
would still have existed according to his later interpretation. 
Perhaps the most logical explanation is that in early 
. 
. December he thought that direct United States intervention would 
be necessary if Morales were forced out, but by the end of the 
month, he no longer considered this either necessary or desir-
able or in accord with his instructions. Dawson's doubts con-
cerning the Horacistas support of the protocol, his attitude 
towards Dominican politicians in general, his conviction of the 
necessity of the protocol in particular, the succession of 
events between December 3 and December 24, and the instructions 
he received from the State Department have to be taken into 
account in explaining this change. 
To begin with, within his own definition of the term 
Dawson seems to have been sincere in his desire not to become 
251 
involved in the internal Dominican politics. However, he was 
anxious to see to it that there was a legal basis for inter-
vention to protect the operation of the modus vivendi. Moreover, 
he also considered the Morales faction to be the strongest 
supporters of the protocol and he did harbor doubts concerning 
the firmness with which the Horacistas would support the agree-
ment if they could find an alternative. But, it is to be noted 
that prior to sending the telegram of December 3, Dawson had 
been informed by the Horacista leaders of their willingness to 
quarantee the ratification of the protocol provided it was so 
amended to allow for congressional consultation on the question 
of requesting United States assistance under the agreement. 
From his statements concerning the Dominican politicians, it is 
equally clear that Dawson had little faith in the average Domini-
can politician putting the welfare of his ~ountry ahead of his 
partisan interests when the two clashed. Dawson himself, how-
ever, had become convinced that the only salvation for the 
Dominican Republic was to be found in the protocol. Therefore, 
in early December, it is not unlikely that he may have placed 
little faith in the Horacista promise and may have thought that 
once Morales was forced out there would be little certainty not 
only of continued support for the protocol, but also that the 
Horacistas would ask for assistance in maintaining the operation 
of the modus vivendi. Consequently, United States intervention 
might be necessary to protect the modus vivendi without the con-
sent of the Dominican Government, and it might serve to strengthen 
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the Morales faction if a complete break came. 
Between December 3 and December 24, several events 
occurred that may have c·aused him to change his mind. After 
I 
slnchez's exit from the Cabinet, the 1 office of Foreign Minister 
was filled by Emiliano Tejera, who had long been in favor of 
the agreement with the United States and had recently re-
affirmed his support of it. Therefore, by the end of December, 
it is probable that the Horacista pledge of continued support 
for the protocol appeared to have more substance. In contrast 
to this, Morales who had been firmly in back of the treaty, and 
as far as any one knew still was, had, by his flight, now found 
his chief support among the Jimenistas, who had been opposed to 
the treaty or at best accepted it with the greatest reluctance. 
Of course, it is possible that Jimenista opposition primarily 
came from identifying the treaty with the Government which they 
were trying to oust. But there is no way of being certain of 
this. Certainly Dawson, in spite of his conviction that any 
government would ultimately come around to the position of 
accepting the treaty as necessary, would have found it difficult 
to expect a Jimenista backed government, even with Morales at its 
head, to be favorable to the treaty. Therefore, after the 
flight of Morales on December 24 and the Jimenista uprising, 
the Horacista dominated Cabinet would seem to have offered the 
pest security for eventual implementation of the treaty and the 
continuance of the modus vivendi. 
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Furthermore, even if he could have counted on a Morales 
lead-Jimenista supported government to support the protocol and 
• I 
the modus vivendi, Dawson probably would have been discouraged 
from requesting authorization to intervene. During the excite-
ment of December 6, when it was thought that the United States 
was planning to land troops at Santo Domingo City, a violent 
anti-Yankee sentiment became apparent. In reporting the events 
of the sixth, Dawson attributed this sentiment to the mistaken 
belief that the marines were actually planning to land and inter-
vene in the quarrel between Morales and the Horacistas. He 
further noted that the reaction of the populace "also indicated 
that in their hearts this people dearly values its independence 
I 
and would sacrifice their lives in a struggle to preserve it 
even though they well know that such a struggle would be hope-
. less."lOl However, in the same report, he· also stated that he 
believed the intesity of the popular reaction resulted from 
circulation·of rumors among the lower classes that United States 
"occupation or annexation means their oppression, enslavement 
and even extermination," and that displays of anti-United States 
sentiment following December 6 had been confined to young men 
and "members of the lower classes. 11102 Certainly then, Dawson 
undoubtedly was aware of the presence of an anti-Yankee feeling 
among the people; but it would also appear that he may h~ve 
101 Dawson to Root, December 15, 1905, No. 197, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14. 
l02Ibid. 
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considered it of little importance since it was confined to 
socially unimportant individuals. Nevertheless, he was anxious 
to have a naval vessel c"iose by jus't in case it were needed to 
protect United States citizens in the capita1. 103 If he did 
underestimate public sentiment in early December, Dawson could 
not overlook its presence after Morales fled from the capital. 
By the twenty-seventh he had received word that United States 
citizens in the interior of the country were frightened that 
. 104 
they would be harmed if marines were landed. On the twenty-
' eighth, he wired the Secretary of State that the French charge 
d'affaires had offered to have a French war ship sent to aid in 
protecting the lives of foreigners, thus eliminating any danger 
I 
to them which might result from the landing of North American 
troops. 105 Therefore, fear of causing a popular uprising against 
United States citizens and their holdings in the Dominican 
Republic may have acted to discourage Dawson from considering 
military intervention. 
Even if this fear did not discourage him, the instruc-
tions he was receiving from the Secretary of State would have 
caused him to think twice before requesting permission to land 
marines. For his part, Secretary of State Root fully concurred 
lOJibid. 
104Dawson to Secretary of State, telegram received 
December 27, 1905, FRUS, 1905, p. 411. 
105Dawson to Secretary of State, telegram received 
December 29, 1905, ibid., p. 411. 
r 255 
'' with Dawson's concept of non-interference in the internal 
political affairs of the Dominican Republic: that is, not taking 
sides in the factionalism but urging both sides to be moderate 
i I 
and to compromise. In fact, as has been noted, Dawson's 
actions on this point were based on his instructions from the 
State Department. Nevertheless, Root made it clear that the 
United States would not insist on the continuation of the modus 
vivendi if the Dominicans did not want it continued, nor would 
the United States intervention, if necessary, go beyond pro-
tecting the lives and property of United States citizens.106 
When Root received Dawson's telegram containing the French offer 
to lend assistance lest United States intervention result in 
harm to foreigners in the Dominican Republic, the Secretary of 
State replied that the restrictions he had earlier placed on 
United States intervention--landing of troops only when neces-
sary to protect lives and property of United States citizens 
and to be confined to that task alone--were to be strictly ob-
served. "In that case," Root maintained, "there will be no land-
ing of troops under any such circumstances as to justify ap-
prehension of danger to [the) lives of foreigners. 11107 These 
instructions could leave little doubt that the State Department 
was not interested in intervening either to maintain the modus 
106secretary of State to Dawson, December 6, 1905, 
telegram, ibid., p. 408. 
107secretary of State to Dawson, December 29, 1905, 
telegram, ibid., p. 411. 
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vivendi against the Dominican Government's wishes or to support 
one of the factions in the Morales-Horacista dispute. 
• I 
Whatever the explanation for Dawson's change of mind 
concerning the effect of Morales' presence on the constitutionality 
of the Dominican Government, his principal objective seems to 
have remained the same: maintain a government in power that 
would continue to support the convention signed with the United 
States. Following the restoration of order in Janaury, the 
continuation of this policy can be seen in Dawson's preference 
I I 
of Caceres' retention of office as opposed to Vasquez's as-
cension to the presidency, and in his attempts to strengthen 
I · I 
the Caceres Government by trying to convince Vasquez that the 
I 
United States was truly neutral in matters of Dominican internal 
politics, and by urging of moderation upon the Government in 
dealing with its Jimenista opponents. In pursuing this course, 
Dawson was undoubtedly motivated by the conviction that the 
modus vivendi and the protocol of the treaty February 7# 1905, 
eliminated a vexing international problem brought about by the 
Dominican debt. But certainly his support of the treaty, with 
its sanction of United States interference in the financial 
affairs of the Dominican Republic, also came from his broader 
view that the treaty and the modus vivendi offered the Republic 
financial and political stability, and economic prosperity. 
r 
CHAPTER VIII 
MISSION COMPLETED: 
MAY, 1906 - MAY, 1907 
By February, 1906, although a year had passed since 
the representatives of the United States and the Dominican Repub-
lie had signed the protocol of the treaty, it had not yet been 
ratified by the United States Senate. Despite this delay, the 
Dominican Government, anxious to secure its ratification, ap-
parently still regarded the protocol as the solution to the 
Republic's international financial problems. In February, 1906, 
Foreign Minister Tejera asked Dawson what the United States 
would do if the convention were rejected by the Senate. While 
the Dominican Government was willing to continue devoting fifty-
five per cent of its revenues to the payment of its debts, 
Tejera feared that if the treaty were rejected, the European 
creditors would demand control of the ports which they had been 
guaranteed under the various protocols. At any rate, the Domi-
nican Government would be unable to hold its customhouses against 
either European intervention or revolutionary forces. Dawson 
refused, however, to discuss what position the United States 
would take in the event of senatorial rejection. He told 
Tejera that instructions would be sent from the Department of 
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state when the time required. 1 
Not all the members of the Horacista Party concurred 
with the Government's continued support of the convention. 
some argued that the treaty should be rejected. They used the 
success of the modus vivendi as proof that the Dominican Repub-
lie could make its own arrangement with its creditors for a 
settlement of the debts. In view of Tejera's statement that 
the Government would not be able to prevent either the European 
creditors or revolutionaries from seizing the customhouses, 
Dawson was probably correct in observing that those who argued 
thusly were insincere. He thought that if they were once re-
sponsible for the government, they would accept the protocol 
without question rather than face the certainty of being over-
thrown if it were rejected. 2 This argument also overlooked the 
fact that the modus vivendi itself constituted United States 
interference in the affairs of the Dominican Republic and that 
North American support for the agreement was what made it 
successful. 
Whatever the advantages of the modus vivendi, it was 
only a temporary expedient. Notwithstanding Dawson's optimistic 
report of July 1, 1905, on the beneficial effects of the modus 
vivendi, after having been in operation for a year, certain 
1Dawson to Root, February 15, 1906, No. 218; Dawson to 
Root, February 15, 1906, personal, Despatches from the Dominican 
Republic, vol. 15, roll 15. 
2Dawson to Root, April 19, 1906, No. 241, ibid. 
,. 
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defects in the arrangement were becoming apparent. In the first 
place, it was beginning to have an adverse effect on the Domini-
can economy. In his memorandum to President Roosevelt in July, 
1905, Dawson had reported that the peace the modus vivendi 
had brought to the Dominican Republic by denying the customhouses 
to the revolutionaries, and thereby discouraging revolutions, 
had led to an increase in production in the Republic. In July, 
1906, Dawson had an opportunity to make a fairly extensive tour 
of the Republic and from his observations and from the reports 
that he received, he was able to report that the economic 
improvement he had reported the previous year was continuing. 
Only in Monte Cristi did the economy remain stagnant. 3 
Nevertheless, it was also becoming apparent to Dawson 
that the modus vivendi was also having a slow, but still very 
present, enervating effect on the economy. The monthly removal 
from the country of fifty-five per cent of the revenues col-
lected in the customhouses, he reported, was beginning to hamper 
. 1 t' 4 commercia opera ions. He thought that it would not be un-
reasonable to suspect that a shortage of circulating currency 
would exist by September, 1906. 5 Dawson was particularly con-
cerned over the fact that this lack of currency might have a 
3oawson to Root, July 24, 1906, No. 269, ibid. 
4Dawson to Secretary of State, May 10, 1906, No. 247, 
FRUS, 1906, Part 1, p. 561. 
5Dawson to Root, July 24, 1906, No. 269, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 15, roll 15. 
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harmful effect on the small farmers. He saw a definite connection 
between the prosperity and the increase in this class and per-
manent peace in the country. In May, 1906, he expressed his 
view on this subject in a despatch to the Secretary of State. 
Dawson wrote: 
The longer I live in this country the more confident I 
am that the danger from the professional revolutionary class 
can be temporarily eliminated by keeping the customhouses 
out of their reach. But back of the danger from this class 
is the possibility of a revolution caused by sheer poverty. 
That is the real reason ~onte Cristi is such a dangerous 
Province, and the fall of Heureaux was due to his extrav-
agance, which led to his interfering with the currency and 
the consequent ruin of the small producer and laborer.6 
The possibility of a critical lack of currency and subsequent 
injury to the Dominican economy were factors, among others, 
which Dawson believed should be taken into consideration in 
formulating the State Department's attitude towards a Dominican 
law which appeared to alter the modus vivendi by authorizing 
the diversion of thirty per cent of the export duties for the 
construction by the Dominicans of a railroad line between the 
two inland cities of Santiago and Moca. 7 
A second defect in the modus vivendi was that no pro-
vision was made for the distribution of the funds placed in 
trust for the creditors. By the early spring of 1906, some of 
the foreign creditors appeared anxious to have the sum which 
6Dawson to the Secretary of State, May 10, 1906, No. 
247, PRUS, 1906, Part 1, p. 562. 
7Ibid., p. 561. 
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had accumulated in New York divided among themselves. 8 Ini-
tially, Dawson did not seem to favor any division prior to the 
ratification of the treaty. His position is explained both 
by the lack of any instructions from Washington and by what he 
considered to be the difficulty of determining what percentage 
each creditor would receive. 9 However, he slowly came around 
to believing that the continued presence of a large sum in New 
York actually served as temptation for potential revolutionaries 
to attempt to overthrow the Government in order to get hold of 
the money. In addition, he believed that an actual payment to 
the creditors would serve to convince those Dominican politicians 
who continued to oppose the treaty "that no backward step is 
practicable. 1110 By May 22, 1906, Dawson was writing the Sec-
retary of State, asking if the Department had considered per-
suading the creditors to reach a voluntary agreement with the 
Dominican Government over the division of the sum already held 
in New York. He thought that the Dominicans would agree to 
such an arrangement provided that the Italian creditors and the 
Improvement Company did not demand a division based on the 
yearly payments which they had been promised. 11 
8Dawson to Root, April 4, 1906, No. 239; Dawson to Root, 
April 18, 1906, No. 240, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, 
vol. 15, roll 15. 
9Dawson to Root, April 18, 1906, No. 240, ibid. 
10Dawson to Root, April 19, 1906, No. 241, ibid. 
11
oawson to Root, May 22, 1906, personal, ibid. 
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In fact, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance 
did attempt to reach a voluntary agreement with the creditors 
on the proportional division of the trust fund. 12 At the end 
of May, the Cabinet, encouraged by reports received from the 
Dominican Minister in Washington, decided to send Minister 
I Velasquez to Washington in order to consult with Secretary of 
State Root and Professor Hollander on the possibility of making 
some voluntary arrangement for the settlement or refunding of 
the debt. 13 When Vel~squez departed on June 9, he evidently 
had been instructed to secure some agreement which would allow 
for refunding and reduction of the debt, without submitting 
each debt to the investigation of a commission. 14 
In Washington, Secretary of State Root had apparently 
been thinking along lines similar to those which Dawson and 
the Dominican Government were following. His view of the prob-
lem, however, was somewhat larger. By achieving a voluntary 
adjustment of the debt through an agreement between the Domini-
can Government and the creditors, Root hoped to remove some 
of the objections which had been brought up in the Senate against 
the protocol. This would not end the need of a treaty because 
the debt adjustment would be contingent upon a convention by 
12Dawson to Secretary of State, June 9, 1906, No. 256, 
FRUS, 1906, Part 1, p. 563. 
13Ibid., p. 564. "Chronology of Political Events in 
Santo Domingo," FRUS, 1906, Part 1, p. 599. 
1411 Chronology of Political Events in Santo Domingo," 
FRUS, 1906, Part 1, p. 599. 
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which the United States would guarantee the servicing of the 
debt. The advantage lay in the fact that the United States 
would be relieved of the burden of supervising the adjustment 
of the debt. 15 
I During the summer of 1906, Velasquez and Hollander de-
vised a plan for the adjustment of the various debts and claims 
against the Republic. All were reduced, depending on their 
character, from ten to ninety per cent. 16 In addition, Vel~s-
quez and Hollander concluded negotiations with Kuhn, Loeb and 
Company of New York for the purchase of $20,000,000 worth of 
five per cent bonds at the rate of 96 per cent of their face 
value. The Morton Trust Company, also of New York, was to act 
as the fiscal agent of the Dominican Republic. The contract 
with Kuhn, Loeb and Company was contingent on the Dominican 
Republic and the United States entering into and ratifying, 
prior to April 1, 1907, a treaty whereby the United States 
would agree to supervise the collection of the Dominican cus-
toms during the life of the bond issue. Furthermore, creditors' 
acceptance of the debt adjustment was required. Upon the satis-
factory fulfillment of these provisions, the Kuhn, Loeb and 
Company would buy the bonds issued by the Dominican Government. 
15Root to Eollander, May 7, 1906; Root to William N. 
Cohen, June 18, 1906, Root Papers, part 2, Letter Books: 
February 16-0ctober 16, 1906, pp. 223, 358, Container 186. 
These letters are also quoted in Philip c. Jessup's biography 
of Elihu Root. Philip c. Jessup, Elihu Root, Vol. I (New 
York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1938), pp~ 546-47. 
16Munro, ~· cit., p. 119. 
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The money thus obtained would be deposited with the Morton Trust 
company, which would in turn pay off the various claimants 
and creditors. Concessions which had been granted by previous 
Governments would also be bought back. The remainder of the 
amount on deposit with the Trust Company would be used by the 
Dominican Government to defray the cost of issuing the bonds 
d f . t 1 . 17 an or in erna improvements. 
Secretary of State Root, who was touring Latin America 
after attending the opening sessions of the Pan-American Con-
ference held in Rio de Janeiro, found no objection with the 
agreement between the Dominican Government and Kuhn, Loeb and 
Company, but felt that an agreement with the creditors would 
help to produce a favorable impression on the Congress. 18 On 
September 27, Hollander left for Europe in order to secure the 
consent of the major European creditors to the plan which he 
I 19 
and Velasquez had formulated. By the last week of October, 
he had succeeded in obtaining his immediate objective: the 
consent of the Belgian and French creditors, and one of the 
1711The Republic of Santo Domingo and Kuhn, Loeb & Co.: 
Agreement for a Government Loan," (signed September 11, 1906); 
"An Agreement Between the Republic of Santo Domingo and the 
Morton Trust Company," (signed September 11, 1906), Numerical 
File 1199/1-2, Files of the Department of State, Record Group 
59, National Archives, Washington, D. c. (Hereafter numerical 
file references shall be cited merely as Numerical File with 
the appropriate file and document numbers.) 
18
unsigned telegram sent from Buenos Aires, August 21, 
1906, Numerical File 1199/ 1/9. 
19 Hollander to Adee, September 24, 1906, Numerical 
File 1199/3. 
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major Italian creditors. 20 This did not constitute all of' the 
European creditors and, in spite of the continued opposition of 
some, the State Department refused to consider altering the 
21 debt adjustment plan. 
The problem of dealing with the North American creditors 
was left to the Dominican Government's financial representatives 
in the United States, the Morton Trust Company and Messrs. 
Stetson, Jennings and Russell of New York. 22 The Improvement 
Company was opposed to the adjustment, but, again, the State 
Department offered little sympathy. 23 The domestic creditors 
/ 
of the Dominican Republic were to be handled by Velasquez, who 
returned home in late September. 24 
Since all of the negotiations prior to the first of 
October had taken place either in the United States or in Europe, 
Dawson did not have a part in them. / When Velasquez returned 
to Santo Domingo City at the end of September, Dawson conferred 
with him on the problem of getting the domestic creditors of 
the Republic to accept the debt adjustment plan. At that time, 
20Hollander to Root, telegrams, October 11, 1906, 
October 16, 1906, October 19, 1906, October 25, 1906, Numeri-
cal File 1199/4-6, 8. 
21 
. t 124 Munro,~·~., p. • 
22 Hollander to Adee, September 24, 1906, Numerical 
File 1199/3. 
23Munro, ~· cit., p. 124. 
24 Hollander to Adee, September 24, 1906, Numerical 
File 1199/3. 
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. 25 
neither of them foresaw any major problem from this quarter. 
About this time, an event occurred which could have had 
serious repercussions in the Dominican Republic. On September 
29, 1906, the United States intervened to assume control of the 
Cuban government under the Platt Amendment. This action could 
have had disastrous effects upon the Dominican public, which 
might have interpreted it as a mere preview of what lay in store 
for their republic. Consequently, Dawson closely observed 
Dominican reaction to the news coming from Cuba. The initial 
reaction of the Dominicans to the Cuban intervention, Dawson 
d f . d'ff 26 f h . d reporte , was one o in i erence. In act, e was surprise 
by "the lack of real sympathy among Dominicans for Cuba. 1127 He 
did not foresee any drastic change in the Dominican attitude, 
unless there were serious clashes between United States and 
Cuban forces. Even then, he did not think that the intervention 
would necessarily be interpreted as an attempt to destroy 
Cuban independence, or, by inference, as an indication of the 
ultimate fate of the Dominican Republic itself. 28 
In spite of these initial reports of Dominican indiffer-
ence towards events in Cuba, some politicians who opposed the 
United States' interference in Dominican affairs used it as a 
25 Dawson to Root, personal, October 2, 1906, Numeri-
cal File 27/75. 
26 Dawson to Root, October 2, 1906, No. 304, Numerical 
File 27/74. 
27 Dawson to Root, October 2, 1906, personal, Numerical 
File 27/75. 
28Ibid. 
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pretext to argue that the Dominican Republic would be deprived 
of its sovereignty. 29 The depth of this opposition is reflected 
in an article by Espaillat de la Mota, the congressional deputy 
from La Vega. To cope with United States intervention, he sug-
gested la doctrina del fosforo: distruction of North American 
properties and extended guerrilla warfare, thereby making it 
economically unfeasible for the United States to retain contro1. 30 
Arguments against the policy of United States involvement in 
Dominican financial affairs, however, had no more effect on the 
Government when they were connected with the Cuban intervention 
than prior to September, 1906. 
Since the question of debt adjustment appeared about to 
be settled without any apparent difficulty and since no other 
major problem was immediately foreseeable, it seemed opportune 
for Dawson to take a leave of absence. 31 It had been over a 
year since he had a vacation and, for sometime, he had been 
urging his superiors in the Department of State to grant him 
permission to return to the United States for much needed 
medical treatment. Almost nine years in the tropics had taken 
their toll on his health. Shortly after coming to the Dominican 
Republic, he developed tropical ulcers of the feet. After his 
29colton to Taft, October 26, 1906, confidential, 
Numerical File 27/126. 
30william H. Gale (U.S. consul at Puerto Plata) to 
Assistant Secretary of State Bacon, November 12, 1906, No. 10, 
enclosure: "La Doctrina Del Fosforo, 11 Listin Diario, October 13, 
1906, p. 2, Numerical File 27/130. 
31 Dawson to Root, October 2, 1906, personal, Numerical 
File 27/75. 
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return from the United States in the fall of 1905, he had found 
it difficult, if not impossible, to wear shoes, and merely 
using his feet produced such a reaction that he was frequently 
confined to bed for a few days at a time. The only cure for 
this ailment seemed to be an extended period in a cooler climate. 32 
Permission for a leave was finally granted and on October 16, 
Dawson left for the United States. 33 
Shortly after his arrival in Washington, Dawson was 
ordered back to Santo Domingo City. 34 Consequently his leave 
was cut short and he left the United States, arriving in the 
Dominican capital on Saturday, December 1, aboard a United 
States naval vessel which had been sent to bring him from San 
Juan, Puerto Rico. 35 It would seem that the principal objec-
tive of Dawson's sudden return to the Dominican Republic was 
to investigate the slow pace with which the domestic creditors 
32 Dawson to Bacon, September 3, 1906, personal, 
Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. 
33Dawson to Root, August 12, 1908, No. 141, Numerical 
File 2765/28. During Dawson's absence the United States Legation 
in Santo Domingo was left in charge of Rosswitte E. Pollock who 
was temporarily serving as clerk of the Legation. Pollock orig-
inally came to the Dominican Republic as a Weather Bureau Observer 
in the employment of the United States Department of Agriculture. 
When the clerk at the Legation resigned on August 15, 1906, Dawson 
asked Pollock to fill the position temporarily, since his own 
official duties with the Weather Bureau had been completed. Numer-
ical File 2078 passim. Dawson to Bacon, September 3, 1906, 
personal, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. 
34 oawson to Root, August 12, 1908, No. 141, Numerical 
File 2765/28. 
35Pollock to Secretary of State, December 10, 1906, 
Numerical File 27/151. Acting Secretary of the Navy to the 
u.s.s. Marietta stationed at Santo Domingo City, November 23, 
1906, telegram, Numerical File 27/147. 
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were accepting the debt adjustment scheme. There is some evidence 
that Hollander and the officials in Washington were becoming 
concerned over this matter. 36 During his brief stay of one 
week, Dawson, who interviewed several prominent creditors, 
concluded that the question of the domestic debt had virtually 
been settled. 37 In fact, on December 5, Dawson wired the Depart-
ment of State that the Dominican Government had issued a decree 
fixing the terms of non-foreign debts. 38 If Dawson and his 
superiors in Washington were convinced that there would be no 
further problem with the domestic creditors, they were mistaken. 
Dissatisfaction with the plan of debt settlement was still 
strong in Puerto Plata, 39 and shortly after Dawson left, opposi-
tion to the settlement developed in the Cibao. 40 However, by 
41 December 24, this opposition had apparently abated. 
Upon his return to the United States on December 18, 42 
36Hollander to Root, December 7, 1906, Numerical File 
1199/16. 
37colton to Secretary of War Taft, December 10, 1906, 
Numerical File 1199/31. 
38Dawson to Secretary of State, December 5, 1906, 
telegram, Numerical File 1199/15. 
39cornrnander w. F. Fullman, commanding officer of the 
u.s.s. Marietta stationed at San Pedro de Macoris, D.R., to 
Secretary of the Navy, December 26, 1906, Numerical File 27/158. 
40
colton to Taft, December 10, 1906, Numerical File 
1199/31. 
41vel~squez to Secretary of State, received December 24, 
1906, telegram, Numerical File 1199/29. 
42 oawson to Secretary of 
telegram, Numerical File 2765/2. 
1906, telegram, ibid. 
State, December 18, 1903 [sic], 
Bacon to Dawson, December 18, 
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oawson continued working on matters connected with the debt 
settlement. It would seem that his attention was primarily 
taken up with the case of the Vicini Claim which amounted to 
$1,500,000 and had been reduced fifty per cent by the debt set-
tlement. This claim was based on a much smaller loan which had 
been greatly inf lated as the result of an interest rate of two 
per cent a month. The original loan, made by an Italian subject, 
had been inherited by his Dominican wife and children, who 
had all been born in the Dominican Republic, and could thus be 
considered Dominican nationals. Nevertheless, since the original 
loan was contracted by an Italian national, Finance Minister 
I Velasquez had been reluctant to include this claim in the decree 
of early December, 1906, settling various domestic claims. 
Subsequently, the Vicini heirs refused to accept the reduction 
which the Dominican Government hoped to impose upon them; per-
haps in part this refusal was founded on the hope of support 
from the Italian Government. 43 Dawson consulted with Joubert, 
the Dominican Minister in Washington, concerning the Vicini 
claim, urging that he wire the Dominican Government to issue 
another decree including this claim and others which had been 
omitted from the earlier decree. 44 Since the debt adjustment 
matters had been handled through Hollander, Joubert was reluctant 
43Dawson's memorandum for Root, December 27, 1906, 
Numerical File 1199/32. 
44 Dawson's memorandum on Santo Domingo, January 10, 
1907, Numerical File 1199/39 1/2. 
r 
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to send the telegram, but advised that Hollander do so. 45 Hol-
lander was contacted and on January 11, the necessary telegram 
was sent. The supplementary decree fixing the remaining domes-
tic debts, whether the claimants had assented or not, was pub-
lished on Monday, January 14, 1907. 46 
In December, it was announced that Dawson had been 
I 47 transferred from the Dominican Republic to Bogota, Colombia. 
In spite of this announcement, there was still an important 
matter to attend to in the Dominican Republic. Although the 
question of the debt adjustment had proceeded reasonably well, 
there was still the problem of negotiating a new treaty, as 
provided for in the contract between the Dominican Government 
and Kuhn, Loeb and Company. This treaty was to establish 
United States collection of the custom revenues for the duration 
of the bonds. The officials in the State Department felt that 
it would be better to entrust the negotiating of the treaty to 
Dawson with his extensive knowledge of conditions in the Domi-
nican Republic, rather than to the newly appointed Minister, 
Fenton R. Mccreery, who was being promoted from the post of 
Secretary of the United States Embassy in Mexico City. 48 
45Ibid. 
46 Root to American Legation in Santo Domingo, January 11, 
1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/35b. Pollock to Sec~etary 
of State, January 12, 1907, Numerical File 1199/36. 
47Pollock to Root, December 26, 1906, No. 327, Numerical 
File 27/154. 
48 Root to Mccreery, January 17, 1907, telegram, Numeri-
cal File 3987/. 
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Therefore, sometime during the second week of January, 1907, 
oawson left the United States, arriving in the Dominican capi-
tal on January 23. 49 It would appear that he brought with him 
a draft treaty which was to serve as the basis for further 
t . . 50 nego iations. 
The telegrams exchanged between Dawson and Root during 
the negotiations and the form of the treaty finally adopted, 
indicate that Secretary of State Root hoped to obtain two major 
51 
objectives in the treaty which he entrusted to Dawson. 
First, and most important was the object of securing United 
States control over the collection of the Dominican custom 
revenues for the life of the bonds. Secondly, the Secretary 
of States:>ught to provide th~ United States Government with 
guarantees that it would both have adequate authority to see 
that funds would be available to pay off the debt contracted 
by the bond issue and that the burden of administering Domini-
can financial affairs would be as brief as possible. In order 
to assure these guarantees, the treaty provided that the Demi-
49 Dawson to Secretary of State, January 24, 1907, 
telegram, Numerical File 2765/4. 
SOThis statement is based on Dawson's telegram to the 
Secretary of State, on January 28, 1907 (Numerical File 1199/ 
48) in which Dawson refers to a draft treaty. The original 
copy of the draft treaty does not seem to have been filed in 
Numerical File 1199. However, it is quite clear from the 
telegrams exchanged between Dawson and the Department of 
State that the content of the draft treaty and the treaty 
finally signed on February 8, 1907 were similar and that the 
objectives of both were identical. 
51The ratified treaty appears in FRUS, 1907, Part 1, 
pp. 307-309. 
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nican debt would not be increased without the previous agreement 
of the United States. Nor would the Dominican Government be 
allowed to alter its tariff scale without United States consent. 
Moreover, the final clause of the first article provided that 
if the sum collected in one year by the custom's receiver ex-
ceeded $3,000,000, one half of the surplus would be devoted 
52 to a sinking fund to be used for the redemption of the bonds. 
For their part, the Dominicans seemed also to have two 
major objectives to obtain during the negotiations. In the 
first place, they were opposed to the necessity of gaining 
United States sanction for the alteration of their tariff 
schedules. The Dominican position on this point was prompted 
by three motives. While they did not mention it, they undoubted-
ly hoped to retain as much independence in the control of their 
financial affairs as was possible. There was also the fear 
that the United States might use the control over tariff revi-
sion for its own benefit. 53 Finally, to molify the Horacista 
members of Congress who opposed the treaty, the Dominican Govern-
ment thought it necessary to remove those phrases which blat-
antly indicated an infringment on Dominican sovereignty. 54 
52 Root to Dawson, February 2, 1907, telegram, Numeri-
cal File 1199/50. 
53Dawson to Secretary of State, February 1, 1907, 
telegram, Numerical File 1199/50. 
54 Dawson to Secretary of State, January 28, 1907, 
telegram, Numerical File 1199/48. Dawson to Secretary of State, 
February 6, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/55. Dawson to 
Secretary of State, February 1, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 
1199/50. 
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The second major objective of the Dominican negotiators was to 
provide as much money as possible for their Government's use. 
This point had also come up in the earlier negotiations for the 
protocols of January 21, 190S and February 7, 190S. In order 
to secure this objective, they were anxious to have some specific 
limitation placed upon the expense of the general receiver of 
customs, who would be appointed by the United States.SS Fur-
thermore, they sought to have the final clause of article one, 
which provided for the diversion of one half of the revenues in 
excess of $3,000,000 for a sinking fund, to be changed so that 
the revenues would have to be in excess of $4,000,000 before 
funds could be put into the sinking fund, and then only one 
third of the excess rather than one half would be diverted.s6 
Secretary of State Root was willing to concede to some 
of the Dominican wishes. Dawson was instructed to agree to 
modify the offensive phraseologys 7 and to include a clause 
limiting the expenses of the collector of customs.s 8 Neverthe-
less, the Secretary still insisted that the United States must 
SSDawson to Secretary of State, January 28, 1907, tele-
gram, Numerical File 1199/48. Dawson to Root, February 3, 1907, 
telegram, Numerical File 1199/Sl. 
SGDawson to Secretary of State, February 1, 1907, 
telegram, Numerical File 1199/SO. 
s 7 t . t' . s t . J Root o American Lega ion in an o Domingo, anuary 
29, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/48. 
SSibid. Root to Dawson, February 4, 1907, telegram, 
Numerical File 1199/Sl. 
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59 be consulted on, and agree to, any tariff change. Root 
argued that the United States did not gain any benefit from 
the treaty, that it was not reasonable to expect to administer 
a tariff for fifty years and not know what that tariff would 
be, and that this provision did not allow the United States 
to alter the Dominican tariff so as to favor North American 
trade. 60 The Secretary of State further refused to alter the 
clause concerning the diversion of funds in excess of $3,000,000 
for the sinking fund. He pointed out that this clause would 
enable the Dominican Government possibly to end the debt and 
thus the United States supervision in less than fifty years. 
This, he maintained, should indicate to the Dominicans that 
the United States did not intend to prolong or increase its 
interference. Moreover, Root noted that the Senate would not 
be too pleased with the length for which the United States 
bound itself under the treaty, and this clause would help per-
suade the senators that the term of service to the Dominican 
Republic would, in fact, be shorter. 61 
In spite of Root's insistence that the United States 
must approve any tariff change, President ciceres maintained 
59 t . . . s . Root o American Legation in anto Domingo, January 
29, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/50. 
60 . . . s . Root to American Legation in anto Domingo, January 
29, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/48. Root to Dawson, 
February 2, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/50. 
61Root to Dawson, February 2, _1907, telegram, Numerical 
File 1199/50. 
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that he could not secure congressional ratification of the 'treaty 
unless this provision was modified. In view of the Secretary 
of State's previous communications, Dawson evidently felt ob-
liged to halt the negotiations and ask for an official refusal 
f th . . G t 62 rom e Dominican overnmen • This, of course, would have 
led to the termination of the negotiations on the treaty and 
the subsequent failure of the loan agreement. It is doubtful 
that Dawson really hoped to place the Dominican Government in 
such dire straits. Probably what he wished to do was to pres-
sure C~ceres into a¢cepting the United States' position. 
Whatever Dawson's purpose, Root certainly was not ready 
to end the negotiations. On February 6, he instructed Dawson 
to use his discretion and, if necessary, exclude from the treaty 
the clause specifically requiring that the import duties not 
be altered "except by previous agreement with the President of 
the United States. 1163 Dawson, however, did not choose to avail 
himself of this permission to consent to the Dominican wishes. 
Instead, on February 8, he signed a treaty which still required 
"previous agreement with the President of the United States" 
for changing the Dominican tariff. The Dominican representa-
1 
tives, Foreign Minister Tejera and Finance Minister Velasquez, 
in addition to signing the form of the treaty which Dawson signed, 
62oawson to Secretary of State, February 6, 1907, 
telegram, Numerical File 1199/55. 
63 Root to Dawson, February 6, 1907, telegram, Numerical 
File 1199/50. 
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also signed another form which was closer to that permitted by 
Root on February 6. Dawson thought it unadvisable to agree to 
the alternate version without first consulting with Root; never-
theless, he agreed to explain the Dominican viewpoint to the 
Secretary of State. 64 
On February 9, Dawson left the Dominican capita165 and 
arrived in Washington with the signed treaties on February 19.66 
After consulting with Secretary of State Root, it was decided 
that the form of the treaty preferred by the Dominicans would 
be accepted by the United States. 67 The treaty was then sub-
mitted for senatorial ratification. In contrast to the difficult 
time that the protocol of February 7, 1905 experienced in the 
Senate, the new treaty was ratified by the twenty-fifth of the 
month. Only a minor verbal change, which did not alter the 
meaning of the document, was required by the Senate. 68 
64Dawson to Secretary of State, February 8, 1907, tele-
gram, Numerical File 1199/57. Tejera to Dawson, personal, 
February 7, 1907, Numerical File 1199/88. For the two versions 
of the treaty see: Pollock to Secretary of State, February 11, 
1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/59. 
65Pollock to Root, February 9, 1907, No. 336, Numerical 
File 27/178. 
66 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 19, 1907, 
telegram sent from New York City, Numerical File 2765/5. 
67 Root to American Legation in Santo Domingo, February 
20, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/59. Dawson to the 
Dominican Plenipotentiaries for the Dominican American Financial 
Convention (Tejera and Velasquez), February 20, 1907, Numerical 
File 1199/72-73. 
68Root to Dawson, February 27, 1907, unnumbered, Numeri-
cal File 1199/59. Dawson to Minister Exteriors (Dominican 
Republic), March 2, 1907, Numerical File 1199/7la. 
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It did not, however, appear as if ratification would 
be so smoothly achieved in the Dominican Republic. By mid-
February, the State Department began receiving distressing news 
from William H. Gale, the United States consul in Puerto Plata. 
Reporting that there was widespread opposition to the loan agree-
ment, Gale asserted that if the C~ceres Government pushed the 
new treaty through the Dominican Congress there would be an 
anti-Yankee revolution. He also informed Washington that the 
opposition was reflected in the Cabinet's determination to force 
. I I President Caceres to dismiss Finance Minister Velasquez for 
the latter's part in negotiating the loan agreement. Twelve 
provincial governors had also supposedly come out in opposition 
to the loan. Gale maintained that although Dawson questioned 
both the sincerity of the opposition to the loan and the possi-
bility of a revolution over this matter, opposition was quite 
69 
real and deep and a revolution very probable. 
Apparently, as a result of Gale's dire reports, it was 
decided to return Dawson to the Dominican Republic, to report 
I 
on the situation and lend whatever aid he could to the Caceres 
Government in its efforts to get the treaty ratified by the 
Dominican Congress. Arriving back in the Dominican Republic 
on March 9, Dawson immediately wired the Department of State 
that conditions were not as bad as Consul Gale had indicated. 70 
69Gale to Secretary of State, February 16, 1907, tele-
gram, Numerical File 1199/61. Gale to Root, February 16, 1907, 
unnumbered, Numerical File 1199/74. 
70Dawson to Secretary of State, March 9, 1907, telegram, 
Numerical File 2765/7. 
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BY that time, word had already been received in Washington that 
the Dominican Government was united in its intention to secure 
ratification of the treaty. 71 Dawson's subsequent investigations 
indicated that neither the division within the Cabinet nor 
opposition on the part of the provincial governors, which Gale 
d d . t d 72 ha reporte , exis e • By March 25, Dawson could wire Root 
that the Dominican Government was assured of the support of the 
two-thirds of the congressmen necessary for the ratification 
of the treaty, and that the treaty would be submitted in early 
April, following the recess for Holy Week. 73 That Dawson's 
evaluation of the situation was basically correct is corro-
borated in Colonel Colton's reports to the Bureau of Insular 
Affairs and to Secretary of War Taft. However, Colton's re-
ports do indicate that a split in the Government was rumored 
and that there was opposition to the debt adjustment and loan 
contract. The latter was based to a large extent on partisan 
I 14 dislike of Velasquez. 
On April 5, the treaty was presented to the Dominican 
71Bacon to American Legation in Havana, March 4, 1907, 
telegram, Numerical File 1199/75.77. 
72Dawson to Root, March 31, 1907, No. 342, Numerical 
File 1199/104. Dawson to Root, March 13, 1907, unnumbered, 
Numerical File 1199/104. 
73oawson to Secretary of State, March 25, 1907, tele-
gram, Numerical File 1199/102. 
74colton to Taft, March 
112. Colton to Edwards (Bureau 
1907, Numerical File 1199/109. 
Numerical File 1199/122. 
12, 1907, Numerical File 1199/ 
of Insular Affairs), March 19, 
Colton to Taft, April 4, 1907, 
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congress, whereupon it was referred to a committee for considera-
tion. 75 In the meantime, William L. Bass, a United States 
citizen and proprietor of the sugar estate "Consuelo" in San 
I 
Pedro de Macoris, circulated in the Dominican Republic copies 
of a letter he had received from Senator Weldon B. Heyburn of 
Idaho. In this letter the Senator stated that he supported 
the treaty because it was the first step toward eventual annexa-
tion of the Caribbean republic. Since this was precisely the 
argument which the opponents of the treaty were using, the 
revelation that a United States senator thought along these 
1 . d'd 'd h · · · h · · 76 ines i provi e t e opposition wit ammunition. Weakening 
the chances of the ratification of the treaty was exactly 
what Bass had in mind when he circulated Senator Heyburn's 
letter. Bass was himself opposed to the treaty. In part, this 
opposition probably resulted because the treaty would tend to 
assure the incumbent Government's continued existence. Bass, 
who had difficulty with the Government over the payment of a 
production tax on his sugar consequently had allied himself 
with the Jimenista opponents of the current regime. Deluging 
the Department of State with letters opposing the treaty, Bass 
even submitted a resolution to the State Department which he 
suggested be approved as a joint resolution by Congress. This 
75 Dawson to Secretary of State, April 5, 1907, tele-
gram, Numerical File 1199/115. Dawson to Root, April 23, 1907, 
No. 361, Numerical File 1199/143. 
76
colton to Taft, April 4, 1907, Numerical File 1199/122. 
Dawson to Root, April 2, 1907, personal, Numerical File 1199/272-
273. 
r 
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resolution called for the President to be authorized to inter-
vene in the Dominican Republic, with armed force if necessary, 
to assure stability and order. Once the resolution were passed, 
according to Bass's plan, the United States would convene an 
assembly consisting of representatives, not only of the Govern-
ment in control of the republic, but also those opponents of 
the regime who were in exile. The assembly would then work out 
the details of this "friendly intervention." Thereupon, the 
United States would intervene in either a forcible or friendly 
manner, with force "if necessary to handle any intractable 
element which happened to be in control, and in a friendly 
manner" to assist "the many who, while desiring peace in the 
country, have no opportunity afforded them to help bring it 
about," because of their exile or imprisonment. The intent 
of Bass's plan was clearly to lend aid to the Jimenista oppo-
nents of the C'ceres Government in their attempt to displace 
't 77 l. • 
Dawson made every possible effort to mitigate the 
, 
effect that the Heyburn-Bass letter might have on the Caceres 
Government. He pointed out to Foreign Minister Tejera that al-
though Senator Heyburn had introduced a resolution for the 
annexation of the Dominican Republic in December, 1905, this 
77Root to Senator Joseph B. Foraker, January 15, 1907, 
Numerical File 1927/la. Bass's letters opposing the treaty were 
so numerous and his involvement in Dominican affairs so extensive 
that the Department of State establisned a file particularly 
for him, Numerical File 1927. 
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78 
resolution had never received any support. In early March, 
secretary of State Root decided that the Dominican Government 
should confidentially be informed of the plans that Bass was 
attempting to promote, and had forwarded the documents to Dawson. 
These arrived just at the time the Heyburn-Bass letter became 
79 known. During his interview with Foreign Minister Tejera, 
Dawson also exhibited these documents. It was thus clear to 
the members of the Government that Bass's real objective was 
to plot their overthrow, and that the Heyburn letter was merely 
an attempt to strengthen the opposition. If any thing, the 
effect was to unify the Cabinet further. Hoping to publicize 
Bass's true intentions, Tejera asked permission to publish 
the proposed joint resolution. Although Dawson had been 
instructed to show this resolution confidentially to the Domini-
can Government, he decided that under the circumstances, it 
would be wise to allow its publication, provided no mention 
was given of how the Dominican Government received it. 80 Dawson 
also submitted to the Government for publication a copy of a 
New York Tribune editorial which had been sent to him by the 
State Department and which noted that Heyburn's annexationist 
plans reflected neither public nor official governmental opinion 
78Dawson to Root, April 2, 1907, personal, Numerical 
File 1199/272-273. 
79 Root to Dawson, March 5, 1907, Numerical File 1927/4a. 
80 Dawson to Root, April 2, 1907, personal, Numerical 
File 1199/272-273. 
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in the United States. 81 
The circulation of the Heyburn-Bass letter did result 
in pressure being exerted on the members of Congress by those 
Horacistas who opposed the treaty. 82 Nevertheless, the Presi-
dent had received sufficient pledges of support from congress-
men and he insisted that these be fulfilled. 83 The Congres-
sional committee, which had been entrusted with studying the 
treaty, by a vote of two to one, finally submitted a favorable 
report on April 22, 1907. 84 
One of the majority members of the committee included 
in his report a recommendation that at the time of ratification 
Congress attach explanatory statements to the treaty in order 
to remove any ambiguity. 85 These explanations consisted of 
three major clarifications. First, those officials to be ap-
pointed by the president of the United States to collect the 
Dominican customs were not to include those employees who by 
Dominican law were to be appointed by the president of the 
81Bacon 
File 1199/117. 
telegram, ibid. 
to Dawson, April 5, 1907, telegram, Numerical 
Dawson to Secretary of State, April 12, 1907, 
82 Dawson to Root, April 15, 1907, personal, Numerical 
File 1199/131. 
83Dawson to Secretary of State, April 23, 1907, tele-
gram, Numerical File 1199/130. 
84Dawson to Secretary of State, April 22, 1907, tele-
gram, Numerical File 1199/127. 
85oawson to Secretary of State, April 23, 1907, No. 
361, Numerical File 1199/143. 
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Republic. Second, the United States would intervene to protect 
the general receiver and his staff only when the Dominican 
Government was unable to do so. Finally, the needed tariff 
reform was to go through as soon as the Dominican Government 
could demonstrate that the custom revenues had exceeded 
86 $2,000,000 for the two proceeding years. Though these explana-
tory statements did not alter the sense or meaning of the 
treaty, Dawson, in wiring the Department of State, referred to 
them as "amendments, 1187 and strictly speaking, if they were to 
be attached to the treaty, they might be considered amendments. 
Dawson's telegram led Root to wire back that it was not neces-
sary to bother to telegraph the amendments as the negotiations 
had reached a point where they must end. The treaty had to 
be accepted as the Senate had approved it and no amendments 
could be considered. 88 
By a vote of seventeen to four with three abstentions, 
the Dominican Congress ratified the treaty on May 3, 1907, and 
adopted the explanatory statements. 89 However, many of the 
861bid. Emilio c. Joubert to the Secretary of State 
(Root), May 24, 1907, enclosure 1, FRUS, 1907, Part 1, pp. 310-311. 
87Dawson to Secretary of State, April 22, 1907, tele-
gram, Numerical File 1199/127. Dawson to Secretary of State, 
April 23, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/130. 
88Root to Dawson, April 24, 1907, telegram, Numerical 
File 1199/130. 
89 Dawson to Secretary of State, May 4, 1907, telegram, 
Numerical File 1199/141. Mccreery to .Root, May 8, 1907, tele-
gram, Numerical File 1199/146. 
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congressmen were opposed to the treaty and apparently voted 
/ for ratification only under pressure from President Caceres. 
At one time ciceres had reached the point where he was ready 
to suspend the provision of the Constitution which forbade 
presidential dissolution of congress, in order that he might 
have a new congress elected. Only with difficulty were Dawson 
and Foreign Minister Tejera able to dissuade Caceres from this 
90 dangerous course. 
Root finally decided that the United States could 
accept the explanatory statements, since they were nothing 
more than "a matter of construction" and agreed with that which 
the United States placed on the treaty. However, these state-
ments could not be included with the treaty since this would 
be tantamount to the President accepting an instrument different 
from the one approved by the Senate. 91 It was finally agreed 
that the explanatory statements would be accepted by a mere 
exchange of diplomatic notes. 92 On July 8, 1907, ratifications 
were exchanged in Washington, and on July 25, President Roosevelt 
issued a proclamation declaring the Dominican-United States 
treaty to be in effect. 93 
90Dawson to Root, May 18, 1907, Numerical File, 1199/169. 
91Root to Mccreery, May 9, 1907, telegram, Numerical 
File 1199/146. 
92 Root to Mccreery, May 24, 1907, No. 8, Numerical File 
1199/170-172. The Dominican Minister (Joubert) to Secretary of 
State (Root), May 24, 1907; Secretary of State (Root) to Domini-
can Minister (Joubert), May 24, 1907, FRUS, 1907, Part l,pp.310-12. 
9311 By the President of the United States of America. A 
Proclamation, 11 FRUS, 1907, Part 1, pp. 307-310. 
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The failure of the Dominican Congress to ratify the 
treaty by April 1, 1907, and subsequent delays in ratifying 
the loan agreement, coupled with the financial panic of 1907, 
caused the New York bankers to withdraw the original rather 
liberal agreement. Consequently, a new loan contract had to 
be negotiated. 94 But this matter was not to concern Dawson. 
His task ended with the ratification of the convention of 
February 8, 1907, by the Dominican Congress. 
Dawson's part in handling the negotiations which 
occurred during his last year in the Dominican Republic was 
much less than in previous years. In part, this is explained 
by the fact that the negotiations for the debt adjustment and 
loan contract were conducted in Washington rather than in 
Santo Domingo City. But it is also true that Dawson had no 
. part in conceiving or formulating the idea of a voluntary debt 
adjustment between the Dominican Government and its creditors. 
His suggestion to the Department of State that the Dominican 
Government and its creditors come to some voluntary agreement 
concerning the distribution of the trust fund held under the 
modus vivendi came out of his desire to see the removal of a 
possible attraction for potential revolutionaries and to demon-
strate that there would be no backing out of the basic plan of 
United States assistance in solving Dominican financial problems. 
Moreover, by the time Secretary Root received Dawson's suggestion, 
94Munro, ~· cit., pp. 121-122. Jessup, op. cit., I, 
550. 
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the Secretary had already grasped the possibility of a voluntary 
agreement between the Dominican Government and its creditors 
in a broader scope, that is, as the ultimate answer to sena-
torial objections to the protocol of February 7, 1905. This 
does not mean that Dawson was slow in perceiving the advantages 
of a voluntary agreement. His duty was to implement the policy 
which had been established and, to achieve that end, his duty 
was to advise on what measures would maintain a stable situation 
in the Dominican Republic. Guiding the signed protocol of 
the treaty through the Senate or formulating a new policy were 
the duties of the Secretary of State. 
Dawson's part in negotiating the convention of February 
8, 1907 is also less conspicious than in the earlier negotia-
tions. In part, this can be attributed to the fact that many 
of the major points over which contention could have developed 
had already been smoothed out. In the one place where he could 
have used his initiative and have accepted the modified version 
of the article concerning United States approval of the Domini-
can tariff revision, he failed to do so. The only reason he 
gave for his action on this point was that he thought it inad-
visable to agree to the Dominican version before discussing it 
with Root. This might indicate that Dawson personally felt 
that the clause did not give the United States adequate control 
of the tariffs and, since he had the stronger version signed, it 
was better not to accept the weaker without the Secretary's 
approval. Nevertheless, he promised to present the Dominican 
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viewpoint in Washington, and ultimately, this viewpoint was 
apparently accepted. 
If Dawson's part in formulating the new policy and in 
negotiating the new treaty were minimal, what then was his 
significance? To answer this question, one only has to look 
at his travel record for the period between October 16, 1906 
and May 21, 1907. In spite of the fact that it had been a 
year since he had had a leave of absence, and in spite of the 
fact that he was in poor health, during that period he made 
three round trips between the Dominican capital and Washington 
before finally returning to the United States in May, 1907. 
Dawson's presence was necessary to secure the implementation 
of the new policy. When the Dominican Government was going too 
slowly or ran into problems in getting the debt adjustment 
scheme accepted by the domestic creditors and claimants, Dawson 
was sent down to lend his assistance. Although he had already 
been officially assigned to Colombia, his experience made him 
indispensable in negotiating the treaty of February 8, 1907 
and back he went to Santo Domingo. When it appeared that the 
treaty and loan agreement would encounter opposition in the 
Republic, he was again sent back. Certainly, the fact that 
the Dominican Government trusted him aided in resolving any 
doubts they may have had when the Heyburn-Bass letter gained 
notoriety. Furthermore, Dawson's beneficial influence over 
President ca'ceres can be seen in his and Tejera's efforts to 
dissuade the President from resorting to unconstitutional means 
to get the treaty ratified by the Dominican legislature. 
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In 
short, his contribution to the successful ratification of the 
February 8, 1907 convention was extensive. 
In addition to his contribution to the ratification of 
the treaty, the last year that he spent in the Dominican Republic 
is also significant in that it demonstrates his changing atti-
tude towards the problem of enedmic revolution which confronted 
the country. Originally Dawson thought that the major problems 
of the Dominican Republic, fiscal insolvency and revolution, 
could be solved by implementing a plan which would secure the 
customhouses for the Government and set aside a portion of 
the custom revenues for the payment of the creditors. It 
eventually became apparent to him, however, that the modus 
vivendi was a mixed blessing, and that in the long run, peace 
and a stable government depended on more than preventing the 
customhouses from falling into the hands of revolutionaries. 
He finally concluded that these goals also depended on main-
taining the well being of the small farmers and laborers. 
Although Dawson may have been slow in realizing the ill effects 
of the modus vivendi, that he did realize them attests to his 
ability to learn from his observations. Moreover, his evalua-
tion of the underlying causes of the revolutionary instability 
of the Republic demonstrates his deepening understanding of 
politico-economic problems of the country. 
It is understandable that, once United States control 
over Dominican finances had been established and the financial 
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problems besetting the Republic apparently solved, Dawson should 
take some satisfaction in having completed his mission. Writing 
to his friend Charles Dawes in June, 1907, Dawson noted that he 
i 
wanted to have a long talk with Dawes about the struggles of 
the past three years. "I pulled it off fin ally," he wrote, "but 
the chances were against me at nearly every stage. 1195 
Dominican reaction to Dawson and his achievements was 
undoubtedly mixed. Among those who accepted United States in-
terference in the financial affairs of the Republic and those 
who benefited from the moral support lent by the United States 
navy, it is not unlikely that he was considered a friend. In 
late December, 1906, R. E. Pollock, who had been left in charge 
of the Legation during Dawson's absence, informed the State 
Department that news of Dawson's transfer and promotion to the 
United States Legation in Colombia had produced expressions of 
regret among his many friends in Santo Domingo. Pollock went 
on to state that Dawson was "regarded as a just and honorable 
statesman, a wise Diplomat [sic] and a good friend. 1196 President 
I Caceres reiterated this sentiment at the formal reception of 
the new United States Minister, Fenton Mccreery. Referring to 
Dawson, the President noted: "Vuestro antecesor. . . ha sido 
un buen amigo de la Republica Dominicana y ha dejado recuerdos 
95 Dawson to Dawes, June 6, 1907, Dawes Collection, Name 
File, 1906-1914, Dawson-Pai, Thomas A. [sic] Dawson Folder. 
96Pollock to Root, December 26, 1906, No. 327, Numeri-
cal File 27/154. 
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que le hara"n grato en todo tiempo. 1197 In view of Dawson's 
continually cordial relations with and unflaging support of the 
Government, it is probable that this statement was motivated 
bY more than mere convention. 
Among those who did not approve of United States inter-
ference in the financial affairs of the Dominican Republic, it 
is doubtful that Dawson's transfer was greeted with much sorrow. 
Deputy G. Alfredo Morales, the dissenting member of the legis-
lative committee which had been entrusted with studying and 
reporting on the treaty of February 8, 1907, had submitted a 
minority report to the Dominican Congress. In his report, 
Morales argued that the treaty violated Dominican sovereignty 
and was unconstitutional. Using Senator Heyburn's letter to 
Bass as evidence, he maintained that the real objective of the 
treaty was the annexation of the Dominican Republic by the 
United States. To Deputy Morales, Dawson was a mere instrument 
of the North American imperialists. The Minister, according 
to Morales, had completed his assigned task with more adroitness 
and polish than had earlier annexationists. Nevertheless, even 
Dawson, the Deputy contended, could not hide his Yankee con-
tempt for "Dominicans as well as all those of the Spanish race. 1198 
97McCreery to Root, May 18, 1907, No. 5, enclosure: 
President Caceres' speech, Numerical File 3987/15. 
98 Mccreery to Root, July 22, 1908, No. 111, enclosures: 
translations of clippings from the Gaceta Official, June 26, 
July 10, 13, 27, 31, August 3, 7, 10, 14, 21, 24, 28, 1907, 
Numerical File 1199/400-401. 
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To prove this point, Morales observed that at times Dawson had 
appeared in the Government Palace in slippers, with his trousers 
turned up, and without a neck tie. 99 
Doubtless, Morales chose to interpret Dawson's casual 
appearance, necessitated by ulcerated feet, as an insult to 
the Dominican Government. How seriously Morales himself con-
sidered this argument might be debated, and certainly the 
charge that Dawson sought annexation of the Dominican Republic 
is unfounded. Nevertheless, Morales' speech does indicate 
that Dawson incurred the enmity of some Dominicans. Since he 
had been so intimately connected with the various agreements 
signed between January, 1905 and February, 1907, it is not 
surprising that, in the minds of some, dislike of the United 
States-Dominican treaty of February 8, 1907 was coupled with 
dislike of the Minister who had had such a large part in nego-
tiating it. 
If those opposed to the treaty of February, 1907, mis-
interpreted Dawson's motives and actions, it is also to be noted 
that Dawson himself never seemed to appreciate fully or to 
credit seriously the Dominican national sentiment that opposed 
United States interference. In reporting on the disturbances 
which occurred in the Dominican capital on December 6, 1905, in 
reaction to the transfer of marines from the Olympia and the 
Des Moines to the Scorpion, Dawson attributed the anti-United 
States sentiment evident at that time to the mistaken belief 
99 Ibid. 
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that the United States troops were actually planning to land 
and intervene in the quarrel between President Morales and the 
aoracistas. He further noted that the reaction of the populace 
"also indicated that in their hearts this people dearly values 
its independence and would sacrifice their lives in a struggle 
to preserve it even though they well know that such a struggle 
100 
would be hopeless." However, in the same report he also 
stated that he believed the intensity of the popular reaction 
resulted from circulation of rumors among the lower classes 
that the United States "occupation or annexation means their 
oppression, enslavement and even extermination," and that dis-
plays of anti-North American sentiment immediately following 
December 6, 1905, had been confined to young men and "members 
101 
of the lower classes." Again, in writing to Secretary of 
State Root in early April, 1907, Dawson reported that among the 
"well-informed" opponents of the February 8, 1907 treaty there 
was little fear that the United States intended to annex the 
Republic. However, he maintained that among the illiterate 
segment of the populace this remained a real fear. He informed 
Root that: 
The negros [sic] here believe that the Yankee whites would 
lynch, abuse and reduce them to servitude and want to come 
here for that purpose. What the Convention really is they 
don't know and they are inclined to believe when they are 
told that it provided for annexation or is a flimsy piece of 
trickery having the same object in view. The existence of 
100 Dawson to Root, December 15, 1905, No. 197, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, ·roll 14. 
lOlibid. 
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such a sentiment has been the cause of nine-tenths of the 
anxiety and tight places I have been in during the last 
three years. Sometimes it lies dormant but it is always 
there reag¥ to be realized by some unforeseeable circum-
stances .1 
While it is probably true that the lower classes might easily 
be swayed to oppose the intervention of the United States as 
the result of reports of what might happen to them at the hands 
of the Yankees, that Dawson appears to have placed so much 
stress on this factor for causing actual or potential opposi-
tion to the intervention, would seem to indicate that he could 
not grasp the possibility of a sincere opposition based on 
nationalistic and patriotic sentiments. 
The nine years Dawson had spent in the diplomatic ser-
vice had provided him with considerable experience, and there 
would seem to be little doubt that he had decided to remain in 
the profession. During the time spent in Santo Domingo City, 
Dawson seems to have made no mention of possibly resigning to 
seek his fame and fortune elsewhere. To the contrary, in a 
letter to Assistant Secretary of State Robert Bacon in Septem-
ber, 1906, Dawson wrote, "I love the diplomatic profession and 
hope that with my increasing experience in it I shall yet be 
able to do some good work. 11103 
There were, however, problems which made his service in 
the Dominican Republic at times personally unpleasant and difficult. 
102 Dawson to Root, April 2, 1907, personal, Numerical 
File 1199/272-273. 
103 Dawson to Bacon, September 3, 1906, Dawson's Appli-
cation and Recommendation File. 
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perhaps the biggest problem was his health. As has already 
been mentioned, the long periods in the tropics had weakened 
his health. In November, 1904, ulcers developed on his feet. 
In the tropical heat the condition progressively grew worse, 
frequently forcing him to interrupt his work. By 1906, he was 
badly in need of a rest in a cool climate. However, it was 
decided that conditions in the Dominican Republic necessitated 
his continuance at his post throughout the summer and early 
fal1. 104 It was not until May, 1907, that he was able to return 
to the United States and take a much needed rest. The result 
of this continuous work was a worsening of his physical condi-
tion. In a letter to Secretary Root, in mid-April, 1907, 
Dawson wrote that he previously thought that his troubles had 
been confined to his feet and stomach, b~t his physican re-
cently had told him that he also had "symptoms of cerebral 
exhaustion. 11105 Nevertheless, Dawson felt confident that a 
few weeks in a cooler climate would cure him of these problems, 
and apparently it did. 106 
Dawson's work load, of course, was very demanding. In 
view of the pending protocols and the modus vivendi, it was 
l04Ibid. 
105Dawson to Root, April 15, 1907, personal, Numerical 
File 1199/131. 
106
oawson to Dawes, July 20, 1907, Dawes Collection, 
Name File, 1906-1914, Dawson-Fai, Thomas A. [sic] Dawson Folder. 
In this letter, Dawson reported that his doctors had told him 
that he had been "close to neurasthenia." 
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necessary for him to keep informed on all political developments 
within the Republic and to confer almost daily with the principal 
members of the Government, the Receiver of Customs, the commanders 
of the United States naval vessels stationed off the Dominican 
coast, and with the other foreign diplomats assigned to the 
Dominican capital. Periodic trips to the provincial capitals 
were also necessary. 107 In addition to his duties as resident 
minister, Dawson also was consul-general and, consequently, 
responsible for the general supervision of the United States 
consular matters in the Dominican Republic. Since no provision 
was made for a secretary of legation, virtually all of the work 
of the Legation fell upon his shoulders. He was forced to do 
all his own translating and typing. Funds were available for 
one clerk who served in both the Consulate-General and the 
Legation. This arrangement proved to be both insufficient 
and inefficient. The excessive work load, Dawson felt, af-
fected the quality of his work and his effectiveness as a diplo-
mat. In a despatch to the Secretary of State in late April, 
1907, urging appropriation of funds for sufficient clerical 
staff in both the Legation and the Consulate-General, Dawson 
noted that as a result of the demands on his time he had not 
had the necessary time and energy for important negotiations, 
or to maintain adequate personal contacts. Furthermore, he 
reported that frequently he had to act without due consideration 
107oawson to Root, September 25, 1905, No. 165, 
enclosure: Memorandum, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, 
vol. 14, roll 14. 
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on routine but important matters. These arrangements had also 
prevented him from preparing the consular reports required of 
him as Consul-General, and had impared his health. 108 
The Department of State was not indifferent and did 
endeavor to improve the situation. The contingency fund and 
the allowance for the hiring of clerks was increased. 109 
Moreover, in 1906, the Department was able to obtain an appro-
priation for a secretary of legation for the Dominican mission. 110 
Nevertheless, the arrival of the secretary and the hiring of 
the necessary clerical staff had not yet occurred when Dawson 
left Santo Domingo in May, 1907. 111 
Another hinderance to the efficient performance of his 
duties, Dawson informed the Dep~rtment of State, was an insuf-
ficient salary. The statutory yearly salary provided for 
the resident minister and consul-general in the Dominican Re-
public was $5,000. In addition to this, Dawson received approxi-
mately another $1,400 yearly, derived from consular and notarial 
fees, 112 and it is not unlikely that he was able to keep his 
108Dawson to Root, April 30, 1907, No. 362, Numerical 
File 2502/3. 
l0 9Ibid. 
llOAdee to Dawson, July 5, 1906, No. 118, Diplomatic 
Instructions, Santo Domingo, vol. 1, roll 98, p. 118. 
111Dawson to Root, April 30, 1907, No. 362; Mccreery to 
Root, June 8, 1907, No. 13, Numerical File, 2502/3-4. 
112 Dawson to Root, July 23, 1906, No. 268, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 15, roll 15. 
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'th' th' l' · 113 h 1 h · · d. expenses wi in is imit. Nevert e ess, e maintaine 
that the meagerness of his salary compelled him and his family 
to live "in a way not becoming a representative of the United 
states" and prevented him from maintaining "those social rela-
tions which in a Latin-American country add so much to his 
[ h t t • I ] 1 • fl d ff• • H 114 t e represen a ive s rea in uence an e iciency. 
In view of the high cost of living in the Dominican Republic, 
the constant need of protection by North American interests 
there, the extensive commercial relations and the importance 
of the political relations between the two countries, and in 
general, the amount of work handled by the Legation and Con-
sulate-General, Dawson recommended that the salary should be 
increased to that appropriated for an equal post in Venezuela, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, or Guatemala. 115 The State Department, 
following Dawson's recommendation, did include an increase to 
$10,000 for the salary of the resident minister and consul-
116 general in the budget for the fiscal year 1908. Again, 
this did not go into effect until after Dawson's transfer to 
Colombia. 
113Dawson to Root, September 25, 1905, No. 165, enclo-
sure: memorandum, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 
14, roll 14. Dawson to Root, July 23, 1906, No. 268, Despatches 
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 15, roll 15. 
114 Dawson to Root, September 25, 1905, No. 165, Des-
patches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14. 
115Ibid. 
116Bacon to Dawson, November 20, 1906, No. 150, Numer-
ical File 2502/. 
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Despite his pressing schedule and poor health, Dawson 
seems to have found some time and energy to devote to the study 
of the historical development of the Dominican Republic. His 
investigations were not, however, for mere personal satisfaction. 
In 1906, he submitted two lengthy memoranda to the Department 
of State to aid in further negotiations. The first consisted 
of a chronology of political events in the Dominican Republic 
from February 27, 1844 to September 30, 1906. 117 The other 
dealt with the history of the Dominican-Haitian boundary dis-
118 pute. The depth and value of these documents were fully 
appreciated by his superiors in Washington. 119 
In November, 1904, Dawson agreed to undertake a more 
ambitious historical study. He agreed to co-author a biography 
of President William McKinley with Charles G. Dawes. Their 
work was to be part of the American Statesmen series published 
120 by Houghton Mifflin and Company. The book, according to 
Dawson's outline, was to be based on sound historical research. 
117Dawson to Secretary of State, October 18, 1906, No. 
309, enclosure: Chronology of Political Events in Santo Domingo, 
FRUS, 1906, Part 1, pp. 572-600. 
118Dawson to Secretary of State, June 16, 1906, No. 261, 
enclosure: Memorandum on the Boundary Question Between Haiti 
and Santo Domingo, ibid., pp. 600-08. 
119Acting Secretary of State to Dawson, July 11, 1906, 
No. 120; Acting Secretary of State to Pollock, October 31, 1906, 
unnumbered, ibid., pp. 600-608. 
120 . 11 . Dawes to Dawson, September 29, 1904, Dawes Co ection, 
Letter Press Books, August 19, 1904 to November 16, 1904, p. 
235. Dawson to Dawes, November 3, 1904, Dawes Collection, July-
December, 1904, File D. 
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He proposed that he and Dawes check the secondary literature, 
conduct personal interviews and use the late President's 
121 personal letters. Dawes' business commitments forced him 
to withdraw from any active participation in the project. 122 
Nevertheless, Dawson insisted that his friend's name must ap-
pear on the title page regardless of any actual contribution. 123 
Dawson, in fact, did begin the research while back in the United 
States on leave, in the summer of 1905. 124 Apparently, his 
own duties prevented him from doing much work on the biography 
until the summer of 1907. The manuscript was to be completed 
by the following spring, with publication scheduled for the 
fall of 1908. 125 A rough draft of the biography was probably 
finished; but, Dawson never had time to complete the task. 126 
121 Dawson to Dawes, November 3, 1904, Dawes Collection, 
July-December, 1904, File D. 
122Dawes tow. B. Parker c/o Houghton, Mifflin Co., 
December 31, 1904; Dawes to Dawson, December 31, 1904; Dawes to 
Dawson, January 6, 1905; Dawes to W. E. Both c/o Houghton, 
Mifflin and Co., January 6, 1905, Dawes Collection, Letter Press 
Book, November 17, 1904 to March 6, 1905, pp. 331, 332, 374-76. 
123 Dawson to Dawes, January 31, 1905, Dawes Collection, 
January-June, 1905, File D. 
124Dawson to Dawes, July 3, 1905, Dawes Collection, 
July-December, 1905. 
125Dawson to Dawes, July 4, 1907, Dawes Collection, 
1906-1914, Name File, Dawson-Pai, Thomas A. [sic] Dawson Folder. 
Dawes to Dawson, July 12, 1907, Dawes Collection, Name File, 
President McKinley Folder. 
126oawes to W. B. Parker, Century Magazine, May 3, 1912, 
Dawes Collection, Letter Press Book, Personal Letters, January 
22, 1912 to November 16, 1912, p. 427. In a letter to Mrs. Daw-
son, shortly after her husband's death, Dawes inquired about the 
manuscript and requested that, if it could be found, it be sent 
--
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In contrast with his Brazilian service, Dawson seems to 
have been contented with his position in the Dominican Republic. 
There is no indication that he was looking for immediate pro-
motion. It would have been difficult for Dawson not to realize 
the importance of his work in the Dominican Republic, and, in 
part, this satisfaction may have resulted from the belief that 
the Dominican assignment would provide a basis for further 
advancement. If this were his conviction, it was certainly 
bolstered by Dawes, who assured him that he was making a name 
and reputation for himself which he "could not have done in 
some of the more high salaried embassies." "All of these," 
he wrote , "wi 11 come later. "12 7 
Despite his satisfaction with the post in Santo Domingo, 
Dawson did apply to accompany Secretary of State Root on his 
trip to the Pan-American Conference held at Rio de Janeiro in 
1906. Dawson felt that his knowledge of Spanish, Portuguese 
and French and his acquaintance with the Brazilian politicians 
to him. He would then attempt to prepare it for publication. 
Dawes to Mrs. Louisa Dawson, May 7, 1912, ibid., 446-47. It 
is difficult to say whatever happened to the manuscript. There 
is no indication that Mrs. Dawson either found it or forwarded 
it to Dawes. Moreover, while Houghton, Mifflin Company's cata-
logue for 1904 does list The Life of William McKinley by T. c. 
Dawson as being in preparation, no further reference is made to 
the book nor do the Company's records apparently contain any 
contract or indicate receipt of a manuscript. Mrs. Barbara E. 
Amidon, Permissions Department, Houghton, Mifflin Company, to 
the author, October 17, 1969. 
127Dawes to Dawson, May 6, 1905, Dawes Collection, Letter 
Press Book, March 6, 1905 to July 11, 1905; also see Dawes to 
Dawson, February 3, 1905, Dawes Collection, Jan-June, 1905, File 
D. Dawes to Dawson, February 1, 1906, Dawes Collection, Letter 
Press Book, December 6, 1905-April 13, 1906, p. 380. 
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and those from other Latin American countries might be useful 
to the Secretary of State. There were also family reasons for 
wanting to return to Brazil. His wife was anxious to see her 
family and show off the children. Moreover, the experience in 
the Dominican Republic had been a strain on both Dawson and 
his wife and he felt that a rest would be to their benefit. 128 
h d . d d t k h. 11 . bl 129 Root, owever, eci e o eep is party as sma as possi e, 
and Dawson was informed that it had been decided not to include 
any incumbent diplomatic officer in the Secretary's delegation. 130 
There is also little indication that Dawson took an 
active part in the United States domestic politics while he 
was in Santo Domingo City. The pressure of his work at the 
Legation, of course, would have prevented him from returning 
to the United States to participate in the presidential cam-
paign of 1904, as he had done in 1900. He did, however, make 
a $50.00 contribution toward the expenses of the Republican 
t . 1 . 131 Na iona Committee. Naturally, he rejoiced in Roosevelt's 
128 Dawson to Root, January 29, 1906, unnumbered, Daw-
son's Application and Recommendation File. 
129 Root to the President, December 14, 1905, Root 
Papers, Letter Book, October 20, 1905-February 15, 1906, part 
1, p. 183, Box 186. 
130 Root to Dawson, May 17, 1906, unnumbered, Diplomatic 
Instructions, Santo Domingo, vol. 1, roll 98, p. 111. 
131Dawson to Dawes, September 13, 1904, Dawes Collec-
tion, July-December, 1904, File D. Dawes to Dawson, Septem-
ber 28, 1904, Letter Press Book, August 19, 1904 to November 
16, 1904, p. 233. 
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. t 132 vie ory. This apparently was the extent of his direct in-
volvement in the affairs of the Republican Party. 
However, while political patronage still dominated 
the diplomatic service, President Roosevelt and Secretary of 
State Root were attempting to improve the quality of United 
States representatives by assigning competent men to critical 
133 posts. Consequently, it is possible that political con-
siderations may have had little or no bearing on Dawson's ap-
pointment to be United States Minister in Bogota, Colombia. 
Colombian-United States relations had not yet recovered from 
the strain placed upon them by the involvement of the United 
States in the Panamanian revolution of 1903. A skilled diplo-
mat, experienced in handling Latin American politicians was 
needed to fill the post being vacated by John Barrett who had 
resigned to become the Director-General of the International 
Bureau of American Republics. Certainly Dawson's extended 
service in the area, particularly his successful handling of 
the negotiations in the Dominican Republic and extensive knowl-
edge of the history of South America fitted him admirably for 
this new post. 
132 Dawson to Loomis, December 17, 1904, personal, 
Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. 
133Munro, £I?.• cit., p. 22. 
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CHAPTER IX 
I 
COLOMBIA: 
1907 - 1909 
Although Dawson's commission as Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Plenipotentiary to Colombia was dated January 10, 
1907, it was a little over nine months before he presented 
his letters of credence to the Colombian president. 1 Preoccupa-
tion with Dominican affairs, his own poor health, and that of 
his wife account for this delay. During the summer of 1907, 
Dawson and his wife rented a house in Falmouth Foreside, Maine. 
There he recuperated and worked on the McKinley biography, 
while Mrs. Dawson awaited the birth of their third child. 
If Dawson's health alone had detained him, it is possible that 
he would have left for his new post in the early summer. Con-
sidering the difficulty of the journey to the Colombian capital, 
however, he felt that it was impossible for him to go before 
h . 'f bl t h' 2 is wi e was a e o accompany im. By late August, the baby, 
their second son, had been born and Mrs. Dawson was well 
enough to begin the trip. Consequently, on the thirty-first, 
1untitled calendar of Dawson's appointments from 1907 
to 1911, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. Register 
of the Department of State, September 20, 1911 (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1911), p. 11. 
2oawson to Bacon, July 2, 1907, Numerical File 2765/12. 
304 
305 
the family started on the trip to Colombia. 3 After brief stops 
in Kingston, Jamaica, and Baranquilla, Colombia, they arrived 
at Cartagena in late September. From there, they began the 
arduous journey by rail, steamboat, and finally mule to the 
. 1 / . 4 capita • Bogota was finally reached on October 9. 
The trip from the Caribbean coast to the capital was 
long and undoubtedly trying. However, it did provide Dawson 
with an opportunity to meet and talk with several Colombians. 
From these conversations and observations, he was able to draw 
some conclusions, which he admitted might be premature, con-
cerning the "national character and ideals" of the Colombians. 
Personally he had found those whom he met to be polite, respect-
ful to authority, and courteous to foreigners. In political 
and social affairs, he gained the impression that the President, 
General Rafael Reyes, and the Catholic Church were the dominate 
influence in the country. Diplomatically, a major obstacle 
to cordial relations between the United States and Colombia 
remained the bitterness felt by the Colombians towards the 
United States as a result of the latter's involvement in the 
Panamanian revolution of 1903. On this point, Dawson was led 
to conclude that Colombian public opinion had become reconciled 
to the loss of Panama, and that resentment towards the United 
States was "mostly confined to the office-holding classes." 
3oawson to Root, August 10, 1907, No. 1, Numerical 
File 2765/14. 
4
oawson to Root, October 15, 1907, No. 2, Numerical 
File 2765/17. 
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He, therefore, felt that this resentment would probably be 
less important in his work than he had originally been led to 
1 . 5 be ieve. 
There can be little doubt that in promoting Dawson to 
Colombia, Secretary of State Root hoped that the new minister 
would work towards an improvement of United States-Colombian 
relations. 6 The cordial reception which Dawson received at 
his formal presentation to the Colombian President, on October 
16, seemed to indicate that the Secretary of State's anticipa-
tion would be fulfilled. In reporting on the official presenta-
tion, Dawson wrote: "I feel that my mission here has begun on 
a favorable footing and that the lack of success, if it comes, 
will be due to my own mistakes or to events not to be controlled." 7 
The initial steps towards a rapprochement between the 
two countries, in fact, had already been taken by the time 
Dawson arrived. His immediate predecessor, John Barrett, who, 
as was previously mentioned, had resigned as Minister to Colom-
bia to become Director General of the International Bureau of 
American Republics, had proven to be a sympathetic friend of 
Colombia and had made an effort to establish personally cordial 
5Ibid. 
6Root to Dawson, March 2, 1907, unnumbered, Numerical 
File 2765/GB. 
7Dawson to Root, October 21, 1907, No. 3, Numerical 
File 2765/18. For a description of the official reception 
and for the speeches delivered by Dawson and Reyes, see en-
closures three and four with the same despatch. 
307 
relations with the Colombian Government. 8 More important was 
the attitude and steps taken by General Rafael Reyes, who be-
came the President of Colombia in 1904. In domestic affairs, 
Reyes governed in a dictatorial fashion, dismissing the elect-
ed congress and calling a national assembly composed of members 
selected by himself. He did succeed, however, in restoring 
Colombian international credit and in securing some internal 
improvements. 9 In the area of international relations, Reyes 
took steps early in his administration to achieve a rapproche-
ment with the United States. To resolve the problem of Pana-
manian independence, he initially suggested a plebiscite in 
Panama, with other differences between Panama and Colombia be-
ing settled by means of a treaty and arbitration. However, 
the Department of State rejected the idea of a plebiscite. 
/ 
Reyes then sent Diego Mendoza Perez as his Minister to Wash-
ington. Mendoza was to treat with the United States Govern-
ment on the various questions pending before the two countries. 
However, in his negotiations with the Department of State, 
Mendoza maintained that the United States was responsible for 
the Panamanian Revolution and insisted that the interpretation 
8E. T. Parks, Colombia and the United States 1765-
1934 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1935), 
p:-432. George B. Lane, Jr., "The Role of John Barrett in 
the Development of the Pan-American Union 1907-1920" (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School, American Univer-
sity, Washington, D. C., 1962), pp. 179-89. 
9Hubert Herring, A History of .Latin America From the 
Beginnings to the Present (2nd ed. rev.; New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1962), p. 512. 
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of the United States-Colombian treaty of 1846, under which the 
united States had claimed the authority to prevent Colombian 
intervention to suppress the Panamanian revolution, be sub-
mitted to arbitration. 10 
It seemed likely that at this juncture a complete break 
in diplomatic relations between the two countries might occur. 
However, in a meeting with Minister John Barrett in May, 1906, 
President Reyes again indicated his desire to come to some 
agreement with the United States and Panama. While rejecting 
the idea of arbitration or indemnity, he suggested a new basis 
for the agreement. This plan included a treaty of commerce 
and friendship between the United States and Colombia which 
would assure the latter of special privileges in the use of the 
canal, and provide for Colombian recognition of the indepen-
dence of Panama, and Panama's assumption of a proportion of 
the Colombian national debt. 11 The plan was favorably re-
ceived in Washington, and when an invitation was extended to 
Root to visit Cartagena in the summer of 1906 during his return 
trip from the Pan-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro, he 
accepted. On September 24, 1906, Root and Barrett met with 
the Colombian Foreign Minister Vazquez Cobo at Cartagena. 
Their discussion centered around a Colombian memorandum con-
taining the basis for a United States-Colombian treaty. This 
10 Cit. I 429-31. Parks, ~- pp. 
11Ibid., pp. 431-33. 
12Ibid. I pp. 433-34. Jessup, ~· cit., I, 522. 
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plan was similar to that discussed by Barrett and Reyes irt 
13 May. After Root's return to Washington, negotiations looking 
towards tripartite agreements among Panama, Colombia, and the 
united States were undertaken with the new Colombian Minister, 
Enrique Cortes, and the Panamanian Minister Jose D. Obaldfa. 14 
By the summer of 1907, these negotiations had bogged 
down on two points: the proportion Panama was to assume of 
the Colombian national debt, and the exact boundary between 
Panama and Colombia. These problems seemed to be resolved in 
July, 1907, when Secretary of War William H. Taft, who was 
assisting in the negotiations, was able to secure Colombian 
consent to accept $2,500,000 as the Panamanian share of the 
debt, and to submit the boundary question to arbitration. 15 
However, before Minister Cortes would finally agree on the 
boundary issue, it was necessary for Root to assure him that 
the United States accepted the boundary of Panama as that es-
tablished by the law of New Granada of June 9, 1855. 16 On 
August 17, 1907, protocols were signed in Washington between 
the Panamanian and Colombian representatives providing for a 
treaty on the basis of Colombian recognition of Panama's inde-
522-23. 
13Memorandum, October 8, 1906, Numerical File 1502/1-2. 
14Parks, ~· cit., p. 434. Jessup, ~· cit., I, 
15Taft to Athos (Root), July 7, 1907, Numerical File 
1502/31 1/2. 
16 Cortes to Root, August 18, 1907; Root to Cortes, 
August 26, 1907, Numerical File 1502/55. Parks, op. cit., p. 
434. Jessup, ~· cit., I, 524. 
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pendence, Panama's recognition of Colombia's claim to 50,000 
shares of the New Panama Canal Company stock, and Panama's 
agreement to turn over to Colombia the first ten payments 
received from the United States under the Hay-Bunau Varilla 
Treaty of 1903. 17 The actual negotiating of the treaties was 
to be postponed until December, 1907. 18 
In spite of the progress in negotiating the treaties, 
the prevailing sentiment in Bogott for rapprochement with the 
United States, and Dawson's early observations on the decline 
of Colombian bitterness towards the United States, there were 
still indications that all had neither been forgiven nor for-
gotten. This point was clearly brought out in several des-
patches which the State Department received in the surcuner and 
fall of 1907. In June, William . / Heimke, the United States 
h I ' t I C arge in Bogo a, reported that on June 18, the Diario Oficial 
noted that it was the intention of the Colombian Government 
to establish diplomatic relations with Japan. According to 
rumors, HeimkE{' wrote, the real objective of this move on the 
part of the Colombian Government was to form an offensive 
and defensive alliance with Japan, and to cede to that country 
coaling stations on both the east and west coasts of Colombia. 
These would, of course, be used by the Japanese navy in the 
event of war with the United States. Since the establishment 
of coaling stations so close to the Panama Canal would de-
58 4/9. 
17Parks, ~· cit., p. 434. 
18 Taft to Root, August 17, 1907, Numerical File 1502/ 
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finitely be detrimental to United States interests, Heimke' · 
gave more than passing interest to this rumor. 19 In August, 
the Department of State received a further report of a Japan-
ese-Colombian alliance. This time the report came from the 
United States consul at Maracaibo, Venezuela. 20 To further 
substantiate his earlier report, in late September, Charge' 
Heimke' forwarded a copy of an article entitled "Colombia y el 
I Japon" which had appeared in the June 3, 1907 issue of the 
semi-official paper El Nuevo Tiempo. Heimk~ reported that he 
had been able to ascertain that the author of the article was 
noneother than the subsecretary of the Foreign Office. In 
this article, the author forecast the extension of diplomatic 
and commercial relations between the peoples of Asia and the 
Americas, with the two forming an alliance to thwart European 
and North American imperialism. Moreover, he predicted an 
eventual war between the United States and Japan over the con-
trol of the Pacific. In foreseeing this conflict, the author 
noted that the Japanese would be looking for strategic pos-
sessions and hinted that their sights would be turned to 
Central and South America. Even if the war never material-
ized, he thought that "los japoneses pueden ser neustros 
futures grandes amigos." They would help populate the country, 
19Heimke to Root, June 20, 1907, No. 198, confiden-
tial, Numerical File 7804/1. 
20 Eugene Plumacher to Bacon, August 7, 1907, Numeri-
cal File 7804/5. 
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and assist in the building of canals and railroads. 21 Al-
though the article may have indicated the intention of the 
Colombian Government to institute closer relations with Japan, 
it is to be noted that the Reyes Administration evidently 
also intended the article to serve as a prod to urge upon the 
united States the importance of maintaining good relations 
with Colombia and quickly concluding the negotiations then 
under way in Washington. 22 
Nevertheless, the idea of the inevitability of war 
between Japan and the United States was widespread in Colom-
bia; upon his arrival, Dawson himself observed it and reported 
accordingly to Washington. In a despatch to the State Depart-
ment in late October, he noted several articles demonstrating 
this widely held belief which had appeared in Colombian news-
. papers. One of these, an article from a Barranquilla paper, 
quoting from a correspondent living in Panama maintained that 
as soon as it was known that the Japanese fleet was bombard-
ing San Francisco, California, Colombians all over South and 
Central America would rush to place their services at the dis-
posal of the Japanese Government, thereby vindicating the na-
tional honor of their country. 23 
21Heimke' to Root, Seytember 26, 1907, No. 234, en-
closure: "Colombia y el Japon," El Nuevo Tiempo, June 3, .1907, 
Numerical File 7804/2-3. 
22 . / Heimke to Root, September 26, 1907, No. 234, Numeri-
cal File 7804/2. 
23oawson to Root, October 31, 1907, No. 8, Numerical 
File 9271/7. 
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Further indications of closer relations between Colom-
bia and Japan were also coming from the United States Embassy 
in Tokyo. In January, 1908, Ambassador Thomas J. O'Brien 
I 
sent Washington an extract of an article which appeared in a 
Japanese newspaper. This article gave an account of the 
actions of one Mr. Izquierdo, a Colombian citizen, who had 
visited several Government Ministers and was making proposals 
for Japanese immigration to Colombia. 24 
The possibility of a Japanese-Colombian treaty pro-
viding for Japanese coaling stations off the Pacific and Carib-
bean coasts of Colombia would naturally have been of great 
concern to Washington at any time. However, the news of this 
supposed treaty and of the closer relations developing between 
Japan and Colombia arrived at the State Department at a par-
ticularly crucial point in United States-Japanese relations 
and thus caused even more concern. In the late spring and 
early summer of 1907, United States-Japanese relations were 
shaken by a war scare brought about by political and press 
reaction in Japan to discrimination against Japanese immi-
grants in California. The United States press also made its 
contribution to the war fever. In fact, however, there was no 
disposition in either the Japanese or United States Governments 
for war, and with the passage of time the war scare subsided 
to flare up less violently later in the year and again in 1908. 
240 1 Brien to Root, January 17; 1908, No. 149, 
Numerical File 7804/7-8. 
314 
Nevertheless, in 1907, the belief that war between Japan and 
the United States was inevitable was widely held. In England, 
France, and Germany, Japan was considered to be a five to 
four favorite to win in any conflict with the United States. 25 
Hence, the war scare combined with the reports from 
/ 
Bogota, Maracaibo, and Tokyo and the State Department's own 
observations of increased intimacy between the Colombian 
Minister and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, led to 
the serious consideration of the possibility of a Japanese-
Colombian treaty. On March 7, 1908, Dawson was instructed 
"discreetly to use every effort either to disprove or to sub-
stantiate the existence of such an agreement, and if it exists 
to ascertain its terms." He was informed that the Department 
considered this information "of some importance" and a mod-
erate expense incurred during the investigation would be met 
by a separate account. Dawson was assured that there had 
been no break in the friendly relations between the United 
States and Japan. However, the possibility of a Japanese-
Colombian treaty had "a bearing upon the Monroe Doctrine, 
which makes it very interesting and worthy of attention. 1126 
25 Raymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), pp. 181, 188-
189, 194. Thomas A. Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the Japan-
ese-American Crises: An Account of the International Complica-
tions Arising From the Race Problem on the Pacific Coast 
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964), pp. 228-60. 
26 Root to Dawson, March 7, 1908, No. 25, confidential, 
Numerical File 7804/9. 
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While this despatch did not reach Dawson until early 
May, 1908, he was quickly able to obtain some important infor-
mation. He learned that prior to his own arrival in Bogota', 
president Reyes had sent the aforementioned Antonio Izquierdo 
to Japan for the purpose of arranging for Japanese immigration 
to Colombia. He was further able to obtain a telegram that 
Izquierdo had sent to Reyes, stating that contracts with 
steamship companies for immigration had been agreed upon, 
and as soon as a treaty was signed, the Japanese Government 
would send agents to inspect the sites for Japanese settle-
ments. A later telegram from Izquierdo, Dawson reported, 
concerned trade and immigration but made no mention of coal-
ing stations. Dawson believed that at the time Reyes sent 
Izquierdo to Japan, the President had in mind not only immi-
. gration but also a treaty providing for Japanese coaling 
stations on the Pacific coast of Colombia. However, Dawson 
thought that it was unlikely that he could get any direct 
proof of this latter point unless, by chance, he got hold of 
Izquierdo's instructions. He would continue his inquiries, 
27 he wrote, and report later. 
Dawson was correct in assuming that Reyes was planning 
to negotiate a treaty with Japan. However, he erred as to 
the extent of the treaty and the place where the negotiations 
were to take place. Enrique Cortes, the Colombian Minister 
27Dawson to Root, May 5, 1908, No. 90, Numerical File 
7804/10. 
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in Washington, not Izquierdo, was entrusted with the task. 28 
on July 20, 1908, Dawson wrote to the State Department that 
he had just ascertained that on May 26, Cortes and Baron 
I 
Takahira, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, had signed 
a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation. He was 
unable to secure a copy of the treaty but promised to forward 
one to Washington as soon as he could. 29 
On July 24, 1908, the Takahira-Cortes treaty was read 
and discussed in a secret session of the Colombian National 
Assembly; but, by the thirtieth, Dawson was able to get the 
major provisions. The treaty provided for the exchange of 
diplomatic and consular representatives. In addition, the 
citizens of one country residing in or emigrating to the 
other were to be free from military service, and were to en-
joy commercial and civil rights, and religious freedom. Daw-
son noted that the treaty obviously contemplated Japanese emi-
gration to Colombia; however, he stated that he had no reason 
to believe that any contracts or arrangements for this immi-
gration had yet been made. Nor did he have any basis for be-
lieving that a secret clause providing for Japanese coaling 
stations had been included in the treaty. Nevertheless, he 
280 1 Brien to Secretary of State, December 17, 1908, 
No. 537, Numerical File 7804/34. 
29 Dawson to Root, July 20, 1908, No. 128, Numerical 
File 7804/12. 
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reported that he would continue to investigate this point. 30 
By August 6, he was able to forward a Spanish copy of the 
treaty to Washington. Still there was no indication of a 
secret clause. 31 
In fact, it would seem that the principal objective 
of the treaty simply was Japanese emigration to Colombia. 32 
However, Dawson's original contention that Reyes had con-
templated. more than this when he initially sent Izquierdo to 
Tokyo evidently possessed some foundation. Paxton Hibben, 
the Secretary of the Legation who was acting as charge" during 
Dawson's absence from Colombia in October, 1908, reported 
that he had received information from an informant close to 
the Foreign Minister that Reyes originally intended a closer 
alliance than that achieved by the Cortes-Takahira treaty. 
Hibben's informant, however, stated "with confidence" that 
no secret clause existed. Moreover, the Japanese immigration 
scheme would be dropped if the negotiations in Washington on 
the United States and Panamanian treaties were successful. 
Evidently, the reason for this decision was popular hostility 
in Colombia to the influx of Japanese immigrants, uncertainty 
as to United States reaction, and the hope that the money 
30oawson to Root, July 30, 1908, No. 133, confidential, 
Numerical File 7804/13. 
31oawson to Root, August 6, 1908, No. 104, Numerical 
File 7804/14-15. 
32Hibben to Root, October 27, 1908, No. 184, confi-
dential, Numerical File 7804/23. 
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received from Panama by the treaty and the privileges accorded 
Colombia in the use of the canal would contribute more to 
Colombian prosperity than any arrangement with Japan. 33 
It is difficult to say from whom Dawson and Hibben 
obtained their information concerning Izquierdo's mission to 
Japan and the Cortes-Takahira treaty. It is possible that it 
was supplied to them by their friends among the President's 
family or from contacts in the Foreign Office. It is also 
possible that they might have resorted to bribery. In Decem-
ber, 1908, Dawson submitted a request to the Department of 
State for the sum of $58.00, the amount he had expended on 
the investigation of the Colombian-Japanese treaty. While 
this was certainly a small sum, there seems to have been an 
aura of intrigue over the entire operation. 34 
Whatever President Reyes' motives in taking steps to 
form a Colombian-Japanese treaty, it would seem that during 
his time in Colombia, Dawson continued to work towards a better 
understanding between the United States and Colombia. Inso-
far as his personal relationships were concerned, he seems to 
33Hibben to Root, October 27, 1908, confidential, 
Numerical File 7804/23. Charg' Hibben noted that there was 
considerable opposition from the Catholic hierarchy in the 
area where the settlement of Japanese immigrants was proposed. 
Consequently, he suggested that if the Department of State 
were determined to oppose the influx of these immigrants into 
Colombia it might be profitable to work through the Church in 
doing so. Hibben to Secretary of State, December 5, 1908, 
Numerical File 7804/27. 
34Dawson to Root, December 18, 1908, unnumbered, 
Numerical File 7804/26. 
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have succeeded admirably in gaining the acceptance and favor 
both of the Colombian Government and the high society of the 
capital. Dawson's own pleasant disposition, refinement and 
interest in Colombia, coupled with his wife's grace and charm, 
were all certainly assets in gaining an entrance to the polite 
society of the capital. 35 Among his most intimate personal 
friends in Bogota were two of President Reyes' nephews, 
Lufs Felipe and Climaco Calderdn. The latter had served as 
Colombian Minister to Washington and at one time Foreign 
Minister. 36 Furthermore, the Reyes Government came to value 
I Dawson's presence in Bogota. In his report to the Colombian 
National Assembly in July, 1908, Foreign Minister Francisco 
/ . / Jose Urrutia, who had replaced Vasquez Cobo in March, 1908, 
noted that both the Colombian Minister in Washington, Enrique 
Cortes, and Dawson "have taken pains to maintain the good 
understanding between the northern Republic and Colombia. • 
.. 37 When Dawson took a leave of absence in September, 1908, . . 
the Colombian Foreign Minister, in a private letter to Minister 
Cortes, urged: "Would to God that when you speak to Mr. Root, 
you would express to him in the name of this Government that 
35Hibben to Root, September 22, 1908, No. 165, 
enclosure 2: translation of an article from El Nuevo Tiempo, 
September 22, 1908, Numerical File 2765/33-35. 
36 oawson to Root, March 10, 1908, No. 60, Numerical 
File 5025/24. In March, 1908, another brother, Victor Calder-
on, whom Dawson knew only slightly became Minister of War. Ibid. 
37R f F . J I . • 1 mb. F . eport o rancisco ose Urrutia, Co o ian oreign 
Minister to the Deputies of the National Constitutent and 
Legislative Assembly, July, 1908, Numerical File 5025/61. 
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Mr. Dawson has made himself deserving of the highest esteem 
for his relevant qualifications as a gentleman and as a diplo-
mat. It would be a real pity if he were not to come back to 
h . t "38 is pos • • • • The Colombian Government's esteem for 
Dawson and that of his Colombian friends was again reflected 
in communications to the Department of State at the time of 
his transfer to Chile, in 1909. 39 
Dawson's concern for maintaining good relations, a-
voiding incidents which might sitr up anti-Yankee sentiment, 
and attempting to understand the problems confronting the 
Colombian Government are, to some extent, demonstrated in his 
handling of two cases involving the protection of United 
States commercial interests. In 1907, Holt and Company of New 
York, a flour exporter, in a letter to the Department of State, 
argued that the imposition of an import tax on flour by the 
Reyes Government had resulted in the decline in the amount of 
United States flour exported to Colombia. The Company urged 
that the State Department threaten to impose a three cent 
tariff on Colombian coffee, as was authorized by the Dingly 
tariff of 1897. This threat alone, the Company felt, would 
be sufficient to secure a reduction of the Colombian 
38Extract from a private letter of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, September 15, 1908, to the Colombian Minister 
in Washington, handed to the Secretary of State by the Colom-
bian Minister, October 19, 1908, Numerical File 1502/91. 
39Guzman (Colombian charge) to Knox, May 15, 1909, 
Numerical File 2765/52. Northcott to Knox, August 18, 1909, 
No. 1, Numerical File 19007/16-17. 
321 
.ff 40 tari • Dawson, however, argued against such a course of 
action. He thought that the threat to impose an import tax 
on Colombian coffee would only serve to antagonize Colombia. 
Furthermore, he did not believe that the Colombian tax vio-
lated the favored nation clause of the 1846 treaty with the 
United States. 41 In another case involving a West Virginia 
corporation known as the Cauca Company, a concern which had a 
railroad building concession and whose claim amounted to 
$193,204.02 plus six per cent yearly interest from Janaury 26, 
1898, Dawson diligently represented the North American corpo-
ration's interest, but continually informed the Department of 
State that the Colombian Government was not delaying because 
of any reluctance to pay, but simply because the financial 
conditions of the country were such that it could not make 
42 immediate or large monthly payments. 
40Holt and Company to Root, April 9, 1907; Sanderson 
and Son (Agents for the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company) to 
Root, April 9, 1907, Numerical File 5775/-1. 
41Dawson to Root, August 20, 1908, No. 148, Numerical 
File 5775/6. Dawson's position on the threat to impose the 
import tax on Colombian coffee was similar to that taken by 
Charg~ William Heimke who was in charge of the Legation prior 
to Dawson's arrival in Bogot~. 
42 Dawson to Root, February 12, 1908, No. 51; Dawson 
to Root, February 12, 1908, No. 51; Dawson to Root, March 12, 
1908, No. 63; Dawson to Root, March 21, 1908, No. 67; Edwin 
Denby to Bacon, February 2, 1909, Numerical File 2086/64, 66, 
69, 72-73, et passim. 
The Cauca Company's claim had its origin in a conces-
sion granted by the Colombian Government to one James L. 
Cherry of San Francisco, California in 1890. Under this con-
cession Cherry was to build a railroad from Port Buenaventura 
to the city of Cali. Cherry shortly thereafter sold his 
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These two instances do not, in any way, indicate that 
Dawson was not interested either in protecting United States 
concession to the Cauca Company which had been incorporated 
under the laws of West Virginia. This Company undertook the 
building of the railroad, and did, in fact, complete a portion 
of it. However, in 1894, a dispute arose with Colombia and 
the Government decided to confiscate the concession. At that 
time the State Department intervened on behalf of the Company 
on the grounds that the Colombian Government's action was a 
denial of justice under the concession. The Colombian Govern-
ment agreed to negotiations with the Company, and an agreement 
was eventually reached which provided that the Government 
would receive the railroad for the actual cost of the construc-
tion. Two-hundred thousand dollars was paid to the Company 
and any further payment was to be determined by a commission 
consisting of the Secretary of State, the Colombian Minister 
in Washington and a third commissioner, who eventually turned 
out to be Professor Lewis M. Haupt of Philadelphia. An award 
against Colombia was finally handed down by this Commission in 
October, 1897. Colombia ultimately appealed the award to the 
United States Supreme Court, where, except for minor altera-
tions, it was upheld. The entire amount to be paid by Colom-
bia, under this award, was $393,204.02 less the $200,000 which 
had already been paid. In addition, six per cent yearly inter-
est was to be paid on the unpaid portion beginning with Janu-
ary 26, 1898, the date of the original payment. The final de-
cree was handed down on July 16, 1903, and the formal demand 
for payment was made on July 23, 1903. In August, 1903, the 
Company asked the Department of State to take some action; 
but, evidently, no action was taken. In October, 1906, Repre-
sentative Edwin Denby, of Detroit, Michigan, wrote to James B. 
Scott the Solicitor of the State Department asking that some 
action be taken on behalf of the Company, some of whose stock-
holders lived in his district. As a result of this letter, in 
February, 1907, Charge Heimke was instructed to bring the mat-
ter to the attention of the Colombian Government and to use 
his "good offices in order to obtain a settlement of the lia-
bility." While not contesting the Company's claim, the Colom-
bian Government decided to transfer negotiations to Washington 
in the hope of having the Company agree to reduce the interest. 
This is where the matter stood until Dawson was instructed to 
bring the matter again to the attention of the Colombian For-
eign Minister in January, 1908. Edwin Denby to James B. Scott, 
October 27, 1906; Root to Heimke, February 23, 1907; Lane and 
Schramme Attorneys in Fact for Cauca Company to Jose M. Passes 
(Colombian Charge in Washington), October 1, 1907; Root to 
Dawson, January 3, 1908, No. 10, Numerical File 2086/1, 57, 62. 
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commercial interests in Colombia or in seeing the extension of 
Yankee enterprises in that republic. The contrary is actually 
true. In the case of the Cauca Company, as has been noted, 
he did his best to secure a settlement satisfactory to the 
company. Moreover, in January, 1908, as a result of the great-
ly fluctuating rate of exchange, Dawson advised North American 
exporters both to exercise great caution in giving credit to 
Colombian importers and not to extend their operations for the 
present time. However, he reconunended that the time was 
propitious for establishing mining and industrial enterprises. 
Again, the rate of exchange prompted him to make this sugges-
tion. Wages were, of course, paid in Colombian currency and, 
since the workers principally used goods of domestic manu-
facture or production, a rise in the rate of exchange would 
not necessitate a proportionate rise in wages. "The net 
result," he reported, "would be that the employer, who pays 
his labor from funds obtained by the sale of foreign drafts, 
would get it cheaper. 1143 
The most important issue in Colombian-United States 
relations during Dawson's assignment to Bogot~.was, of course, 
the Colombia-Panama-United States treaties then being nego-
tiated in Washington. Dawson had no part in the initial nego-
tiations and only a minor role in their later phases. His 
contribution in the matter of the treaties seems to have been 
confined to three points: advising the Reyes Government to 
43Dawson to Root, January 25 1908 N 45 co f' , , o. , n 1-
dential, Numerical File 10717/1. 
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avoid any action which might endanger the negotiations, 
lending some assistance in the last phase of the negotiations, 
and finally urging Reyes to secure their ratification. 
By the time he arrived in the Colombian capital, the 
preliminary negotiations had been concluded and the protocols 
outlining the basis for the treaties had already been signed. 
However, the boundary issue continued to present a difficulty. 
In spite of Root's acceptance of the boundary as defined by 
the New Granada law of 1855, the Panamanians attempted to 
extend their control beyond these limits. 44 In mid-September, 
1907, a small Panamanian party visited, and, for all practical 
purposes, occupied the little village and port of Jurado, 
on the Pacific coast about ten miles south of Point Ardita. 
The Colombian Government claimed that this area lay within 
I 
the Colombian department of Choco and, not unnaturally, in-
terpreted the Panamanian action as an attempt to extend Pan-
45 
ama's jurisdiction prior to the conclusion of the treaty. 
The Panamanians, however, contended that Juardo had been under 
the jurisdiction of the former Department of Panama since 1898, 
and that by occupying the village they were not actually 
disturbing the status quo. 46 
44 Parks,~· cit., p. 434. 
45 Dawson to Root, October 28, 1907, No. 5, Numerical 
File 9271/8. 
46
squiers to Secretary of State, telegram, November 
19, 1907, Numerical File 9271/6. 
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The Panamanian occupation of Jurado was the first 
problem to confront Dawson upon arriving in Bogota in October, 
1907. When the matter was brought to his attention, he wired 
' 
' 
the news to Washington, and advised Vasquez Cobo, the Colom-
bian Foreign Minister, against taking any hasty or violent 
action. 47 For the time being,the Reyes Government decided 
to work through the United States in an attempt to dislodge 
the Panamanians. However, pressure was being exerted on 
/ I 
Bogota by the provincial authorities in Checo to grant them 
permission to expell the intruders. The possibility of an 
unauthorized or accidental clash between Colombians and Pana-
manians, in the disputed area, was growing progressively more 
likely. Moreover, the Government itself was fearful that its 
inaction might be interpreted as a willingness to cede more 
Colombian territory. Such a stand, of course, would not be 
t 1 t d b C 1 mb . bl' . ' 48 D t' d t o era e y o o ian pu ic opinion. awson con inue o 
advise against the use of force. He assured the Colombian 
Foreign Minister that the diplomatic course which the Govern-
ment had decided to follow would be far better calculated to 
gain the support of Secretary of State Root than the use of 
force. He further pointed out that since Root had apparently 
decided that the boundary laid down by the 1855 law was the 
47
oawson to Root, October 28, 1907, No. 5, Numeri-
cal File 9271/8. 
48 Dawson to Root, November 18, 1907, No. 17, Numeri-
cal File 9271/21. 
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correct one, the Panamanians would not receive United States 
support in claiming additional territory. 49 
Dawson's assurances were well founded. Secretary of 
state Root remained firm in his support of the Colombian posi-
tion and finally indicated that the United States would have 
no objection to Colombia extending its jurisdiction over the 
disputed territory. 50 On March 22, 1908, the region was, in 
fact, occupied by a Colombian military expedition. This ac-
tion had the salutary effect for the Reyes Government of stop-
ping opposition arguments that the treaty negotiations would 
1 d t th ' f C 1 mb' t 't 51 R t ea o e cession o more o o ian erri ory. oo 
offered no solace when the Panamanian Government called upon 
the United States to intervene and protect the integrity of 
the Republic as provided in the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty of 
. November 18, 1903. 52 He informed the Panamanian Legation in 
Washington that the United States did not consider the Co.lorn-
bian action or, for that matter, the boundary dispute with 
Colombia, as in any way endangering the independence of the 
Republic of Panama. Furthermore, the Secretary pointed out 
that the treaty of 1903 could not be interpreted in such a way 
49 Ibid. 
50oawson to Root, March 6, 1908, No. 58, Numerical 
File 1502/84. 
51
oawson to Root, April 13, 1908, No. 80, Numerical 
File 9271/46. 
52Arango to Root, April 3, 1908; Arango to Root, 
April 5, 1908, Numerical File 9271/34, 37. 
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as to mean that the United States was obliged to accept the 
validity of the Panamanian view in every international con-
troversy involving that republic. Specifically concerning 
the Jurado district, Root noted that he accepted the boundary 
line of 1855, and the nationality of Jurado depended on its 
location in reference to that line.SJ 
Colombian occupation of Jurado did not settle the 
boundary issue. In fact, the Colombian and Panamanian posi-
tions seemed to be irreconcilable. Since arbitration on the 
boundary would only serve to delay the final settlement with 
the United States and Panama, the Colombian Government pre-
f d t t t th . l t' 54 M' . t C t . erre not o resor o is so u ion. inis er or es in 
Washington agreed to proceed with the negotiations on the 
basis of not mentioning the boundary issue in the treaty.SS 
However, still fearing accusations of being willing to cede 
Colombian territory, the Reyes Administration thought it es-
S6 
sential that the treaty include a boundary clause. The 
solution ultimately adopted was partly to delimit the Pana-
ma-Colombian boundary, while leaving the ownership of the 
SJRoot to Arosemena, May 14, 1908, Numerical File 
9271/38. 
S4oawson to Root, March 6, 1908, No. S8, Numerical 
File 1502/84. 
s5Parks, £E.· cit., p. 434. 
56 oawson to Root, March 6, 1908, No. 58, Numerical 
File 1502/84. 
328 
Jurado region to be settled by arbitration. 57 
/ On September 20, 1908, Dawson left Bogota to return 
to the United States for a leave of absence. 58 Before leaving, 
I 
he called upon President Reyes. At that time, Reyes expressed 
his urgent desire that the treaties with Panama and the United 
States be concluded as soon as possible. Dawson, in turn, 
offered to join with Root and Cortes in working towards the 
successful completion of the negotiations. 59 Once back in 
Washington, Dawson apparently conferred with Minister Cortes, 
and it is possible that he may have taken some part in the 
negotiations. However, it is impossible to say what he 
actually did. 60 
On January 9, 1909, the tripartite treaties were final-
ly signed. In the treaty between Panama and the United States 
only the first article directly effected Colombia. The United 
States consented to Panama assigning to Colombia the first 
ten yearly payments of $250,000, which the United States had 
agreed to pay Panama under the Hay-Bunau varilla Treaty. The 
57Parks, op. cit., pp. 434-435. Panama-Colombian 
Treaty, Article IX";" FRUS, 1909, pp. 232-33. 
58Hibben to Root, September 22, 1908, No. 165, 
Numerical File 2765/33. 
59Extract from a Private Letter of the Colombian 
Foreign Minister to the Colombian Minister in Washington, 
September 15, 1908, handed to the Secretary of State on Octo-
ber 19, 1908, by the Colombian Minister, Numerical File 
1502/91. 
60cortes to Dawson, November is, 1909, Numerical 
File 1502/258. 
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treaty between Colombia and the United States regulated Colom-
bian use of the completed canal and, in the meantime, the use 
of the trans-isthmus railroad. In time of war1 Colombia 
was to have free use of the canal to transport troops and 
war materials. In addition, Colombian products and mail were 
to enter the canal zone on the same basis as products and 
mail from the United States. Article VI, which would later 
cause opposition in Colombia, provided that all Colombian 
ports open to commerce would be open, free of any port fees, 
as a refuge in the time of distress to any ship involved in 
the building of the canal or passing through the canal. Be-
sides partly delimiting the boundary between the two countries 
and leaving the ownership of Jurado region to later arbitra-
tion, the Panama-Colombian treaty provided for Colombian 
recognition of Panamanian independence. Panama, in turn, a-
greed to transfer to Colombia the first ten annual payments 
received from the United States, thereby settling the question 
of Panama's share in the Colombian national debt. Provisions 
were also made for determining the citizenship of those indi-
viduals who were residing in Colombia but had been born in 
Panama or vice versa. For any one treaty to become effective, 
11th h d t b t "f" db th . t . 61 a ree a o e ra i ie y e respective coun ries. 
6111Treaties Between the United States and the Repub-
lic of Panama and Colombia Relating to the Panama Canal, Both 
signed January 9, 1909," FRUS, 1909, pp. 223-29. "Treaty 
Between the Republics of Panama and Colombia," ibid., pp. 
229-33. -
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Once the negotiations were completed and the treaties 
signed, Secretary of State Root decided that Dawson should 
return to Colombia with the treaties. 62 It was also ap-
parently thought that Dawson might lend some assistance in 
securing Colombian ratification. 63 Upon arriving back in 
/ Bogota, on February 13, Dawson found the initial Colombian 
reaction to the treaties to be favorable. Nevertheless, those 
who opposed Reyes' policies began to call for the submission 
of the treaties to a popularly elected congress for ratifica-
tion rather than to the Reyes appointed National Assembly. 64 
Despite these rumblings, Reyes convened the National 
Assembly on February 22. On the twenty-third, Foreign Minister 
Urrutia presented the treaties to the Assembly. 65 However, 
by the end of the month, the opposition began to gain mo-
. mentum, and, in an effort to calm it, Reyes agreed to summon 
an elected congress to meet in February, 1910. In the mean-
time, the National Assembly would continue to function and 
62 Dawson to Root, January 5, 1909, (also Root's 
notation at the bottom of the letter) , Numerical File 1502/ 
105. 
63Dawson to Dawes, January 21, 1909, Dawes Collec-
tion, Name File, 1906-1914, Dawson-Pai, Thomas A. [sic] 
Dawson Folder. 
64Dawson to Secretary of State, February 17, 1909, 
No. 235, Numerical File 1502/160. 
65 oawson to Secretary of State, February 24, 1909, 
No. 239; Dawson to Secretary of State, February 24, 1909, 
No. 240, Numerical File 1502/167, 169. 
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ratify the treaties. 66 Also, by this time Dawson could report 
that he was observing some genuine opposition among the public 
to the boundary article in the Panama-Colombian treaty and 
the presence of considerable hostile sentiment towards Panama 
and the United States resulting from the 1903 revolution. 67 
Reyes' efforts to mollify the opposition proved inadequate, 
and during the first week of March, it continued to gain 
strength. Dawson, seeing that Reyes was becoming irresolute 
regarding the ratification, made an effort to let the Presi-
dent know that the United States Legation expected him to pro-
ceed with the ratification. 68 
The committee of the National Assembly which had been 
entrusted with studying and reporting on the treaties deliver-
ed its report on March 8. The majority report £avored rati-
fication of the treaties. Nevertheless, one member of the com-
mittee, Francisco de P. Mat~us issued a minority report op-
posing ratification. I In his report, Mateus argued that Article 
VI of the treaty with the United States, by which Colombia 
agreed to allow ships, either engaged in building or using the 
canal, free use of Colombian ports as a refuge in time of dis-
tress, would result in the lose of Colombian sovereignty over 
66 Dawson to Secretary of State, March 8, 1909, No. 
244, Numerical File, 5025/81. 
67Ibid. 
68 Dawson to the Secretary of State, March 29, 1909, 
No. 247, Numerical File 1502/184. 
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these ports. In addition, he maintained that the failure to 
define the limits of the district of Jurado in the Panamanian 
treaty indicated that the United States and Panama were plan-
ning to extend the boundary line far enough into Colombian 
territory to include an alternate canal route through the 
t R . 69 Atra o iver. 
On the evening of the eighth, the capital was rocked 
by student demonstrations against the treaties. By the ninth 
the crowds had grown both in size and in temper. The United 
States Legation now became a target of some of the demonstra-
tions. Around two o'clock in the afternoon a delegation of 
about forty students was admitted and Dawson agreed to meet 
with them. The leaders, basing their arguments on the conten-
tions that the National Assembly was not a constitutional body 
and that recognition of Panamanian independence would dishonor 
and disgrace Colombia, politely delivered speeches expressing 
their opposition to the ratification of the treaties. Dawson 
replied that it would be improper for him as a foreign diplo-
mat to discuss the merits of the treaties with private indi-
viduals. However, he assured the students that the United 
States had only the friendliest sentiments towards Colombia, 
wishing it peace and prosperity. 70 While the students probably 
left unconvinced by Dawson's statements, the meeting possibly 
69Ibid. ?Oibid. 
r 
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did have a good effect upon them. 71 Dawson did not lodge a 
complaint with the Colombian Foreign Office over the demonstra-
tions at the Legation; nevertheless, the Legation was soon 
placed under heavy police guard. Future demonstrations in 
the vicinity were thwarted and the leaders arrested. 72 
In spite of Government attempts to stop the demonstra-
tions elsewhere, they continued to grow in intensity. On the 
thirteenth, in an effort to calm the students, Reyes agreed 
to meet with some of them in order to discuss the treaties. 
The students, however, soon turned the meeting into a denun-
ciation of the Reyes financial policies, his supression of 
freedom of the press and failure to call an elective congress. 
Shortly after the meeting Reyes submitted his resignation as 
President to the National Assembly, and Carlos Holguin, the 
designado, took the oath as acting President. Dawson was 
inclined to think that Reyes' move was prompted by his desire 
to demonstrate his own indispensability. Before the day was 
out, Reyes had regained his composure, or had decided that he 
had made his point. He resumed the presidency and determined 
to restore order by arresting the opposition leaders and de-
claring a state of seige. As a result of these moves by the 
President, Dawson hoped that the treaties would quickly be 
71Hibben to Secretary of State, June 21, 1909, en-
closure 1: British Vice Consul Huckin to Sir Edward Grey, 
March 19, .1909, Numerical File 5025/228. 
72Dawson to Secretary of State, March 29, 1909, No. 
247, Numerical File 1502/184. 
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acted upon. However, the Colombian Foreign Minister indicated 
that the opposition had been too successful in stirring up 
popular resentment against both the treaties and the domestic 
i 
policies of the Reyes Administration to allow for any inunedi-
ate action on the treaties. 73 
In the Assembly the opposition continued to center 
its attack on the treaties around Article VI of the treaty 
with the United States and the boundary article in the Pana-
manian treaty. Dawson believing that the resentment against 
the treaties "was being swallowed up in the feeling against 
the Government and considerations on internal politics and 
personal ambition," was eager to remove the complaints against 
these articles. By so doing, he hoped "to soften the blow in 
case Reyes should make up his mind to act vigorously. 1174 
Consequently, on the seventeenth he wired the State Depart-
ment urging that the Panamanian and Colombian Ministers in 
Washington exchange notes defining the limits of Jurado. Re-
garding Article VI of the United States treaty, he requested 
permission to give the Colombian Foreign Minister a note 
stating that the United States understood the article to be 
merely a reiteration of that provision of international law 
which provided for the refuge of a ship in distress, with 
the addition that the Colombian government would grant this 
refuge without the imposition of port fees. He also requested 
73Ibid. 74Ibid. 
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permission to make a minor punctuation correction in Article 
vr.75 
Authorization to make the necessary correction in 
Article VI and to officially inform the Colombian Foreign 
Minister of the United States' interpretation of that article 
was quickly sent. 76 However, the Panamanians were reluctant 
to exchange notes on the exact limits of Jurado, and the State 
Department, now under the direction of Secretary of State 
Philander c. Knox, did not feel called upon to express an 
77 
opinion on the Panamanina-Colombian boundary. 
By the twentieth, Begot~ seemed to be back to normal. 
The state of seige had been raised and Reyes had promised 
fiscal reforms and the immediate calling of an elected con-
gress. Nevertheless, the political situation was still con-
sidered too tenuous to take up once again the matter of the 
t t . 78 rea ies. On the twenty-fifth Dawson and the Colombian 
Foreign Minister completed the correction of Article VI and 
Dawson presented Urrutia with a note containing the United 
States' interpretation of the article. At that time Dawson 
was informed that Reyes had decided to push the treaties 
75 Dawson to Secretary of State, undated telegram, 
received 3:00 P.M., March 18, 1909, Numerical File 1502/166. 
76Knox to Dawson, March 19, 1909, telegram, Numeri-
cal File 1502/166. 
77rbid. Knox to Dawson, April 19, 1909, confiden-
tial, NumerICal File 1502/179-180. 
78Dawson to Secretary of State, March 29, 1909, No. 
247, Numerical File 1502/184. 
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through, without any further delay. Following this plan, on 
the twenty-sixth, the President summoned several members of 
the National Assembly to the Presidential palace and had them 
r 
I i 
sign a document pledging themselves to ratification of the 
treaties at the meeting of the Assembly on March 29. News of 
the President's action leaked out, and once again resulted 
in plotting against the Government. Rumors of revolt again 
became common in Bogot,. Members of the Assembly were threat-
ened with assassination if they voted for ratification, and 
r 
even the Archbishop of Bogot,, who had favored the treaties, 
wrote to Reyes advising their withdrawal and the immediate 
summoning of an elected congress. Whether the Archbishop's let-
ter wc:sdecisive, Dawson was unable to say; however, on the 
twenty-seventh Reyes announced both that he would recommend 
that the National Assembly put aside the treaties and that an 
elected congress would meet on July 20, 1909. Dawson was dis-
tressed over this change in plans and spent the twenty-
seventh with his friends in the Assembly and Government at-
tempting to prevent the delay in considering the treaties. 
However, his efforts were to no avail. 79 
Since the treaties would not be considered by the Colom-
bian congress until August at the earliest, Dawson thought 
that it would be better for the Legation to be left in charge 
of the Secretary. He reasoned that he himself would be pres-
sured to become involved in Colombian domestic politics as the 
79 Ibid. 
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elections drew near, and while he did not doubt that he would 
continue "to be prudent," he was fearful that there would be 
misapprehensions and misrepresentations of his attitude. 80 
Moreover, Dawson's return to Bogot~ in January had been some-
what unexpected, and he had been forced to leave his family in 
the United States. He was, therefore, eager to return to the 
United States as soon as possible, in order that he might ac-
,, 81 
company them back to Bogota. His superiors in the State 
I Department, however, decided that his presence in Bogota was 
required until the treaties had been ratified. 82 Despite 
this decision, within three weeks of receiving word that he 
would have to stay in Colombia, he was instructed to return 
to Washington. He was informed that he had been promoted to 
the Legation in Chile, and it was the State Department's 
desire that he return as soon as possible to confer with the 
. . / 11" 83 . 1 2 5 new minister to Bogota, E iott Northcott. By Apri , 
Dawson was on his way to Washington. 84 
Insofar as Dawson's mission had been concerned with 
SO Ibid. 
81Dawson to Root, January 18, 1909; Dawson to Bacon, 
January 20, 1909, Numerical File 2765/38-39. 
82
wilson to Dawson, April 3, 1909, telegram, Numeri-
cal File 2765/43a. 
83
wilson to Dawson, April 20, 1909, telegram, Numeri-
cal File 2765/45a. 
84Hibben to Secretary of State, April 25, 1909, tele-
gram, Numerical File 2765/47. 
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securing the ratification of the treaties, it had been a fail-
ure. They were never to receive the ratification of the Colom-
bian legislature. As a result of the strong opposition to 
both the treaties and his domestic policies, Reyes resigned 
the presidency and went into exile in the summer of 1909. 85 
In the face of the popular opposition in Colombia, Washing-
ton's reaction to Colombian ratification of the treaties be-
came one of indifference. In June, Assistant Secretary of 
State Huntington Wilson, serving as Acting Secretary, wired 
I • Charge Hibben to this effect. Wilson noted that the interests 
of Colombia and Panama were more involved than those of the 
United States, and, in view of the prevailing Colombian mood, 
the United States Legation "should maintain an impassive and 
dignified attitude. 1186 Since it appeared certain that the 
Colombian-United States treaty would not be ratified by the 
congress which convened in July, 1909, the new Colombian Gov-
ernment proposed a re-negotiation of that treaty. 87 However, 
the State Department maintaining its air of indifference and 
basing its argument on the joint character of the Panama-
. d 1 mb' . f d . t' 88 Unite States-Co o. ia treaties, re use to re-open negotia ions. 
85Parks, ~· cit., p. 436. 
86Acting Secretary of State to Hibben, June 11, 
1909, telegram, FRUS, 1910, p. 398. 
87Northcott to Secretary of State, September 29, 
1909, telegram; Northcott to Secretary of State, October 1, 
1909, No. 12, FRUS, 1910, pp. 399-401. 
88Acting Secretary of State to Northcott, October 4, 
1909, telegram, FRUS, 1910, p. 402, Parks, ~· cit., p. 436. 
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Furthermore, although relations between Colombia and 
the United States remained officially cordial, between March 
and August, 1909, the anti-United States sentiment among the 
I 
citizens of Colombia grew to such an' extent that according to 
oawson's successor, it was even stronger than it had been im-
mediately after the Panamanian revolution. 89 This hostility 
was only increased by Reyes, who threatened his opponents with 
United States intervention. 90 Dawson, of course, had personal-
ly maintained cordial relations with the Government and had 
also cultivated friendship with members of Colombian society. 
This did not spare him from the attacks of those who opposed 
both the treaties and the Reyes Administration. In May, Daw-
son was subject, along with other United States officials, to 
atta-cks in some Colombian papers. 91 Being the Minister of the 
United States, he was a natural focus for anti-Yankee sentiment. 
Undoubtedly, the failure to achieve ratification and 
the growth of anti-United States sentiment in Colombia were 
both results beyond Dawson's control rather than the outgrowth 
of any act or fault on his part. If Dawson failed, it was in 
his inability to fully realize the extent to which anti-
89Northcott to Secretary of State, August 18, 1909, 
No. 2, Numerical File 5025/286. 
90Northcott to Secretary of State, August 18, 1909, 
No. 2; Northcott to Secretary of State, November 8, 1909, 
No. 24, Numerical File 5025/286, 314. 
91
uibben to Knox, May 13, 1909, No. 262, Numerical 
File 1502/222. Hibben to Secretary of State, May 19, 1909, 
No. 264, Numerical File 5025/126. 
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Yankee sentiment still lingered in Colombia. A failure to 
fully credit nationalist opposition to United States policies 
had also been evident during his service in the Dominican 
Republic. There, however, this oversight was not as import-
ant in achieving the ultimate goal of his mission. The opposi-
tion was not as well organized, and the Dominican Government 
could always count on the moral support of the United States 
navy in its struggle to retain power. Neither was true in 
Colombia. The opponents of Reyes combined a genuine popular 
hostility towards the treaties with opposition to Reyes' 
domestic policies to force the President's ultimate resigna-
tion. Intervention, of course, was never even contemplated 
either by Dawson or his superiors in Washington. 
CHAPTER X 
CHILE: 
THE ALSOP CLAIM 1909 
William Howard Taft's victory in the November, 1908 
presidential election assured the continuation of Republican 
control of the federal executive. However, despite Dawson's 
desire both to remain in the diplomatic service and to seek 
promotion, there was no guarantee that either would be forth-
coming under the new Administration. That he was retained and 
promoted was probably the combined.result of his diplomatic 
record and the influence of his friends and political patrons. 
The necessity oe returning to Bogot~ with the tripartite 
treaties in January, 1909, made it impossible for Dawson to be 
present to plead his own case when the matter of his promotion 
or retention came up. Hence, he had to depend on the influence 
of his political patrons, Senators Albert B. Cummins and 
Johnathon Dolliver of Iowa and Walter Smith the congressmen 
from his home district, and his friend Charles G. Dawes, who 
still had influential political contacts. 1 Originally, it 
would seem that Dawson had set his sights on the United States 
Embassy in Brazil. 2 Both Iowa senators petitioned the new 
1 Dawson to Dawes, January 21, 1909, Dawes Collec-
tion, 1906-1914 Name File, Dawson-Pai, Thomas A. [sic] Dawson 
Folder. 
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secretary of State, Philander c. Knox, to promote Dawson. 
Instead of the Brazilian Embassy, however, they sought the 
t . . B . 3 r,ega ion in uenos Aires •. 
behalf to individuals close 
without making any specific 
promotion to Chile. 
Dawes likewise wrote on Dawson's 
I 
to the new Administration, but 
suggestions. 4 The outcome was the 
Dawson, as noted above, left Bogota' on April 25, 1909, 
to return to the United States before taking up his new as-
. t 5 signmen • By the time he reached Barranquilla, a telegram 
from Assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson was a-
waiting him at the United States Consulate. He was instructed 
to stop at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, for about a week and, in 
conjunction with Minister Henry w. Furniss, to investigate the 
"financial and other conditions" in Haiti, in order that he 
might be prepared to report fully to the State Department upon 
his return to Washington. 6 
The inunediate concern of the Department of State was 
the attempt of the National Bank of Haiti, a French controlled 
3cummins to Knox, February 22, 1909, Dawson's Appli-
cation and Reconunendation File. 
4Dawes to Fred W. Upham, American Trust Co. Bldg, 
Chicago, Illinois, March 25, 1909, Dawes Collection, Press 
Letter Books, October 9, 1908 to May 22, 1909, pp. 826-827. 
See also, Dawson to Dawes, June 8, 1909, Dawes Collection, 
1906-1914 Name File, Dawson-Pai, Thomas A. [sic] Dawson Folder. 
5Hibben to Secretary of State, April 25, 1909, tele-
gram, Numerical File 2765/47. 
6
wilson to Dawson, April 28, i909, telegram in care of 
the American Consulate, Barranquilla, Numerical File 874/43. 
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firm, to persuade the Haitian Government to allow it to col-
lect the custom revenues of the republic under a system similar 
to that which the United States had recently established in 
the Dominican Republic. 7 The State Department had earlier 
informed Minister Furniss that the United States viewed "with 
concern an arrangement whose potentiality might hereafter so 
seriously affect American citizens in Haiti, and the welfare 
of the whole country. 118 The Third Assistant Secretary of 
State, William Phillips, who was temporarily handling the 
Haitian problem, apparently reasoning that Dawson's extensive 
experience in the Dominican Republic would fit him well to 
investigate conditions in Haiti, suggested that he be in-
structed to stop off in Port-au-Prince on his way home from 
Colombia. 9 No written report by Dawson appears in the Depart-
ment of State's file on Haiti. 10 However, it is possible that 
he may have delivered his report orally. At any rate, the 
State Department's concern seemed to be for naught. The 
11 Haitian Government never approved the Bank's plan. 
By the end of May, his investigation in Haiti completed, 
7Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary (William 
Phillips) to the Secretary of State, April 28, 1909, ibid. 
8
sacon to Furniss, February 23, 1909, confidential, 
Numerical File 874/33-34. 
9Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary to Sec-
retary of State, April 28, 1909, Numerical File 874/43. 
10see Numerical File 874. 
11Munro, ~· cit., p. 247. 
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oawson was back in the United States. Here he remained for a 
month, spending part of his time familiarizing himself with 
United States-Chilean relations. 12 His thirty day instruction 
period completed, he shortly left for Chile, arriving in San-
tiago on August 14. Six days later he formally presented his 
credentials to President Pedro Montt. 13 Scarcely had he made 
his formal presentation, when he received a telegram from 
the Assistant Secretary of State informing him that he had 
been assigned to work in the Department of State as chief of 
the newly created Division of Latin American Affairs. He was 
instructed to leave Santiago at his earliest convenience, how-
ever, not before he had received and complied with instructions 
mailed on August 5, concerning the claim of Alsop and Company 
against the Government of Chile. 14 These instructions did not 
arrive in Santiago until September 12, and another five days 
passed before Dawson had completely fulfilled them. 15 
12 Dawson to Secretary of State, undated telegram re-
ceived May 8, 1909, Numerical File 2765/50. Dawson to Dawes, 
June 8, 1909, Dawes Collection, 1906-1914, Name File, Dawson-
Fai, Thomas A. [sic] Folder. Assistant Secretary to Dawson, 
June 15, 1909, memorandum, Numerical File 944. 
13
untitled calendar of Dawson's appointments from 1907 
to 1911, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. 
14
wilson to Dawson, August 27, 1909, telegram, ibid. 
Adee to American Legation in Santiago, Chile, September--rl';"" 
1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/157. 
15Dawson to Secretary of State, September 27, 1909, 
telegram, Numerical File 1154/164. Dawson to Secretary of 
State, October 4, 1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/166. 
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Announcement of Dawson's new assignment and pending 
departure from Santiago was apparently withheld until this 
time. When the announcement was made, Chilean reaction was 
overwhelmingly favorable. Both the principal government and 
opposition newspapers, El Mercurio and La Union respectively, 
ran editorials favorably commenting that the decision of the 
United States to create a special division within the State 
Department to handle Latin American affairs was a sign of the 
Taft Administration's desire for cordial and closer relations 
with the United States' southern neighbors. Both papers also 
found Dawson well suited for the position of chief of the new 
d . · · b f h' ·a k 1 d f t' · 16 ivision ecause o is wi e now e ge o La in America. 
In the days following the announcement, several semi-
official and social receptions honoring Dawson and his wife 
were held by the Chilean political and social elite. These 
festivities culminated with a banquet given in Dawson's be-
half by the leaders of the major political parties, on Octo-
ber 5, the day before Dawson scheduled to leave. 17 was 
I 
Here, Joaquin Walker Martinez, the former Minister to 
the United States and toastmaster at the dinner, in glowing 
terms, praised Dawson for his ability to have gained the 
16 Dawson to Secretary of State, October 27, 1909, No. 
20, enclosure 2: translation of editorial from El Mercurio; 
enclosure 4: translation of editorial from La Union, Numerical 
File 2765/80-81. 
17 Dawson to Secretary of Stat~, October 27, 1909, No. 
20, Numerical File 2765/79. 
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esteem and good will of those who had known him during the 
short time he had been in Santiago. The toastmaster further 
assured the new Chief of the Latin American Division that in 
Chile it was "a unanimous and solid conviction that Latin-
America should trust serene and tranquilly in the friendship 
of Saxon-America," and that he, as a former representative of 
his country in Washington, was convinced "that the actual 
policy of the United States toward her continental sisters is 
sincere and respects our sovereign rights." Nevertheless, 
I 
Walker Martinez did not hesitate to caution that if the United 
States were "interested in the fate and harmony of these 
countries, she will avoid with the greatest care every step 
that might give rise to what is called pretension to pre-
eminence, that make impossible the international approxima-
tion that she covets and strives so to realize. 1118 While the 
toastmaster probably meant his advice to be taken as a guide-
line for Dawson in conducting the business of the Division of 
Latin American Affairs, it was particularly appropriate in 
view of the negotiations which were then going on between the 
United States Legation and the Chilean Foreign Office. 
Despite the fact that Dawson's new assignment had been 
announced and that he had set his departure for October 6, he 
would not leave Santiago until mid-November, and then it would 
18 Dawson to Secretary of State, October 27,.)909, No. 
20, enclosure 8: translation of Joaquin Walker Martinez's 
speech as printed in El Mercurio, October 6, 1909, Numerical 
File 2765/83. 
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be under the clouds of deteriorating United States-Chilean 
relations. The issue which was to occupy Dawson's attention 
during the remainder of his stay in the Chilean capital was 
the settlement of the claim with which the instructions of 
August 5 were concerned: the claim of the heirs of Alsop 
and Company against the Government of Chile. This complicated 
claim had its origin in a loan made to the Government of 
/ Bolivia by a Chilean citizen, Pedro Lopez Gama, in the early 
1870's. In return for the loan, Bolivia was to give Gama 
150,000 tons of guano. Gama himself was indebted for the money 
he had advanced to Bolivia to a Chilean corporation known as 
Alsop and Company whose partners and capital were both North 
American. In 1875, to meet his indebtness to Alsop and Company, 
Gama transferred his claim against Bolivia to the Company, 
. which was then in the process of liquidating its holdings. 
This transaction was approved by Bolivia. The following year 
Bolivia and Alsop and Company, through its liquidator John 
Wheelwright, fixed the principal of the debt at approximately 
$805,775.00 in United States currency with five per cent inter-
est from the date of the contract, plus approximately 
$232,375.50 in interest already accrued. The debt was to be 
met from the revenues Bolivia received from its portion of 
the receipts from the Peruvian customhouse at Arica and from 
various state owned mines located in the Bolivian littoral. 
These mines were to be selected, by Wheelwright and leased for 
r 
' 
19 
a period of twenty-five years. 
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Before any of the provisions of the agreement could 
become operative, the War of the Pacific broke out and both 
i 
the customhouse and the mines fell to the control of Chile. 
Following the cessation of hostilities, no provision was made 
for Alsop and Company to share in the revenues from the Arica 
customhouse, and the application of Chilean mining laws to 
the former Bolivian littoral resulted in the Company being 
deprived of some of the rights it had acquired under the agree-
ment with Bolivia and being forced to expend large sums of 
money to retain the mines which would not have been necessary 
under Bolivian law. An appeal to the Chilean courts and 
executive did not resolve the problem of the Company's claim 
to the mines and consequently the Company appealed to the De-
partment of State. In Washington, it was considered that the 
action of Chile amounted to a violation of the practices of 
international law and the confiscation of the Company's 
19The sketch of the background of the Alsop claim up 
to 1907 is based on the major documents presenting respectively 
the United States and Chilean positions (Secretary of State to 
Minister Hicks, April 30, 1907, No. 60; The Chilean Charge to 
the Secretary of State, July 31, 1908, No. 122, enclosure: 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs to Minister Hicks, April 9, 
1908; The Secretary of State to Minister Dawson, August 5, 1909, 
No. 5; The Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister Dawson, 
October 15, 1909, PRUS, 1910, pp. 138-143, 146-154, 159-178, 
178-186), and the description given in Henry Clay Evans' book, 
Chile and its Relations with the United States (Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1927), pp. 165-167; and 
Frederick B. Pike's Chile and the United States, 1880-1962: 
The Erner ence of Chile's Social Crisis and the Challen e to 
United States Dip omacy Notre Dame, In 
Notre Dame Press, 1963), pp. 139-142. 
r 
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property. The result was several years of inclusive exchanges 
between the United States Legation in Santiago and the Chilean 
Foreign Office concerning the matter of the Alsop claim. In 
1892 and again in 1901, the Alsop claim was presented to 
United States-Chilean Claims conunissions which met to settle 
claims of citizens of one country against the other. The 
first conunission did not rule on the Alsop claim for want of 
time, and the second dismissed the claim on the grounds that 
the Company's Chilean registration made it legally a citizen 
of that country, and that the conunission was only authorized 
to rule on claims of United States citizens against Chile, 
not Chilean citizens against Chile. 
In the meantime, in the various preliminary negotia-
tions between Chile and Bolivia from 1891 to 1904, looking 
towards a definitive peace treaty, Chile had agreed to assume 
the Bolivian debt and obligations in the territory which had 
been annexed as a result of the War of the Pacific. Finally, 
on October 20, 1904, the two countries signed a peace treaty. 
Under the fifth article of that treaty, Chile agreed to assume, 
to the extent of 2,000,000 pesos gold of 18 pence, several 
claims against Bolivia, among these was the Alsop claim. In 
an additional protocol, signed and made public in November, 
1904, the two Governments explained that under article five of 
the treaty signed on October 20, it was understood that Chile 
had the right to reduce the claims as it saw fit. Subsequent-
ly, all but two claimants, Alsop and Company being one, agreed 
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to a pro-rated settlement. 
As previously noted, the Alsop claim had been the ob-
ject of correspondence between the United States Ministers in 
Santiago and the Chilean Foreign Office. In April, 1907, 
Secretary of State Elihu Root instructed Minister John Hicks 
to take up once again the Alsop case with the Foreign Minister. 
The State Department had recently acquired copies of secret 
notes which had been exchanged by the Bolivian and Chilean 
plenipotentiaries on October 21, 1904 concerning the meaning 
of Article V of the treaty which they had signed the previous 
day. In his note, the Bolivian plenipotentiary stated that by 
Article V his Government understood that Chile would cancel 
all of the obligations enumerated in the article, Bolivia's 
liability being completely eliminated "and the Government of 
Chile assuming all liabilities to their full extent." The 
Chilean representative, evading the issue, replied that his 
Government recognized that by Article V, it was responsible 
for arranging for the permanent cancellation of the claims 
mentioned in the article. The State Department interpreted 
these notes to mean that, in spite of the limitations which 
the article apparently placed on Chile's responsibility, Chile 
had bound itself to pay in full the claims mentioned in the 
t . 1 20 ar ic e. 
I On June 27, 1907, Charge Henry L. Janes presented the 
20
secretary of State to Hicks, April 30, 1907, No. 
60, PRUS, 1910, pp. 141-142. 
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united States case to the Chilean Foreign Minister, Frederico 
Puga Borne. Subsequently, in an interview with the United 
States charg~, the Foreign Minister rejected the United States 
contention that Chile was bound to pay in full the various 
claims and maintained that Chile's responsibility was limited 
to the amount of 2,000,000 pesos as provided by Article V of 
the treaty of October 20, 1904. 21 A formal written answer to 
Janes' note of June 27, 1907 was not sent to the United States 
Legation until April 9, 1908. In this note, Foreign Minister 
Puga Borne explained that he understood that the United States 
had been merely exercising its good offices on behalf of the 
Alsop claim and that the verbal reply given to the United 
I States charge had been considered sufficient. However, he went 
on, the continued efforts of the Legation on the behalf of 
the claimants now made it advisable to explain in full Chile's 
position in the matter. In summary, Puga Borne denied that 
Chile had either a responsibility to assume the Alsop claim 
because of the conquest of the territory in which the con-
cession had originally been granted or was bound to pay in 
full the claim by assuming this responsibility under Article 
V of the treaty with Bolivia. While refusing to acknowledge 
the secret notes of October 21, 1904, he maintained that even 
if they did exist, the wording of the supposed Chilean reply 
was such as to in no way indicate that Chile interpreted 
21Janes to Secretary of State; August 5, 1907, No. 
163, FRUS, 1910, pp. 143-144. 
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Article V as binding it to pay the claims in full. He repeated 
that the Chilean Government had considered the action of the 
United States Government on behalf of the Alsop claim as in 
the nature of good offices. Falling back on the decision of 
the Chilean-United States Claims Commission in 1901 to the 
effect that Alsop was juridically a Chilean person, he denied 
that the Company could seek diplomatic intervention from the 
United States. Nevertheless, if the United States insisted 
on intervening diplomatically on behalf of the claim, he noted 
that his Government could not accept this intervention and 
would offer to arbitrate the case. 22 
In Washington, it was thought that the Chilean note of 
April 9, 1908 did not throw any new light on the case. Minis-
ter Hicks was informed that the Department of State considered 
the note "in a large measure ill-founded in its statements of 
fact, and sophistical in its arguments. 1123 Furthermore, Hicks 
was reprimanded for mentioning, in his acknowledgment of re-
ceipt to the Foreign Minister, that the note of April 9 was 
forceful and would receive the careful attention of the Depart-
ment of State. He was instructed not to do or say anything 
which might indicate that the United States was not sincere in 
22
chilean Charg~ to Secretary of State, July 31, 
1908, enclosure: the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Minister 
Hicks, April 9, 1908, ibid., pp. 146-154. 
23 Root to Hicks, November 30, 1908, No. 139, Numeri-
cal File 1154/99. 
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its efforts to obtain a settlement of the claim. 24 
During the last six months of the Roosevelt Administra-
tion, the State Department's actions on behalf of the claim 
seems to have been directed to obtaining from Chile any infor-
mation which would have justified Santiago in refusing to pay 
the entire amount of the claim. 25 The Taft Administration had 
no difficulty in deciding to continue to press for a settle-
ment of the claim. 26 On March 18, 1909, Secretary of State 
Knox wrote to the Chilean Minister in Washington, Anibal Cruz, 
again requesting information which would justify Chile's at-
t t d h t d h 1 1 . 27 temp o re uce t e amoun ue t e A sop c aim. In mid-
April, during an interview with Assistant Secretary Hunting-
ton Wilson and J. Ruben Clark of the Solicitor's Office, Cruz 
admitted that his Government did not have any specific evi-
dence which would justify a reduction of the claim. Wilson 
24Ibid. 
25J. B. Scott (Solicitor of the State Department) to 
Adee, August 11, 1908, Numerical File 1154/95. Acting Secre-
tary of State to the Chilean Minister, August 29, 1908; Acting 
Secretary of State to the Chilean Minister, November 24, 1908; 
Chilean Minister to the Secretary of State, November 26, 1908; 
Acting Secretary of State to Hicks, January 24, 1909, telegram; 
Hicks to Secretary of State, telegram, received February 26, 
1909, FRUS, 1910, pp. 154-156. 
26
undated and unsigned memorandum on foreign affairs, 
Philander c. Knox Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D. c., [hereafter cited as Knox Papers], 
Correspondence of Philander C. Knox, Vol. VI, 1908-1909, 
June 2, April 22. 
27 Secretary of State to Chilean Minister, March 18, 
1909, No. 22, FRUS, 1910, pp. 156-57. 
r . . 
~ 
asked that the State Department be given a formal note to 
28 this effect. In his note to Knox on April 16, complying 
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with Wilson's request, Cruz repeated the argument that Alsop 
I I 
and Company was a Chilean firm and thus not entitled to the 
protection of the United States State Department. Finally, 
he stated that the reduction of the claim was based on the 
provision of Article V of the Chilean-Bolivian treaty of 
October 20, 1904. 29 The absence of any further communications 
for the period April to August, 1909, either between the State 
Department and the Legation in Santiago or between the Depart-
ment and the Chilean Legation in Washington, would seem to 
indicate that Knox and Wilson decided to await Dawson's ar-
rival in Santiago before further pursuing the case. 
By the time Dawson arrived in Santiago in mid-August, 
1909, Washington had decided to press for the settlement of 
the Alsop claim on the bases that Chile was guilty of viola-
tion of contract and of committing a tort against the Company. 
To substantiate the charge of violation of contract, the De-
partment, bringing forth both the correspondence between Chile 
and the United States on the Alsop claim and the various pro-
tocols between Chile and Bolivia, including Article V of the 
28Memorandum of an Interview Between Assistant Secre-
tary Wilson and Minister Cruz Concerning the Alsop Case, Mr. 
Clark of the Solicitor's Office Being Present, April 15, 
1909, Numerical File 1154/123. 
29The Chilean Minister to the Secretary of State, 
April 16, 1909, FRUS, 1910, p. 157. . 
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treaty of October 20, 1904 and the subsequent secret notes of 
October 21, argued that these constituted Chilean recognition 
of the validity of the Alsop claim and were tantamount to a 
contractual obligation on the part of the Chilean Government 
to pay the claim in full. The contention that Chile had com-
mitted a tort against the Company was based on the argument 
that by depriving Alsop and Company of its share of the Arica 
customs and by applying Chilean mining laws, Chile violated 
"the well established principle of international law that all 
private rights and property must be respected and protected 
by a government assuming jurisdiction and control over terri-
n 30 tory in which such rights exist. . . . 
The Chilean Government's position on these charges, 
as made clear in the negotiations prior to and following Daw-
son's arrival, was in summary, that it recognized only a lim-
ited liability towards the Alsop claim. It denied that it had 
ever agreed to pay the claim in full, or that the treaty with 
Bolivia and the subsequent secret notes required it to do so. 
Concerning Washington's contention that the application of 
Chilean mining laws to the former Bolivian littoral constituted 
a tort against Alsop and Company, Chile argued that the con-
cession which had been granted to the Company by Bolivia did 
not constitute an actual right over the properties but merely 
consisted of the assignment of the proceeds of certain property 
30 Secretary of State to Dawson, August S, 1909, No. 
5, ibid., pp. 159-78. 
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to the payment of credit and thus the annexing country did not, 
under international practice, have to recognize these conces-
sions. Furthermore, it was argued that these concessions had 
in fact been granted in territory actually belonging to Chile 
and which had merely gone back to its rightful owner as a 
result of the War of the Pacific. 31 
However, Chile's major argument against the United 
States intervening diplomatically on behalf of the Alsop and 
Company was based on the premise that the Company was a firm 
incorporated under the laws of Chile and thus juridically a 
Chilean citizen entitled to diplomatic intervention only by 
Chile. To support this position, the Chilean Foreign Office 
brought forward the United States-Chilean Claim Commission 
decision of 1901, and maintained that if the firm were to ob-
tain redress, it had to apply to the Chilean courts. 32 For 
its part, the State Department argued that the Chilean re-
gistry of the firm did not preclude United States diplomatic 
intervention on behalf of the Yankee claimants. The Depart-
ment noted that North American capital had been lost by North 
American citizens and that for all practical purposes the 
partnership had ceased to exist. Therefore, it was maintained 
31
chilean Charge" to Secretary of State, July 31, 
1908, enclosure: Minister for Foreign Affairs to Minister 
Hicks, April 9, 1908; Minister of Foreign Affairs to Dawson, 
October 15, 1909 (delivered November 27, 1909), ibid., pp. 
146-154' 178-186. --
32 . . f . ff . t b 15 Minister o Foreign A airs to Dawson, Oc o er , 
1909, ibid., pp. 180-81. 
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that 
to contest the right of the Government of the United States 
to intervene in behalf of the injured American partners 
in such a partnership, under such conditions, for the loss 
of American capital, would be to contest the fundamental 
sovereign right of the Government of the United States to 
intervene in behalf of its citizens--a proposition for 
which the Government of Chile would not, the Government 
of the United States feels, for a moment contend.33 
Furthermore, the State Department insisted that the decision 
of the Chilean-United States Claims Commission neither was 
meant to preclude, nor did preclude, United States diplomatic 
intervention. Finally, the Department noted that Chilean 
objection to United States intervention on behalf of the Com-
pany was recent and had not been brought up in the earlier 
t . t' 34 nego ia ions. 
On August 5, 1909, Secretary of State Knox sent Daw-
son a fifty-four page despatch containing the United States' 
position in regard to the Alsop claim and calling upon the 
Chilean Government to come to an equitable agreement with the 
claimants or to consent immediately to sign a protocol with 
the United States agreeing to arbitrate the dispute. Dawson 
was instructed to present this note verbatim to Foreign Minis-
/ 
ter Augustin Edwards as soon as possible. A draft protocol, 
containing a lengthy preamble in which the case from the United 
States viewpoint was put forth, was included should the 
33secretary of State to Dawson, August 5, 1909, No. 
5, ibid., p. 175. 
34Ibid., pp. 175-76. 
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r Chilean Government decide on the alternative of arbitration. 35 
' This was the despatch which Dawson had been instructed 
to await before returning to Washington to assume his new post 
as Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs. When it 
did arrive on September 12, for some reason which is not clear, 
oawson did not choose to follow his instructions to the letter. 
He did not present the note to the Foreign Minister until 
. 36 September 17. Nevertheless, he had discussed the matter with 
Edwards prior to this, and by the thirteenth the Foreign 
Minister agreed to arbitration. On the fifteenth, Dawson sub-
mitted the draft arbitration protocol to him. Within a week, 
Edwards presented a counter draft in which the right of the 
United States to intervene diplomatically would also be sub-
mitted to arbitration. Upon being assured by Dawson that this 
would not be acceptable, Edwards yielded, but rejected the 
lengthy preamble setting forth the United States viewpoint 
as one sided and unjustly preventing Chile from noting the 
Chilean registration of the firm. In place of this preamble, 
Edwards suggested one of a more general nature which merely 
noted that the United States and Chile, not having been able 
to agree on the original and subsequent claims of Alsop and 
35Knox to Dawson, August 5, 1909, No. 5, Numerical 
File 1154/156A. This document, less the protocol, was 
printed in PRUS, 1910, pp. 159-178. 
36Dawson to Secretary of State, October 4, 1909, 
telegram, Numerical File 1154/164. 
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h d d t b 't th t b' t' 37 company, a agree o su mi e case o ar itra ion. 
Apparently, foreseeing no great difficulty in corning 
to an agreement with the Chilean Government, Dawson wired the 
Foreign Minister's preamble to the State Department, and set 
October 6, as the date for his departure. It was at this 
juncture that the various receptions and dinners honoring 
Dawson were held. In Washington, the Chilean preamble was 
rejected as not sufficiently defining the issues. Dawson 
was told that if Chile wished to enumerate its allegations, 
the Department of State would be willing to consider them as 
additions to the preamble which had been sent. Concerning 
the issue of Chilean registry of Alsop and Company, the De-
partrnent thought that articles III and VI of the protocol, 
which provided respectively for the manner of submission of 
. evidence and the bases for the judgment, were sufficiently 
broad to permit the issue to be brought before the arbitral 
tribunal. However, Dawson was informed that the United States 
could not allow its right to intervene in the case to be ques-
tioned. Furthermore, he was reminded that, in view of his 
impending return to Washington to be Chief of the Division of 
Latin American Affairs, it was most desirable that he succeed 
in these negotiations. He was instructed to make known to the 
Government of Chile that if its relations with the United 
States were considered important, it was essential that this 
37Dawson to Secretary of State, September 27, 1909, 
telegram, Numerical File 1154/164. 
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one controversy, which had existed for over twenty years, be 
resolved. Finally, if a settlement could not be reached by 
October 6, he was to delay his departure for another week. 38 
I 
Over the next six weeks the negotiations would continue 
to falter over the right of the United States to intervene 
on behalf of that claim. On October 9, Foreign Minister Ed-
wards ag~ed to sign a protocol with a preamble containing 
the allegations and counter allegations of the two countries, 
without any mention being made of the registry of Alsop and 
' Company. The Foreign Minister's consent depended on Dawson's 
willingness to give him a note, at the time of signing, re-
stating the State Department's position that Articles III and 
VI allowed Chile to mention the Chilean registration in its 
arguments before the arbitral board. Dawson optimistically 
set October 12, for his departure. 39 Again he was instructed 
to delay leaving Santiago. 40 
At this point, an agreement might have been possible. 
On the sixteenth, Assistant Secretary of State Wilson sent 
Dawson a telegram informing him that the Department of State 
agreed to the inclusion in the preamble of all the Chilean 
counter-allegations so long as these did not include mention 
38
wilson to Dawson, October 1, 1909, telegram, ibid. 
39 oawson to Secretary of State, October 9, 1909, 
telegram, Numerical File 1154/171. 
40w·1 t . t' S ' Ch'l i son o American Lega ion, antiago, i e, 
October 11, 1909, telegram, ibid. 
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of the registration of the firm. Wilson noted that the Depart-
ment did not see the need for the note which Edwards desired. 
He observed that as the articles stood it would be impossible 
to prevent Chile from bringing the registry of Alsop and Com-
pany or any other information before the arbitral board. In 
Washington, however, it was suspected that the proposed note 
was merely another attempt on Chile's part to include the 
issue of the nationality of the firm as a matter for arbitra-
tion. The United States position on this point, of course, 
had not changed. Dawson, however, was authorized to suggest, 
once the protocol was signed, that, if Chile preferred to 
save the expense of arbitration, a subsequent protocol be 
signed, which would delay the arbitration, in order to give 
Chile an opportunity to come to an agreement with the claim-
. ants. Dawson was further to inform the Chilean Foreign Minis-
ter that if Chile suggested a sum which the State Department 
considered reasonable, it would be accepted by Washington 
even if the claimants did not think it reasonable. 41 
In the meantime, however, President Montt and the 
Cabinet overruled Edwards and insisted that the portion of the 
1901 United States-Chilean Claims Commission's decision dis-
missing the Alsop claim on the basis that the firm was tech-
nically a Chilean citizen be included in the preamble of .the 
protocol. No allegation as to the legal effect of this 
41
wilson to American Legation, Santiago, Chile, 
October 16, 1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/174. 
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decision was to be mentioned. Dawson's reaction to this new 
demand was to restate the State Department's position that 
the United States could not allow its right to intervene on 
h lf f th 1 . t t b t' d 42 be a o e c aiman s o e ques ione • 
By November 3, the State Department had decided to 
yield somewhat to Chilean preferences. Secretary Knox tele-
graphed Dawson authorization to accept either of two alterna-
tives. First, he could accept a preamble containing the 
Chilean counter-allegations, including the insertion of the 
United States-Chilean Claims Commission's decision on the 
legal personality of the Alsop firm. Secondly, he could agree 
to a more general preamble, which would evidently refrain 
from mentioning the various contentions of the opposing par-
ties. In either case, Dawson's acceptance was to be contin-
gent on the Chilean Foreign Minister agreeing to give him a 
note at the time of signing stating that the United States' 
right to intervene in this case was not questioned. Nor was 
it to be an issue of the arbitration. If Chile should continue 
to refuse to sign an arbitration protocol unless United States 
intervention were made an issue of the arbitration, Dawson was 
to give notice of his intention to depart by the next ship 
and to inform the Foreign Minister that Washington considered 
Chile's unwillingness to arbitrate as signifying Santiago's 
decision to reach an equitable settlement with the Alsop 
42 Dawson to Secretary of State, October 15, 1909, 
telegram, ibid. 
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claimants through the United States charge'. However, if the 
Chilean Government had not given some evidence of intending to 
reach an agreement with the claimants prior to his departure, 
I 
oawson was instructed to bring along with him the Secretary 
I 
of the Legation, who normally would have acted as charge, and 
to leave the Legation in the custody of the United States 
consul. 43 
On November 5, Dawson wired the Secretary of State 
that Foreign Minister Edwards had agreed to sign a protocol 
with a preamble containing the various allegations and counter-
allegations of the two Governments including the Claims Com-
mission's decision on the nationality of the Alsop firm, and 
to exchange notes disavowing the questioning of the United 
States' right of diplomatic intervention. 44 By the twelfth, 
the details of the protocol had been agreed upon and the 
English and Spanish texts prepared. Anticipating no further 
delay, Dawson set his departure for the sixteenth. However, 
on the thirteenth, the day prior to the signing, President 
Montt and the Cabinet again overruled Edwards and insisted 
that the question of the United States' right to intervention 
must be included in the protocol. Dawson informed the Foreign 
Minister that unless Chile made some assurances that a 
43K . . . h'l nox to American Legation, Santiago, C i e, Novem-
ber 3, 1909, telegram, ~· 
44
oawson to Secretary of State, November 5, 1909, 
telegram, Numerical File 1154/182. · 
r 364 
settlement would be reached with the claimants, the United 
states would close its legation in Santiago. On the morning 
of the fourteenth, Edwards countered with two proposals which 
were to be transmitted to the Secretary of State through 
Minister Cruz in Washington. The first provided for a cash 
settlement, and the second for Chile to pay the amount found 
to be equitable by a liquidator appointed by Brazil. Dawson 
informed Edwards that it was doubtful the latter proposal 
would receive much favor in Washington in view of the previous 
vacillation of Chile unless the Government obligated itself 
to obtain the appropriation as soon as the amount had been 
determined by the l' . d t 45 iqui a or. 
Since he had already set the date for his departure, 
Dawson felt to change it again would only serve to convince 
the Chilean Government that the United States was weakening 
in its resolve to settle the Alsop matter. He left on sched-
ule, therefore, first heading for Buenos Aires and from there 
going on to Rio de Janeiro where his family was awaiting him. 
Before leaving, he gave Seth Low Pierrepont, the Secretary of 
the Legation two notes. One accredited him as Charg~ d'Af-
faires. The other provided for the severing of relations. 
Neither was to be used until instructions had been received 
from Washington. 46 
45oawson to Secretary of State, November 14, 1909, 
telegram, Numerical File 1154/186. 
46oawson to Secretary of State, November 16, 1909, 
telegram, Numerical File 1154/187. 
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Dawson's departure for Buenos Aires stirred up alarm-
ing rumors in Santiago, 47 and provided the opposition with an 
opportunity to attack the policies of the Government. In an 
editorial entitled "Que cese el ministerio," on November 19, 
La Union interpreted Dawson's departure as tantamount to the 
United States severing diplomatic relations with Chile. It 
was noted that the United States Minister had left under cir-
cumstances which were not advantageous for Chile's interests 
and which amounted "to an affront to his person and to his 
diplomatic action. 1148 In an article published the previous 
day, which also discussed Chile's relations with the United 
States and Dawson's departure, La Union reported that the 
F~reign Minister had given Dawson a note agreeing to arbitra-
tion, but that later the contents had been altered by the 
President with the result that the United States Minister 
understood that the promise of arbitration had been withdrawn. 
Consequently, the article maintained, Dawson thought he had 
no other recourse but to leave for Buenos Aires. The author 
of the article stated he had heard the United States Minister 
express, prior to his departure, the displeasure which the 
Chilean Government's change of positions had caused him. 
47Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 29, 1909, 
No. 27, enclosure: clipping from El Mercurio (Santiago), 
November 21, 1909, Numerical File 1154/257. 
48Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 29, 1909, 
No. 27, enclosure: clipping from La Union, November 19, 1909, 
ibid. 
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According to the reporter, Dawson supposedly said that he had 
been able to accomplish nothing in Santiago. Until the Govern-
ment had changed its position, he thought the Alsop matter 
could be arranged, but now he would leave. It was further 
reported that Dawson observed that his Government had not named 
a new minister to Chile and that he did not know if one would 
be assigned. Nor did he know if the Department of State would 
wait for him to return to Washington to negotiate with Minis-
ter Cruz or if it would insist on arbitration as had been 
promised. He said, it was stated, that he had provided every 
opportunity for the Government of Chile to win his friendship 
and that he regretted the unforeseen development which this 
disagreeable incident had taken. The United States Govern-
ment had been kept fully informed, but he had not had time to 
receive new instructions. Nevertheless, he had not lost hope 
that the Alsop matter could be satisfactorily arranged by both 
countries. 49 The article went on to raise the question of 
whether Chile could now count on Dawson's good will. In com-
menting on the adverse reaction Dawson's departure had in 
Santiago, La Union observed that Dawson was going back to the 
United States to be an adviser to his government on Latin Ameri-
can affairs and asked how the Government of Chile could let 
h . 1 'th h f bl . . so im eave wi sue an un avora e impression. 
49Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 29, 
1909, No. 27, enclosure: clipping from La Union, November 18, 
1909, ibid. 
SO Ibid. 
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In an interview with a reporter from La Prensa in 
suenos Aires, Dawson attempted to mitigate the effect that his 
departure had had in Chile. He stressed that his departure 
was not a severing of diplomatic relations but was merely 
prompted by his new assignment which had been announced some 
time ago. He maintained that the press reaction to the Alsop 
case was all out of proportion to the real state of the matter. 
He further stated that it was his general impression that a 
perfectly satisfactory solution would be obtained. Concerning 
the supposed remarks published in La Union, Dawson categori-
cally denied he had such an interview or that he had made the 
statements attributed to him. La Prensa quoted him as saying 
"it was not likely that a career diplomat like me, experienced 
in that type of diplomatic business would be so impolitic in 
. making declarations on diplomatic negotiations, which ought 
not to be seen by the public except when the governments 
think it convenient. 1151 When asked if the nervousness appar-
ent in the Chilean press might not be explained by the fear 
that the United States might support Peru in the Tacna and 
Arica dispute, Dawson replied that this was a mistake and that 
no one could produce even a shred of evidence to indicate that 
the United States was intervening in the Chilean-Peruvian 
5111No es verosimil--agrego--que un diplomatico de 
carrera come yo, experimentado en esta clase de asuntos de 
cancillerfa, hubiera sido tan impolitico en hacer declara-
ciones sobre negaciados diplomaticos, que no deben ver la 
publicidad sino cuando los gobiernos lo creen conveniente." 
La Prensa (Buenos Aires), November 20, 1909, p. 10. 
~ntroversy. 368 He further observed that the United States had 
' 
' 
nothing to gain in the dispute and that, above all, Washington 
hoped South Americans could resolve their own problems. The 
/ 
south American policy of the United States, he maintained, 
b d th . . 52 was ase on is premise. 
Despite Dawson's denial, as printed in La Prensa, the 
question of whether he actually made the statements attributed 
to him in La Union, still remains. Lacking any other evi-
dence, the argument reduces itself to a matter of simply 
weighing Dawson's words against those of the author of the 
La Union article. On the one hand, Dawson certainly had an 
interest in denying the remarks attributed to him. They 
would undoubtedly have been inappropriate for a diplomat to 
make, and one would think that Dawson's experience would have 
enabled him to act more discreetly. On the other hand, La 
Union was clearly attempting to embarrass the Government of 
President Pedro Montt by publishing the supposed statements 
of the former United States Minister. Nevertheless, the 
statements which La Union attributed to Dawson were perhaps 
not far from the sentiment of frustration he might have felt 
towards the negotiations recently conducted with Foreign 
Minister Edwards. Wiring the State Department from Buenos 
Aires on November 19, Dawson reported that he was convinced 
that the protocol, which he and Edwards had agreed to on the 
52Ibid. 
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twelfth, would not have been submitted to the Chilean Legisla-
ture until June, 1910, and then, he felt, it would not have 
. d t'f' t• 53 receive ra i ica ion • Furthermore, his denial of having 
. had an interview is not directly contradicted in La Union. 
,/ 
The article merely states: "Pero, antes de partir, tuvimos 
/ 
oportunidad de oirle manifestar el desagrado que este cambio 
.I 54 de frente del Gobierno de Chile le producia." Therefore, 
it is possible that the remarks attributed to Dawson were, in 
fact, made in an off-handed manner or in private conversation. 
Here, as before, no definite conclusion can be reached. In 
addition, Dawson was something less than completely honest 
when he referred to the Tacna-Arica controversy. In an inter-
view with Minister Cruz, prior to leaving for Chile, Dawson 
apparently hinted that the United States might decide to side 
with Peru in the dispute if Chile did not come to some agree-
ment on the Alsop claim. 55 
Back in Santiago, El Mercurio, which was owned by 
Edward's family, 56 took Dawson's interview with La Prensa at 
face value, and reprinted the gist of his comments. 
53Dawson to Secretary of State, November 19, 1909, 
telegram, Numerical File 1154/194. 
54Pierrepont to Knox, November 29, 1909, No. 27, 
enclosure: clipping from La Union, November 18, 1909, Numeri-
cal File 1154/257. 
55Pike, op. cit., pp. 143, 362. Pike bases his claim 
on documents froil\the-archives of the Chilean Foreign Office. 
56 Dawson to Secretary of State, September 17, 1909, 
No. 9, Numerical File 180/28. 
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undoubtedly, this was an attempt to disprove La Union's charge 
that the Government's handling of the Alsop negotiations had 
injured United States-Chilean relations for some time to come 
and to squelch rumors that Dawson's departure had amounted to 
a severing of diplomatic relations between the two countries. 57 
In the meantime, negotiations on the Alsop claim were 
continuing. On November 16, Minister Cruz, in Washington, 
presented the State Department with the alternative plans 
which Edwards had mentioned to Dawson before the latter's de-
parture. The first called for a cash settlement of 67,000 
pounds sterling ($335,000) with interest from 1905 until the 
date of payment, while the second proposed submitting the 
case to the Brazilian Government for liquidation. Secretary 
of State Knox rejected both plans and stated that the Alsop 
claim could not be considered settled unless Chile agreed to 
sign and carry out an arbitration protocol or made a cash 
payment of not less than $1,000,000 United States gold to the 
1 . t 58 c aiman s. Pierrepont was instructed to assume the character 
I 
of Charge d' Affaires and to present the Chilean Foreign Of-
fice with a note containing the two conditions under which the 
United States would consider the claim settled. In addition, 
57Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 29, 
1909, No. 27, enclosure: clipping from El Mercurio (Santiago), 
December 22, 1909, Numerical File 1154/257. 
58Knox to American Legation, Santiago, Chile, Novem-
ber 17, 1909, telegram, Numerical Pile 1154/186. Knox to 
Cruz, November 17, 1909, Numerical File 1154/190-192. 
371 
Pierrepont was to state in the note that if the settlement of 
the case was not undertaken in one of these ways within ten 
days, he had been instructed to leave, entrusting the archives 
of the Legation to the care of the uhited States consu1. 59 
Pierrepont complied with his instructions on the afternoon of 
h . h h 60 t e eig teent • 
By threatening to withdraw its diplomatic officers 
from Santiago, the State Department did not, strictly speaking, 
envision breaking off diplomatic relations with Chile. There 
was no intention of handing Minister Cruz his passport. The 
official argument in Washington was simply that failure to 
resolve the controversy over the Alsop claim made the Lega-
tion in Santiago virtually useless for conducting negotiations 
between the two governments. Furthermore, the State Depart-
ment did not choose to interpret Pierrepont's note of the 
eighteenth to the Chilean Foreign Office as an ultimatum in 
h · a· 1 t' 61 t e strict ip oma ic sense. 
Whatever the technical interpretation Washington 
placed upon Pierrepont's note, Santiago viewed it as an ulti-
matum. 62 Foreign Minister Edwards hastened to instruct Minister 
59Knox to American Legation, Santiago, Chile, 
November 17, 1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/190-192. 
60Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 18, 
1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/193. 
61 t ' t' ' h'l N mb . 24 Knox o American Lega ion in C i e, ave er , 
1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/206. 
62Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 25, 
1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/211. 
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cruz to inform the State Department that Chile was still wil-
ling to arbitrate on a basis where each Government could make 
all allegations considered necessary for its case. To prove 
its sincerity, Cruz was to state that Chile had deposited in 
London, to the account of the Permanent Court at the Hague, 
the sum of ~200,000 ($1,000,000), the amount which the Depart-
ment of State had indicated was a minimum acceptable for set-
tling the claim. 63 
Despite this expression of sincerity, Chile's in-
sistence that the United States' right to intervene in the 
case must be a point of arbitration led to an impasse. 64 
Pierrepont would have left Santiago on schedule had not an 
alternate solution been f~und. On the twenty-fourth Knox 
/ 
wired the charge to propose that the two Governments submit 
the matter to King Edward VII of Great Britain as an "aimable 
compositeur" who would render a decision which would be bind-
ing on both parties. 65 This solution avoided the issue of 
the United States' right to intervene on behalf of the claim-
ants of the Chilean corporation. Pierrepont presented the 
proposal to Edwards on November 25, and on the twenty-sixth 
63Edwards to Minister of Chile in Washington, Novem-
ber 18, 1909, Numerical File 1154/199. 
64Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 23, 
1909, telegram, Numericql File 1154/206. 
65Knox to American Legation in Chile, November 24, 
1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/206. 
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it was accepted by the Chilean Government. 66 The formal pro-
tocol was signed December 1. 67 
This solution was not suddenly pulled out of the 
thin air by the State Department and presented as a possible 
solution to the impasse. The idea of submitting the contro-
versy to a third party for liquidation had its origin in the 
Chilean suggestion.of mid-November that the case be submitted 
to the Brazilian Government. At that time it was rejected by 
the Secretary of State because he probably thought that it 
was only another Chilean attempt to delay a final settlement. 68 
Consequently, Pierrepont was instructed to present his note 
setting a time limit for the settlement or arbitration of the 
claim. When news of this "ultimatum" became known in the 
other South American countries, press reaction in some of them 
bl 1 h . 1 h . d . . 69 . was atant y osti e to t e Unite States position. In 
Brazil, where Foreign Minister Rio-Branco was seeking close 
friendship with both the United States and Chile, the news of 
what appeared to be a pending break in relations between the 
66Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 25, 1909, 
telegram, Numerical File 1154/211. Pierrepont to Secretary of 
State, November 26, 1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/213. 
67Protocol Between the United States and Chile--Arbi-
tration of the Alsop Claim, FRUS, 1910, pp. 186-187. 
68Frederic w. Ganzert, "The Baron Do Rio Branco, 
Joaquim Nabuco, and the Growth of Brazilian-American Friend-
ship 1900-1911," The Hispanic American Historical Review, 
XXII (August, 1942)' 450. 
69oudley to Secretary of State, November 23, 1909, 
telegram, Numerical File 1154/205. 
70 two countries was greeted with much concern. Both Rio-
Branco and the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington, Joaquim 
Nabuco, expressed Brazil's. hope that a solution could be 
! 
I I 
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reached. In addition to meeting with Knox on November 23, and 
explaining the Chilean position on submitting the case to a 
third party, Nabuco had appealed to his friend, the former 
secretary of State, Elihu Root to intervene with Knox. 71 Al-
so on the twenty-third, Minister Cruz presented Knox with a 
letter explaining Chile's proposa1. 72 It was apparently out 
of this background that the decision was reached to accept the 
alternative of presenting the entire case to a third party for 
resolution, without a specific protocol containing the allega-
tions of the two Governments. In his conversation with Knox 
on November 23, Nabuco had alluded to the difficulty with 
which Brazil would be faced if it were forced to decide a case 
between its two friends. 73 A solution to this problem was 
70Burns, ~· cit., pp. 135-136. In his work on United 
States-Brazilian relations during Rio-Branco's administration 
of the Brazilian Foreign Office, E. Bradford Burns incorrect-
ly states that Chile objected to the United States intervening 
on behalf of a private citizen's claim. Ibid., p. 136. As 
noted above, the Chilean objection was based on the registry 
of the Company. 
71Ibid., pp. 137-138. 
72
cruz to Knox, November 23, 1909, Numerical File 
1154/204. In contrast to Burns who stress the role of Nabuco, 
Pike maintains that Cruz's friendship with Knox was also im-
portant in bringing the Alsop controversy to a happy conclu-
sion. Pike,~· cit., p. 142. 
73Nabuco to Knox, November 27, 1909, Numerical File 
1154/216. 
f 
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already at hand. In his telegram of November 23, informing 
the State Department that Chile insisted upon the United 
states' right to intervene being questioned in any arbitra-
tion protocol, Pierrepont also noted that there were indica-
tions Chile would be willing to seek the good offices of the 
British Government in reaching an agreement with the United 
States, 74 hence, the choice of the king of Great Britain. 75 
From the vantage point of over half a century, neither 
the sum at issue in the Alsop claim nor the controversy it-
self appear to have been important enough to warrant the 
rather drastic measures that the State Department was willing 
to take in order to bring the case to a conclusion. Even in 
1909, Washington's policy seemed unwarranted to some. Minis-
ter Cruz expressed this sentiment in a note to Secretary Knox 
on November 23, 1909. He noted that his "Government could 
never have imagined that a pecuniary claim would have assumed 
the character and proportion of a controversy which, accord-
ing to the announcement of the Chargi d'Affaires, may lead to 
a suspension of diplomatic relations. 1176 Latin American 
74 . 
Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 23, 1909, 
telegram, Numerical File 1154/206. 
751n the award handed down by George V of Great Bri-
tain, the claimants were to be paid 187,000 pounds sterling. 
The claim as it existed at the time of the Wheelwright-
Bolivian agreement was allowed. However, the United States' 
contention that the application of Chilean mining laws to the 
former Bolivian littoral had unjustly harmed the Alsop claim-
ants was dropped. Evans,~· cit., p. 168; Pike,~· cit., 
pp • 13 9-14 0 • 
76
cruz to Knox, November 23, 1909, Numerical File 
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6ympathies were clearly with Chile. Santiago's version of the 
case received publicity in the Latin American press, while 
the United States policy was greeted, as has been noted, with 
hostility. To counter this rhostility, the State Department 
sent a circular note containing its version of the Alsop claim 
to the Legations in the major capitals of South America. A-
long with the circular were instructions to have the United 
states' case published in the local press. 77 Opposition to 
the United States policy in the Alsop case was not confined to 
Latin Americans. Fearing that their own business would suffer 
as a result of the Alsop controversy, North American business 
firms with interests in Chile urged the State Department to 
adopt a more lenient attitude. 78 
In view of the apparent insignificance of the claim, 
the hostility stirred up in Latin America, and the adverse re-
action of North American businessmen, the question naturally 
1154/204. The same sentiment was expressed by Edwards to 
Pierrepont. Pike, ~· cit., pp. 139-140. 
77Knox to Pierrepont, December 1, 1909, telegram, 
Numerical File 1154/224 and attached memorandum. Writing in 
the l940's former Assistant Secretary of State Hunting Wilson 
remembered that the cost of telegraphing the United States 
case had been $12,000. F. M. Huntington Wilson, Memoirs of 
an Ex-Diplomat (Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1945), p. 212. 
78w. M. Crane to Knox, November 25, 1909, Numerical 
File 1154/225. Pierrepont to Knox, November 29, 1909, No. 27, 
enclosure: clipping from El Mercuiro (Santiago), November 20, 
1909, Numerical File 1154/257. Dawson to Clark, February 14, 
1910, Memorandum from the Division of Latin American Affairs; 
J.R.C. [J. Ruben Clark] February 16, 1910, note from the Of-
fice of the Solicitor, Numerical File 1154/298. 
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arises of why did the State Department choose to follow the 
course it did in the Alsop case. The answer to this question 
can be found in the legalistic and somewhat self-righteous at-
, 
I 
titude which guided the Department in handling of this case. 
This attitude is reflected in a note dated February 16, 1910 
from J. Ruben Clark to Dawson. Clark was a member of the Soli-
citor's Office, the State Department's legal advisers, and 
had been deeply involved in formulating the policy which the 
Department pursued in the Alsop controversy. Clark's note 
was in reference to a letter from Wessel, Duval and Company, 
a United States firm with Chilean interests second only to 
those of Grace and Company. In the letter, which Dawson, now 
the Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, had for-
warded to Clark, the Company suggested that the United States 
and Chile attempt to reach some agreement prior to the arbi-
tration. It was apparently Wessel, Duval and Company's hope 
that this "out of court" settlement would lessen anti-Yankee 
sentiment in Chile. 79 
In his note, Clark replied that he did not feel that 
the United States could take the initiative in suggesting a 
compromise solution to Chile. To do so, he maintained, would 
indicate that the United States was afraid to arbitrate or 
that the United States had forced Chile to agree to arbitra-
tion merely in the hope of persuading Santiago to settle an 
79 Dawson to Clark, February 14, 1910, Memorandum from 
the Division of Latin American Affairs, Numerical File 1154/298. 
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unjust claim rather than going to the expense of arbitration. 
While acknowledging that there were those in Latin America 
who would criticize the United States no matter what it did, 
Clark rejected the idea that the United States would still 
appear as an oppressor even if the arbitral decision went 
against Washington. He suspected that habitual criticism of 
the United States came from either willful or ignorant failure 
"to understand the people of the United States and the policy 
of this Government," and from the habit of judging the United 
States by the critics' "own principles and standards." Con-
cerning these principles and standards, Clark wrote: 
They cannot understand that, since were they as powerful 
as are we, they would dominate and oppress weaker states 
and would seize from such states whatever those states 
had of value which they desired {just as Chile wearing a 
saintly mien, did with Peru and Bolivia) that th8 Govern-
ment of the United States will not do likewise.a 
Clark was convinced that the complaints of these habitual 
critics should be disregarded because there was nothing the 
United States could do to please them. "I find it difficult," 
he confessed, "to restrain my feelings on this matter when I 
am faced with the charges of some of these pious hypocrites 
81 
who attack us." He was equally unsympathetic towards 
United States businessmen who urged leniency in handling the 
Alsop claim. Clark noted that it was merely a question "as to 
80 J.R.C. to Dawson, February 16, 1910, note from the 
Office of the Solicitor, ibid. 
Slibid. 
I 
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the United States policy in the Alsop case would not hesitate 
a minute, he observed, in seeking assistance from the State 
oepartment if their own interests were threatened. 82 
Clark's remarks on the question of whether or not Chile 
should pay the Alsop claim are worth quoting at length. On 
this point he wrote: 
On this whole question, I may observe that I have 
never been able to understand why a solvent debtor should 
not pay his honest debts, nor why a solvent nation should 
not meet its just obligations. Nor can I understand why 
it should be thought that a request to pay a debt is an 
insult or an act of oppression. I always feel that, un-
less there be some overpowering reason to the contrary, 
one may reasonably ask and insist that a solvent debtor 
pay his honest debts, even though the debtor might prefer 
to avoid payment and even though the request for payment 
irritates and annoys the debtor. The good will of such 
a debtor can scarcely be classed as legal tender.83 
In swnmary, the position of the United States in re-
gard to the Alsop claim was simply that the claimants had a 
just case against Chile, and Chile should settle this claim 
either by a cash settlement or arbitration regardless of 
criticism either from Latin America or United States business 
firms operating in Chile. In his annual message to Congress 
on December 7, 1909, President Taft expressed this view more 
succinctly and less caustically than Clark, albeit more author-
atively, when he said "a citizen himself can not by contact 
[sic] or otherwise divest himself of the right, nor can this 
Government escape the obligation, of his protection in his 
82Ibid. 83Ibid. 
personal and property rights when these are unjustly in-
fringed in a foreign country. 1184 
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Dawson himself seems to have been of the opinion that 
i I 
the settlement of the Alsop claim, which had been a bother to 
United States-Chilean relations for so many years, actually 
served, by clearing the air, to promote better relations be-
tween the two countries. In 1911, while he was serving as 
Resident Diplomatic Officer in the State Department, a cari-
cature of President Taft taken from the Chilean magazine 
Zizzag came to his attention. The caption read "He has at-
tained impressive power and conquered universal applause by 
his noble idealist character and his great gifts for states-
craft." Dawson sent the caricature to the President's secre-
tary with the comment that "better than a ream of solemn of-
ficial interchanges the spirit & details of this caricature 
show that Chilean feeling toward the U.S. Govt has been rev-
olutionized since I was sent down there two years ago & that 
they are gladder than we are that the old Alsop sore was 
cauterized. 1185 
Insofar as the Chilean Government was concerned, Daw-
son may have been correct. In a conversation with Charge' 
Pierrepont in the early spring of 1910, Foreign Minister 
84 Message of the President, FRUS, 1909, p. xv. 
85 . Dawson to Hilles, undated, acknowledged August 1, 
1911, William H. Taft Papers, Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D. C. [hereafter cited as the Taft 
Papers], Presidential Series No. 2, File 1415. 
• 
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Edwards indicated that he thought that the determined policy 
which Secretary of State Knox had pursued in finally eliminat-
ing the Alsop claim was correct, and that Chile proposed to 
follow the same tactics in finally bringing the Tacna-Arica 
controversy to a solution. 86 However, notwithstanding a claim 
later made by Edwards that the Alsop case had not adversely 
affected the good relations between the United States and 
Chile, 87 the tactics which the United States had followed in 
bringing the Alsop controversy to a conclusion did stir-up 
anti-Yankee sentiment in Chile. 88 Dawson's and Edwards' 
statements can only be taken at their face value if one dis-
regards popular and non-official sentiment. 
86 Dawson to Wilson, May 2, 1910, Memorandum from the 
Division of Latin American Affairs, Numerical File 1154/365, 
filed in Decimal File 425.11A78. 
87P'k i e, ~· cit., p. 142. 
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CHAPTER XI 
DOLLAR DIPLOMACY: 
ASSIGNMENTS IN THE STATE DEPARI'MENT 
AND CENTRAL AMERICA 1910-1912 
The appointment of Dawson as Chief of the Division of 
Latin American Affairs was part of a general reorganization of 
the State Department undertaken by Secretary of State Knox. 
Huntington Wilson, the new Assistant Secretary of State, was 
the guiding spirit in this reorganization. As Third Assistant 
Secretary under Root in 1906, Wilson, who had recently come to 
the Department from the secretaryship of the United States 
Embassy in Tokyo, had presented the Secretary with a plan for 
departmental reorganization along less centralized lines. To 
achieve the plan's objective of greater efficiency, one pro-
vision called for the creation of four geographical divisions 
to be manned by individuals who had served in the areas and 
were consequently familiar with their problems. Root, ap-
parently preferring to retain direct control over the affairs 
of the Department, was reluctant to authorize the complete 
reorganization, but did allow Wilson to form and head the Divi-
sion of Far Eastern Affairs. With Wilson's ascendancy under 
the new Secretary, his ideas of reorganization were bound to 
receive a more favorable hearing. In the summer of 1909, 
appropriations for the reorganization scheme were obtained 
382 
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from Congress and the reorganization itself undertaken. 1 
In view of his twelve years service in Latin America, 
part of which had been spent in critical areas, and his general 
i I 
knowledge of the region, Dawson seems to have been a logical 
choice to head the Division of Latin American Affairs. As 
the name indicates, the Division was responsible for United 
States relations with the nations south of the Rio Grande. 
The order establishing the Division provided that its offi-
cers would handle all diplomatic and consular matters "in 
relation to Mexico, Central America, Panama, South America 
and the West Indies." Routine administrative affairs were 
excepted. 2 This wide latitude meant that the Division could 
be concerned with such diverse matters as a possible visit to 
the United States by President-elect Marshal Hermes da Fonseca 
of Brazil in 1910, 3 and a revolution in Nicaragua. 4 
1Huntington Wilson, ~· cit., pp. 153, 156, 161, 
181-182. 
2order of Secretary Knox establishing the Division of 
Latin American Affairs, November 19, 1909, Numerical File 
21235/8. Prior to Dawson's returning to the United States, 
in December, 1909, William Tecumseh Sherman Doyle, the Assist-
ant Chief, ran the Division. That the Division of Latin 
American Affairs was functioning under Doyle's administration 
as early as October 25, 1909 would seem to be indicated by 
memoranda and other documents contained in the Numerical Files 
of the Department of State, for example, see Numerical File 
1502/251 et seq. It is possible that even earlier examples 
could be found. The Division itself was not officially es-
tablished by the order of the Secretary of State, until Novem-
ber 19, 1909. 
3Numerical File 24173. 
4Numerical File 6369/591 et seq. 
384 
The efficiency which the reorganization envisioned was 
to be realized not merely in the handling of political rela-
tions with foreign powers but primarily in furthering and pro-
tecting United States commerical and financial interests in 
f . t . 5 oreign coun ries. In recognition of the presence of a po-
tentially large field for commerical expansion and the increas-
ing investment of North American private capital in Latin 
America in addition to the growing importance of United 
States-Latin American diplomatic relation, Dawson was also 
to serve as Resident Diplomatic Officer in the State Depart-
ment. 6 This position was also newly created and like the 
geographical division was designed to provide expert advice 
to the Secretary of State in the formulation and execution of 
policy. 7 With salaries of $7,500 the Resident Diplomatic Of-
ficer and the counselor for the Department were the second 
highest paid officials in the Department of State. 8 
Insofar as the departmental reorganization was concerned 
5Memorandum on developments within the Department of 
State, undated and unsigned, Knox Papers, Correspondence, 
June 2, 1908-April 22, 1909, Vol. 6. 
6outline of the Organization and Work of the Depart-
ment of State. Prepared by Direction of the Secretary of 
State (Washington: n.p., 1911), pp. 12-14. Included in the 
Taft Papers, Presidential Series No. 2, File 40. 
7Ibid., p. 28. 
8The Secretary of State's salary was $12,000, while 
the Assistant Secretary and Second Assistant Secretary re-
ceived $5,000 and $4,500 respectively. Register of the Depart-
ment of State, September 20, 1911 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1911), p. 21. 
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with furthering the legitimate interests of United States com-
merce and financial investments, it can be seen to fit into 
the Taft Administration's policy of dollar diplomacy. 9 In 
addition to merely assisting these commerical and financial 
interests, and perhaps more importantly, the policy of dollar 
diplomacy also implies the use of North American financial 
investments to obtain policy objectives. This latter was fre-
quently used in dealing with the countries of Central America. 
As chief of the Latin American Division, Dawson dealt with 
both aspects of this policy. 
One of the earliest matters which came to Dawson's 
attention in January, 1910, was concerned with obtaining new 
markets in Latin America. In March, 1909, the Argentine Gov-
ernment announced that it would accept bids for the construe-
tion of two battleships. In addition to French, British and 
Italian concerns, four North American shipbuilders entered the 
competition. The State Department was desirous of having the 
contracts awarded to an United States firm. However, the anti-
Yankee sentiment stirred up in Argentina by the Alsop contro-
versy and the report that Dawson had supposedly made a speech 
in Rio de Janeiro, while on his way home, attributing the 
resolution of the controversy to the Brazilian Government when 
Buenos Aires was seeking this credit seemed to dampen the 
9
wilfrid H. Callcott, The Caribbean Policy of the 
United States, 1890-1920 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1942) I PP• 263-64. 
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t f h . h' d . l' d lO prospec s o aving t is esire rea ize • 
In a memorandum to the Division of Latin American Af-
fairs, in early January, 1,910, Assistant Secretary Wilson 
I 
noted that he was "getting worried about the battleships" and 
asked if the Division could not "think up some further pressure 
upon the Argentine. 1111 Dawson replied by asking if all the 
information was correct and stating that he was studying the 
matter. He then listed various points which might be used in 
bargaining with Argentina. Regarding his supposed Rio de 
Janeiro speech, he suggested that he might write a personal let-
ter to the United States Minister in Buenos Aires on the sub-
ject of the speech, which could be shown to the Argentine 
12 Foreign Minister if it were thought necessary. 
Apparently, it was never necessary to take any action. 
On January 21, the Argentine Cabinet awarded the contracts to 
the lowest bidder, which happened to be one of the United States 
companies. In a memorandum to Secretary Knox, Dawson observ-
ed that the contract meant that over $23,000,000 would be 
spent in the United States to the benefit of North American 
10c. H. Sherrill {U.S. Minister in Buenos Aires) to 
Secretary of State, November 25, 1909, No. 160; Sherrill to 
Secretary of State, December 9, 1909, No. 181, Numerical File 
1070/155 and 159. 
11Assistant Secretary to the Division of Latin Ameri-
can Affairs, Numerical File 1070/161. 
12Dawson to Wilson, January 7, 1910, Memorandum, 
ibid. 
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industry and labor. 13 Although the State Department's contri-
bution to this achievement during the time when Dawson was con-
cerned with the matter seems to have been relegated to keeping 
the North American firms up to date on the various Argentine 
14 
specifications and changes, this was no minor factor consid-
ering the distances involved. 
The State Department was not always so successful in 
securing Latin American contracts for North American firms. 
Sometimes this was made difficult by lack of interest on the 
part of the companies themselves. In April, 1910, Minister 
Sherrill in Buenos Aires informed the Department of State that 
the Argentine Government was interested in having a ship for 
use in the Antarctic built in the United States. This ship 
was to be similar to the one used by Commander Peary in his 
A t . 1 t" 15 re ic exp ora ion. As soon as Sherrill's despatch reached 
his desk, Dawson got in touch with congressmen in whose dis-
tricts shipbuilding firms were located. However, no firm was 
interested in the contract, and Dawson thought it unlikely 
that the Department would be able to find a ship yard that 
13Dawson to the Secretary, January 22, 1910, Mem-
orandum, Numerical File 1070/175. 
14Ibid. 
15sherrill to Secretary of State, April 4, 1910,.No. 
307, Decimal File 835.34/224, Records of the Department of 
State Relating to Internal Affairs of Argentina, 1910-29, 
Microcopy No. 514, (Washington: National Archives, 1963), 
roll 17. 
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would want the job. 16 
Of course, in addition to looking for new markets in 
Latin America for United States industry and commerce, the Div-
ision of Latin American Affairs was also involved in protect-
ing already existing North American financial investments south 
of the Rio Grande. An example of this can be seen in the case 
of the Bogota' City Railway Company. In March, 1910, Tunis G. 
Bergen, the President of the Railway Company had appealed to 
the State Department to instruct the United States Minister in 
/ Bogota to watch that the Company's rights were not discrimi-
nated against simply because it was an United States corpora-
tion .17 Bergen's appeal was prompted by riots against the 
Company in early March. These were anti-Yankee in spirit. 
They were particularly directed against the Company's lengthy 
. concession which had been granted in 1906 by former President 
Reyes, contingent upon the Company converting from animal power 
to electricity. Prior to the riots, the municipal council of 
Bogota" had attempted to obtain a modification of the concession. 18 
Minister Elliott Northcott in Bogota" was instructed to 
investigate and report on the situation. 19 The entire diffi-
16T. c. D. to Davis (Bureau of Trade Relations, De-
partment of State), July 1, 1910, Decimal File 835.34/232, ibid. 
17Bergen to Knox, March 22, 1910, Decimal File 341. 
114B63/82. 
18Northcott to Secretary of State, April 7, 1910, No. 
65, Numerical File 570/13. 
19Knox to American Legation, Bogota': April 4, 1910, 
telegram, Numerical File 570/5. 
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culty was finally resolved in October, 1910, when the munici-
pal government of Bogota" purchased the Company. 20 The State 
Department's attitude on the case of the Bogot~ City Railway 
I 
company seems to have initially been formulated by J. Ruben 
Clark of the Solicitor's Office in conjunction with Dawson. 
Both men agreed that while sale of the Railway would remove 
the cause for friction, the price must be equitable to both 
parties. The value of the Company's property and investment 
could not be sacrificed simply because the Colombian Govern-
, 
ment failed to provide adequate protection. Furthermore, 
until such time as the Government purchased the Railway at a 
fair price, the Department expected that the Colombian Govern-
ment would provide adequate protection to the Company in the 
operation of its. street cars .• 21 Later, however, the Department 
did agree to get the Company to accept the lowest possible 
price. 22 It is unclear whether Dawson was involved in formu-
lating the policy on this last point, since the decision seems 
to have been made shortly after he had been appointed Minister 
2
°Frazier to Secretary of State, October 7, 1910, 
telegram, Decimal File 321.114B63/71. 
21 J. R. c. to Dawson, May 10, 1910, Memorandum; Daw-
son's handwirtten note at the bottom of this memorandum; and 
Knox to American Legation, Bogota, May 11, 1910, telegram, 
Numerical File 570/15. Memorandum Division of Latin American 
Affairs to Doyle and Coughlin, May 14, 1910; and Knox to 
American Legation, Bogota, May 14, 1910, telegram, Numerical 
File 570/18. Wilson to American Legation, Bogoti, August 17, 
1910, Numerical File 570/39. J. R. c. to Dodge, August 20, 
1910, memorandum, Numerical File 570/40. 
22
wilson to American Legation, Bogota, August 24, 
1910, telegram, Numerical File 570/40. 
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to Panama. Apparently, the willingness which existed both in 
Washington and Bogotl to reach a settlement on this problem 
came largely from the desire to eliminate it as a possible 
cause of increased friction between the two countries, whose 
relations had never completely recovered from the Panamanian 
revolution of 1903. At any rate, the efforts which Dawson 
and other members of the State Department had exerted on be-
half of the Bogotf City Railway Company's interests were duly 
recognized by the Company's Board of Directors in a resolution 
of appreciation passed in February, 1911. 23 
In the two preceeding cases, North American business 
interests clearly benefited from the assistance given by the 
State Department. At times, however, the relationship between 
the businessmen and financiers on the one hand and the State 
Department on the other could be mutually beneficial. While 
Central America was the region subject most frequently to that 
aspect of dollar diplomacy which called for the use of private 
United States capital in attaining policy objectives during 
Dawson's tenure as Chief of the Division of Latin American Af-
fairs, there is at least one instance where this method of 
dollar diplomacy was considered for use in South America. 
The continual presence of yellow fever and periodic 
out breaks of bubonic plague made the chief Ecuadorian port of 
23Bergen to Knox, March 6, 1911, Dawson's Application 
and Recommendation File. The original copy of the resolution 
is in Decimal File 321.114B63/109. 
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Guayaquil a health hazard for ships stopping there. The possi-
bility of a contaminated ship coming from Guayaquil to the 
canal Zone made this problem a critical concern of the United 
States. During the Roosevelt Administration, an effort was 
made to encourage the Ecuadorian Government to take effective 
action to clean up the port. 24 Although some success was 
achieved along these lines, 25 the Government in Quito found it 
difficult to secure its complete objective because of strong 
local opposition to interference in Guayaquil's affairs. 26 
As the result of a request from the United States War 
Department, 27 in October, 1909 the State Department instructed 
Minister William c. Fox in Quito to bring the matter of the 
sanitation of Guayaquil again to the attention of the Ecuador-
ian President, General Eloy Alfaro. 28 Fox presented a strong 
. protest; but there seemed to be little likelihood of achieving 
29 
any concrete results. In addition to local objections in 
Guayaquil to interference from Quito, Fox also noted that the 
24
william c. Fox (Minister in Quito) to Root, Novem-
ber 16, 1908, No. 390, Numerical File 468/79. 
25Ibid. 
26oawson to Wilson, January 4, 1910, memorandum, 
Numerical File 468/93. 
27Acting Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 
October 5, 1909, Numerical File 468/91. 
28
wilson to Fox, October 25, 1909, ibid. 
29Fox to Secretary of State, December 31, 1909, tele-
gram, Numerical File 468/92. 
r 
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financial situation in Ecuador made it difficult for the Gov-
ernment to undertake the project. However, Fox reported he 
felt confident that if some assistance could be offered by 
the United States, the central government would accept any 
reasonable plan offered by the United States Government or by 
a banking firm and would consent to having the work directed 
or controlled by United States officials or by the Canal Zone 
authorities. 30 
In the meantime, Fox had discussed the sanitation of 
Guayaquil with Archer Harman, a North American who, because of 
his aid to Alfaro during the latter's political eclipse in 
1901 and after, enjoyed a considerable influence with the Ecu-
adorian President. Harman was also president of the Guayaquil 
and Quito Railway. He devised a scheme to accomplish the 
.sanitation of the port and, with Fox's blessing, headed for 
Washington to present it to the State Department. Harman's 
interest in the sanitation of Guayaquil, as Fox admitted, 
sprang from more than mere humanitarian motives. Sanitation 
of the port would ultimately lead to the development of the 
rest of the country with the consequent prosperity of Harman's 
'l d 31 rai roa • 
In Washington, the correspondence relating to the sani-
tation of Guayaquil was being handled by the Division of Latin 
3
°Fox to Secretary of State, December 30, 1909, No. 
561, Numerical File 468/97. 
31Fox to Secretary of State, December 30, 1909, No. 
560, confidential, Numerical File 468/98. 
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American Affairs. The possibility of closing Panama to any 
ship coming from Guayaquil was considered as a means of pres-
suring Ecuador into taking some effective ;;ction. Before 
closing Panama, Dawson advised that the Le · ,tions in Lima 
and Santiago be contacted to learn if Peru and Chile were plan-
ning similar action against ships coming from the Ecuadorian 
port. 32 Neither country contemplated such action, 33 and Dawson 
thought that nothing should be done until he had had an oppor-
' t t ' t ' H 34 tuni y o in erview arman. 
In an interview on January 19, 1910, Harman presented 
Dawson with two alternate plans. The first called for the 
United States directly to undertake the sanitation of the port 
providing the necessary funds at two per cent interest. The 
cost of the sanitation would be met out of the water tax, 
which would be collected by the United States, with the water 
works remaining the property of the United States until the 
entire debt was paid. The second scheme provided for the work 
to be undertaken by a private United States corporation. To 
secure its investment, the company would own the water works 
and enjoy the revenue from these plants plus that realized 
from a tonage tax on all imports and exports from Guayaquil at 
32
oawson to Wilson, January 4, 1910, memorandum, 
Numerical File 468/93. 
33 Cresson to Secretary of State, January 5, 1910, 
telegram; Pierrepont to Secretary of State, January 7, 1910, 
telegram, Numerical File 468/94-95. 
34oawson to Wilson, January 12, 1910, memorandum, 
Numerical File 468/96. 
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the rate of $2.00 per ton. To obtain financial backing for the 
company, Harman thought that it would be necessary for the 
United States to agree to appoint an engineer and sanitary 
I 
officer to see that the terms of the company's contract with 
Guayaquil were carried out, and to support the company in the 
event that either the central government or the municipal gov-
ernment of Guayaquil interferred with the concession. In view 
of his influence with President Alfaro and his belief that 
the President would remain in power for the foreseeable future, 
' 
Harman assured Dawson that there would be no trouble in getting 
the Ecuadorian Congress to pass the necessary laws permitting 
and guaranteeing a loan. 35 
Neither of Harman's schemes received Dawson's unre-
served approval. The first plan he rejected outright. For 
the United States to lend the money directly "would be consi-
dered throughout South America," Dawson was convinced, "as 
virtually an annexation of Guayaquil. 1136 Concerning the sec-
ond project, he had several reservations. In the first place 
Dawson was not at all convinced that Alfaro was assured of 
continuing in power as Harman had indicated. 37 Secondly, he 
thought that Harman's scheme which called for the issuance of 
35Dawson to Wilson, January 20, 1910, memorandum, 
Numerical File 468/100. 
36T. c. D. to Wilson, January 31, 1910, memorandum, 
ibid. 
37Dawson to Wilson, February 4, 1910, memorandum, 
ibid. 
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$10,000,000 in bonds was overly generous to the capitalists. 38 
Furthennore, Dawson was convinced that the provisions which 
called for United States guarantee of the company's rights 
were in violation of the Ecuadorian constitution, and to amend 
39 the constitution was a four year procedure. Finally, he 
thought that a contract between the proposed company and Ecua-
dor, with the United States guaranteeing the company's rights, 
"would incite fears of our imperialistic designs among South 
Americans to nearly as great an extent as would Mr. Harman's 
first project for the United States to do it directly. 1140 
His rejection of Harman's first project and reserva-
tions on the second did not mean that Dawson completely re-
jected the idea of obtaining the sanitation of Guayaquil 
through the agency of an United States corporation. His idea 
was to come up with some plan which would provide adequate 
guarantee in order that the money could be raised at only a 
little above the prevailing interest rates and at the same 
time would not arouse hostility towards the United States in 
Latin America. 41 By February 8, Dawson had devised a plan 
38T. c. D. to Wilson, January 31, 1910, memorandum, 
ibid. 
39oawson to Wilson, January 20, 1910, memorandum; 
T. c. D. to Wilson, January 31, 1910, memorandum, ibid. 
40 Dawson to Wilson, February 4, 1910, memorandum, 
ibid. 
41T. c. D. to Wilson, January 31, 1910, memorandum, 
ibid. Dawson to Wilson, February 16, 1910, memorandum, 
Decimal File 822.124/134. 
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which he apparently thought would meet these qualifications. 
The sanitation of the port was to be undertaken by a company 
incorporated under the laws of Ecuador whose majority stock-
holders presumably would be United States citizens. The muni-
cipality of Guayaquil would finance the work of sanitation by 
issuing five per cent bonds not to exceed $10,000,000. These 
bonds would be secured by the water and sewerage taxes, a 
tonnage tax placed on all exports and imports, and a lien on 
all municipal revenues. The water, sewerage, and tonnage 
taxes were all to be collected by an individual chosen by the 
company. Neither the Ecuadorian Government nor the municipal 
authorities in Guayaquil could interfer with the company's 
rights until such action had been approved by an arbitration 
board composed of representatives of the President of Ecuador, 
the company and the President of the United States. The Ecua-
dorian Congress was to ratify the contract and make any neces-
h . th h f G . 1 42 sary c anges in e c arter o uayaqui • 
Despite the fact that Dawson's plan did not provide 
for direct participation of the United States Government in the 
santiation project, it is clear that there would have been 
adequate opportunity for the United States to intervene if it 
were eventually considered necessary to protect the North 
American investors. However, Harman and his legal adviser, 
R. Floyd Clarke felt that the needed capital could not be 
42
oawson's "Precis of Contract," stamped Latin Ameri-
can Division, February 8, 1910, Decimal File 822.124/133. 
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raised unless the United States and Ecuador entered into a 
treaty which would provide for the protection of the company's 
interests. 43 
I 
John B. Scott, the Solicitor of the State Department, 
favored Dawson's plan and was partly successful in bringing 
Harman and Clarke around to his way of thought. 44 Clarke next 
presented the Department with the draft of a protocol between 
Ecuador and the United States providing for the protection of 
th ' . ht 45 e company s rig s. The protocol, while less formal than 
a treaty, was still not acceptable. Clarke was informed that 
the Secretary of State could not agree to negotiate the pro-
tocol which had been suggested, but would be willing to con-
46 
sider any other proposal he might wish to make. A solution 
was finally reached in April, when Secretary of State Knox 
suggested a scheme by which a North American corporation would 
contract with Ecuador to effect the sanitation of Guayaquil 
and the United States would agree, through a simple exchange 
of diplomatic notes, to participate in arbitrating any dispute 
43Dawson to Wilson, February 16, 1910, memorandum 
and attached treaty draft: "Proposed form of Convention Be-
tween the United States of America and the Republic of Ecua-
dor," February 14, 1910, Decimal File 822.124/134. 
44Dawson to Wilson, February 16, 1910, memorandum, 
note at the bottom of this memorandum dated February 17, 1910, 
Decimal File 822.124/132. 
45 Dawson to Scott, February 19, 1910, memorandum, 
Numerical File 468/103. 
46Knox to Clarke, March 14, 1910, Numerical File 
468/106. This letter was evidently drawn up by Dawson. 
.... 
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between the company and the Ecuadorian authorities. 47 
No action had been taken on this plan up to the time 
that Dawson left the Latin American Division, in August, 1910. 48 
In the meantime, however, Harman had presented the State Depart-
ment with another scheme which would have benefited his rail-
road and also provided the cash necessary for the sanitation 
of Guayaquil. Dawson, while not conunitting himself fully to 
this plan, did find merit in it. The plan centered around an 
offer by the United States to purchase the Galapagos Islands 
for $15,000,000. Ecuador at this time was interested in sel-
ling the Islands in order to raise money for a pending war 
with Peru over a boundary dispute. The Ecuadorian Government 
had 30,000 men under arms and had been financing this army 
through its customs revenues. These revenues, however, had 
been earmarked to pay off the Guayaquil and Quito Railway and 
for the payment of interest on the bounded debt. In addition, 
the railroad had been carrying troops and supplies without pay-
47c1arke to Secretary of State, April 9, 1910, Numeri-
cal File 468/114; Knox to Francis J. Heney, care of R. Floyd 
Clarke, April 20, 1910, Numerical File 468/109a; Guayaquil 
Concession, Form, April 22, 1910, attached to Clarke to Sec-
retary of State, April 28, 1910, Numerical File 468/100. 
48The eradication of yellow fever from Guayaquil was 
finally achieved between 1913-1919, through the efforts of 
the Rockefeller Foundation. By 1930, Guayaquil qualified as 
a Class A - 1 port under the standards of the Pan American 
Sanitary Code. Lois F. Parks and Gustave A. Nuermberger~ 
"The Sanitation of Guayaquil," The Hispanic American Histori-
cal Review, XXIII (May, 1943), 219-220. This article covers 
the problem of yellow fever in the port from the founding of 
the city until the eradication of the problem in 1919. 
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ment. It was thought that a mere threat by the United States 
to seize the Ecuadorian customhouses would be sufficient to 
convince President Alfaro to accept any restrictions on the 
use of the money which the United States might wish to impose. 
Harman, miscalculating the amount which was to be available, 
suggested that the money might be paid in the following manner: 
$6,000,000 for the sanitation of Guayaquil; $1,500,000 for 
arrears of railroad interest; $1,100,000 for the amount due 
the railroad for transportation; $2,000,000 towards the Gov-
ernment's floating debt with Ecuadorian banks; $4,750,000 for 
five to six years interest on railroad bonds held primarily 
by Englishmen. 49 
In commenting on this scheme Dawson observed that the 
advantages to the railroad and bondholders was clear, but be-
fore it could be considered it would be necessary to investi-
gate the Railroad's relations with the Government. Moreover, 
he thought that it would aid Ecuador commercially and United 
States commerce indirectly. The greatest advantage he saw in 
the plan, however, was that Ecuador would have none of the 
money available to use in war preparations and the health haz-
ard at Guayaquil would finally be removed.so 
49T. c. o. "Memorandum as To Terms and Conditions Upon 
Which the Galapagos Islands Could be Purchased," undated, 
stamped Division of Latin American Affairs, September 24, 
1910, Decimal File 822.014G/80. This document had to be 
drawn up prior to September 24, 1910, since that was the date 
upon which Dawson assumed his new duties as United States 
Minister to Panama. 
SO Ibid. 
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As previously mentioned, the use of private North Ameri-
can financial investments by the State Department to obtain 
policy objectives was a frequent occurrence in Central American-
1 I 
United States relations during the Taft Administration. The 
object of the policy was political stability through financial 
stability. In a memorandum entitled the "Altruistic Policy 
of the United States Toward Latin American Countries," which 
was signed by Dawson and prepared for a speech Knox was to 
give at the University of Pennsylvania on June 15, 1910, this 
point is brought out. Without economic prosperity and good 
governmental finances, good government, it was maintained, was 
impossible. The State Department earnestly desired "to bring 
about American sodality and to advance American interests ever-
wher~ on this hemisphere by assisting the financially weak 
nation~ to improve their fiscal and monetary systems." Loans 
from United States capitalists to help Latin American nations 
achieve these goals would be a benefit to both creditor and 
borrower. 51 
The primary motive in back of this policy of encourag-
ing financial interference to secure sound finances and sound 
government was to remove any cause for European interference 
5111Altruistic Policy of the United States Toward Latin 
American Countries," May 28, 1910, Knox Papers, General Cor-
respondence, Box 28. This memorandum is signed by Dawson~ 
but it is possible that someone else in the Division of Latin 
American Affairs actually authored it. Nevertheless, from 
the corrections, which are made in Da~son's handwriting, it 
is clear that he read it carefully. 
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in the Caribbean area. 52 In addition there was a spirit of 
altruism in aiding these countries progress. 53 Insofar as this 
poli¢y was directed towards political stability, it did not 
d 'ff f th t db th R lt Adm' ' t t' 54 i er rom a pursue y e ooseve inis ra ion, 
and was in fact a continuation of the growing interest which 
the United States Government had shown in the Central American 
Republics since 1903. 55 
Partisan differences within the five republics of 
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, 
would have been sufficient to contribute to revolutionary dis-
turbances. However, this situation was aggravated by the close 
connections between the Liberals and Conservatives in the vari-
ous countries. This resulted in the dominate party in one 
country aiding its counterpart in another to gain power. Not 
. only did this add to the likelihood of revolution, it also 
contributed to international wars. Moreover, the financial 
situations in these states was similar to that which had ex-
isted in the Dominican Republic prior to 1905: large foreign 
debts and claims against the governments and failure to meet 
52Munro, ~· cit., p. 161. Samuel Flagg Bemis, The 
Latin American Poirc -or the United States: An HistoricaY--
Interlretation New York: w. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1967) 
p. 16 • 
53semis, ~· cit., p. 161. 
54 Munro, ~· cit., p. 161. 
ss~., p. 143. 
.
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h bl . t' 56 t ese o 1ga ions. 
Prior to becoming Secretary of State, Root appears to 
have seen an advantage in having at least Costa Rica, because 
of its proximity to Panama, under North American financial 
control, 57 and towards the end of his tenure in the State De-
partment, a proposition to reorganize Honduran finances re-
ceived a favorable hearing. 58 However, there was no attempt 
to extend a customs receivership, as had been done in the 
Dominican Republic, to any of the Central American countries 
during the Roosevelt Administration. Instead, Root worked with 
Mexico in order to secure stability on the isthmus by means of 
international agreements. From 1903 on, the State Department 
had offered its assistance in preventing international con-
flicts among the Central American republics. When war did 
. break out in 1906, between El Salvador and Guatemala, the United 
States and Mexico were successful in getting the belligerents 
to agree to an armistice and later to agree to a general Cen-
tral American peace conference. By urging joint action by the 
United States and Mexico, Root hoped to eliminate the suspi-
cion which unilateral United States action might have caused. 59 
56~., pp. 142-43. 
57Root to Hay, January 7, 1905, Root Papers, Letter 
Book, October 7, 1904-February 17, 1905, pp. 363-64, Con~ 
tainer 185, Part 1. 
58Munro, 't 165 ~· £!__·, p. • 
59Ibid. I p. 146. 
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The agreements signed at the conference which met in 
San Josi, Costa Rica, in 1906, were ineffective in keeping 
the peace. In early 1907, war broke out between Nicaragua and 
I 
Honduras, with El Salvador coming to the aid of the latter. 
When Jos' Santos Zelaya, the Nicaraguan dictator-President de-
feated a combined Honduran and El Salvadorean army and sue-
ceeded in setting up a new regime in Tegucigalpa under Miguel 
Davila, a general Central America war, directed against 
Zelaya's domination of Honduras, seemed likely. This danger 
temporarily passed when Nicaragua and El Salvador agreed on 
peace terms in April. However, Zelaya's continued interference 
in Salvadorean internal affairs led Guatemala to prepare for 
war against Nicaragua. Under these circumstances, in August, 
1907, Mexico and the United States suggested another Central 
American Peace Conference. 60 
Although Roosevelt and Root would have preferred the 
conference to take place in Mexico City, strained relations 
between Guatemala and Mexico resulted in the Central American 
republics insisting on Washington. The agreements signed at 
Washington in 1907 among the five Central American republics 
provided for the establishment of a permanent Central American 
Court of Justice, the neutrality of Honduras, restriction on 
the activities of political exiles living within their terri-
tories in order to prevent attacks on neighboring states, and 
GOibi' d., 147 49 p. - • 
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agreement not to recognize any regime which had come to power 
by revolution. The United States and Mexico were not signa-
tories of these treaties; nevertheless, since they had spon-
sored the conference and since their representatives had 
attended its meetings, they were morally committed to the 
principles of the Conference. 61 Although it may have seemed 
reasonable to hope that the Washington treaties of 1907, par-
ticularly the Permanent Court of Justice, might preserve the 
peace in Central America, by 1909, there were· already signs 
that neither the agreements nor the court were proving as 
effective as hoped. 62 
Secretary of State Knox rejected neither the inter-
national machinery which Root helped institute, nor, original-
1 t . "th M . 63 y, coopera ion wi exico. He continued to use these and 
merely employed loan agreements and custom receiverships as 
additional instruments in attaining his goal. In so doing, 
Knox and the other officials in the State Department were fol-
l . h 1 . h . . ubl. 64 d owing t e examp e set in t e Dominican Rep ic, an un er-
taking in which Dawson had played a prominent role. 
During Dawson's tenure as Chief of the Division of 
Latin American Affairs there is no indication that he opposed 
61aemis, ~· Cit. I p. 161. Munro, ~· Cit. I pp. 151-53. 
62 Munro, ~· cit., pp. 155-58. 
63Ibid. I pp. 162 I 164. 
64 Ibid., pp. 161-162. 
r 
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the policy of financial intervention in the affairs of the 
Central American republics. His attitude is reflected in the 
case of the Honduran loan and planned customs receiverships. 
By the time he came to the Department, negotiations between 
the Government of Honduras and the banking firm of J. P. 
Morgan and Company were already under way for a loan to refund 
the national debt. The negotiations had the blessing and en-
65 
couragement of the State Department. In December, 1909, an 
agreement was reached providing for the issuance of $10,000,000 
of five per cent bonds. The plan was contingent upon the 
United States entering a treaty with Honduras in which the 
independence of Honduras would be guaranteed, and the United 
States would participate in the collection and distribution of 
the custom revenues. 66 
When the plan came to Dawson's attention, he was ap-
parently somewhat sceptical about it. 67 He advised that the 
Department would want to consider the "numerous bearings" on 
the matter of the scheme and that it might be wise, if it were 
considered at all, to do so in relation to arrangements with 
other Central American states. 68 Perhaps remembering the 
65For the background and the details of these nego-
tiations see ibid., pp. 217-221. 
66Ibid., p. 221. 
67Ibid., pp. 221-22. 
68
oawson to Wilson, January 6, 1910, Numerical File 
17624/91. 
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difficult time that the Dominican treaty had had in the United 
States Senate, and basing his opinion on his experience in the 
Dominican Republic prior to the modus vivendi of April 1, 1905, 
Dawson observed that the "general right of protecting American 
citizens and property," would be sufficient without a formal 
treaty to allow the State Department to effectively protect a 
North American customs collector in the operation of his duties. 69 
After further consideration and study of the case, Dawson's 
doubts seemed to have diminished. He concluded that a treaty 
on the model of the Dominican treaty of 1907 would be the best 
arrangement. 70 
At the time that the Honduran loan plan was under con-
sideration, Dawson was also studying Archer Harman's scheme 
for the sanitation of Guayaquil. In regard to the latter, as 
indicated, Dawson had rejected the idea of a United States-
Ecuadorian treaty protecting North American investment as being 
too likely to arouse South American fears of United States im-
perialism. There was no similar worry in the case of Honduras. 
He thought· that Mexico would secretly oppose the arrangement, 
and so would "the grafting military and political elements" in 
69Dawson to Wilson, January 11, 1910, memorandum, 
Numerical File 17624/01. Munro also refers to these memoran-
da, pp. 221-22. 
70 Dawson to Wilson, February 21, 1910, memorandum, 
Decimal File 815.51/96, Records of the Department of State 
Relating to Internal Affairs of Honduras 1910-29, Microcopy 
No. 647, (Washington, National Archives, 1966) [hereafter 
cited as Internal Affairs of Honduras 1910-29], roll 34. 
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the rest of Central America. Nevertheless, again basing his 
opinion on the experience in Santo Domingo, he did not think 
that the United States' action would produce much alarm in the 
rest of Latin America. The difference, Dawson explained, was 
that "the geographical and international situation as regards 
. 
Honduras is entirely different from the one we find ourselves 
in with regard to Ecuador •• . . By the time Dawson left 
the Latin American Division, the matter of the loan agreement 
and treaty had not yet been completed. 
Another Central American issue before the State Depart-
ment at this time was the question of according recognition 
to one of the two factions contending for control of Nicaragua. 
This situation was the result of a revolution which had broken 
out against President Jose Santos Zelaya in October, 1909. 
/ Zelaya, a Liberal from the city of Leon, who had ruled dicta-
torily since 1893, 72 had gained the hostility not only of the 
Conservatives from the city of Granada, but also that of North 
American business interests centered at Bluefields on the east 
coast. Moreover, his interference in the affairs of other 
Central American countries had convinced the State Department 
71Ibid. 
72For descriptions of Zelaya's policies at home and his 
interferences in other Central American countries see John R. 
McDevi tt, "American-Nicaraguan Relations from 1909 to 1916" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, George-
town University, 1954), pp. 6-28, and Harold N. Denny, Dollars 
for Bullets: The Stor of American Rule in Nicara ua {New York: 
Te Dial Press, 929 , pp. 64-69. 
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that he was a menace to the stability and peace of the region. 73 
The October, 1909 revolution, which began in Bluefields 
was led by General Juan J. Estrada, the Liberal governor at 
I 
Bluefields, and the Conservative Don Adolfo Diaz, and supported 
/ 
by the Conservative generals, Emiliano Chamorro and Luis 
Mena. 74 Although Secretary of State Knox's former law firm 
had represented individuals with interests in North American 
companies operating in Bluefields, and while it seems certain 
that the State Department had prior knowledge of the revolt, 
there appears to be no evidence proving that the Department 
was connected with this revolution. 75 Once it was under way, 
officially the attitude of the Department of State toward the 
revolution was one of neutrality and care was taken not to 
1 f 't' . f ff' . 1 t' 76 eave room or cri icism o any o icia ac ion. Neverthe-
less, Assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson openly 
th . d 'th th 1 t' 77 d K I f ·1 t d sympa ize wi e revo u ion, an nox s ai ure o or er 
73Munro, ~· cit., pp. 169-170, 171-173. 
74J. Fred Rippy, The Caribbean Danger Zone {New York: 
G. P. Putn~'s Sons, 1940), pp. 169-70. 
75c~llcott, ~· cit., p. 279. Rippy, ~· cit., p. 
171. Mcoevitt, ~· cit., p. 31. Munro, £E_. cit., pp. 173-174. 
All of these autnors point out that the State Department had 
information showing that a revolution was about to develop. 
Both Callcott and Rippy imply that Knox's legal or financial 
connections may have had an impact on the State Department's 
actions. However, Munro, whose book is based on far more ex-
tensive archival research than the other two, maintains that 
there is no indication of any connection between the Depart-
ment and the revolutionaries. 
76Munro, ~· cit., p. 175. 
77Ibid. 
409 
Minister John Gardner Collidge, who was on leave, back to his 
post in Managua might be considered as a further indication of 
this sympathy. 78 
Zelaya's execution of Lee Roy Cannon and Leonard Groce, 
two United States citizens who were serving in the revolution-
ary army when captured, provided Knox with an excuse to sever 
diplomatic relations with Nicaragua on December 1, 1909. 
The purpose of the Secretary of State's note to the Nicaraguan 
Legation breaking relations, according to one authority on 
United States Caribbean policy, was clearly to bring Zelaya's 
downfall. 79 In fact, the attitude of the United States had so 
undermined Zelaya's position that he felt it necessary to re-
sign on December 16, and to go into exile in Mexico. The 
Nicaraguan Congress chose Josi Madriz a Liberal who was the 
Nicaraguan appointee to the Central American Court of Justice 
. ' 1 'd 80 as provisiona presi ent. 
Zelaya's removal did not result in any improved re-
lations between the United States and Nicaragua. In Washing-
ton, it was felt that there was no indication that Madriz's 
Liberal regime was any different from that of Zelaya's, and 
recognition was not extended. Again, officially the attitude 
78R· 't 171 ippy, ~- £!._•1 p. • 
79Munro, ~· cit., 177. 
8
°For the details of the events from the execution of 
Cannon and Groce see Munro, ~· cit., pp. 175-179. Rippy, ~· 
cit., pp. 171-72 and Callcott, 2£• cit., pp. 280-81 give less 
1\il'l accounts. ~-
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of the United States Government was one of neutrality and im-
partiality towards both factions. The sympathies of the offi-
cials in the State Department, however, continued to remain 
I 
with the Estrada revolution. Justifications were found for 
refusing to recognize Madriz, and, while perhaps not intend-
ing to intervene on Estrada's behalf, continued refusal of 
recognition for Madriz and the actions taken to protect for-
eign lives and property by the United States naval commanders 
in the waters off the Nicaraguan coast, acted to the detriment 
f th d . . 81 o e Ma riz regime. 
In the meantime, the Mexican Government's hostility 
to the Guatemalan dictator, Estrada Cabrera, and opposition 
to increasing United States influence in Central America led 
to the break down of Mexican-United States cooperation in the 
82 
area. Furthermore, the friendly attitude of President Por-
/ 
firio Diaz towards Zelaya led the State Department to be 
. . f M • ' t f ' · 83 suspicious o exican in er erence in Nicaragua. 
As Chief of the Latin American Division, besides 
81Munro believes that Knox and Wilson may not have 
considered the action of the naval commanders in preventing 
the Madriz forces from bombarding Bluefields or in preventing 
the Maximo J~rez, which had been the S.S. Venus before its 
purchase by the Madriz faction, from blockading the port of 
Bluefields as a violation of neutrality. Nevertheless, he 
does not deny that the action was of definite benefit to 
Estrada. Callcott and Rippy, both indicate that these ac-
tions were directly intended to aid Estrada. Munro, ~· 
cit., p. 184. Rippy,~· cit., p. 172. Callcott, ~·cit., 
p. 282. 
82Munro, 2£.· cit., pp. 164-67. 
83Ibid., p. 179. 
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handling all incoming and outgoing correspondence on the Nica-
raguan revolution, Dawson frequently met in Washington with 
the confidential representatives of Estrada and Madriz, Salva-
dor Castrillo and Lufs Corea respectively. 84 Under the di-
rection of Assistant Secretary Wilson, Dawson helped to formu-
late some specific policy for the State Department to follow 
in dealing with one or the other of the factions. As in the 
case of the Honduran loan, here again there is no indication 
that Dawson differed from the policy which Knox and Wilson 
had laid down before he came to the Division of Latin Ameri-
can Affairs in December, 1909. 
In February, 1910, the State Department was receiving 
information which seemed to indicate that the Estrada forces 
were about to enter Managua. 85 This information proved to be 
premature. However, at the time Assistant Secretary Wilson, 
anticipating a victory by the revolutionary forces, took steps 
to recognize Estrada. The Latin American Division was in-
structed to have the Solicitor's Office draw up a proclamation 
recognizing Estrada's Government as the provisional government 
84Memorandum, December 29, 1909, Numerical File 
6369/591 et passim. 
85Estrada to Castrillo, February 12, 1910, telegram: 
Estrada to Castrillo, February 23, 1910, telegram. These 
documents are filed with Decimal File 817.00 but are given no 
specific file number. Records of the Department of State 
Relating to Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, Microcopy 
No. 632 (Washington: National Archives, 1966) [hereafter cited 
as Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29], roll 8. 
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of Nicaragua. The Division itself was to draw up two letters. 
Both of these were to be for Castrillo to present to the Secre-
tary of State at the opportune moment. The first requested 
recognition of the Estrada faction as the provisional govern-
ment of Nicaragua. The second was a letter expressing grati-
tude both for the impartial attitude which the United States 
had displayed during the revolution and for its influence in 
ending the Zelaya regime, and committing the provisional gov-
ernment to certain policies which the United States Government 
hoped to see the new Nicaraguan Government implement. Among 
these were punishment of Cannon and Groce's murderers,reor-
ganization of Nicaraguan finances through a loan with North 
American bankers and equitable treatment of North American 
commercial and business interests, and finally the re-estab-
lishment of constitutional government with free elections. 86 
Both Dawson and Doyle, the Assistant Chief of the 
Division, felt that the Washington treaties of 1907, made it 
difficult for the United States to recognize Estrada's Gov-
ernment, which would come to power as the result of a revolu-
tion, until the country was constitutionally organized. 87 
Doyle, moreover, felt that to include the matter of the loan 
in the letter from Castrillo would only lead to a Liberal up-
86Hw to Dawson, February 24, 1910, memorandum, Deci-
mal File 810.00/1373, ibid., roll 7. 
87 Doyle to Dawson, February 25, 1910, memorandum, 
Decimal File 817.00/1375, ibid. T. c. D. to Wilson, Febru-
ary 25, 1910, memorandum attached to Decimal File 817.00/1374, 
ibid. 
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rising against Estrada's regime. He pointed out that the 
Liberals had continually argued that Estrada's victory would 
be the forerunner of United States aggression. 88 Dawson did 
not share Doyle's caution. He felt that the Liberals would 
"raise the cry of 'gare aux guis' any way and that the present 
is our best opportunity to get the guarantee we really de-
. ,,89 
sire. 
A few days prior to the date Dawson and Doyle submit-
ted their opinions to Wilson,the revolutionary forces had 
suffered a major defeat. 90 With the changing military situa-
tion, in early March, Corea urged that Madriz be recognized 
as de facto and de jure president of Nicaragua. 91 Dawson re-
jected both contentions, 92 and in spite of this changing mili-
tary situation, the State Department did not become any more 
'11' t ' Md ' 93 
_wi ing o recognize a riz. In mid-April, Wilson asked 
88Doyle to Dawson, February 25, 1910, memorandum, 
Decimal File 817.00/1375, ibid. 
89T. c. D. to Wilson, February 25, 1910, memorandum, 
ibid. Munro incorrectly states that both Dawson and Doyle ar-
gued that the immediate announcement of the loan project would 
cause an uprising. Munro, ~· cit., p. 180. 
90Munro, ~· cit., p. 180. 
91 . Corea to Secretary of State, March 8, 1910, Numeri-
cal File 6369/828, filed with Decimal File 817.00, Internal 
Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 4. 
92 Dawson to Hoyt, March 9, 1910, memorandum, Decimal 
File 817.00/1770, ibid., roll 11. 
93Munro, ~· cit., p. 181. 
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Dawson to draw up a plan for the United States to follow in 
regard to Nicaragua. He was also to prepare an official state-
ment which would vindicate the United States' position and 
I i 94 
could be given to Madriz and made public. 
Dawson suggested that a reply be sent to Corea's note 
of March 8, requesting de facto and de jure recognition of 
Madriz's presidency. In the note the United States would argue 
that Corea had not shown conclusively that Madriz was in con-
trol of the country and enjoyed the support of the people, 
thus entitling him to de facto recognition. Furthermore, Corea 
was to be informed that before the United States recognized 
any Nicaraguan government, that government would have to indi-
cate its willingness to prosecute those responsible for Cannon 
and Groce's deaths. No indication of this willingness, it was 
to be maintained, was apparent in the Madriz faction. Finally, 
any government recognized would have to agree to fulfill faith-
fully the Washington agreements of 1907. 95 
Dawson thought that in addition to sending the note to 
Corea, it should also be sent to all United States Legations 
and Embassies in Latin America and be given as wide a publicity 
94Hw to Dawson, April 14, 1910, memorandum, Numeri-
cal File 6369/906, filed in Decimal File 817.00, Internal 
Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 4. 
95oawson to Wilson, April 18, 1910, memorandum, "Pro-
ject for Action in the Nicaraguan Situation," attached note 
to Corea, Numerical File 6369/907, filed with Decimal File 
817.00, ibid. 
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as possible. By doing this, it was hoped that any hostile · 
criticism of the State Department's actions, particularly any 
criticism from Mexico, would be off set. Upon receiving the 
note, Dawson thought that Madriz would have two alternatives. 
First, he could give the United States the guarantees it 
sought and this might be done by requesting that a special com-
mission be sent to Managua. Or, he could refuse to give any 
guarantee seeking the support of Mexico and joining with the 
anti-Cabrera factions in the other Central American countries. 96 
Apparently, Dawson did not anticipate a favorable 
reception for the United States note in Managua. He suggested 
that the United States be ready to seize forceably the custom 
receipts from Corinto and deduct a fixed sum as an indemnity 
for the murders of Cannon and Groce and for installments due 
. on the Emery claim, a North American claim against Nicaragua 
which had been pending for sometime. However, he thought 
that this action ought to be postponed until after the Pan 
American conference which was to meet in Buenos Aires in 1910, 
and until after the State Department had come to the conclusion 
that Mexico and Madriz were "determined to continue their anti-
American policies. 1197 
Dawson's severe stand was perhaps motivated by what he 
thought was increasing Mexican influence in Central America 
96Dawson to Wilson, April 18, 1910, memorandum, "Pro-
ject for Action in the Nicaraguan Situation," ibid. 
97Ibid. 
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and the danger that the State Department's plan to reform the 
economy of Nicaragua might be thwarted by Madriz. He noted 
that Madriz was trying to get a loan from a British syndicate 
which would be guaranteed by both the custom receipts and the 
liquor and tobacco monopolies for the next thirty-four years. 
This plan, Dawson thought, "would complicate and embarrass our 
Central American negotiations and interests for years to come." 
In addition, he observed that the Guatemalan dictator Estrada 
Cabrera was beginning to show signs of being unfavorable to 
North American influence and loan projects. Dawson inter-
preted this attitude as perhaps indicating that Estrada Cabrera 
feared "that the pressure of Zelayaism and Mexicanism will be 
too strong and is contemplating lining his pockets as quickly 
as possible in the meantime." Dawson saw little hope for 
stability in Central America in the immediate future unless 
the United States should decide "to let the anti-Estrada 
Cabrera and Mexican factions have free swing for the next year 
or two." In view of the situation as Dawson saw it, he 
thought that by presenting Corea with the note he suggested, 
the United States would be showing its determination and would 
thus "force Mexico and Madriz to come to us and try to reach 
terms. 1198 
An offer by the Central American Court of Justice to 
mediate between the two factions in Nicaragua, which eventually 
98Ibid. 
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came to nothing, may explain why Dawson's plan was not 
adopted by the State Department. 99 Or, in April, the plan 
may still have been considered too bold. However, this does 
not mean that his suggestions were necessarily out of tune 
with the thinking in the Department. In June, J. Ruben Clark 
of the Solicitor's Office was instructed to draw up a memoran-
dum which could be used to justify United States military 
intervention in Nicaragua and to gather precedents for obtain-
ing congressional approval for the use of the armed forces 
with and without a formal declaration of war. 100 Although 
Clark's memoranda on these topics were never used, the fact 
that they were drawn up would seem to indicate a more aggres-
sive policy was being considered as time passed. 
In late August, the revolution came to an end with the 
victory of Estrada's forces. Madriz's position had been weak-
ened when in May the United States naval commander at Blue-
fields prevented any fighting in the city and refused to allow 
the Madriz forces to bombard or blockade this last stronghold 
of the revolutionary forces. Following the failure to take 
Bluefields,small uprisings against Madriz occurred in areas 
previously secured, and in July, the revolutionary forces 
assumed the offensive which ultimately resulted in their capture 
99Munro, ~· cit., p. 183. 
lOOJ. R. c. to Wilson, June 20, 1910; memorandum, 
"Outline--Nicaragua," June 8, 1910, Decimal File 817.00/1486-
1487, Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 9. Munro 
mentions these memoranda, pp. 185-87. 
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of Managua on August 28.lOl 
On August 26, Thomas P. Moffatt, the United States Con-
sul at Bluefields, cabled the Secretary of State that Estrada 
was planning to inform the State Department through Castrillo, 
of the policies his Government intended to follow. These in-
eluded "re-establishment of the country's finances," elimina-
tion of the monopolistic policies of Zelaya, and free election 
of a constitutional president within six months. 102 They did 
not differ radically from the policies which the State Depart-
ment hoped to see fulfilled. The latter were included in a 
telegram Castrillo sent to Estrada, stating the exact terms 
in which Estrada should ask for recognition as provisional 
president, 103 and were almost identical to those which Wilson 
had mentioned in his instructions to the Latin American Divi-
sion in February. Elections were to be held within six months. 
The assistance of the United States was to be sought in ob-
taining a loan from North American bankers. This loan was to 
be secured by a portion of the customs revenues collected in a 
manner to be agreed upon by the United States and Nicaragua. 
Assurances were to be given that those responsible for the kil-
ling of Cannon and Groce would be brought to justice and an 
101 . 186 Munro, ~· ~·, p. • 
102Moffatt to Secretary of State, August 26, 1910, 
telegram, Decimal File 817.00/1352, Internal Affiars of Nica-
ragua 1910-29, roll 7. 
103Munro, ~· cit., p. 187. 
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indemnity paid to the families of the dead men. Finally, the 
United States Government was to be requested to send a com-
missioner to Nicaragua to act on any of the matters which might 
I 104 
require a formal convention. 
Estrada was reluctant to accept the United States' pro-
gram, and informed Castrillo that David Arellano was being 
sent to Washington as a special envoy to treat with the State 
Department on the various points included in Castrillo's 
telegram. Castrillo replied that the situation was difficult 
and urged the immediate acceptance of the United States' pro-
gram. He argued that an envoy sent to Washington would be able 
to achieve nothinq. 105 Castrillo's reply apparently persuaded 
Estrada that if he wanted the recognition of the United States 
he would have to comply with the program set down by the State 
Department, and, on the tenth of September, he sent Castrillo 
a telegram requesting recognition, including all the points 
that the State Department wanted. However, with regard to the 
election of the president, there would be a delay of one year, 
the exact date being fixed by a constitutional convention con-
104wilson to American Consul, Managua, September 1, 
1910, Decimal File 817.00/1370A, Internal Affairs of Nicara-
gua 1910-29, roll 7. 
105undated and unsigned memorandum containing the 
telegrams exchanged between Castrillo and Estrada on Septem-
ber 9, 1910, Decimal File 817.00/1369, ibid. Olivares to 
Secretary of State, September 3, 1910, telegram, Decimal 
File 817.00/1369, ibid. 
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106 
voked for that purpose. The formal request for recognition 
was transmitted to the State Department on September 12, and 
two days later Wilson replied to Castrillo's note, thus ac-
cording Estrada's provisional Government recognition as the 
d f t f N. l07 B 0 t b 8 d e ac o government o icaragua. y c o er , Knox an 
Wilson had selected Dawson as the United States commissioner 
108 Estrada had been required to request. 
Dawson, at this time, was no longer Chief of the Divi-
sion of Latin American Affairs. In June, 1910, he had been 
appointed Minister to Panama and had left for his new post in 
the late summer. Two and a half weeks after the formal pre-
t t . f h' d t' 1 109 h . d t'f' t' f sen a ion o is ere en ia s, e receive no i ica ion o 
his appointment as Special Agent of the United States to the 
. . . 1 f N' llO Th b' t f I provisiona Government o icaragua. e o Jee o Dawson s 
mission was to secure the implementation of the program which 
the provisional Government had promised to fulfill in its 
106castrillo to Wilson, September 12, 1910, Decimal 
File 817.00/1395, ibid. 
107wilson to Castrillo, September 14, 1910, Decimal 
File 817.00/1395; Wilson to American Consul, Managua, Septem-
ber 16, 1910, telegram, Decimal File 817.00/1400, ibid. 
108Adee to Secretary of State, October 8, 1910, 
Decimal File 817.001452a, ibid., roll 8. 
109untitled calendar of Dawson's appointments from 
1907 to 1911, Dawson's Application and Recommendation Fiie. 
llOAdee to Dawson, October 11, 1910, telegram, Deci-
mal File 817.00/1432A, Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, 
roll 8. 
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t f 't' 111 reques or recogni ion. Dawson's knowledge of the Sta·te 
Department's desires and his knowledge of the situation gained 
as Chief of the Latin American Division, in addition to his 
proximity to Nicaragua made him a logical choice for this 
assignment. 
He arrived in Managua on October 18, and almost im-
mediately found that before he could hope to accomplish his 
mission, it would be necessary to restore some semblance of 
unity among the various factions into which the revolutionary 
t h d d .. t t d 112 d . ·11 b mb d par y a isin egra e • Estra a, it wi e reme ere , 
despite his opposition to Zelaya, was a Liberal. The revolu-
tion itself, however, was really a Conservative movement 
against the dictatorship of Zelaya. Once Managua had been cap-
tured and the provisional Government established, there were 
those in the Conservative Party who wished to limit greatly 
Estrada's powers and to take repressive measures against the 
Liberals. Furthermore, personal ambitions led to division 
among the Conservatives themselves. The two prominent Conser-
/ 
vative military leaders, Generals Luis Mena and Emiliano 
Chamorro, were vying with one another for control of the mili-
tary supplies and the presidency of the republic. 113 Dawson 
111Ibid:. 
112Dawson to Secretary of State, October 19, 1910, 
telegram, Decimal File 817.00/1443, ibid. 
113
oawson to Secretary of State, October 28, 1910, 
telegram, Decimal File 817.00/1445; Dawson to Dodge, Novem-
ber 17, 1910, Decimal File 817.00/1473, ibid. 
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reported that under these conditions the situation was "virtual 
anarchy. 11114 
The elimination of Estrada and the creation of a com-
pletely Conservative Government might have removed some of 
the problems. Dawson, however, thought Estrada's retention of 
the presidency was the only way to placate the Liberals and 
thus prevent another revolution. Consequently, he followed 
a course which would keep Estrada as president and at the 
same time have the various Conservative factions reconciled 
and supporting Estrada. A popular presidential election, Daw-
son thought, was at that time impractical and potentially 
"dangerous to peace." The solution, therefore, was to call a 
constitutional convention which would have the power to draw 
up an electoral law and would select Estrada as the president 
for a term of two years. 115 The advantages of this scheme were 
clearly that Estrada, as constitutional president, could be 
recognized by the United States and the plan for economic re-
form began, without any violation of the Washington agreements 
of 1907, and that the enforced presidency, while securing the 
peace, would be only temporary. To secure this plan, Dawson 
resorted to a series of agreements signed by the four prominent 
/ leaders in the revolution: Estrada, Adolfo Diaz, a Conservative 
114Dawson to Secretary of State, October 28, 1910, 
telegram, Decimal File 817.00/1445, ibid. 
115Dawson to Secretary of State, October 28, 1910, 
telegram, Decimal File 817.00/1445; Dawson to Dodge, Novem-
ber 17, 1910, Decimal File 817.00/1473, ibid. 
r 
but a personal friend of Estrada, 116 Mena, and Chamorro. 
, 
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Estrada, Mena, and Diaz were willing to accept this 
plan. Chamorro initially proved reluctant. To discourage any 
I 
idea that a revolution wa~ possible, 1 Dawson inf 1ormed all four 
men that the United States would never recognize a government 
which came to power by a coup d'etat. Whether this or other 
considerations persuaded him, Chamorro finally agreed to the 
arrangement which Dawson proposed. 117 On October 27, Estrada, 
I •. 
Mena, Diaz, and Chamorro signed three sets of agreements. By 
the first, they agreed to the election of a constitutional 
assembly which would meet in December and elect a president 
and vice president who would serve for a two year period. The 
/ 
four agreed to support the candidacy of Estrada and Diaz for 
president and vice president respectively. Furthermore, they 
agreed that the constitution which would be composed would 
abolish monopolies and provide for the protection of the legi-
timate interests of foreigners. Finally, a popular election 
would be held to fill the office of president for the term 
following the interim period. The second agreement provided 
that a claims commission would be instituted between the 
United States and Nicaragua to eliminate any unsettled claims. 
The four also agreed to see that those responsible for Cannon 
and Groce's deaths were prosecuted and an indemnity paid to 
116Munro, ~· cit., p. 188. 
117Dawson to Dodge, November 17, 1910, Decimal File 
817.00/1473, Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 8. 
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the families of the North Americans. The final agreement com-
mitted the men to ask the United States Government to assist 
Nicaragua in obtaining a loan guaranteed by a portion of the 
118 
customs receipts, with United States aid in collecting these. 
In addition to these three sets of agreements, Estrada, 
/ / 
Diaz, Chamorro, Mena and Fernando Solorzano, another prominent 
Conservative, signed a fourth agreement which dealt with the 
election of Estrada's successor. The five men agreed that 
Estrada would not succeed himself. By a majority vote, they 
would select candidates for the presidency and vice presidency 
whom they would support in the election for Estrada and 
I 
Diaz's successors. In order not to interfer with the freedom 
' 
of elections, they also agreed not to concentrate troops in 
any one section of the republic. Finally, the supporters of 
Zelaya were not to be permitted to enter the administration. 119 
Taken together, these four agreements are known as the Dawson 
Agreements. 120 
In a note to Dawson, the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, 
I / Tomas Martinez, officially informed the United States of the 
program which the Nicaraguan Government was committed to follow 
in the first three agreements. In reply, Dawson expressed the 
118 ~, 1911, pp. 652-54. 
119Ibid., p. 654. 
120
see Munro, ~· cit., pp. 188-89; Callcott, ~· cit., 
p. 283; Rippy, oo. cit., p:-!74; and Issac J. Cox, Nicaragua 
and The United states-1909-1927 (Boston: World Peace Foundation 
Pamphlets, 1927), p. 710. 
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United States' pleasure in the program which had been adop·ted. 
Since the fourth agreement concerned domestic matters, no 
official notice was taken of it. 121 
While Dawson was successful in securing his mission's 
objective of officially committing the Nicaraguan Government 
to the program which the State Department desired and laying 
the foundation for the implementation of this program, he did 
not necessarily win the approval of all the Nicaraguan factions. 
Among the Conservatives, it is true, there apparently was 
support. The Liberals, however, remembering too well the part 
that the United States had played in the down fall of Zelaya 
and Madriz, remained hostile. The possibility of an anti-
United States demonstration prevented Dawson from visiting 
Ledn, the Liberal stronghold. 122 Prior to and following Daw-
son's departure from Nicaragua, Liberal newspapers attacked 
him and the Conservatives for making Nicaragua a virtual North 
American protectorate. Representative of these attacks was a 
speech of a young man, made at a Liberal meeting in Managua 
shortly after the announcement of the agreements. In his 
emotional diatribe he proposed to avenge his country stating: 
I willingly offer myself as a sacrifice for my country 
and to bequeath it a grand example. Gentlemen, here is my 
hand, it is ready to do justice, with it I shall bury the 
dagger of vengence into the heart of that Yankee, who 
comes to give our country over to those infamous traitors. 
121FRUS, ·191+, p.· .654. 
122Dawson to Dodge, November 17, 1910, Decimal File 
817.00/1473, Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 8. 
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Tell me that what has just been published is true, and I 
swear by the sacred ashes of my parents that in this very 
hour, to-morrow, as soon as I may catch that man, I shall 
kill him as I would a sick dog, in order to make a warn-
ing so that the yankees may know how a3weak people ans-wers the brutal imposition of force.12 
Following the completion of his assignment in Nicara-
gua, Dawson returned to Panama. Shortly thereafter, perhaps as 
a result of poor health, and certainly to report on his mis-
sion to Managua and to assist in the Nicaraguan loan negotia-
tions, he left for the United States. 124 He apparently re-
mained in Washington until February 13, when he left for Hon-
duras to act as Special Commissioner of the United States to 
preside over a meeting between two warrin::JHOnduran factions. 125 
This new assignment came as a result of a revolution 
which had broken out in January, 1911, against the government 
of President Miguel Davila. Davila, as previously mentioned, 
123ouoted in J. Johnson {U.S. Consul in Corinto) to 
Secretary of State, November 14, 1910, No. 78, Decimal File 
817.00/1489, Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 9. 
124Dawson to Dodge, November 17, 1910, Decimal File 
817.00/1473, Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 8. 
Untitled calendar of Dawson's appointments 1907 to 1911, 
Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. That Dawson 
was involved in matters concerning the economic and fiscal 
affairs of Nicaragua during his stay in the United States in 
January, 1911 is further indicated in a letter from Knox to 
Ernest H. Wands, dated January 20, 1911. Wands, the financial 
expert who had been appointed by the Department to investigate 
the financial situation in Nicaragua, was instructed to con-
sult with Dawson and Elliott Northcott, the new minister to 
Nicaragua. Decimal File 817.51/99A, Internal Affairs of Nica-
ragua 1910-29, roll 70. 
125 Dawson to Secretary of State, April 30, 1911, Deci-
mal File 815.00/1284, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-29, 
roll 6. 
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had been placed in power in 1907 as a consequence of Zelaya's 
victory over the Conservative regime of Manuel Bonilla in the 
Nicaraguan-Honduran war of that year. The leader of the 1911 
revolution was none other than Bonilla. In his attempt to 
displace Davila, Bonilla enjoyed the support of the Guatemalan 
president, Estrada Cabrera, and individuals who were apparently 
closely connected with the United Fruit Company. 126 
In early January, 1911, shortly before the beginning of 
the revolution, the State Department had been successful in 
negotiating with the Davila Government a treaty which called 
for Honduras to negotiate a loan for the purpose of refunding 
its external and internal debts. This loan was to be secured 
by the customs revenues which would be collected by a Collec-
tor-General of customs during the life of the loan. While 
this collector was not directly appointed by the United States, 
he would have the approval of Washington, since he was to be 
appointed by the Honduran Government from a list approved by 
the President of the United States. Furthermore, both the 
United States and Honduras would provide the collector with pro-
tection whenever this became necessary. In addition, negotia-
tions for a loan contract with J.P. Morgan and Company were 
nearing completion. 127 'lhe fact that Davila had accepted the 
loan treaty and that his enemies were receiving support from 
126 
cit., 225-227. Rippy' ~., Munro, 2£.· pp. ~· p. 211. 
127 Munro, ~· cit., pp. 223-224. 
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Guatemala in direct violation of the Washington agreements of 
1907 seem to have disposed the State Department to support him 
B '11 . h 1 t' 128 over oni a in t e revo u ion. 
However, when the Bonilla forces attempted to take 
Puerto Cortes, the last Government stronghold on the north 
coast, the commander of the u.s.s. Tacoma intervened to protect 
the lives and property of foreigners living in the city. He 
notified the opposing forces that fighting would not be allow-
ed in or immediately around the city. The Government forces 
would have to withdraw and meet the revolutionary forces a 
safe distance from Puerto Cortes. This would have acted to 
the detriment of the Government forces, and an anticipated 
revolutionary victory would make the Government's position 
virtually unattainable. 129 Davila protested this restriction 
on his forces, but, in view of Bonilla's increasing strength, 
he offered to resign. He called upon the United States to 
arbitrate between the two factions and name, or at least ap-
prove, his successor. 130 
In the State Department, it was decided to support the 
Navy's prohibition on fighting in Puerto Cortes. However, 
128G. T. Weitzel to Wilson, January 11, 1911, Memoran-
dum, Division of Latin American Affairs, Decimal File 815.00/ 
974, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-1929, roll 4. Munro, 
2E.· cit., p. 226. 
129 Munro, op. cit., p. 229. 
130Munro, op. cit., p. 228. Mccreery to Secretary of 
State, telegrams January 27, 28, 29, 30, 1911, Decimal File 
815.00/1035-1038, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-29, roll 4. 
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rather than letting this prohibition act as an aid to Bonil-
la's forces, the State Department authorized the United States 
Minister in Tegucigalpa to sug~est to both sides that an armis-
tice be instituted and that representatives of the factions 
meet under United States auspices aboard an United States naval 
vessel in an attempt to reach a mutually satisfactory solution 
to their differences, including the question of the presidency 
of the republic. 131 The reasoning in back of this decision 
seems to have been that.}3onilla's position was considered to 
be such that he would ultimately win. It was thought that 
through the agency of a peace conference it might be possible 
to have the two factions agree upon an individual other than 
either Davila or Bonilla, "but necessarily with Bonilist lean-
ings" as interim president until a popular assmebly could be 
elected. Second Assistant Secretary Adee believed that, in 
this way, the United States would be put "in a fairly good 
position to entitle us to Bonilla's good will. 11132 
By February 11, both sides had accepted the United 
States proposition and Dawson was appointed as the United 
States' Special Commissioner. As in the case of the assignment 
to Nicaragua, here again his familiarity with the Department 
of State's views on the matter and his acquaintance with 
131Knox to American Legation, Tegucigalpa, Januai:y 31, 
1911, Decimal File 815.00/lOSSA, ibid. 
132Memorandum from the off ice of the Second Assistant 
Secretary, January 30, 1911, Decimal File 815.00/ no document 
number, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-29, roll 3. 
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Honduran affairs as a result of his service in the Latin Arileri-
can Division doubtless account for his appointrnent. 133 
Dawson arrived at Puerto Cortes on the morning of 
February 19, 134 the representatives of Davila and Bonilla corn-
ing shortly thereafter. On the twenty-first, the peace con-
ference formally began aboard the u.s.s. Tacoma. Prior to the 
first meeting, Dawson suggested that the representatives try 
to form some compromise. When they were unable to do so, he 
interpreted this failure as an indication that neither side 
was really interested in coming to a compromise but merely 
hoped either to use the conference as a means of forcing its 
ideas on the other, or to lead to the termination of the con-
ference and the resumption of the fighting. 135 
It soon became clear, however, that both sides were 
. anxious to please the United States. While neither side would 
willing give in on any point, both were eager to be the first 
t t t . h' h D ~~ght rnake. 136 Th o accep any sugges ion w ic awson ··~ ere-
fore, Dawson apparently following the ideas which were current 
in the State Department, formulated a compromise plan himself. 
133wilson to Dawson, February 11, 1911, Decimal File, 
815.00/ll89A, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-29, roll 5. 
134Dawson to Secretary of State, undated telegram, 
received February 20, 1911, 4:25 P.M., Decimal File 815.00/ 
1134, ibid. 
135oawson to Secretary of State, April 30, 1911, 
Decimal File 815.00/1284, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-
29, roll 6. 
136Ibid. 
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Since Davila had already indicated his willingness to exclude 
himself from the presidency, Dawson's plan called for the 
elimination of Bonilla as a possible presidential contender 
and the conference's acceptance of a supporter of Bonilla as 
president. To implement his plan, Dawson urged the opposing 
representatives to reach an agreement on the presidency. 
When it became apparent that no agreement could be reached 
on this point, and after the factions had agreed upon a pro-
gram for the provisional government to follow, he consented to 
comply with their requests that he suggest the individual 
who would serve as provisional president. He selected Fran-
cisco Bertrand, a Bonilla partisan. 137 
The program accepted for the provisional government 
provided for a general political amnesty, free elections for 
national and local authorities, governmental assumption of the 
debts incurred by both factions, the distribution of cabinet 
posts equally between Davila and Bonilla partisans, and the 
disarming of the opposing military forces. The provisional 
government was to respect all committments made by both the 
Davila Government and the revolutionaries. Finally, the con-
ference recommended that the provisional government settle 
the public debt "as a means of recovering the national credit, 
which is without doubt indispensible for the development of 
137oawson to Secretary of State, April 30, 1911, and 
enclosure: Minutes of the Peace Conference aboard the u.s.s. 
Tacoma, Decimal File 815.00/1284, ibid. 
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the country • " 13 8 
Dawson's mission to Honduras might be considered a 
success, insofar as it was directed towards restoring peace 
to the country and providing for a relatively orderly trans-
fer of power to Bonilla. However, the attempt to provide a 
compromise solution between the two factions, which was clear-
ly envisioned in the program for the provisional government, 
proved to be illusionary. The success of this plan depended 
on the good will of both factions, but particularly the Bonil-
listas now that they controlled the presidency. This was too 
much to be expected. The Bonillistas consolidated their posi-
tion appointing only their partisans to office, and in the 
October elections, from which Bonilla emerged victorious, 
there was no pretense of freedom. 139 
Although there seems to have been no attempt to re-
quire Bonilla to accept the loan treaty with the United States 
and the loan contract which Davila had signed with J. P. Morgan 
140 
and Company, there can be no question that Dawson and his 
superiors in the State Department hoped that these agreements 
would be accepted. Since the provisional government was sup-
posed to accept the conunitments made by the Davila Government 
and since the Bonillista representative at the peace conference 
138Minutes of the Peace Conference aboard the u.s.s. 
Tacoma, ibid. 
139Munro, 't 231 £e.· £!..._·, p. • 
l 40ibid., p. 231. 
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had indicated that Bonilla would negotiate a loan agreemerit, 141 
the possibility that a loan agreement and a form of a customs 
receivership would be accepted probably seemed very likely. 
I 
However, here again, the hopes of the State Department were not 
fulfilled. 142 
In the meantime, the arrangement which the Dawson 
Agreements had set up in Nicaragua was faring even worse than 
that established by the peace conference in Honduras. Dawson's 
success in securing a semblance of agreement among Estrada, 
, 
Diaz, Mena and Chamarro was at best ephemeral. The continuance 
of agreement depended on the willingness of the various parties 
to maintain the status quo. It soon became evident that they 
were not willing to do so. Mena and Chamarro continued to 
plot against one another and to attempt to weaken and embarrass 
Estrada. In the spring of 1911, Estrada, in frustration, 
/ left the country and Diaz assumed the executive power. This, 
however, really did not alter the situation. In spite of the 
fact that the State Department continued to urge the fulfill-
ment of the Dawson Agreements, the plotting continued. 143 
Initially, it seemed that the plan to reorganize Nica-
raguan finances through a loan from North American bankers 
guaranteed by some form of a customs receivership, supported by 
141Dawson to Secretary of State, April 30, 1911, Deci-
mal File 815.00/1284, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-29, 
roll 6. 
142Munro, ~· cit., pp. 231-35. 
143Ibid., pp. 189-92. 
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the United States, would be more successful. In January, 1911, 
the State Department sent Ernest H. Wands to Managua as a fin-
ancial adviser to the Estrada Government. By the spring, 
negotiations for a loan contract with the firm of J. and W. 
Seligman and Company were well advanced. Moreover, in June 
Knox and Castrillo, the Nicaraguan Minister in Washington, 
signed a treaty which was identical in content to the one 
signed between the United States and Honduras in January, 1911, 
providing for a form of a customs collectorship in the event 
that Nicaragua obtained a loan from a United States banking 
house. Although the treaty received speedy ratification in 
the Nicaraguan Congress, it failed to receive the approval of 
the United States Senate. 144 
Despite the failure of the Knox-Castrillo treaty to 
receive senatorial ratification, in September, 1911, the 
bankers signed a loan contract with the Nicaraguan Government. 
However, since this loan for $15,000,000 would not become 
effective until the treaty was ratified, the bankers agreed 
to make an immediate loan of $1,500,000 to be secured by the 
custom receipts which were to be collected by a Collector-
General, whom the bankers had nominated and the State Depart-
ment approved. In December, 1911, Colonel Clifford D. Ham, 
who had served in the Philippines custom service, was appointed 
to collect the custom revenues. Hence, in part the customs 
144Ibi'd. I 192 95 pp. - • Cox, ~· cit., pp. 711-13. 
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receivership plan was partially put into operation. In March, 
1912, the bankers extended further financial assistance to the 
Nicaraguan Government. This time to secure the loan, the 
I 
bankers acquired a controlling interest in the government 
owned railroad and asswned direction of the railroad until the 
loan was paid. Later in the year, when the revolutionary 
forces under the command of Mena seized a lake steamer belong-
ing to the railroad, the United States intervened militarily 
/ 
at the request of Diaz in order to protect the lives and pro-
perty of United States citizens in Nicaragua. 145 The revolu-
tion collapsed but the marines were not removed until 1925. 
In summary, Dawson clearly supported the policy of 
dollar diplomacy as applied to the countries of Central .Ameri-
ca. In a letter to Senator Albert Cummins urging the Senator 
to support ratification of the treaties with Honduras and 
Nicaragua, Dawson wrote: 
You know already how deeply I feel that we owe to 
our southern neighbors some aid in putting them on the 
road to good government, and that this aid should be 
purely benevolent and not officious or by way of appli-
cation of force. In fact, if my work for the last seven 
years has been worth anything, it has been in this direc-
tion, and I feel it my duty to do the little I can to 
see that the decision whether my favorite policy shall 
be followed or not is reached only after mature consider-
ation .146 
At first sight the sentiments expressed in this passage seem to 
145Munro, ~·cit., p. 205. 
146
oawson to Cummins, June 22, 1911, Decimal File 
815.51/270A, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-29, roll 35. 
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be contrary to some of the measures which Dawson actually 
recommended while Chief of the Division of Latin American Af-
fairs. However, it is likely that to Dawson there was a 
clear distinction between using diplomatic pressure to force 
Nicaragua and Honduras to adopt a policy which the State De-
partment believed would produce the beneficial results of 
sound finance and good government and forceably imposing this 
policy. In those instances where he had recommended the use 
of force, for example, the seizure of Nicaraguan custom-
houses, the purpose was not to secure adoption of a loan agree-
ment and treaty but rather to secure compensation for what was 
considered a just claim. Moreover, he saw a clear distinction 
between the methods of dollar diplomacy to be used in Central 
America and the Caribbean, an area which he considered to be a 
legitimate United States sphere of influence, and the methods 
to be used in the rest of Latin America. 
Dawson's missions to both Nicaragua and Honduras were 
only momentarily successful. In both instances, he was able to 
bring the dissident factions to the point of agreement with 
one another. While this surely attests to his ability as a 
mediator, the ultimate objectives of his missions, stable gov-
ernment and financial reform with a customs receivership were 
either not realized at all or at least were not realized in 
the form envisioned. The arrangements which Dawson was able 
to secure were frustrated primarily because they depended on 
the continuing good will of those involved and because the 
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United States really had no effective way of enforcing them. 
This is not to say that either the Dawson Agreements or the 
settlement provided for by the Honduran peace conference were 
necessarily unrealistic. To the contrary, in regard to Nica-
ragua, the decisions to arrange for Estrada's continuance as 
provisiona~ president and to arrange for the elections were 
based on what was considered to be the realistic assumption 
that to do otherwise would result in revolution. Likewise, in 
the case of Honduras the fact was accepted that Bonilla would 
ultimately be the victor. Consequently, Dawson pushed for a 
compromise favoring the Bonillasts. Lack of realism, however, 
was apparent in the belief that North American interference in 
the financial affairs would be readily accepted and imple-
mented. Although this last point was not a fault sole~y of 
Dawson, it again illustrates his inability to understand, or 
his disregard for, a national sentiment among the Latin 
Americans. 
Following the completion of his mission in Honduras, 
Dawson returned to Washington. However, he first stopped off 
in Guatemala City in order to ascertain whether or not Estrada 
Cabrera would accept the Honduran settlement and not lend his 
. 1 1 t' . 147 support to potentia revo u ionaries. While there, he and 
Estrada Cabrera discussed the possibility of a loan agreement 
147Dawson to Secretary of State, April 30, 1911, Deci-
mal File 815.00/1284, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-29, 
roll 6. 
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to be made with an United States banking firm. 148 He finally 
arrived in Washington in late March and began the preparation 
of his official report. At the same time he kept in close 
I 
i ~49 
touch with developments in Honduras. 
In May, 1911, the leaders of the Republican Party in 
Iowa made an effort to have Dawson promoted to the Embassy in 
Brazil. Ernest E. Hart, Chairman of the Republican State Com-
mittee of Iowa, wrote to President Taft requesting an interview 
150 to plead Dawson's case. In addition, Hart and Senator 
Cummins of Iowa both called upon Knox to urge the promotion. 151 
The entire, Iowa congressional delegation also supported the 
appointment. 152 Charles Dawes too attempted to help Dawson, 
this time by asking Horace D. Taft, the President's brother 
and a classmate of Dawson and Dawes at the Cincinnati Law 
148Manuel Estrada Cabrera to Dawson, April 5, 1911, 
Decimal File 814.51/140, Records of the Department of State 
Relating To Internal Affairs of Guatemala, 1910-29, Microcopy 
No. 655, (Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1966), roll 21. 
149Dawson to Secretary of State, April 30, 1911, Deci-
mal File 815.00/1284, Internal Aff~irs of Honduras, 1910-29, 
roll 6. 
150Hart to Taft, May 11, 1911, Taft Papers, Presiden-
tial Series No. 2, File 1415. 
151Assistant Secretary of State to Appointment Bureau, 
June 26, 1911, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. 
152 E. H. Hubbard (Congressman from Iowa) to the 
President, December 2, 1911, ibid. 
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School, to write in Dawson's behalf. 153 
Despite this apparently impressive support, Dawson did 
not receive the promotion. Perhaps the most likely explanation 
of this is to be found in United States domestic politics. · 
Although Dawson clearly supported the foreign policy pursued 
by the Taft Administration, and not withstanding the fact that 
his talents were apparently appreciated, as indicated by his 
appointment to Nicaragua and Honduras, his political support 
was based largely on men who did not have the favor of Presi-
dent Taft. Dawson's patrons included senator Albert Cununins, 
a leading member of the group of Republican senators known as 
insurgents because of their opposition to Taft's domestic poli-
cies. By 1910, Cununins, with several other of the progressive 
and insurgent senators, was already on record as opposing 
Taft's renomination in 1912. 154 To make matters worse for Daw-
son, the Taft Administration failed to receive the endorsement 
of the progressive controlled Iowa State Republican Convention 
153
nawes to Horace D. Taft, May 16, 1911, telegram, 
Dawes Collection, 1906-1914 Name File, Dawson-Fai, Thomas A. 
[sic] Dawson File. Horace Taft refused to write to his 
brother. He argued that he did not remember Dawson, and 
furthermore, he had made it a practice never to write to his 
brother on behalf of any candidate for any position. Horace 
D. Taft to Dawes, May 17, 1911, ibid. 
154George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and 
the Birth of Modern America 1900-1912, The New American Nation 
Series, eds. Henry Steele Commanger and Richard B. Morris 
(Harper Torchbooks edition; New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 
p. 268. 
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in 1910. 155 In an attempt to defeat his congressional oppo-
nents, President Taft cut-off their patronage shortly before 
the 1910 primary elections. 156 Following the mid-term elec-
1 
tions, which were disastrous for the Republicans, an attempt 
was made by the President to bring about a reconciliation 
with the insurgents and progressives~ The reconciliation, 
however, failed to materialize and the insurgents continued 
to exert little influence on Taft. Furthermore, as late as 
January, 1911, their patronage was still suffering. 157 There-
fore, while Dawson's ability was acknowledged and his talents 
utilized, it is possible that the post of Ambassador to Brazil, 
with a salary of $17,500, 158 was reserved as a patronage posi-
tion for a senator who enjoyed more favor in the eyes of the 
President than did Senator Cummins. Whatever the specific 
reason that his candidacy failed to receive a favorable hear-
ing, Dawson himself apparently did not wish that it be pressed 
on the President by the Iowa congressional delegation. 159 
155James Holt, Congressional Insurgents and the Party 
System 1909-1916 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1967), p. 41. 
156Ibid., p. 37. 
157Ibid., p. 44, 46. 
158Register of the Department of State, September 20, 
1911 (Washington, D. c.: Government Printing Office, 1911), 
p. 21. 
159E. H. Hubbard to the President, December 2, 1911, 
Dawson's Application and RecommendatiQn File. 
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The failure to receive Brazil did not mean that Dawson's 
career was at an end. In June, 1911, he was appointed Ambas-
sador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on Special Mission 
to attend the Venezuelan Centennial celebration in Caracas. 160 
Upon his return to the United States in July, 1911, he again 
assumed the post of Resident Diplomatic Officer of the Depart-
ment of State. 161 In this position, he continued to devote his 
t . . 'l t Lt' Am ' ff ' 162 ime primari y o a in erican a airs. 
In late November, 1911, Irving Dudley the United States 
Ambassador to Brazil died. Dawson once again beqame an active 
candidate for this post in Rio de Janeiro. He appealed to his 
friend Dawes to cable the President and administration officials 
in his behalf. 163 Numerous letters from businessmen with 
financial or conunercial interest in Brazil were sent to the 
White House in support of Dawson's appointment. 164 Again he 
16
°Knox to Dawson, June 19, 1911, Decimal File 831.414A/ 
23E, Records of the Department of State relating to Internal 
Affairs of Venezuela, 1910-29, Microcopy No. 366 (Washington, 
D. C.: National Archives), roll 17. 
161Re ister of the De artment of State, 
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162For examples, see Knox Papers, General Correspon-
dence, Box 29, File 1912, and Correspondence vol. 16, 1911-
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Files 033.1100K77 and 711.21 passim, National Archives, Wash-
ington, D. c. 
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failed to receive the Ambassadorship. 
In March, 1912, while still serving as Resident Diplo-
matic Officer, Dawson became seriously ill. Shortly thereafter, 
he was moved to Fort Monroe, Virginia in the hope that the 
change of climate and scenery might prove beneficial. However, 
his health continued to decline and he was returned to his 
home at 1816 Nineteenth Street in Washington, where he died in 
the early morning of May 1. The obituary in The Washington 
Post attributed the cause of death to heart and liver trouble. 
In addition, the long periods he had spent in the tropics 
certainly must have served to weaken his health. 165 
Announcement of Dawson's death was followed by the 
usual eulogistic statements in his honor by those who had 
worked with him. Acting Secretary of State Huntington Wilson 
noted that by Dawson's death the diplomatic service had lost 
a man with "a distinguished record of long and efficient ser-
vice •••• " and that he would be greatly missed by his col-
l . th St t De t t d th F ' S · 16 6 eagues in e a e par men an e oreign ervice. 
On May 2, the day of the funeral, the State Department closed 
at 2:30 in order that Dawson's associates could attend the 
services at the New York Avenue Presbyterian Church at 3:0o. 167 
165The Washington Post, May 2, 1912, p. 4. The Wash-
ington Star, May 1, 1912, p. 3. 
166ouoted in The Washington Post, May 2, 1912, p. 4. 
167Purport Sheet for Department of State Decimal File 
123.D321, sub. no. 119. This file is Dawson's personnel file 
and it was not available. 
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The honorary pallbearers at the funeral included the Brazilian 
and Japanese Ambassadors, Secretary of the Interior Walter 
Fisher, who had known Dawson at Hanover College, Assistant 
Secretary of State Huntington Wilson, John Barrett the Director 
General of the Pan-American Union, Senator Cummins and Repre-
sentative James Good of Iowa. 168 
When word of his death reached the off ices of the 
Pan-American Union, Director General Barrett had ordered the 
flag over the building lowered to half-mast. This tribute 
was described by the Bulletin of the Pan-American Union "not 
as a perfunctory compliment, but as a real expression of the 
great loss which Pan-American relations had suffered by his 
demise." Furthermore, the article noted that Dawson could 
probably be considered one of the best authorities "on the 
Latin American countries and their relations with the United 
States." The experience which he had acquired while serving 
in Latin America and in the Department of State were useful 
to him "in promoting friendship, good understanding and com-
merce among all the American nations." Finally the Bulletin 
asserted that, "in addition to the remarkable ability and re-
putation he enjoyed, he had a personal charm and an affability 
which made him loved by all who knew him well. 11169 
Perhaps the importance of Dawson's career and the un-
168The Washington Post, May 2, 1912, p. 4. 
169Bulletin of the Pan-American Union, XXXIV (June, 
1912), 720-721. 
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timeliness of his death were best summed up by Charles G. 
Dawes, his longtime friend and patron. In a letter to James c. 
Hume, Dawson's cousin, Dawes wrote: 
It is hard to become reconciled to the thought of 
Tom's death at a point in his career when it was com-
mencing to receive that general appreciation which in 
time would have crystalized into enduring fame. The 
public service which he performed, fortunately for his 
memory, are of such a nature that their importance to 
the people involved will be cumulative. In the his-
tories of some governments Tom's name will have its 
fixed place as it would have ha~ in this country to a 
greater degree had he lived. 70 
170 . Dawes to Hume, May 17, 1912, Dawes Collection, 
Letter Press Book, personal letters, January 22, 1912-
November 16, 1912. 
CHAPTER XII 
I CONCLUSIONS 
Dawson's entry into the diplomatic service in 1897 
came, like the majority of similar appointments, as a result 
of political patrongage. Initially, he may have considered 
his appointment as Secretary of the Legation in Brazil as 
merely a stepping stone to further political preferment. The 
six years in Brazil served as an adequate apprenticeship, and, 
as time passed, he began to look upon the diplomatic service 
as his chosen career. Following the Brazilian assignment, the 
posts that he held progressively grew in importance. Finally, 
he reached the point where he was among the chief advisers on 
Latin American affairs in the State Department. 
There is no indication that Dawson in any significant 
way disagreed with the policies which Washington pursued dur-
ing the fourteen years he was in the diplomatic service. He 
accepted unquestioningly the concepts that Latin America should 
serve as a market for the expanding United States industrial 
economy and that claims of United States citizens against Latin 
American governments should be pushed by the State Department 
to a successful conclusion. Furthermore, he fully approved of 
the interference of the United States in the turbulent politi-
cal and economic affairs of the Caribb~an and Central American 
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nations. In view of his acceptance of the prevailing policies 
within the State Department, his influence on these policies 
was confined to advising on certain specific aspects concern-
ing implementation, rather than in urging any complete change 
of policy. This does not mean that he had no impact on United 
States-Latin American relations. To the contrary, he had a 
considerable impact in Central America and the Caribbean by 
skillfully negotiating the agreements which implemented the 
policy of dollar diplomacy formulated in Washington. Perhaps 
his most significant contribution occurred during his assign-
ment to the Dominican Republic. The customs receivership, 
which he helped to establish, later served as a model when 
the State Department recommended intervention to bring about 
financial reforms in Central America. As Chief of the Latin 
American Division and Resident Diplomatic Officer, he had 
further opportunity to work for the implementation of this 
policy. 
Dawson appears to have had a genuine liking and sym-
pathy for the Latin Americans. In dealing with the revolu-
tionary governments of Santo Domingo, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 
at times he could become exasperated with their factionalism 
and apparent unreasonableness. Nevertheless, he never seems 
to have treated the members of these governments with an ar-
rogance which would convey a feeling of political or racial 
superiority. Undoubtedly, his ability to understand these 
men and to treat them with respect helped him to win their 
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confidence, and, thus, enabled him to achieve success, albeit 
only temporary, in mediation. His sympathy towards the Latin 
Americans is further evidenced in his two volume history of 
South America, where he foresaw an optimistic future for the 
countries of that continent. 
Dawson's acceptance of the policies of the State De-
partment and his role in implementing them and his favorable 
disposition towards the Latin Americans, at first sight, 
appears to form something of a paradox. It is highly un-
likely that this problem ever presented itself to him; how-
ever, if it had, it would probably have seemed more apparent 
than real. In the first place, to find new markets for North 
American products and capital was considered a completely 
legitimate goal of diplomacy. The United States was merely 
seeking what would have been considered an equitable share--
that is, an equity based on the closeness and special interest 
in Latin America--of the market a~ready dominated by Euro-
pean manufacturers and investors. The protection of the 
legitimate commercial enterprises and financial investments 
of United States citizens was also considered a perfectly 
legitimate objective of United States diplomacy. Taking a 
rigidly legalistic view of the property rights of United States 
citizens in foreign countries, the officials in Washington 
were determined that strict justice was to be rendered. Once 
the foreign government involved accepted this principle, the 
State Department was normally willing to make the resolution 
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of the controversy as painless as possible. There appears to 
have been little worry that the protection of one claim might 
injure more important policy considerations. During Dawson's 
I 
career, there are two illustrations of this point. The first 
occurred with regard to the San Domingo Improvement Company. 
Dawson assiduously defended the Company's rights under the 
Award of July 14, 1904 until it became overwhelmingly clear 
that fear and dislike of the Company was hindering the fur-
therance of Washington's policy in Santo Domingo. The second 
example is that of the Alsop claim against the Government of 
Chile. The anti-Yankee sentiment which this case generated 
and the effects it could have on Chilean-United States rela-
tions or upon other North American investments in Chile were 
disregarded. Dawson could perhaps justify the course his 
Government had taken in that a lingering source of controversy 
between Washington and Santiago had, at long last, been re-
moved. However, he simply overlooked the fact that the resi-
dual effect of bad feelings could remain. 
Interference in the affairs of the Central American 
and Caribbean nations also was not incompatible with Dawson's 
friendly disposition towards the Latin Americans. In the 
first place, he accepted the argument that the Caribbean and 
Central America were a special sphere of United States influ-
ence. Secondly, as indicated in his history of the South 
American nations and in various repor~s he sent to Washington, 
he believed that political stability was contingent upon eco-
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nomic stability and prosperity. There.fore, he could logically 
conclude that it was the-United States' place to offer a help-
ing hand. Finally, certain benefits did seem to flow from 
United States interference. In the Dominican Republic, at 
least, endemic revolution ceased, the international financial 
morass was untangled, and an economic revival appeared to be 
under way. Hence, he had some altruistic and optimistic argu-
ments to bolster an interventionist policy. 
Dawson's most glaring deficiency was his inability to 
recognize and understand the depth and sincerity of those who 
opposed United States interference in the affairs of the vari-
ous countries. In the Dominican Republic OP.position was rli~ .. 
missed as coming from professional revolutionaries or from d11S 
easily aroused lower classes. In Colombia, the anti-Yankee 
sentiment still lingering from the Panamanian revolution of 
1903, was not even taken into account when Dawson discussed 
the possibility of ratification of the United States-Colombian-
Panamanian treaties in 1909. Later, in helping to shape the 
United States' policy in Nicaragua and Honduras, Dawson again 
rejected the sincerity of the opposition and chose to assume 
that once the provisional governments of these countries had 
officially accepted United States interference in their econo-
mic affairs, they would readily implement this interference. 
Where the United States offered "moral support," as in the case 
of the Dominican Republic, indifference to the opposition made 
no difference. However, in Colombia where there was no way of 
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supporting the government favorable to the United States policy, 
or in Nicaragua and Honduras, where no effective pressures 
could be brought to bear upon the governments which had supposed-
ly accepted the United States' viewpoint, the policy itself 
failed. 
In view of the partisan nature of the newspaper re-
ports, it is difficult to arrive at any adequate conclusions 
regarding Latin American sentiment towards Dawson and his 
work. From the available evidence, Dawson always remained on 
the most cordial personal and official terms with the Govern-
ment to which he was accredited. Socially, he and his wife 
were apparently readily accepted into the polite society of 
the va.i:J.;;'""·' .;..:ctph,d..1.S. Since frequently the policies he sup·-
ported were also accepted in the capitals where he was as-
signed, it is not surprising that he and his work would re-
ceive governmental approval. However, if he failed to under-
stand those who opposed his policies, the opposition obtained 
its revenge by attacking Dawson as the symbol of policies they 
opposed and as being too closely connected with the governments 
they were trying to displace. 
Although it is futile to speculate, one still wonders 
whether Dawson might not have attained higher honors had he 
lived. His friend Charles Dawes seems to have implied this 
in the quote which concludes the last chapter. Indeed, Daw-
son's prominence in Latin American affairs would seem to have 
pointed in that direction. Nevertheless, any immediate advance-
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ment would have been at best probably only temporary. Even if 
he had obtained an ambassadorship under the Taft Administra-
tion, his career would pro,bably have. gone into eclipse with 
! I 
the advent of the new Democratic administration in 1913. 
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